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ABSTRACT
Inspite of the fact that banking has been practised in Nigeria for about a hundred years,
little is still known about the characteristics of Nigerian banks as well as what factors
determine their performance, that are essentially typical of banks operating in developing
economies, particularly those of Africa. This study represents a research effort aimed at
contributing to the literature on the determinants of commercial bank performance in
general, and in developing economies in particular.
The study employs univariate tests in addition to both the discriminant and logit
techniques of analyses to determine which factor(s) are major determinants of
commercial bank performance, using Nigeria as a case study and over the period of
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (1987-1989) as well as the last two years prior
to this period (1985-1986). We are, thus, able not only to identify these bank
performance factors for each year during the five year period (1985-1989), but also to
observe the trend over both periods and consequently compare developments pre- and
since SAP. It also attempts to identify factors that distinguish Nigerian commercial
banks by type of ownership, head-office location as well as banks with technical partners
from those without.
We establish that managerial efficiency remains the most important determinant
of commercial bank performance over both the pre-SAP and SAP periods. Over the
entire study period vulnerable banks were shown to be significantly less efficient compared
with the resistant banks. With respect to the SAP period we find that such factors as
capital adequacy and liquidity have begun to be signi ficant petformance factors only since
the more recent years of the SAP period.
The conclusions from the techniques of analyses were also corroborated by our
critical examination of the National Bank of Nigeria, which is perhaps the most
financially vulnerable of the operating banks in Nigeria to date. Through this, we
establish the critical nature of the composition and actions of a bank's board for its
performance. The incessant clashes between the management and boards of Nigerian
banks is also established as a significant hinderance to sound bank performance. This
has also caught up with the new banks, thereby threatening industiy's survival.
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Glossary of Terms
Resistant Bank	 This represents a sample bank whose return on assets is at least
the specified cut-off going by different criteria.
Vulnerable Bank This represents a sample bank whose return on assets is less
than the specified cut-off going by different criteria.
Out-of-Sample Bank	 This is a bank which is not included in the sample upon
which analysis (estimation) is based.
Binary Choice Model	 A regression model having as it response or dependent
variable, a binary choice variable.
Discriminant Reclassification This refers to an aspect of the discriminant method
which attempts to reclassify sample or out-of-sample banks based on the estimated
discriminant function in an assessment of the accuracy of the discriminant model.
Banks and Other Financial Institution Decree (BOFTD) The Decree was
promulgated in 1991 as a legal regulatory framework for Nigerian commercial and
merchant banks as well as such other financila institutions as Insurance companies
and finance firms, among others.
Prudential Guidelines This refers to a set of guidelines issued by the Central Bank
of Nigeria (CBN) in November 1990 to aid Nigerian Banks in making appropriate
and adequate provisions for loan losses and risk assets in a uniform manner; thereby
promoting the revealation of the true quality of bank's assets.
PROC 'TEST This refers to the command for activating the T-Test (of hypothesis)
option in the SAS Software which was used for the various analysis conducted in this
study.
PROC STEPDISC This refers to the command for activating the stepwise
discriiminant analysis option in the SAS Software.
SAS Software This represents a computer software designed to aid thje conduct of
different types of statistical/mathematical analyses.
Resubstitution Analysis This refers to the method of assessing the accuracy of
dicriminant and logit models respectively by using the estimated model to attempt a
reclassification of sample members.
xiv.
Cross-validation Analysis This refers to an alternative method of assessing the
accuracy of dicriminant and logit models respectively by estimating in rotation the
model without a sample member and then using the estimated model to attempt a
reclassification of the out-of-sample member.
False Positive Rate This represents the proportion of vulnerable banks worngly
classified by the discriminant/logit model as resistant.
False Negative Rate This is the proportion of resistant banks wrongly classified as
vulnerable by the discriminant/logit model.
Sensitivity (SSY) This is the term used in the SAS Software to mean the
proportion of resistant banks correctly classified as resistant.
Specificty (SFY) This term is used in the SAS Software to mean the proportion of
vulnerable banks correctly classified as vulnerable.
Correct Clasification Rate (CC) This represents the proportion of sample banks
whose health status were correctly reclassified.
Misclasification Rate (MC) This represents the proportion of sample banks whose
health status were wrongly classified.
1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Some years ago, it was the general belief that banks must be heavily
capitalised in order to survive. This school of thought suggests that capital adequacy
is fundamental to bank performance. However, bank capital ratios have been
declining steadily since the early 1800's when capital ratios were extremely high
thereby bringing to the fore the relevance of some other factors which in fact seem
to be more important than capital. The ratio of capital funds to total assets in the
United States of America (USA) during this period was in the 70% range, but by
1900 it had dropped to 20%. Following expansion of banks' assets during the war and
post-war economic expansion of the 1920s, the ratio dropped further to 13%. From
1945, the depression year, the ratio fell to an all-time low of 6%. Again during the
second post-war years, the ratio adjusted to just under 10% before stabilising at 6 -
10% range in the early '70s. The credit crunch of the sixties finally drove home the
practical lesson that the strongest capital ratios do not necessarily guarantee solvency.
So much emphasis had been placed on bank capital as if it represents the only or
even the major determinant of bank performance.
Vojta's (1973) extensive pioneering research into the subject validated the
conclusion that strong capital ratios do not insure liquidity and solvency, and the
need to re-examine the question of bank capital adequacy along with related concepts
of liquidity, profitability, management, and risk was clearly established. One
authoritative study of the capital of banks which failed and those which survived
during the period 1921 -31 in the U.S. showed that the capital ratios of banks which
survived were lower than for those which failed (Wriston, 1973). Other scholarly
research indicate that most of the banks which have closed their doors in the past
met or exceeded capital ratio tests applied by regulators immediately prior to their
bankruptcy. In addition to relating the level of bank capital to historical figures,
2subsequent works on re-definition of capital adequacy attempted to use scientific
techniques to forecast future performance for capital adequacy purposes. These were
in response to the challenge posed by the problem of the determination of adequate
level of capital for banks.
Interestingly, the regulation of banks goes back to the ancient world spanning
through Babylonian, Greek, Egyptian and Roman civilisations. Over the years, special
attention had been given to bank capital, liquidity and asset quality for bank
performance. The need for control and regulation of banks in view of their
importance to the national economy has been highlighted by several writers including
Wood (1970, 1983), Teriba (1986a, 19861), Onimode (1986), Oyejide and Soyode
(1986b, 1986c, 1986d), Nwankwo (1976) and Adewunrni (1984). In their
intermediation role between financial resources and production as well as
consumption, banks influence the volume of purchasing power available for the
investment and consumption expenditure (Oyejide and Soyode, 1986b). They do this
through their power to expand and contract credit. They provide facilities for the
effective mobilisation of savings and channel the funds mobilised into investments
through the process of granting credit facilities to their customers. Thus, the funds
mobilised are made available to businesses to enable them expand their productive
capacity and to individuals and households to facilitate consumption. However, their
ability to facilitate credit depends to a large extent on their capital base.
Another characteristic of commercial banks which distinguish them from other
financial institutions is what Wood (1983) described as the high degree of liquidity
of their demand deposits. It is generally acknowledged that the greater proportion
of money supply in a modern economy is demand deposits, the bulk of which is
money created by commercial banks. Thus, as a group, banks are the principal
suppliers of money. They, in the process, therefore, influence the general price level
and facilitate or hinder efforts of governments in solving the perennial problem of
inflation. This important position of banks in the economy makes them subject to
official intervention and control. As a result, banks all over the world are the most
regulated of all businesses (Adekanye, 1986; Oyejide and Soyibo, 1987). Funds
3mobilised by them are managed strictly in accordance with certain statutory
regulatory or policy requirements laid down by government and relevant monetary
authorities.' Such controls may stipulate the liquidity ratio or others in respect of
capital adequacy, solvency, maximum lending limit, levels of interest rates, etc.
The degree of solvency has often represented a signal towards the extent to
which banks could perform their roles effectively. In assessing solvency, capital has
always been an important factor because of its role in absorbing losses. It is a
deliberate intention to elaborate further in the next few paragraphs on this issue of
capital with a view to validating recent thoughts on its importance or otherwise for
banks' performance. As the study would later reveal, there is no agreement between
banking practitioners and the monetary authorities as to what constitutes capital and
what quantity may be regarded as adequate. What one bank regards as adequate
cushion may not be adequate for another. Oduyemi (1981) confirmed that the
adequacy of capital depends on each bank's risk characteristics, its management and
competitive environment. Although it is desirable for a bank to maintain adequate
capital, yet several writers have argued that bank failures may not necessarily be
caused by inadequacy of capital. In the words of Watson (1975), there is no amount
of capital that will salvage a bank which is grossly mismanaged. Conversely, a strong,
well-managed bank can operate on a very thin capital base. The importance of
management or better still, managerial efficiency is thus also emphasized.
The two major functions of capital are consequently:
a) to permit acquisition of the institutional structure necessary to perform the
intermediation function and provide related services. Capital funds permit an
enterprise to acquire the physical skill base to compete in the market place;
and
b) in conditions short of total economic collapse, to provide protection against
1 We rightly note that regulations may be of different forms among which may
be, statutory, official non-statutory, self-regulation by the sector, monetary
policy, intervention and/or industry structure restrictions.
4unanticipated adversity leading to loss in excess of normal expectations.
The capital provision against excessive loss permits the bank to continue
operations in periods of difficulty until a normal level of earnings is restored. Thus,
capital provides protection against unexpected loss. Since loss is related to business
risk, risk exposures in commercial banking must be explicitly recognised.
Bank losses arise because of the nature of risks inherent to banking business.
All business operations involve some element of risk; in banking there is a special
relationship between risk and the operations of banks in the sense that banks, as
financial intermediaries, are in business to reduce the risks in financial transactions
for both depositors who place money in their care and borrowers who use these
funds. Given the consensus that capital should be adequate to absorb losses, it is
considered appropriate that the types of risks which cause losses be identified.
For capital adequacy purposes, Vojta (1973) and Revel (1975) identified the
following risks which are peculiar to the operations of banks and other financial
institutions. These are: (1) credit risks (losses on the loan portfolio); (2) investment
risks (losses in the value of marketable securities and fixed assets); (3) liquidity risks
(losses arising from financing mismatches in the tenor of assets and liabilities); (4)
operating risks (losses arising from operating errors and inefficiency); (5) fraud risks
(losses arising from dishonsety, fraud and forgery by bank staff, etc); (6) fiduciary
risks (losses arising from the improper discharge of fiduciary responsibilities); (7)
earning risks (losses arising from changes in interest rates, asset prices and operating
expenses) and (8) spill-over/foreign exchange risk (losses arising from subsidiaries or
through foreign exchange contract)!
In Nigeria, it does not appear as if banks pay sufficient attention to capital,
liquidity, asset quality and risk except profitability in their day-to-day operations. Yet
these variables are very important and indeed crucial in a country like Nigeria that
is understandably in haste to develop the banking habit among its citizenry.
It is in the light of the foregoing that this study will examine the conceptual
2 It should be noted that these risks are by no means independent.
5framework as well as practical realities of not only capital adequacy, but also liquidity,
solvency and managerial efficiency of Nigerian commercial banks and analyse,
through various financial ratios, their importance for commercial bank performance
in Nigeria using various techniques, with a view to making policy recommendations
that can ensure a virile and competitive banking system in the country.
1.2	 The Objectives of the Study
The following are the specific objectives of this study:
i) to analyse the capital adequacy, liquidity and other financial characteristics of
Nigerian commercial banks with a view to identifying which banks are
potentially vulnerable to financial difficulty compared with those that are not;
ii) to provide an indication of Nigerian commercial banks' ability to withstand
adverse economic and financial developments from data that are readily
available without on-site examinations;
iii) to evaluate and assess descriptive indices and financial ratios that can be used
to classify Nigerian commercial banks into those that are resistant to adverse
financial and economic conditions taking into consideration the peculiar
conditions and environments; such indices are those that can be easily used
by bankers without statistical or analytic sophistication;
iv) to carry out more sophisticated (confirmatory) analysis of the classification of
Nigerian commercial banks into resistant and vulnerable banks according to
a variety of performance criteria, using Multivariate Discriminant Analysis
(MDA), and Logit analysis with a view to identifying which of the indices or
combination of indices, may be used to distinguish between vulnerable and
resistant banks;
v) to provide the Nigerian regulatory authorities with alternative approaches that
can be used as track signals for identifying problem or vulnerable banks early
enough with a view to nipping bank failures in the bud before they occur; and
vi) to offer policy recommendations based on the results of the study; in
particular, to offer such recommendations that can achieve efficiency in the
6allocation of supervisory resources devoted to preserving and encouraging a
sound and competitive banking system in Nigeria.
1.3	 Scope and Coverage of the Study
This study covers commercial bank performance in Nigeria. Performance in
the context of the study is to be determined as part of the focus of the study's
objectives. The study period covers a five-year period spanning 1985 to 1989. This
period covers a considerable part of the pre-Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)
period as well as three years of the implementation of SAP. This is deliberate as the
aim is to provide the possibility of investigating bank performance under both policy
regimes and possibly the structural changes that had taken place in the industry since
SAP. The study also covers only those Nigerian commercial banks which had existed
prior to the adoption and implementation of SAP.
1.4	 Study Plan of Thesis
In order to achieve the objectives of this study we have mapped out a plan
which is exemplified by the layout of the thesis as indicated in the table of contents.
Following this introduction, we examine the characteristics of the Nigerian banking
industry and relevant developments in both the industry and the economy as a whole.
The regulatory and supervisory framework within which the banks have been
operating is also discussed, especially over the period of deregulation. Observations
from these discussions would bring out some important factors on the performance
of banks.
Next a detailed review of literature on banking theory and the significance for
bank performance of such factors as capital adequacy, asset quality, managerial
efficiency and liquidity, among others, is undertaken. This, in conjunction with a
review of studies which have been based on the identification of factors which
distinguish the performance of different banks is expected to give a more complete
picture revealing the essential components of our research. This would include the
various techniques of analysis which have been adopted.
7Further to this, a comparison is made between various techniques of analysis
which are identified to have been adopted in the literature with a view to selecting
an appropriate one. In addition, the univariate T-Test is conducted to assess the
individual significance of the financial ratio which is identified to be a potential
distinguishing factor of bank performance. Having selected the appropriate
technique(s), we conduct an analysis of bank performance determinants. The
conclusions of the analysis are then examined for their significance in our assessment
of the National Bank, which is deemed a good example of a vulnerable bank.
1.5	 Organisation of the Thesis
Based on the above study plan, this thesis is divided into nine chapters.
Chapter two discusses commercial banking and bank performance in Nigeria. Chapter
3 reviews the literature and related studies on the theory of the banking firm, capital
and bank performance. In chapter 4, the research methodology is presented while
the description of survey results follows in chapter five. Chapter six deals with the
discussion of univariate results while the results of the regression analyses, both
discriminant and logit, are discussed in chapter seven. In chapter eight we take a
closer look at the National Bank of Nigeria, often viewed as a good example of a
vulnerable bank and consider the relevance of significant performance factors
identified by the regression analyses. Chapter nine presents the summary of the study,
its conclusions, implications and recommendations. The suggestions for further
research are also indicated.
8CHAPTER TWO
COMMERCIAL BANKING AND BANK PERFORMANCE
IN NIGERIA
2.1	 Evolution of Commercial Banking in Nigeria
The history of commercial banking in Nigeria dates back to August 1891. In
that year, the African Banking Corporation (ABC) which was operating in South
Africa was persuaded by the local agent of Elder Dempster & Co., a Liverpool based
shipping company, to open an office in Lagos. The owners of the bank were so
enthusiastic about the invitation to operate in Lagos that instead of basing their
decision on pure commercial judgement, they relied on the assumption that Elder
Dempster & Co. would ensure a successful operation for the bank in Lagos. This
initial enthusiasm was, however, dampened by the delay in granting the bank the right
to import silver coins from the Royal Mint in London for distribution in Nigeria as
originally planned.
Barely two months after securing the right, in January 1892, Lagos suffered
a trade depression and under the worsening trading relations, ABC grew continuously
regretful of its decision to operate in Lagos. It, therefore, welcomed Elder Dempster
& Co's offer to buy over the bank without hesitation, a deal that was concluded in
March, 1893. The bank was, however, absorbed later by the Bank of British West
Africa (BBWA) which was incorporated in March, 1894. It is, therefore, safe to
conclude that ABC was the first bank that ceased to exist as a distinct corporate
entity in Nigeria.
At this period, BBWA had the monopoly of importing silver coins into Nigeria
and by 1908, this monopoly had been extended to cover the entire West Africa. It
This chapter has benefitted considerably from Adekanye, F. A. (1982) The
Elements of Banking in Nigeria (F & A Publishers, Lagos & Graham Burn
Publishers, Leighton Buzzard, Beds, U.K.)
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was, however, in that year that its monopoly of banking business in Nigeria was
challenged with the establishment of the Anglo-African Bank. Interestingly, the new
bank which was later renamed Bank of Nigeria could not withstand the fierce
competition posed by BBWA which eventually bought it over four years later in 1912.
BBWA thus remained the only bank in Nigeria until 1917 when the Colonial Bank
was established. Of importance is the fact that acquisition proposals were made by
BBWA at three different times between 1917 and 1938 which Colonial Bank turned
down at the various instances.
In 1925, the Colonial Bank was absorbed by Barclays Bank to form an
integrated international banking group with several largely autonomous entities and
the new bank was named Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas
(D.C.0.)). Barclays Bank remained BBWA's greatest rival and the two banks
dominated Nigerian banking until the British and French Bank, which was later
incorporated in Nigeria as United Bank for Africa Limited (UBA), entered the scene
in 1948. BBWA dropped the word British in its name in 1956 to reflect the emerging
independent status of West African countries where it did business. It became known
as Bank of West Africa (BWA). This was later changed to Standard Bank of Nigeria
Limited in 1969 and ten years later, the bank's name became First Bank of Nigeria
Limited. It has since reflected its public limited status by adding the letters Plc in
place of limited. Barclays Bank (D.C.0.) was also to change its name to Union Bank
of Nigeria Limited in 1979, following the political rift between the parent bank,
Barclays Bank PLC of U.K. and the Nigerian government, under General Olusegun
Obasanjo, over the former's business relationship with South Africa.
It is noteworthy that up to the end of the second decade of the century, no
attempt was made to establish a purely indigenous bank. However, spurred by the
resentment of Nigerian businessmen to the policy of the expatriate banks which,
though solicited deposits from them, declined their credit requests, the first
indigenous bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank, was established in 1929 by a group
of Lagos-based Nigerians. This first endeavour, however, came to a hitch soon as the
bank tried to do what expatriate banks were unwilling to do: lending to indigenous
10
businessmen. It ran into problems with its too liberal credit policy which led to its
liquidation after about one year of operation. In 1931, another bank, the Nigerian
Merchantile Bank was set up and headed by the same Managing Director under
whom the Industrial and Commercial Bank had liquidated the year before. It also
failed in 1936 due to adverse business conditions.
In 1933, National Bank of Nigeria, the first surviving indigenous bank, was
established by a group of businessmen but was later taken over by the Western
Regional Government of Nigeria, now succeeded by Oyo, Ogun, Undo and Osun
states. The survival of this bank is attributed to its relatively superior management
quality and perhaps the patronage of the Regional Government. The success of the
bank thereafter encouraged indigenous banking interests in Nigeria to a large extent.
Another surviving early indigenous commercial bank, Wema Bank PLC, was
established as Agbonmagbe Bank in 1945. African Continental Bank, today one of
the three largest inter-state banks, (others being National Bank and Bank of the
North) began with the buying over of the entire shares of Tinubu Properties Limited,
a Lagos based company owned by, Dr. (then Mr.) Nnamdi Azikiwe in 1944. Dr.
Azikiwe later became the First President of an independent Nigeria. The company
was transformed into a bank known as Tinubu Bank Limited in 1946, and was
renamed African Continental Bank in 1947. It is noteworthy that the success of the
earliest indigenous banks (National Bank, Wema Bank and African Continental
Bank) could in one way or the other be linked to the involvement of the regional
governments.
This new consciousness continued with vigour into the 1950s, a decade that
marked an unprecedented boom in banking registration. During that period, several
indigenous banks were floated, but most of them folded up as rapidly as they opened
their doors to customers.
Indeed, the indigenous banking history of the pre-independence era is strewn
with more records of failures than successes (Table 2.1). By 1954, 21 of the 25 newly
floated indigenous banks had folded up, 15 of them liquidating in 1954 alone. With
the exception of two inter-state co-operative banks and International Bank for West
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Table 2.1: Commercial Banks That Failed in Nigeria
S. No. Name of Bank Year
Established
Year
Failed
1. African Banking Corporation 1892 1893
2. Anglo-African Bank
(Later Bank of Nigeria)
1899 1912
3. Industrial And Commercial Bank 1929 1930
4. Nigerian Mercantile Bank 1931 1936
5. Nigerian Penny Bank 1940 1947
6. Nigerian Farmers and Commercial
Bank
1947 1952
7. Pan Nigerian Bank 1951 1960
8. Standard Bank of Nigeria 1951 1954
9. Premier Bank 1951 1960
10. Nigerian Trust Bank 1951 1954
11. Afroseas Credit Bank 1951 1954
12. Onward Bank of Nigeria 1951 1954
13. Central Bank of Nigeria 1951 1954
14. Provincial Bank of Nigeria 1952 1954
15. Union Bank of British Africa 1952 1954
16. United Commercial (Credit) Bank 1952 1954
17. Cosmopolitan Credit Bank 1952 1954
18. Mainland Bank 1952 1954
19. Group Credit & Agric Bank. 1952 1954
20. Industrial Bank 1952 1954
21. West African Bank 1952 1954
22. The Merchants Bank 1952 1960
23. Muslim bank 1958 _ 1965
Source: Adekanye, F.A. (1982) Elements of Banking in Nigeria
(F & A Publishers, Lagos).
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Africa, the second French-owned bank established in Nigeria in 1959, none of the
numerous banks formed in the 1950s survived beyond 1960.
The high mortality rate of indigenous banks is explained by acute capital
inadequacy, lack of managerial expertise and illiquidity. According to Nwankwo
(1980) quoting Paton (1949), in one instance neither the promoter nor any of his
associates had even a rudimentary idea of banking or company practice. Of particular
impact on the banks established in the 1950s were suffocating political pressures and
compromises at a period when the crusade against colonialism headed for a climax.
It was, in fact difficult to separate politics from banking; the admixture made good
politics but poor banking. The political and financial might of the regional
governments had helped the indigenous banks owned by them to withstand the
vicissitudes of crisis and depression of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. Ironically,
however, governments' direct involvement in banking which was a source of strength
in those decades was later to constitute a source of weakness in the environment of
the 1980s and 1990s.
It was in a bid to check the unintended effects of the banks' registration boom
that the Banking Ordinance of 1952 was enacted. It stipulated minimum capital
requirements for foreign and indigenous banks; required banks to maintain an
adequate degree of liquidity satisfactory to the monetary authority; and provided for
bank examination and supervision. This marked the first attempt to regulate banking
practice after more than half a century of banking in Nigeria. It is noteworthy that
inspite of the high failure rate at this period, the ability of the few indigenous banks
to survive the worst period of banking crisis in Nigeria served as some form of
catalyst in the development of indigenous entrepreneurship both in commerce and
industry in the post-independence era.
2.2	 Commercial Banking in Nigeria Since 1959 
By 1958 when the Central Bank of Nigeria was established, Nigeria had
operated banking services for about 66 years without a central regulatory body for
the financial system. The commencement of operations by the Central Bank of
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Nigeria (CBN) in 1959 therefore marked a turning point in Nigerian banking. A total
of 12 commercial banks had survived the financial turmoil and depression up to 1960.
With the ensuing regulation and supervision of banks by the CBN, the task of
harnessing the activity of banks for national development had begun.
Against the background of the banking crisis of the 1950s, the major objective
of the regulatory authorities at the dawn of the 1960s was to protect depositors and
restore confidence in the banking system. This was the beginning of what is today
referred to as the control regime. Spurred by the strong desire to completely rid the
system of any vestiges of the laissez-faire era, the government, during the period
amassed enormous powers for itself in banking matters. The central objective was to
redirect commercial activities of former colonial masters to national development
programmes. Before then, the foreign-owned banks which were predominant were
operating like subsidiaries of their parent bodies overseas. They invested actively in
the developed financial markets, particularly in their countries of origin.
The policy of domesticating the nation's financial markets which was initiated
by the CBN took the form of the introduction of money market instruments such as
treasury bills, call money scheme and produce bills. The impact of these was positive
and therefore encouraging to the monetary authorities. By 1962, for instance, total
investments by commercial banks in overseas markets dropped sharply from the
equivalent of over three million naira in 1960 to less than a million naira. On the
other hand, their investments in Nigeria rose by the equivalent of nearly N13 million
between 1960 and 1962.
The same positive trend was noticeable by way of considerable physical
expansion in the banking system. By 1965, the number of commercial banks had
grown from 13 in 1960 with total branch offices of 192 to 15 with a total branch
network of 240 (Table 2.3). A noticeable trend that later became a crucial policy
issue for the CBN was however the high concentration of banks in urban areas which
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accounted for about 80 per cent of total branch offices in 1962. 2 The disparity in
growth rates between rural and urban bank branches continued and by the end of the
decade, the proportion of bank offices located in urban and semi-urban areas (those
having a population of 20,000 people or more) rose to about 85 per cent while the
ratio of rural branches declined to about 15 per cent. The urban bias was more
pronounced among expatriate banks compared with the indigenous state government
banks. For instance, up to early 1970s, four of the seven operating foreign banks had
no rural branch offices. This reflects their original objective of catering for the
banking needs of expatriate businesses which were concentrated in the cities.
The presumption that expatriate banks were less inclined to implement pro-
developmental policies could have informed the promulgation of the Companies Act,
1968, which was designed to strengthen government's control of the activities of
banks. The Act required all foreign owned companies operating in Nigeria to
incorporate locally under the new Company Law. In compliance with the
requirements of the Act, expatriate controlled banks registered as Nigerian
companies. The Nigerian Banking Decree (1969) had further laid down the basic
regulatory framework for banking operations and firmly established the controlling
authority of CBN over banks. The Decree has been replaced by the Banks and Other
Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID) which was introduced to allow necessary
regulatory flexibility required in a deregulated financial market. In 1969 also CBN
issued the first Monetary Policy Circular which has since become an annual policy
document for monitoring and supervising banking operations in Nigeria.
Of particular importance in terms of operational development is the
considerable improvement in the growth of commercial banks over the first decade
post independence. Total assets, for instance, grew at an average of 14.6 per cent
between 1961 and 1969 while loans and advances which accounted for 31.9 per cent
2 This concentration in the regional spectrum is essentially due to efficiencies;
even though it goes against naive development schemes. Same is reflected in
the financial services industry in developed countries. London, New York,
Chicago, Frankfurt and Paris are good examples of such tendencies.
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of aggregate bank assets in 1962 expanded by an average of 9.9 per cent over the
same period. Commercial banking also grew in importance in terms of contribution
to macro-economic aggregates. The ratio of commercial bank deposits to Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) rose from 6.15 per cent in 1961 to 13.24 per cent in 1969.3
Also, the ratio of demand deposits to money supply rose from 36.7 per cent in 1961
to 425 per cent in 1969. Thus, it could be readily concluded that by the end of the
1960s decade, commercial banking, both in terms of statutory regulation and
operational relevance to the developmental aspirations of Nigeria as a nation-state,
had come of age.
The idea of directed credit was later introduced in the monettary policy
circular, as the share of the preferred sector from the total bank credit was
continuously increased while a requirement that a minimum percentage of all loans
be made to indigenous businesses was also introduced. Minimum and maximum
targets were set for bank credit across several economic sectors and sub-sectors
broadly grouped under preferred and less preferred sectors.
The major objective of this policy was to redirect the flow of bank credit from
purely commercial to productive activities. This was particularly underscored by the
experiences of the 1960s when on the average the proportion of commercial bank
credit allocated to general commerce was over 61 per cent of the total loans and
advances. Although the situation improved gradually over the years, as at 1969, the
proportion of credit to general commerce was still predominant at over 52 per cent
of total bank lending while the production sector accounted for about 28 per cent
(Table 22).
By 1973, the ratios had drastically altered to 38 per cent for the productive
sector and 35 per cent for general commerce. This trend continued over the years
and in 1980, commercial bank credit to the productive sector had climbed to N3,7953
million or about 59.8 per cent of total credit. On the other hand, general commerce
3 We could also use Goldsmith's Financial Intermediary Ratio here as an index
of financial development as was used in Koh (1989).
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accounted for about 19 per cent of total commercial bank credit in that year. There
was a slight fall in the share of the productive sector in 1986 when it accounted for
about 56 per cent while that of general commerce decreased to 17.5 per cent. This
was attributable to the growing emphasis on export financing at the time.
As part of the decontrol measures which started in the second half of 1986,
the rigid allocation of commercial bank loans gave way to a broad classification into
'high priority' and 'other sectors'. The high priority sectors which consist of
agricultural production and manufacturing enterprises are allocated 50 per cent. The
50 per cent allocation to the high priority sectors is shared 15 per cent to agricultural
production and 35 per cent to manufacturing enterprises. The performance of
commercial banks in this respect has improved substantially in the recent past. The
structure of commercial banks' loans and advances in 1987 showed a short-fall of 9.1
per cent from the prescribed 50 per cent allocation to the high priority sectors. The
shortfall so far has been entirely accounted for by allocation to manufacturing
enterprises. This is not unconnected with the unimpressive performance of the
manufacturing sector due to its heavy dependence on imported inputs. However, the
share of the high priority sector of bank loans and advances has continued to grow.
The shortfall in the allocation to the high priority sectors dropped to 4.0 percent in
1989 and further to 3.8 percent in 1990. In 1991, the banks complied fully with the
requirement.
One other key development in terms of official involvement in banking in the
early 1970s was the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree
(NEPD) of 1972 under which the Federal Government also exercised the right to
appoint chairmen of boards of directors of the three largest banks - First Bank,
Union Bank and United Bank for Africa. The NEPD was amended in 1977 and the
Federal Government extended its equity holding in alien controlled banks from 40
to 60 per cent.
The CBN also strengthened its grip on the banking system through the
introduction of a number of policy measures for direct and indirect regulation of
banks by intensifying its use of Monetary Policy Guidelines. Both exchange and
18
interest rates were, for instance, officially pre-determined in an inflexible manner. A
few other financial instruments such as Stabilization Securities and Bankers Unit
Fund were also introduced for regulating bank liquidity.
One of the government's most ambitious and relatively successful programmes
at this period is the Rural Banking Scheme which commenced with 18 banks in 1976.
This was a design to rectify the anomally being witnessed in the spatial distribution
of bank branches. The concentration of banks in urban areas had, in fact, reached an
alarming proportion at this period.
By 1980, the number of banks increased to 20 and the total number of branch
offices stood at about 800. By the end of 1986, the number of commercial banks in
the system expanded to 28 with a total branch network of 1,297. Thereafter, the
banking industry entered the period of unprecedented physical expansion following
the liberalization of entry restrictions (Table 23).
Table 23: Growth of Ni2erian Commercial Banks: 1960-1992
Year Number of Banks Number of Bank
Offices
Total Assets
(N' Million)
1960 13 192 238.8
1965 15 240 4343
1970 15 273 1,152.0
1975 17 445 4,308.0
1980 20 779 16,3405
1985 28 1,297 31,997.9
1989 47 1,844 64,874.2
1990 58 1,939 82,957.9
1991 65 2,023 117,558.0
1992 65 2,269 181,736.1
urce: Lentral01igena, LcOnornic	 vanous issues.
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By the end of 1988, the number of commercial banks had expanded to 40 with
a total of 1,655 branch offices. Additional seven commercial banks were licensed in
1989, bringing the number to 47 with a total network of 1,844. Commercial banks
operating in Nigeria and their number of branches are shown in Table 2.3.
Indeed, a success rate of 100 per cent was recorded for the first phase of the
rural banking scheme as all the 200 rural branch offices allocated to the participating
commercial banks were opened promptly. The target set for the second phase was
almost fully achieved as only three branch offices allocated to one bank were still
outstanding by the end of 1989. The same high success rate was achieved during the
third phase as almost all the 300 branches allocated had been opened by mid-year
1989. By December 1989 there were only 10 outstanding branches to be opened
(Table 23).
The performance of commercial banks can be further analysed from the trend
in the main elements of the flow of funds for the consolidated commercial banking
sector. The combined assets and liabilities of all commercial banks rose more than
102 times from the lowly sum of N1,152.03 million in 1970 to N117,558.0 million in
1991. From the liabilities side of the flow of funds table, capital and reserves had
more than doubled by 1975 from N57.48 million in 1970 to N127.25 million. This rose
to N389.1 million in 1980 and in 1986, the capital account amounted to N1,298.7
million. In 1989, the capital stock stood at N2,692.3 million and rose to N3,712.7
million in 1990. However, whereas capital stock accounted for roughly 5 per cent of
total liabilities in 1970, this ratio deteriorated continuously from 1974 and amounted
to 3.3 per cent by 1986. By the end of 1989, the ratio improved to about 4.2 per cent.
At about 4.5 percent, the ratio also improved marginally. Balances held for other
banks expanded from the very modest sum of N13.3 million in 1970 to N353 million
in 1975 and further to N170.7 million in 1980. In 1986, balances from other banks
jumped from only N310.4 million in 1985 and stood at N1,211.6 million in December
1989. Since mid 1990, however, there has been a remarkable decline in this item due
to a significant drop in the holdings of foreign banks and overseas branches and
offices of Nigeria. In 1990, total balances from other banks declined by more than
20.
Table 2.4: Commercial Operating in Nigeria and Number
Branches as at December 31st, 1989
S. No. Name of Bank Year
Established
Number	 of
Branches
1. Access Bank 1989 1
2. African Continental Bank 1947 119
3. All States Trust Bank 1988 1
4. Allied Bank 1969 62
5. Bank of Credit & Commerce
International
1979 45
6. Bank of the North 1959 89
7. Chartered Bank 1988 1
8. Commerce Bank 1989 2
9. Commercial Bank (Credit
Lyonnais)
1983 9
10. Commercial Trust Bank 1989 2
11. Co-operative and Commerce Bank 1961 56
12. Co-operative Bank 1953 54
13. Co-operative Development Bank 1986 3
14.	 . Eco Bank 1989 1
15. Eko International Bank 1987 2
16. First Bank 1894 269
17. Gant! Bank 1981 5
18. Habib Bank 1982 20
19. Highland Bank 1988 1
20. Inland Bank 1988 1
21. Intercity Bank 1987 1
22. International Bank for West
Africa
1959 95
23. Lion Bank 1987 4
21.
Table 2.4 Continued
S. No. Name of Bank Year
Established
Number of
Branches
24. Lobi Bank 1983 15
25. Merchantile Bank 1971 35
26. National Bank 1933 114
27. New Nigeria Bank 1970 59
28. Nigeria International Bank 1984 10
29. Nigeria-Arab Bank 1962 38
30. Nigeria Universal Bank 1972 24
31. North-South Bank 1988 1
32. Orient Bank 1987 5
33. Owena Bank 1981 22
34. Pan African Bank 1971 30
35. Premier Commercial Bank 1987 6
36. Progress Bank 1982 38
37. Union Bank 1914 239
38. United Bank for Africa 1912 180
39. Wema Bank 1945 50
40. Universal Trust Bank 1985 13
41. Savannah Bank 1960 63
42. Societe General Bank 1977 33
43. Tropical Commercial Bank 1984 10
44. Trade Bank 1988 1
45. Trans International Bank 1988 1
Source: Redasel, Nigerian Banking, Finance and Commerce
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53 per cent over the level in 1989 to stand at N565.2 million.
Deposits which are the major source of funds for banks accounted for the bulk
of the increase in bank funds. By 1975, for instance, total deposits had grown more
than four folds from N625.7 million in 1970 to N2,839.18 million. In 1980, total
deposits of commercial banks amounted to N10,009.1 million and rose by N8,128.5
million or 81.2 per cent to N18,137.6 million in 1986. In December 1989, total
deposits stood at N27, 164.9 million. As at September 1991, commercial bank
deposits had jumped by N9,753.1 million over the level in December 1990 to hit
N48,528.7 million. However, while deposits accounted for 56.66 per cent of total
liabilities in 1970, the ratio declined to 45.83 per cent in 1986, a drop from over 61
per cent in 1980. This further declined to 41.9 per cent in 1989. In 1990, the ratio
bounced back to 46.99 per cent. 'Other liabilities' expanded to 47.59 per cent of total
liabilities in 1986 from 38.9 per cent in 1970. In 1989, this item amounted to N31,986
million or 49.3 per cent of total liabilities. By the end of 1990, 'other liabilities' had
expanded to N36,840.2 million or 44.64 percent of total liabilities. Deposits and
'other liabilities', therefore accounted for the rapid growth of commercial banks'
funds and represented about 91.63 per cent of total liabilities in 1990 (Table 2.6).
On the asset side, the major items in the application of funds are loans and
advances, investments and 'other assets'. Each of these items recorded a phenomenal
growth over the period, but there was a relative decline in the proportion of the three
items in the total assets from 94.2 per cent in 1970 to 84.47 per cent in 1978 and
further to 76.21 per cent in 1986. The asset structure thus altered in favour of liquid
assets during this period. In 1989, however, this ratio again improved to 83.8 per cent
and further to 84.61 percent in 1990 as can be seen from Table 2.7.
Loans and advances expanded from only N351.35 million in 1970 to N1,537.33
million in 1975 and rose more rapidly to N6,379.2 million in 1980. In 1986, the
volume of loans and advances amounted to N15,701.5 million and by 1989, this had
reached N22,221.3 million. By the end of 1991, commercial bank loans and advances
totalled N31, 762.4 million. The relative importance of loans and advances grew over
the period from 30.5 per cent of total assets in 1970 to 39.67 per cent in 1986.
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Table 2.5: Rural Banking Programme: Allocation of Branches and Compliance
By Commercial Banks as at December 31st, 1991
S.
No.
Commercial Banks 1st Phase 2nd Phase 3r4 Phase Total	 I
A 0 R A 0 R A 0 R A 0 R
1. African Continental Bank 16 16 - 19 19 - 14 14 - 49 49 -
2. Allied Bank 6 6 - 7 7 - 11 11 - 24 24
3. Bank of Credit and
Commerce International
- 6 6 - 16 16 - 22 22 --
4. Bank of the North 6 6 - 19 19 - 14 14 - 39 39 -
5. Commercial Bank (Credit
Lyonnais)
- - - - - - 5 5 - 5 5 -
6. Co-perative Bank 5 5 - 8 8 - 9 9 - 22 22 -
7. Co-operative and
Commerce Bank
7 7 - 8 8 - 9 9 - 24 24 -
8. First Bank 40 40 - 37 37 - 28 28 - 105 105 -
9. Genii Bank - - - - - 5 5 - 5 5
10. Habib Bank - - - - 6 6 - 6 6
11. Imternational Bank for
West Africa
11 11 - 13 13 - 15 15 - 39 39
12. Lobi Bank - - - - - 6 6 - 6 6 -
13. Mercantile Bank 3 3 - 6 6 - 8 8 - 17 17
14. National Bank 15 15 - 19 19 - 10 9 1 44 43
15. New Nigeria Bank 4 4 - 9 9 - 8 8 - 21 21
16. Nigeria-Arab Bank 7 7 - 6 6 - 9 9 - 22 22 -
17. Nigeria International
. Bank
- - - - - 5 5 - 5 5 -
18. Nigeria Universal Bank 3 3 - 6 6 - 5 5 - 14 14
19. Owena Bank - - - - - - 6 6 - 6 6
20. Pan African Bank 5 5 - 6 6 - 5 5 - 16 16
21. Progress Bank - - - - - - 5 5 - 5 5 _
22. Savannah Bank 7 7 - 11 11 - 14 14 - 32 32 -
23. Societe Generale Bank - - - 6 6 - 15 15 - 21 21 -
24. Tropical Commercial Bank 6 6 - 6 6 - 5 5 - 17 17 -
25. Union Bank 27 27 - 36 36 - 28 28 - 91 91 -
26. United Bank for Africa 27 27 - 32 32 - 28 28 - 87 87 -
27. Universal Trust Bank - - - - - - 5 5 - 5 5 -
28. Wema Bank 5 5 - 6 6 - 6 6 - 17 17 -
Total 200 200 - 266 263 3 300 293 7 766 756 10
Source: Central Bank, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1991.
Notes: A = Number of branches allocated; 0 = Number opened; and R = remaining
number of branches.
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Thereafter, this declined to 34.3 per cent in 1989 as 'other assets' grew faster than
loans and advances during the year. The de-emphasis on loans and advances has
continued in the face of tight liquidity. In 1990, loans and advances constituted 34.25
percent of total assets.
Of equal interest is the fact that total investment grew absolutely from
N533.98 million in 1970 to N3,114.9 million in 1980 and stood at N5,715.2 million in
1986. This, however, shows a drastic decline from its dominant position of 46.4 per
cent of total assets in 1970 to 14.44 per cent in 1986. The value of investments had
dropped by almost one-half in December 1986 from the preceding year's level due
to massive discounting following CBN's demonetization of customers' pre-import
deposits awaiting foreign exchange cover earlier in August. This experience was
repeated in 1989 when total investments dropped from N10,376.2 million in February
to N4,606.4 million in December representing a record low of 7.1 per cent of total
assets, as banks sought to replenish funds lost in a drastic liquidity squeeze involving
the withdrawal of public sector deposits from banks. The relative financial stability
experienced in 1990 enabled banks to expand their investment portfolios once more.
This rose to N11,099.4 million in the year, representing 13.38 percent of total assets.
On the other hand, 'other assets' which accounted for 17.3 per cent of total assets in
1970 improved its position to 22.1 per cent in 1986 and jumped to 42.44 per cent in
1989. In 1990, other assets formed about 40.16 percent of total assets.
It is worthy of mention that the period between 1970 and June 1986 was the
climax of regulatory banking in Nigeria as the regulators became highly inclined to
the use of strict regulation in many instances. Where the measures failed to achieve
their intended goals, regulations were usually intensified and rather than incentives,
penalties were imposed to enforce compliance. This clearly demonstrated
government's seemingly overzealous pursuit of its ambitious development
programmes. It also reflected the basic feature of the prevailing protectionist policy
framework at the global level at that time.
The performance of commercial banks highlighted above was therefore
achieved in an environment of near total official control of banking. Added to this
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is the fact that most of the banks in the system were government banks, factors which
hardly allowed the banks any discretion to operate on purely economic and
commercial considerations. The ensuing rigidity proved rather a disincentive to banks
which were constantly in breach of the set sectoral targets. While government
intervention did achieve desirable changes in the pattern of commercial banking in
Nigeria in many instances there is little doubt that commercial banks could have done
much better without direct official involvement and rigid regulation of banking
operations which often bred distortions and created room for inefficiency and
circumvention. Nevertheless, commercial banks have remained the largest single
group of financial institutions in the economy accounting for over 80 per cent of total
institutional deposits. Their combined assets of N64,874.2 million in 1989 constituted
over 72 per cent of total assets of the entire banking sector.
The dominant position of the three largest banks; First Bank of Nigeria,
Union Bank of Nigeria and United Bank for Africa in the Nigerian market has been
challenged over the years, though the three are still indisputably the largest
commercial banks in Nigeria. There was a time the 'big three' controlled over 70 per
cent of the total assets and total credit of commercial banks. Since the beginning of
the 1980s, the situation has changed drastically. For instance, in 1982 the 'big three'
banks controlled only 40.59 per cent of commercial banks' total assets. By 1986, a
marginal reduction to 40.37 per cent was recorded. The decline continued in 1987
and reached an all time low of 34.56 per cent in 1988 as competition intensified. The
ratio however rose sharply to 39.59 per cent in 1989 (Table 2.8) as several drastic
liquidity measures shook many small banks in that year.
The market share of the 'big three' in deposit liabilities stood at 68.18 per cent
in 1982, fell to 67.4 and 67.25 per cent in 1984 and 1985 respectively but increased
marginally to 68.26 per cent in 1986 (Table 2.9). The decline continued in 1987 and
hit lowest level of 59.82 per cent in 1988. In 1989, however, the 'big three' accounted
for as much as 80.62 per cent of total deposits as they were less affected by the
massive withdrawal of government-related deposits from banks as ordered by the
monetary authorities.
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The most significant reduction in the market share of the 'big three' occurred
in loans and advances. Their share of total loans and advances which stood at 45.28
per cent in 1982 dropped sharply to 33.46 per cent in 1986 (Table 2.9). This reached
the lowest point of 32.61 per cent in 1986 before improving again to 35.22 per cent
in 1989. The downward trend resumed once more in 1990 with a marked drop to
24.85 per cent and further to 22.30 percent in 1991.
Price distortions which the prevailing interest rate structure had caused by
subsidising borrowers and discouraging savings, the severe restrictions of commercial
banking activities and restricted entry into the banking industry remained the major
unsettling issues that had begun to call for urgent reforms as from the early 1980s.
The desired response, however, did not come until the second half of 1986 when
deregulation was initiated.
2.3	 The Economic and Financial Environment: 1980 - 1991 
The year 1980 was the height of Nigeria's economic prosperity before the
sharp decline in 1981. In that year, the country earned a total export revenue of
$25,962 million, recorded a balance of payments surplus of N2,402.2 million and
achieved a 5.34% growth in GDP. External reserves rose by 78.94% in 1980 to stand
at N5,655 million. Up till the end of 1991, the external earnings record of 1980
remained the highest in the country's earnings profile.
External revenue dropped to $18,046 million in 1981 and dipped further to
$12,932 million in 1982. The slump was accounted for by significant declines in
production and sales of crude oil in the face of glut in the oil market which began
at the time. The decline has since continued. In 1992, the total projected external
revenue of $10,412 million was viewed in financial circles as too optimistic. Balance
of payments swung into deficit in 1981 with a negative balance of N3,036.8 million
thus exceeding the previous years surplus. The import restrictive measures adopted
in 1982 under the Economic Stabilisation measures of the government of Alhaji
Shehu Shagari helped to reduce the balance of payment deficit by more than 50%
to N1,398.3 million in the year. GDP declined by 8.39% and 3.2% in 1981 and 1982
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respectively. Also, external reserves fell by 54.2% in 1981 and 58.3% in 1982. Further
clouding the outlook for the economy were rapid growth in external debt and debt
service obligations.
The persistence of these adverse movements in the major macro-economic
variables and the almost insignificant contributions to GDP of the manufacturing
sector confirmed to policy makers that the Nigerian economy was facing a structural
macro-economic disequilibrium. Hence, financial policies were unable to respond
adequately to the changed domestic and external economic conditions. Consequently,
a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced in July, 1986 aimed at
redesigning economic and financial policies to redirect economic activity especially
in line with the changed circumstances.
Financial sector reform constitutes the central plank of the economic
restructuring programme. Key macro-economic adjustment tools such as interest and
exchange rate reforms have been implemented, entry restrictions into the financial
markets, particularly the banking industry has been liberalised and public sector
rationalisation and privatisation has also been undertaken. These far reaching
measures have severely changed the nation's economic and financial landscape.
Deregulation has afforded financial institutions greater operating freedom.
Institutional barriers among various groups of financial services firms have been
lowered in many respects. For instance, commercial banks were admitted into the
equipment leasing market in 1990. Prior to that year, only merchant banks were
permitted to engage in leasing business. For the first time in the same year, the first
commercial bank to be allowed into investment banking activities was registered by
the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (NSEC). Some innovative
approaches have equally been adopted to extend the freedom gained through the
greater flexibility of the regulatory framework. These include the opening of
merchant banking subsidiaries by the large commercial banks and the use of
subsidiary non-bank financial houses by both commercial and merchant banks to
extend the frontier of their operations.
Liberalisation of entry restriction has created a tough competitive environment
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for banks and other financial intermediaries. Compared with the 40 commercial and
merchant banks operating at the begining of the reforms in 1986, the number nearly
trippled to about 120 at the end of 1991. The rapidity of the expansion against the
background of the depressed state of the real sector (the industrial sector has been
operating at well under one-third of installed capacity) has led to predictions of an
imminent shakeout within the industry. This is yet to happen but there are clear signs
of financial distress among a growing number of banks.
Stiff competition for deposits under tight monetary policy and drastic liquidity
curbs have raised money market rates well above prospective rates of returns in the
capital market. In 1991, share prices were also outpaced by naira depreciation at the
ratio of 1:1.90. Consequently, new investments have tended to flow away from the
real sector in favour of short-term money market transactions. The resulting financial
instability, reduced domestic output, rising inflation and more fundamentally, the
sorry state of infrastructural facilities have considerably dimmed the prospects for an
economic turnaround in the short-term.
2.4	 Practical Regulatory Rules for Nigerian Banks in the 1980s 
Within the first half of the 1980s, tight controls on banking activities which were
intensified in the 1970s reached their climax. While the main objective of regulation
in the 1970s was to involve banks in developmental roles in the economy, the main
focus in the 1980s shifted slightly to tackling the problems emanating from the
external sector in the face of economic decline. There was a greater reliance on direct
and unorthodox credit controls, particularly, strict allocation of banks loans and
advances and exchange control measures.
Consequently, the share of the preferred sectors (Agriculture and
manufacturing) of total bank credit was continuously increased as a strategy to arrest
the decline in domestic production. The allocation to the government sector also
grew as the fiscal problems of the government worsened. In 1982, for instance, the
allocation to the government sector was increased from 2% to 3% while the share
of the export sector was reduced from 5% to 3%. However, the fixed interest rate
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structure in place then stipulated lower lending rates for the preferred sectors than
the less preferred. This was a big discouragement to the banks and expectedly
accounted for the large scale circumvention and consequent unattainment of the
sectoral targets.
As macro-economic problems intensified into the 1980s, greater and more
stringent control measures were introduced. Penalties for noncompliance with various
policy measures became more frequently imposed and strictly enforced. Where
regulations had previously failed to achieve their intended objectives, such as in
exchange controls, regulations were further intensified and more severe penalties
imposed.
The main regulation introduced to address the problem of domestic inflation
was a ceiling on bank credit expansion. In 1984, the permissible growth rate of
aggregate bank loans and advances was reduced by one-half from 25% in 1983 to
12.5%. This followed the sharp increase in the domestic inflation rate from 7.7% in
1982 to 23.2% in 1983, the first double digit inflation rate in many years. This, plus
the build-up of large external payment arrears which doubled from N2.2 billion in
1982 to about N4.4 billion in 1983, made the reduction of demand pressures in the
economy the central objective of monetary and regulatory policy.
By the mid 1980s, a large part of the detailed regulatory requirements had
become difficult to police. The sectoral allocation of bank credit was a typical case.
Owing more to the difficulties encountered in monitoring banks' compliance than
recognition of the need to allow banks some initiative and flexibility in credit
decisions, the sectoral and sub-sectoral classification was compressed from nineteen
to eight sectors. This was subsequently further compressed to two, the preferred and
non-preferred sectors.
Over the years, discretionary policy became the characteristic feature of bank
regulation in Nigeria. While the banks suffocated under the heat of tight regulatory
framework, they were, however, compensated by the absence of competition and
access to low cost public sector deposits. The environment therefore guaranteed
profits for the few operating banks, reduced risk taking resulting in financial stability.
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Following the economic and financial policy reforms in 1986, the above scenario
completely changed. The demonetisation of pre-import deposits with commercial and
merchant banks in 1986 was targeted at curbing banks' liquidity and therefore their
credit creating ability amid rising domestic inflation. This resulted in liquidity
shortfalls and spurred both competition and innovation in the banking marketplace.
Deregulation of interest rate in 1987 and the liberalisation of entry restrictions into
the banking sector further intensified the competitive pressures in the deposit side
of the financial markets.
Another regulation which equally was aimed at reducing excessive loan growth
was the withdrawal of offshore guarantees and domiciliary accounts deposits as
collateral for naira denominated loans. Then came the withdrawal of public sector
related deposits from banks in 1989 which threw many banks into severe liquidity
crisis.
The considerable economic strains resulting from the financial sector reforms
seriously undermined the soundness of financial institutions generally and the overall
health condition of the financial system. The regulatory authorities have responded
to this development through prudential reforms. Three major regulations can be
mentioned in this regard. The first is the introduction of deposit insurance protection
for depositors in 1989. Under this, all bank deposits are insured to the tune of
N50,000 per account. The second is the introduction of strict rules on loan
classification and provisioning under the Prudential Guidelines issued by the Central
Bank of Nigeria. Also, capital adequacy requirements have been introduced to
prevent financial insolvency among banks and financial crisis within the industry.
Inspite of the firm commitment to financial deregulation, there is a great deal
of hesitation on the part of Central Bank authorities to abandon direct control
instruments and to establish indirect instruments. This hesitation is perhaps informed
by the fear that a discontinuation of the use of direct instruments could lead to
excessive credit expansion and total loss of monetary control.
However, the Bank has retained in its arsenal, direct instruments that have been
found distortive. It has, in addition, adopted the use of some unorthodox indirect
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instruments such as stabilisation securities and direct debits to banks which have led
to sharp and sudden falls in bank liquidity and consequently wide fluctuations in
interest rate. Hence, bank regulation in Nigeria had come midway between
administrative controls and free market mechanism. Excessive reliance on direct
instruments has continued while indirect instruments are still in their infancy.
The specifics of monetary policy from year to year has been expressed in the
annual monetary policy circular published by the apex regulatory body, the Central
Bank of Nigeria, now for more than 20 years. The circular is essentially made
available to all operating commercial, merchant and other specialised banks as it
contains specific guidelines which they are expected to observe during the course of
the fiscal year. Since the CBN was empowered by the BOFID to regulate and
supervise the activities of other non-bank financial institutions such as finance houses
and insurance companies, a section of the guidelines has since been devoted to this
class of institutions. However, due essentially to the recency of the development, the
guidelines rarely go beyond the statement of returns to be submitted to the apex body
and perhaps stipulation of minimum share capital and capital-asset ratios for
insurance companies. The Insurance Decree specifies more explicit regulations over
their operations.
The bulk of the policy initiatives hinges on the operations of banks for
effectiveness. This makes supervision very crtical since the authortities must ensure
banks operate in line with their aspirations and expectations. In 1986, banks were
expected to adopt specific prescribed interest and deposit rate structures. In addition,
cash reserve requirements were specified. A cash reserve ratio defined as the ratio
of a bank's cash holding to certain components of its deposit liabilities was specified.
The definition of the ratio has changed with time.
The liquidity ratio has always been consistently stipulated to ensure that banks
are able to meet their deposit obligations, sustain confidence and stability in the
system and also modify the risk disposition of operating banks. The definition of the
ratio has changed with time though within the more than 20 year period, the ratio
has ranged between 25-30%. Eligible components for the computation of the ratio
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have also changed as the characteristics of the financial and indeed, the broad
economic system changed.
Also over this period, banks as the major sources of credit for the economy
were not spared in their credit operations. Ceilings were placed on the growth of
banks' credit portfolio. More than this, banks were expected to maintain a sectoral
composition of credit which reflected national economic priorities. From an
eighteen (18) sector/sub-sector categorisation adopted in 1986, the constant
reclassification and redefinition of sectors/sub-sector finally resulted in a broad 3
sector classification from 1987. This categorises agricultural production and
manufacturing enterprises as the high priority or preferred sector while the non-
preferred sector comprises all other activities. Since 1986, commercial banks have
been required to devote a minimum of 15% and 35% respectively of their total credit
to the agricultural and manufacturing sectors repectively. By implication the non
preferred sector should account for not more than 50% of each bank's total credit
portfolio.
In addition to the sectoral credit allocation policy, banks are expected to
devote minimum portions of their overall credit portfolio to indigenous businesses,
small scale businesses and rural borrowers respectively. From a minimum credit
allocation of about 75% to indigenous businesses, each bank's credit portfolio should
now reflect the class of businesses as 100% beneficiaries. Small scale businesses as
a group are also to benefit to the tune of a minimum of 20% of each bank's credit
portfolio while for rural borrowers, their credit benefit is tied to deposit mobilised
from within their rural vicinity. The 1992 monetary policy guidelines specified that
of the funds mobilised from rural areas by each bank, at least 50% must be ploughed
back to the same area as credit to finance productive activities.
Every bank renders mid-month, monthly and quarterly reports on these
activities among others, to enable the supervisory authorities monitor adherence to
these policies and assess the effectiveness of monetary policy. In addition to these
credit related guidelines, policies are directed at regulating the structure of merchant
banks' assets. The 1992 guidelines required this class of banks to maintain at least
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20% of their total credit, medium and long-term credit with maturity of not less than
three years. The share of credit of short term nature (maturing within 12 months)
is to remain at a maximum of 20%.
Since deregulation, many changes have been made with respect to the contents
of the monetary policy guidelines. For instance, in 1987 interest rate ceilings were
removed and banks were allowed to fix both lending and deposit rates. Due to the
significant rise in interest rates and the resultant high and rising inflation which
threatened the real sector, the ceilings were again introduced in 1988. They have
however, since been removed from 1990. Both the 1992 and 1993 guidelines specify
a floor of 13.5% for savings deposits and place a ceiling not on the deposit or lending
rates but on the spread defined as the difference between a bank's average cost of
funds and the average lending rate. Banks' periodic returns must indicate both the
average cost of funds and the lending rate to enable the supervisory authorities check
their adherence to the maximum spread imposed.
As part of the changes made, elements eligble for the calculation of a bank's
loan portfolio were expanded. A bank's total credit now comprise loans and
advances, equipment leasing portfolio, bankers' acceptance and net inter-bank float
in respect of call money, certificates of deposit, bankers' acceptances, commercial
papers, bills discounted, and Naira promissory notes. In 1988, banks were permitted
to own equity in companies. The regulation limits a bank's investment in any
company to a maximum of 10% of its paid up capital while its overall ownership in
various companies must not exceed 33%. These have been made more formal with
the inclusion of similar prescriptions in section 21 of the BOFID of 1991. Each bank
is equally to obtain permission expressly from the CBN before investing in any
company or group of companies.
The ability of a bank to invest in subsidiaries or other companies is also
hinged on the adequacy of its capital. From a simple capital ratio of adjusted capital
funds to loans and advances, the supervisory authorities have fully implemented the
recommendation of the Basle Committee on capital adequacy. The committee
stipulates that each bank should exhibit a minimum risk-weighted captial ratio of 8%
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from end of 1992. This is deemed a more realistic approach to assessing capital
adequacy in the international community. As part of the complete package the
authorities have also made room for revaluation reserves in banks' balance sheets.
They are acknowledged as part of a bank's supplementary tier 2 capital. It is
noteworthy that in 1993, in addition to the Basle capital ratio, banks were mandated
to maintain a ratio of not less than one to ten (1:10) between their adjusted capital
fund and their total credit. The re-introduction of the capital-asset (credit) ratio can
be appreciated from the fact that the Basle Committee encouraged national
supervisory authorities to impose additional capital restrictions as they may deem fit
since the 8% risk-weighted capital ratio prescription is to be viewed only as the barest
minimum. Perhaps more importantly it is thought that the additional ratio was
introduced to constrain indirectly banks' credit growth and also their risk exposure
as this was a tendency in banks for which the credit ceiling had been removed.
In 1990, the CBN prescribed prudential guidelines for asset classification and
disclosure, provisioning, interest accruals and off-balance-sheet engagements. These
guidelines were also designed to ensure consistency and uniformity in the treatment
of banks' assets. The adoption of the guidelines indeed has had the positive effect
of revealing the true quality of the assets of Nigerian banks and consequently the
adequacy of their capital. Banks are now required to review their credit portfolio
continously (at least once every quarter) with a view to recognising any deterioration
in credit quality. The guidelines come handy in ensuring that such reviews
systematically and realistically classify banks' credit exposures based on the perceived
risks of default. Operating banks are now required to reveal as part of their returns
and in their annual reports, the level and composition of their performing and non-
performing assets as well as the provisions made in respect of the non-performing
assets. In addition, a general provision amounting to at least 1% of each bank's
'other assets' is expected to be made. It is important to note that the supervisory
authorities reserve the right to disagree with a bank's assessment of the quality of
certain components of its assets and consequently the associated provisions. This
usually will be informed by the findings and observation of examiners during on-site
40
examination.
Since deregulation, the CBN has reserved the right to apportion Stabilisation
Securities to banks when a mop-up of excess liquidity from within the economy is
considered desirable. These are mandatory 90 - day investments. Banks have no
control whatsoever over its application and management. Its pricing, volume of
investment and timing are at the will of the apex regulatory authority usually acting
in this regard on behalf of government. A review of the 1992 performance of the
economy revealed that this so-called liquidity management process instrument forms
about 95% of fiscal deficit financing in the year. The use and application of these
securities is expected to be scrapped with the implementation and installation of open
market operations.
The Banking examination and supervision department of the CBN has been
responsible for monitoring the adherence of banks to these guidelines and prescribing
penalties where returns are submitted late or guidelines are not adhered to. The
department conducts both off-site and on-site examination. Averagely, each bank is
examined comprehensively on-site about every 18-24 months. A separate inspection
of each bank's foreign operations activities is also conducted. Based on its
examination and extent of adherence to prescribed guidelines, the supervisory
authorities have labelled some banks distressed and these have been placed under
CBN's close surveillance as well as the watchful eye of the NDIC. The NDIC also
conducts both on-site and off-site examination of each operating bank once within
the same period. The NDIC receives a copy of the returns which banks make to the
CBN.
From September 1, 1992, the CBN embarked upon a phased implementation
of the indirect approach to monetary and credit control and removed the credit
ceiling for any bank classified healthy. A bank was classified healthy if it met a
number of criteria during the preceding three months. These criteria include
adherence to the specified cash reserve ratio (which was simultaneously increased to
6% from 3%), specified liquidity ratio, prudential guidelines, statutory minimum paid-
up capital requirement, capital adequacy ratio, and exhibited a sound management.
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A bank is classified distressed if at least one of these criteria was violated at least
once in the preceding three months. Such distressed banks will not benefit from the
removal of the credit ceiling and will equally not be allowed to participate in foreign
exchange market auctions until it was reclassified healthy.
2.5	 The Ni2erian Banking Industry Since Deregulation
As was mentioned earlier, the deregulation of the Nigerian financial system
began with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in July,
1986. As an essentially monetarist regime, the key role played by banks, particularly
commercial banks, in the creation and allocation of credit makes them the pivot of
the restructuring programme. This is due to the fact that such monetary aggregates
as money supply, interest and exchange rates which are being fine-tuned in the
process all reside in the banking industry.
Banks have thus assumed a greater role in resource management in the
economy. Deregulation has brought with it relatively greater freedom in the
operations of banks as well as challenges in terms of options available for rational
responses under the new business environment. A number of key policy initiatives
have particularly reshaped the environment of commercial banking in the past four
years. Perhaps, the most important and far reaching of these is liberalisation of entry
restrictions which has brought competition in the industry to the highest level on
record.
The number of commercial banks has expanded from 28 in December 1986
to 54 in mid 1990. Other key policy measures include deregulation of the foreign
exchange market and interest rates which have significantly increased the resource
allocation powers of banks and eliminated some of the distortions in resource pricing.
Exchange rate deregulation started with the introduction of the Second-Tier Foreign
Exchange Market (SFEM) in September 1986. The market has undergone various
changes and modifications in its operational procedures. The number of banks in the
market had risen from about 28 in 1986 to about 103 in mid 1990 and about US$8
million or N64 million is traded on a daily basis.
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In a recent report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Banking Policy to the
General Assembly of Bank Chief Executives under the auspices of the Chartered
Institute of Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN), the following policy defects, which had
exacerbated market imperfections, were identified:
(i) the limitations and constraints posed by the absence of a truly competitive
foreign exchange market; and
(ii) the continued reliance on various monetary controls, which are inconsistent
with the policy of de-regulation. Notable examples are:
(a) the continued reliance on absolute loan growth ceilings as the primary
means of controlling credit expansion; and
(b) the compulsory issuance of stabilisation securities.
According to the committee, these and other policy defects have discouraged
the establishment of additional bank branches by existing banks, whilst encouraging
existing banks to set up parallel and/or sister institutions predominantly as a means
of increasing their access to Inter-Bank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM) and thus
their market share. Also, potential entrants to the industry have been encouraged to
submit as many new bank licence applications as possible. The main policy
recommendations of the committee were:
(i)
 
That the naira should become a convertible currency. In the interim the
Central Bank of Nigeria should adopt the report of the Sub-Committee on
Foreign Exchange Market (FEM) of the Bankers Committee which called for
an immediate return to a competitive foreign exchange market system which
would ensure that winners and losers emerge from the daily foreign exchange
auction sessions. According to the committee, the adoption of this system,
known as the Dutch Auction system would ensure that individual banks submit
realistic bid rates as the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) would debit successful
banks for the naira equivalent based on their bid rates. Banks that bid at very
low rates would lose, while very high bids would be punished by the
stipulation that all banks must sell at a uniform selling rate to be determined
and maintained by Central Bank as the weighted average of the successful
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bids.
(ii) While recognising the need for CBN to control aggregate credit expansion in
its effort to limit growth of money supply and thus reduce inflationary
pressures, the committee felt that properly defined capital adequacy ratios and
loan/deposit ratios could achieve the same objective without stuffing
competition amongst banks in the areas of deposit mobilisation, lending and
project finance. Also, absolute loan growth ceilings tend to inhibit the
establishment of new branches since no credit requests from such branches
could be entertained. The adoption of market-determined ratios such as
capital adequacy, loan/deposit ratios and the use of Open Market Operations
(OMO) was recommended in preference to absolute loan growth ceiling as a
mechanism for controlling credit growth in the economy;
(iii) Finally, the Committee recommended an upward review of the minimum paid
up capital of new and existing banks. This, it was suggested, should be
dynamic to take account of inflation and exchange rate fluctuation.
Interest rates were deregulated in August 1987 such that deposit and lending rates
of commercial banks became negotiable. This led to intensified deposit mobilisation
efforts and careful fund matching by banks. Also, some restrictions on banking
activities have been removed, thus allowing commercial banks increased scope in
financial intermediation. These include the permission to make equity investments in
other enterprises and the freedom to engage in equipment leasing. Some leading
commercial banks have now established merchant banking arms while many others
have formed subsidiary finance companies among other investments. The institutional
distinction between commercial and merchant banks continues to submerge.'
2.6	 Commercial Banking in Nigeria Since Deregulation: 
Any Expectation of Failure? 
Interestingly, the far reaching developments highlighted above are taking place
4 This development suggests the emergence of universal banks in Nigeria.
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at a period when the national economy is in distress and the productive sector is
facing a dwindling market. A number of ad hoc macro-economic measures have
therefore been introduced to moderate the economic upheavals. Some of these
measures have however jolted the financial sector and by extension the real sector
with the tendency towards a boomerang and counter-productive effects.
Inspite of this constraining environment, however, banks have been able to
demonstrate a high degree of resilience through an unprecedented product
differentiation and more scientific financial engineering. Against the background of
eroding real incomes and therefore a reduction in the propensity to save, savings
deposit campaigns have continued to mount. Compared with less than 10
conventional borrowing instruments before deregulation, not less than 150 new
products are now in the market. There are growing worries, however, that in the
absence of a corresponding expansion in the productive sectors and reasonable
overall growth in the economy, the observed expansion in the banking sector could
become a phantom and quite unsustainable in the long-run.
Even more worrisome, perhaps, is the geographical factor in the physical
expansion of banking institutions. The degree of concentration of banks in Lagos is
so high that it is aptly correct to say that Lagos is over-banked while the rest of the
country is underbanked. Of about 105 banks operating in 1990, only about 26 of them
are based outside Lagos. Yet, those few are run more or less from Lagos. This
development presents a far greater problem than the sheer number of banks in the
market. It indicates little direct involvement of banks in the developmental efforts in
other areas outside Lagos, particularly in rural areas. This situation has been further
compounded by the prevailing policy of bank licensing which tilted in favour of
merchant banks, which, as wholesale banks, are essentially "city" banks. Consequently,
the signs are already there that this group of banks would be under severe pressures
soon. In a relatively crowded market, such as we now have, and in the absence of
substantial economic growth, city business would hardly be sufficient to sustain all the
banks. Survival and growth will then depend on ability to explore opportunities in
other areas of the country. In this regard, commercial banks, through their branch
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network, have far greater chances of weathering the storm generated by competition
than any other group of banks in the country today.
It is however pertinent, at this stage, to note that threats of bank failures have
come not so much from the general effects of deregulation but from management
problems, fraud and forgeries, poor loan recovery record, capital inadequacy and
illiquidity, all of which could exist with or without deregulation. Many commercial
banks are, in fact, in very precarious financial conditions as a result of a combination
of these factors.
State government owned banks are, in particular, largely associated with these
problems and are, therefore, highly vulnerable under the fierce competition and the
unfolding extremely difficult business climate. This group of commercial banks
dominate the list of banks that could hardly pass the criteria for Nigerian Deposit
Insurance Corporation's (NDIC) viability test in 1989.
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CHAPTER THREE
BANKING THEORY, BANK CAPITAL AND COMMERCIAL
BANK PERFORMANCE
3.1	 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant existing traditional literature and provides
the theoretical framework for the analysis in the empirical chapters. We review
various propositions in the theory of banking while some issues of specific importance
are examined. Within the framework of banking theory discussed, we consider the
concepts of capital and its adequacy, assessment and measurement; bank liquidity,
asset quality and risk for their significant roles in the operations of banks. Clearly
the essence of this is to examine a basis in theory for the identification of factors
important for the continued health of a bank and to examine these factors in the light
of banking in developing economies. Following this, a review of bank performance
factors is carried out. It covers techniques of analysis, types of classification of banks,
the performance of earlier models and their information requirements. It would
appear in the discussion in this chapter that emphasis has been on capital and capital
adequacy relative to other identified factors. This is explained by the peculiarities of
the Nigerian situation. There has been so much worry about the capital base of
Nigerian banks and one of the issues which have arisen is whether in fact this is a
significant factor for the performance of these banks. Since deregulation, banks have
been directed twice to beef up their capital base.
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3.2	 The Theory of the Banking Firm 1
According to Fama (1980), banks are financial intermediaries that issue
deposits and use the proceeds to purchase securities. He suggests that there is no
need to control the deposit creation or security purchasing activities of banks in order
to obtain a stable general equilibrium with respect to prices and real activity. In
practice, however, banks are forcibly involved in the process by which a pure nominal
commodity or unit of account is made to play the role of numeraire and medium of
exchange in a monetary system. Although there seems to be some consensus that
banks and other financial intermediaries being firms, could be analysed with the same
microeconomic tools that have been employed to analyse other industries, yet
considerable divergence can be found in the approach. While Pesek (1970) and
Towey (1974) describe banks as producing money by employing loans as inputs;
Hyman (1972) and Melitz and Pardue (1973) describe them as producing credit with
deposits as inputs. Most authors suggest that the intermediaries maximize "something"
but there is no agreement on what they maximize. Some emphasize profits, others
growth and yet others utility.
Benston and Smith (1976) viewed the role of the financial intermediary as
creating specialised financial commodities. These commodities are created whenever
an intermediary finds that it can sell them for prices which are expected to cover all
costs of their production, both direct costs and opportunity costs. They identified the
following forms of financial intermediaries: The market maker who simply provides
a market place where potential buyers and sellers come together, thus lowering
relevant information costs, e.g. the Stock Exchange. The Stock Exchange does not
create assets; it only furnishes a physical location for buyers and sellers to transact
business. And without this intermediary, the task of locating a potential seller,
especially the seller with the lowest reservation price, would be much more expensive.
I Note that this theory of banking can be labelled "a legal restriction theory
under otherwise perfect market assumptions". It differs from informational or
frictional, or even agency theories of banking (Fama, 1985; Gallagher,
Forthcoming).
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The second type of financial intermediation is provided by a dealer who also
takes a position at his own risk in the asset transacted. A market specialist on a
securities exchange is a good example of this form of intermediation.
The third type is a more complex form of financial intermediation by which
new financial commodities are produced. This form is exemplified by Mutual Funds,
Banks, Unit Trusts, etc, which allow individuals to purchase shares in diversified
portfolios of securities, in odd amounts, for indefinite lengths of time, generally at a
much lower transaction costs than could be achieved through the direct purchase of
the underlying securities. This intermediary in this instance has a comparative
advantage over a stock exchange in serving some particular group.
Frequently, portfolio theory has been used to analyse the behaviour of banks
and other financial institutions. This approach, however, fails to take into
consideration the production and cost constraints which determine the equilibrium
output mix and scale size of the financial firm. Other studies conducted by Kareken
(1967), Bell and Murphy (1968), Pesek (1970), Klein (1971), Towey (1974), Sealey
and Lindley (1977) were based on the concept of the theory of the firm and have
attempted to correct the deficiencies observed in portfolio theory.
Various measures of output have been suggested by writers such as Mackara
(1975) and Benston (1972) which can be used depending on one's goal! These
include total assets, earning assets, total deposits, demand deposits, operating income
etc. In all these instances, it has been noticed that there has been a lot of confusion
on the interpretation of outputs and inputs in relation to financial firms; a situation
that underscores the need to clearly understand the economic term 'production' in
relation to the financial firm.
Frisch (1965) describes production as a process of transformation, directed by
human beings which is considered desirable by some individuals. It means that certain
2 More recent work on the multiproduct firm applied to banks uses further
measures of output. This thesis, however, does not go as far as these newer
specifications as data, etc. in Nigeria make it impossible.
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goods or services (inputs) enter into a process in which they lose their identity, i.e.
cease to exist in the original form, while other goods or services (outputs) are
generated.
Nyong (1987) explained the transformation process for a financial firm as
involving the borrowing of funds from surplus spending units and lending those funds
to deficit spending units; that is, financial intermediation. The financial firm's output
in a technical sense is thus a set of financial services to the firm's depositors
(creditors) and borrowers.
Klein (1971) identified three major types of financial services:
i) administration of the payment mechanism for demand deposit
customers in the case of commercial banks;
ii) intermediation services to depositors and borrowers in the case of a
commercial bank or other depository institutions; and
iii) portfolio management services.
The output of the financial firm is earning assets produced with labour, capital and
loanable funds (deposits) as well as services rendered to depositors and other
customers.
Baltensperger (1980) examines the various approaches and attempts so far
made to model and explain the behaviour of banking firms. He finds that there are
a number of rival models and approaches which have not yet been forged together
to form a coherent, unified and generally accepted theory of bank behaviour. The
main economic functions of financial firms, according to Baltensperger, are those of
consolidating and transfering risks on the one hand, and of serving as dealers or
brokers in the credit markets on the other hand. A satisfactory theory of the banking
firm must take these elements into account. Baltensperger's approach is to group the
models into two. In the first group are models of bank portfolio management. He
describes these as 'partial' models, in the sense that the total size of the bank's
portfolio of the optimal allocation of this portfolio remains to be solved. In the
second group are complete models of the banking firm. These models attempt to
explain the joint determination of not only the structure of assets and liabilities and
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their interaction, but also the total scale of the bank's operation and portfolio.
Models relating to bank reserve (liquidity) management have dominated the
scene. A typical model in this category is characterised by the assumption that the
total size, as well as the structure, of the bank's liabilities are exogenously determined
and not subject to optimizing behaviour, the problem to be solved being the optimal
allocation of the given funds among various assets, with particular attention being
paid to the choice between earning assets and reserve (liquid) assets (Baltensperger,
1980).
Apart from bank reserve and liquidity management, Baltensperger also
examined the activities which are recorded on the liability side of the balance sheet.
His analysis showed the desired (optimal) liability side structure (including the
desired relationship between deposit liabilities and capital account).
In his view, a complete theory of the banking firm should go beyond these. It
should explain not only the bank's asset and liability choices and their interaction (if
any), but also the determination of the total size of the firm. Also, it should not only
provide an integrated view of the firm's asset and liability choices, and allow for an
endogenous determination of the total scale of operation of the firm. Thus,
Baltensperger distinguished three types of models, vis: monopoly models, risk
aversion models and real resource models.
In the first type a crucial role is assigned to the assumption that banks can
operate as monopolistic price setters in deposit and/or credit markets. The second
type places emphasis on the assumption of subjective risk aversion on the part of the
bank (or its owners). He described the third type as real resource or real production
aspects of banking business.
The models of optimal asset choice are models of bank reserve and liquidity
management. The basic model is traced back to Edgeworth (1888) and has since been
followed by various studies such as those by Orr and Mellon (1961), Porter (1961),
Morrison (1966), Poole (1968), Frost (1971), Baltensperger (1972a, 1972b), Ritzmann
(1973), Pringle (1974), Hester (1975), Koskela (1976), and Niehans (1978).
Essentially, these models treat the bank's reserve and liquidity management decision
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as a problem of inventory optimization under stochastic demand (Baltensperger,
1980).
The liability management model also applies the inventory theoretic approach
to determine banks' capital account and deposits. For deposits, the modelling has
been akin to the simple monopolistic structure outlined for the asset side, while for
capital and leverage issues, more sophisticated techniques have been used.
Some authors including Sealey and Lindley (1977) and Baltensperger (1972b)
further extended the work by integrating production costs analyses. These two models
are described as partial (portfolio structure) models dealing with questions of either
asset choice or liability management.
Santomero (1984) in his attempt at micro-modelling identified three
approaches to the problem of why banks exist in the financial market:
a) the role played as asset transfomers;
b) the role of banks' demand liabilities as medium of exchange; and
c) the two-sided nature of these financial firms which he regards as
critical in any explanation of their behaviour.
The asset transformation function can be further subdivided into asset
diversification and asset evaluation functions of the financial firm. Klein (1971) and
Benston and Smith (1976) noted that a fundamental role of intermediation is
transformation of large denomination financial assets into smaller units. The banks
provide divisibility services to depositors and equity holders interested in asset
diversification. The second view argues that the bank is fundamentally an evaluator
of credit risk. They serve as financial intermediaries whose primary role is the
evaluation and purchase of financial assets (Santomero, 1984). Another argument is
that because of imperfect information concerning the value of the underlying project,
investors can glean some information about its quality by observing the willingness
of the insider to invest equity capital in the endeavour. Accordingly, the financial
structure df the firm adds information to the market. This approach was also
extended to intermediation, with the central argument being that this signalling
problem could explain financial intermediation. Thus, banks which gather information
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become intermediaries, holding assets that are considered to be of added value,
compared with when they are held separately.
A counter argument also exists which maintains that because of the
uncertainty of the value of the intermediaries' information, the mere observation of
the portfolio is not sufficient to resolve the signalling issue. The conclusion here is
that by dedicating wealth to the firm, the owner-managers of financial intermediaries
demonstrate their commitment to the portfolio and signal the value of the underlying
assets. Diversification was also found to be an important characteristic in the
information uncertainty equilibrium.
The second reason for the existence of the banking firm is the central role
played by its demand deposit liabilities as the medium of exchange. The unique
function of a monetary unit with the formalisation of the choice of monetary unit and
exchange patterns has also been shown (Niehans, 1978). The central feature of a
monetary unit is its ability to minimize the cost of transactions that convert income
into the optimal consumption bundle (Santomero, 1984).
The common feature of the literature on the demand for money is the
determination of positive money holding that are a function of transaction costs,
uncertainty and relative rates of return. The monetary mechanism, along with bank
pricing decisions, offer the financial firm the opportunity to attract deposits which
may be reinvested at a positive spread. The extent of this profit will depend upon the
nature of competition.
The third reason advanced for the existence of a banking firm centres upon
the conditions necessary for banks to exist as internal financial firms. This relates to
the two-sided nature of the financial firm. A model of the maximizing firm in a
financial market with uncertain rates of return was developed which found that
covariance between the return on loans and deposits fosters intermediation by
encouraging the risk-averse maximizer to transform deposits into loans (Pyle, 1971).
Sealey (1980) states that a correlation between profits and the level of rates is shown
to be equally important as an explanation for financial intermediation.
Santomero (1984) also discussed asset allocation models. These are of two
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types, namely, reserve management models and portfolio composition models. 3 The
former is concerned with the problem of the optimal quantity of primary or
secondary reserves to be held by a bank that is subject to stochastic reserve losses due
to uncertain deposit levels. The latter is devoted to the allocation across risky assets
according to risk and return.
Reserve Management Modelling is perhaps the oldest in banking which has
also been traced to Edgeworth (1888) with contributions and corrections subsequently
made by Orr and Mellon (1961), Poole (1968), Frost (1971), Baltensperger (1972a,
1972b, 1974) and Ralti (1979).
Basically, the models prove that if withdrawals exceed reserves, the bank must
undergo a proportional cost to obtain the additional funds. The bank, therefore,
wishing to maximize expected profit from its deposit balances, must ensure that the
opportunity cost of reserves, on the margin, equals the expected reduction in
operating or transactions cost devoted to reserve adjustments. This is the essential
condition that must be met in reserve management models. Portfolio Choice models
of asset allocation take two forms: the bank is viewed as possessing some degree of
monopoly control over its loan price, or the asset market is modelled as a perfectly
competitive one where the bank must select appropriate quantities of loans of various
characteristics.
The typical model structure is a two-sided discriminating monopoly. Marginal
revenue equals marginal costs. A variation in any one market feeds through the
model to a comparative static shift in all marginal conditions (Santomero, 1984). The
bank is a deposit rate setter with some monopolistic control over deposit market. In
such situations the marginal cost of funds from each deposit source must equal the
marginal cost of funds from the competitive market. Another approach has one
market as a perfectly competitive one.
The discussion of liability choice models throws a searchlight on capital
decision. In the absence of frictions and taxes, there exists no optimal capital
3 These go back to Baltensperger (1980).
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structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Pringle (1974) showed that optimal capital
is attained when the excess marginal revenue on loans equals the excess marginal cost
of capital.
Kahane (1977) and Koehn and Santomero (1980) use the portfolio model
approach on the bank capital issue. They optimize the bank's rate of return on capital
by selecting a portfolio of assets and leverage position that optimizes shareholders'
returns. They analyze the effect on bank portfolio behaviour of a regulatory shift in
capital adequacy regulations. They demonstrate that although capital increases as a
fraction of assets, the resultant portfolio is unambiguously more risky than before the
capital constraint. Essentially, the constrained firm attempts to offset some of the
effect of the leverage limit by absorbing greater risk in its portfolio than before the
regulation. These results lend credence to the idea that regulation, if it is to be
effective, must be combined with adequate understanding of the behavioural response
of the banking firm (Santomero, 1984). The two-sided modelling which we discussed
earlier was further examined by Santomero and several models have recently
appeared which are related to this nature of the banking problem.
The alteration in the financial intermediation process associated with increased
interest variability has been examined. It was found that the typical bank serves as
both an asset-transformer and broker. The former, in the sense that it borrows funds
at a fixed rate before interest rate uncertainty on the asset side is resolved, and the
latter, in the sense that it borrows only after interest rates are known. Increased rate
volatility therefore, shifts the bank's activity more toward a brokerage function and
away from the traditional asset transformation function. The limited upside gain from
higher rates is unlikely to be sufficient to compensate the bank for the reduced profit
from asset transformation when rates decline. Accordingly, variability results in the
shift to brokerage activity even for an expected profit-maximizing firm.
Santomero also discussed credit rationing models. Credit rationing occurs
when a subset of firms seeking credit at the going rate is not granted such loan in
spite of the fact that its objective characteristics are identical, or nearly so, to those
firms receiving credit. This definition recognizes that some borrowers are not worthy
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of credit because of loan or project characteristics and are, therefore, formally
rejected by the lending institution. These models have been divided into two, vis:
equilibrium rationing and dynamic rationing models. Equilibrium Rationing is such that
occurs in the long run while dynamic Rationing exists in the transitory periods
between such equilibria.
It has been argued, however, that because of the intertemporal and cross-
product relationship between a customer and the bank, preferential treatment is given
to prime customers when credit tightening occurs. Accordingly, nonprime, small
customers are rationed during periods of interest rate movement. Banks in this case
are seen to be merely behaving as multi-period profit maximizers by favouring their
best customers.
Blackwell and Santomero (1982) have shown that if large firms, with
intertemporal demands for credit and multi-periods commitments to the banking
institution are priced correctly, they will, on the margin, be no more profitable than
the smaller less sophisticated firm. Accordingly, if rationing becomes necessary, there
is no reason to believe that they will be given additional consideration. It is also
shown that large firms have higher elasticity of demand with alternative funding
options, and are less likely to receive credit preference during such periods of
constraint in contrast to the traditional result. Santomero (1984) questions the worth
of this submission.
A third approach to credit rationing is the information asymmetry or adverse
selection approach. Santomero (1984) regards this as the most promising of the three
approaches. The argument is that expected value pricing of loan rates hides two
different types of borrowers. That is, when all loans are priced at a single rate, the
bank attracts both honest and dishonest customers. The former fully anticipates
repayment, whereas the latter will renege in all states where the implied cost is lower
than the repayment. An equilibrium competitive interest rate will be set so that the
market rate incorporates the probability of default by the dishonest or unlucky
borrower. The variations in the loan rate from this equilibrium level are shown to be
capable of shifting the relative proportion of honest borrowers so as to improve the
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expected profit for the financial institution. Essentially, by restricting the percentage
of an investment project that is financed by the bank, the lender attracts more honest
customers and a small loan loss experience.
Also demonstrated is the fact that, as the interest rate charged to borrowers
increases, the percentage of low quality loans may increase. That is, without a priori
knowledge of the quality of each loan applicant, the willingness to pay higher interest
rates is a screening device in identifying high-risk borrowers. Therefore, the bank
would prefer to charge a lower rate than to clear the loan market by discouraging the
preferred borrowing group.
3.3	 Defining Capital in the Context of Capital Adequacy Analysis
The Bank of England (1980), on the measurement of bank capital, did not
include the two types of loan provisions in the computation of capital resources. Loan
provisions may be specific or general, and different banking considerations apply to
each, although in the accounting sense, they are essentially part of the same
provision.
In the case of specific provisions, they relate to specific loans which have been
classified because recovery in full is considered doubtful. Such provisions are based
on subjective judgement and are regarded as inaccurate. Wesson (1985) regards this
as a good ground for excluding them in the calculation of a bank's capital resources
and agrees with the stand of the Bank of England on the issue. It is the practice of
banks to also exclude general provisions from capital. These are provisions made to
cover latent but as yet unidentified bad debts already in the balance sheet. The Bank
has concluded that where it is satisfied that a general provision is freely available to
absorb future losses it is appropriate to include it within the Bank's definition of the
capital base. In the context of country risk debts the position has now become
clearer.
In August 1987 the Bank of England issued a policy paper on debt
provisioning. It introduced a system of credit scoring covering 15 characteristics to
all country risk debts in the form of a matrix. The various characteristics were then
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grouped into three factors. Scores are attached to the various factors with suggestions
for the rate of provisions. For example, if interest on a loan has not been serviced for
more than 3 months, it scores eight and if it is in breach of International Monetary
Fund (IMF) performance criteria it scores three. Total score of 10-24 points requires
a minimum provision of 5 percent; a point score of 71-83 leads to a maximum
provision of 100 per cent. Then, significantly, all provisions required under the matrix
calculation must be deducted from a bank's capital base for capital adequacy
purposes, whether regarded as general or specific provisions.
There has also been some controversy about the relationship of deferred tax
to bank capital. The consensus however appears to be that, if a company has
identified that it is liable to pay tax at a future date and makes provision for such tax
liability in its accounts, the provision clearly reflects a potential debt owed to
government and amounts set aside for this purpose should not be regarded as part
of capital resources.
Another aspect of the definition of capital which is outside the confines of the
concept of equity base extends to what may be described as capital gearing. In this
regard, it is necessary to examine how the capital of a bank may include terms other
than the equity of the parent company or shareholders, for example, loan stock. The
Bank of England (1985) stated that the function of loan stocks is not to provide a
reserve against losses but to finance part of the infrastructure of the business; and
that such loan stocks should be subordinated on medium or long-term. This
conclusion rested on the view that loan stocks are an inadequate substitute for
shareholders' funds because of their impermanence and inability to absorb losses
without precipitating a liquidation. The Bank has since reviewed this approach to
loan stocks in the context of the purposes for which capital is required which have
been identified as follows:
i) to provide a cushion to absorb losses;
ii) to demonstrate to potential depositors the willingness of the
shareholders to put their own funds at risk on a permanent basis;
iii) to provide resources free of fixed financing costs;
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iv)	 to be a suitable form of finance for the general infrastructure of the
business.
Shareholders' funds are found to be suitable for all these purposes. Loan
stocks do not meet all the four conditions. For instance, they do not provide a
reserve against losses for a business which continues to trade. They do not
demonstrate to depositors a willingness of the shareholders to put capital at risk on
a permanent basis; nor do they provide resources free of fixed financing costs. In
times of low profitability, loan stocks, provided they are fully subordinated, do protect
depositors against loss in a liquidation. Thus, it is agreed that while subordinated loan
stocks are not a full substitute for share capital, their presence can enhance the level
of protection available to depositors.
In the light of the above, the Bank of England concluded that fully
subordinated loan stocks be allowed as part of capital base provided they have a
minimum maturity of five years and are subject to an amortisation factor applied to
loan stocks with less than five years remaining to maturity. This factor, according to
the Bank is intended to discourage unduly short initial terms and to soften the impact
on capital ratios when the loan capital is repaid and not re-issued. The Bank also
expects that loan stocks which form part of the capital base will not have any unduly
restrictive conditions attached to them which might necessitate their immediate
repayment at a time when a bank can least afford it from a prudential point of view.
The difficulties arising in defining capital are threefold. First, capital must not
only be looked at as a stock at a given time as stated on a balance sheet but must,
according to Wesson (1985), also be seen as the fulcrum of a continuing business an4
accordingly, as a magnitude changing through time. Hence, interpretation of trends in
capital strength must centre on examination of the path of capital through time and
in particular, on shifts of the level of earnings and profitability.
Secondly, it is necessary to determine the purpose for which the definition is
required as this may create differences in approach leading to different answers. For
instance, are we trying to focus attention on the net worth of the business?. Or the
free equity described by Wesson as that part of capital resources not regarded as pre-
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empted to cover fixed assets and thus available at need to cover the risks inherent in
banking assets?. Or are we taking a broader perspective and thus include all or part
of subordinated debt loan stock, so long as we distinguish between equity and debt?
Finally, are we considering the capital structure of a group of related
companies? In which case the distribution of capital between parent and subsidiary
becomes significant in the assessment of group capital resources.
The third difficulty highlighted by Wesson is the problem of valuation of
capital. By accounting convention, assets and liabilities are measured in balance
sheets on the basis of historical cost, which may be grossly inaccurate and thus give
rise to a false picture if there is a marked difference between historical cost and
current cost, particularly in periods of high inflation. Thus, capital as stated in
published balance sheet may be unrealistic. Wesson emphasized the importance of
current cost adjustment to historical cost figures and concludes that the basis of
valuation of assets assumes special importance in this regard. To date, perhaps no
satisfactory solution has been found to the problem of valuation of capital. And for
want of a better alternative, book value remains the most promising approach to
evaluate bank capital.
Having surveyed the problems of definition, the different components of
capital can be examined. The equity of the shareholders is regarded as an essential
part of capital resources. Wesson (1985) defined equity as the issued share capital of
the bank and all reserves, other than those reflecting specific provisions for losses.
Reserves include retained profits and any surpluses arising, for example, from the
revaluation of assets, such as bank properties, or from transfer of provisions from
loan losses judged surplus to requirements, as well as any premiums received from
the sale of shares to shareholders. We agree entirely with this definition of equity
which is in conformity with the position in Nigeria. Banks in Nigeria are required to
maintain reserve funds called Statutory Reserves into which a fixed amount of profits
must be transferred each year and before dividends are declared. The balance on the
Statutory Reserve account cannot be distributed by shareholders. Thus, banks are
compelled to retain a reasonable proportion of their profits which then forms part
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of their capital base. The significance of the level of earnings to growth in bank
capital becomes clearer from this requirement. A bank that makes good profits will
not only directly strengthen its capital base but will be able to attract new capital
from the market or from existing shareholders on better terms. On the other hand,
low levels of earnings will make it more difficult and more expensive to raise new
capital. Capacity of management to consistently generate adequate profit which tend
to maintain both liquidity and confidence, contain risk and preserve the capital base.
The role of capital can also be examined from three view points, vis: a) that of
depositors and the monetary system; b) that of the functioning of banks as financial
intermediaries; and c) that of shareholders of the bank. From the viewpoint of
regulators (a) and (b) are regarded as being of major importance as they are the role
of bank's capital in terms of providing the depositors and the monetary systems with
reasonable protection against insolvency.
Furthermore, in discussing the role of capital, the approach of Wesson (1985)
was to examine the reasons why banks need capital. As financial intermediaries, the
basic function of a bank is to provide facilities for the mobilisation of savings and
make the funds available for investment purposes by the process of granting credit
facilities to those in need of funds. Thus, these funds are made available to businesses
to enable them to expand their productive capacity and to individuals and households
to facilitate consumption. To be able to perform this important function a bank must
always be able to meet all its contractual obligations without delay. These include
repayment of deposits and payment of maturing acceptances, which means that the
bank must remain liquid at all times. When deposits are withdrawn new deposits may
be raised in replacement, but a bank's ability to repay deposits will also depend on
the maturity structure and value of its assets. Wesson, therefore, points out that if the
maturity structure of a bank's assets is excessively long relative to the maturity
structure of its deposits, it will have a negative cash flow in the sense that the inflow
of cash from maturing assets will fall short of its maturing liabilities. If the bank is
unable to raise new deposits to meet the liabilities, those repayments can be made
only by sale of assets which will reduce the size of the bank's total assets. Such an
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action can only provide a temporary solution because as assets continue to be
depleted at a steady rate, a bank will eventually become insolvent. This is, however,
also a function of the price of assets.
This type of dilemma can only be avoided by fostering a healthy relationship
between bank capital resources and the maturity structure of assets and liabilities.
Viability depends not only on depositors being confident that the maturity
transformation in bank balance sheets is not excessive in relation to capital resources
but also that this confidence extends to exposure to all those risks which exist in
banking assets. This amounts to saying that the minimum acceptable ratio of capital
to deposits of a bank will ultimately depend on the depositors' perceptions of the
adequacy of capital in relation to risk (Wesson, 1985). The Bank of England also
identified the following reasons why banks need capital:
i) provision of the infrastructure of the business; and
ii) protection of depositors from losses as a result of business risks thus
engendering the confidence of potential depositors and trading
partners.
It has since been established that the infrastructure of a bank should normally be
covered on a one-to-one basis by capital resources and should not be financed by
depositors' funds. The infrastructures of a bank include the premises, equipment,
other fixed assets, trade investments, goodwill etc.
Apilado and Gies (1972) and Vojta (1973) also reduced the major functions
of capital to two. The first, and perhaps more important, is the protection of
depositors - creditors; the second is the provision of funds to finance operations,
particularly the acquisition of fixed assets. For the majority of non-financial firms
capital is used primarily to finance operations, and secondarily to provide a buffer or
insurance fund to absorb possible losses. Other writers and authorities who agree with
this view include Mingo (1975) and the U.S. Federal Reserve Board.
Short (1977) followed a different approach in equating the function of bank
capital to that of any business, which is, to cover all the expenses in setting the
business up, getting it into operation, and thereafter finance addition to its fixed
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assets. He agrees that no firm, especially a bank, should use borrowed funds to get
established or to acquire fixed assets, rather, these should be financed directly by the
shareholders or from funds accumulated within the business.
In addition to financing its creation and subsequent acquisition of any more
fixed assets, a bank should also have capital to justify the trust placed in it by
depositors and to protect the economy's payment mechanism, of which its deposits
are a part. Another role of bank capital, according to Short, is to absorb unexpected
losses already mentioned; it should serve as a buffer to absorb only unexpected losses.
It is also the role of capital to minimize the losses that depositors and other creditors
will have to bear if it does fail.
The argument here is that a bank's capital should serve as a buffer against
insolvency and be adequate enough to attract deposits. It should serve to establish
a level of confidence in savers and depositors sufficient to induce them to invest in
and deposit with the bank and thereby fund the institution in a manner adequate to
enable it to conduct its business. The shareholders should be able to respond to the
implicit market perception that a profit-making enterprise must have risk capital to
support its operations and business. A bank's capital in this respect should serve as
a demonstration to the depositors of the willingness of a bank's shareholders to put
their funds at risk on a permanent basis thus serving as a cushion to absorb losses
that may expose a bank to insolvency.
Depositors' losses can also be reduced through deposit insurance schemes. In
fact, some authors like Kreps and Wacht (1971) argue that deposit insurance has
reduced, if not largely eliminated, the importance of capital as buffer to absorb
losses. The role of deposit insurance will be examined in more detail later in this
review. We will only say at this juncture that we do not subscribe to the view that
deposit insurance is a substitute for capital.
As has been seen, the impact of earnings on capital is quite significant. A
sufficient flow of earnings is essential as a first defence against losses and as a source
of new capital. In view of the fact that profitability is influenced by managerial
capacity, the assessment of the overall quality of management cannot be avoided.
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Profitability also has its place in the assessment of capital adequacy and a regulator's
assessment of capital adequacy of a particular bank should involve qualitative
judgements on the nature of its business.
Another function of capital which is usually overlooked is its use as an
instrument of monetary policy in countries where bank regulations enforce a capital
to deposit ratio or where bank management believes that their capital should be
proportional to their deposits. Thus capital assumes the function of restraining the
growth of bank deposits. Although this is not a classical instrument of monetary
policy, there is some indication that capital adequacy requirements may have been
employed in some countries, especially in the United States, to help to slow the
growth of money supply. Leavitt (1974) listed capital adequacy requirement as a
monetary policy instrument. We believe that capital adequacy requirements, like cash
reserve requirements which also were designed initially to protect depositors, can be
effective monetary policy instruments of general application.
It is necessary to also consider the role of capital in the determination of a
bank's policy. In formulating its loan policy a bank will consider the returns, cost of
funds, availability of funds and the position of capital. There is no doubt that capital
plays a very important role in determining the magnitude of a bank's total loan
portfolio because it represents a source of funds to the bank, along with deposits and
borrowings. A bank must, therefore, consider the position of its capital before
determining its policy on loans. We also find that during a period of tight money an
under-capitalised bank may find itself in a situation where it will have to raise funds
at a relatively high cost, while some of its existing loans are locked in at lower
interest rates. At such times the bank's profits will be squeezed and it may well have
to constrain its loans below the otherwise optimal level because of non-availability of
funds at profitable margins. Conversely, an over-capitalised bank will be in a position
to exploit high returns during such period, especially if it is prepared to take some
risk.
The work of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisorsy
Practices in respect of capital measurement and the setting of capital standards is
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perhaps the most significant attempt in recent times to clarify the eligible components
and composition of a bank's capital and equally ensure uniformity and consistency
among banks across different countries and different economies. In the 1988
document which details minimum standards and allows for initiative from domestic
monetary authorities, a risk weighted capital ratio approach to assessing capital
adequacy was proposed. The selection of the approach was, from all indications
greatly influenced by the need to engender uniformity in and equally strenghten the
international banking system.
The Committee in defining a bank's total capital distinguishes between two
categories of capital referred to as tier 1 and tier 2 capital respectively. Of these two
categories, components of tier 1 capital which are viewed as having equal intra-
category weights, are emphasised over and above components of tier 2 capital. This
can equally be appreciated from the restriction that tier 2 capital an eligible
component of a bank's total capital, cannot exceed tier 1 capital. The reverse
position is, however, encouraged. The Committee essentially considers a bank's
equity capital and reserves which comprise tier 1 capital in the scheme, to be the key
elements of capital upon which emphasis should be placed. This is due to the fact
that these elements are the only ones common to all countries' banking systems.
They are visible in the published accounts and form the basis on which most market
judgements of capital adequacy are made and they have crucial bearing on profit
margins and any bank's ability to compete (Basle, 1988).
Other elements of capital are admitted into tier 2 up to an amount equal to
that of tier 1 capital also referred to as 'core capital'. The major eligible components
for tier 2 or supplementary capital include (i) undisclosed reserves, (ii) revaluation
reserves, (iii) general provisions/general loan loss reserves, (iv) hybrid debt capital
instruments and (v) subordinated term debt. According to the Committee, each of
these elements may be included or excluded by national supervisory authorities at
their discretion in the light of their national accounting and supervisory regulations.
The unpublished or hidden reserves as the name suggests refer to only reserves
which, though unpublished, have passed through the profit & loss account and
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perhaps more importantly, which are accepted by the bank's supervisory authorities.
The Committee realised the possibility that such reserves may be inherently of the
same intrinsic quality as published retained earnings but is more disposed towards its
exclusion as a core capital element since many countries hardly recognised such
reserves. They seem to lack transparency and this may not be appropriate in the
context of setting widely applicable international minimum standards.
The revaluation reserves are important for banking systems which allow banks
to revalue certain assets to reflect their current value, or at least something closer
to their current value than historic cost. Such systems even consider such revaluation
reserves to be eligible components of a bank's capital base. It is however, demanded
that where such reserves are to be considered as part of supplementary tier 2 capital,
the authorities must ensure that the assets are considered to have been prudently
valued, especially fully reflecting the possibility of price fluctuations and forced sale.
The Central Bank of Nigeria has since implemented this provision as part of the
larger Basle capital adequacy scheme. General provisions/general loan loss reserves
qualify for inclusion in tier 2 capital if they are not set aside to take care of
particular assets and do not reflect a reduction in the valuation of particular assets.
Perpetual preference shares carrying cumulative fixed charge are considered part of
hybrid debt capital instruments. Perpetual debt instruments in the United Kingdom
and mandatory convertible debt instruments in the United Sates are also examples
of qualifying components. In the case of Nigeria, convertible fixed rate debentures
will also qualify for inclusion. Finally, subordinated term debt with a minimum
orginal term to maturity of over five years may be included within the supplementary
capital elements and in fact subject to adequate authorisation arrangements.
Some deductions are also to be made from a bank's capital base. These are
goodwill, to be deducted from tier 1 capital and investment in subsidiaries engaged
in banking and financial activities which are not consolidated in national systems.
Such deductions as expressed by the latter are essential to prevent the multiple use
of the same capital resources in different parts of the group. The risk weighted
approach to capital adequacy assessment is further expatiated and discussed in sub-
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section 3.4.4.
3.4 The Measurement and Assessment of Capital Adequacy
Capital adequacy is generally assessed in terms of the ratio of capital and
resources to total deposits. Some monetary authorities, like the Bank of England, at
times prefer to employ a ratio of free resources to public liabilities whereby
investments in fixed assets such as premises, in subsidiary and associated companies
and in unquoted investments are deducted from capital and resources, and a residual
figure is set against deposit liabilities and other liabilities (Bank of England, 1975).
The Bank agrees that although capital/deposit ratios do provide some measure
of the overall capital adequacy of a bank, in present circumstances, it is thought that
a more effective measure is capital resources in relation to the risks, if any, in
different classes of assets. The assessment of capital adequacy on this basis may be
derived from figures of total capital resources, but a bank's capacity to withstand risk
is also to some extent dependent on the element of freely usable reserves within that
total. The Bank suggested that the assessment of capital required for protection
against risks should be made in relation to broad categories of assets instead of
basing it on individual assets. For instance, as earlier mentioned, fixed assets must be
covered on a one-to-one basis by capital resources. Assets such as cash and balances
with the Bank of England etc are to be regarded as risk-free. Other assets such as
loans and advances are also categorised according to their degree of risk, e.g. an
unsecured loan will attract a higher rate of solvency requirement than a secured loan.
Other assets that need to be covered by capital reserves will be noted in this review.
Our discussion of the subject of assessment of capital adequacy cannot be
complete without recognising that almost every country in the world has got its own
set of solvency ratios, ranging from simple net worth/deposits or net worth/total assets
ratio through a net worth/risk assets ratio to the complicated ones like those of the
Federal Reserve System in the U.S. and in Nigeria which are based on capital
requirements appropriate to each of a long list of asset classes. While it is difficult
to comment on such wide range systems, we have discovered that there are certain
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features common to all systems of prescribed solvency ratios. The following common
features have been listed by Revell (1975): first, a fixed minimum of capital required
for licensing or recognition by the authorities; secondly, it is a normal expectation for
any new company to incur losses during the early years of its life before profits can
be made and reserves accumulated from earnings. Thirdly, the existence of risks
entailing heavy losses; the probability that a particular institution will suffer large
losses of this type is generally quite low, but if it does the greater part of a small net-
worth could be wiped out in one stroke. A good example of this type of risk is the
possibility of damages in a law suit.
In Nigeria as well as other parts of the world, the tendency over the past 5
years has been to raise minimum levels of capital required for licensing. In some
countries, the minimum capital is put so high that it prevents new entry and
encourages monopoly.
Most regulatory authorities in many countries relate bank capital to some
items on its balance sheet like total liabilities, total deposits, other liabilities, total
assets less liquid assets and other assets. By relating capital to liabilities, the
regulators are seeking to sustain the confidence of depositors and creditors in the
banking system. Another justification for relating a bank's capital to liabilities is that
there is a relationship between the amount of liabilities and the risk of losses
resulting from realising assets prematurely to meet deposit withdrawals. While it is
agreeable that the ratios which measure a bank's capital in relation to its
liabilities/deposits can be regarded as useful indicators of a bank's gearing, in the
sense that they measure the extent to which the bank's assets are financed by
depositors, the usefulness of such ratios as a measure of a bank's soundness remains
questionnable, as the capital/deposit ratio does not take into account the risk
characteristics of the bank's assets themselves. It is widely acknowledged that the
major sources of vulnerability in banking are the risk assets held by banks. The risk
assets are of more importance in assessing the soundness of a bank than the
relationship between capital and deposits. It seems meaningless therefore to impose
the same capital-deposit ratio on two banks with the same deposit base but different
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risk-asset portfolios. What really matters in solvency then is the degree of risk selection
by each bank not the absolute size of its deposit base (Oduyemi, 1981).
We agree entirely with this conclusion on the grounds that since
capital/deposit ratio fails to take into account the risks attached to a bank's assets,
it is possible to have a relatively high ratio of capital to deposits but a very low ratio
of capital to risk assets. Having shown that losses mostly result from a bank's assets,
we agree that there should be a shift from capital/deposit ratios to capital/assets
ratios, as solvency ratios based on the latter are of more value in determining how
vulnerable a bank is. Capital/asset ratios are generally designed to ensure that
possible losses arising from a bank's assets are covered to a certain minimum extent
by the bank's capital. Thus, it recognises the functional role of a bank's capital as the
cushion to absorb losses which are inherent in risk assets. It also allows a bank's
deposit/liabilities to expand without having to increase capital as long as the deposits
are used to finance quality assets.
It must be noted, however, that it is not always easy to determine the degree
of risk inherent in bank assets. And to determine capital requirements of each bank,
it is essential to assess the degree of risk in each asset. Some monetary authorities
have devised means of evaluation which have not been found so far to be accurate
and scientific. In the U.S., bank examiners use the method of evaluating the loan-
assets of banks by careful scrutiny and examination which may lead to loans being
classified as good, substandard, doubtful and loss. Those categorised into sub-
standard, doubtful and loss are totalled up and a percentage of the total of each
category is expected to be covered by capital. For example, loans classified doubtful
need capital requirement of 50% while those classified loss must be covered 100%.
The U.S. system has been adopted by the Central Bank of Nigeria. In the U.K., the
Bank of England ascribes weight to different categories of risk assets. For example,
loans and advances are weighted unity, while bank premises are given a weight of
two. The risk-asset ratio is then calculated by multiplying each balance sheet item by
its weight to produce the adjusted total of risk assets, which total is then expressed
in relation to the capital base of the bank. We criticise the rigid capital asset ratios
69
on the grounds that such ratios do not recognise that economies of scale\scope play
a major role in influencing the loss profile of a bank. Large banks with well
diversified spread of high quality loan-assets will be less exposed to losses and
therefore require relatively less capital for credit risks. If there is a default on one of
the loans this will be a small proportion of its total loan portfolio, unlike a small bank
with a narrower customer base. Also, large banks are less exposed to liquidity risks
than the smaller ones because for bigger banks, any withdrawals of deposit represent
a small proportion of its total deposit base. Finally, bigger banks tend to have easier
and cheaper access to capital and money market funds than the smaller banks.
Revell (1975) discusses the Bank of England approach of using the concept
of free resources (net worth less fixed assets) in capital adequacy assessments, the
same approach is implicit in Vojta's (1973) scheme. This approach is preferred for
a number of reasons including the following:
1) It completely removes the possibility of artificially boosting capital
ratios through frequent revaluations at times of rising prices. In fact,
it dodges the valuation problem altogether, since equal amounts are
deducted from both sides of the balance sheet whatever the valuation.
Fixed assets may be carried at book value without distorting the
balance sheet, and there is no artificial incentive to incur the
considerable expense of frequent professional valuations.
2) It concentrates attention on the amount of net worth available to serve
as a risk cushion.
3.4.1 Capital Ratios: Uses and Limitations 
Capital ratios have been used as a means of determining solvency of banks
since the time when it was generally believed to be the only sure test of soundness.
We have seen how, over the years, bank capital ratios have steadily declined after it
was proved conclusively that strong capital ratios do not insure solvency. The most
popular capital ratios over the years have been those which relate a bank's capital to
some items on the balance sheet, such as total liabilities, total deposits, total assets,
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etc.
The question that has agitated the minds of banking experts, including
regulators and practitioners, is the degree of reliability of capital ratios as a means
of determining the soundness of banks. What evidence do we have to prove that bank
failure is related to poor capital base?
In a study conducted by Orgler (1975) to analyse the predictive performance
of capital adequacy measures in estimating recoveries from failed banks and to
improve the prediction of recoveries by adding other variables to the capital measures
within the context of a multivariate model, it was shown that simple capital ratios and
other financial variables that are calculated from bank statements are of little use in
predicting net recoveries from failed banks. While this result is not surprising, given
the limitations of accounting information, it raises some doubts on the widespread
use of simple capital ratios.
In a more recent study, Koehn and Santomero (1980) tried to examine
explicitly the issue of portfolio reaction on the behaviour of commercial banks. It was
found that regulating bank capital through ratio constraints appears to be an
inadequate tool to control the riskiness of banks and the probability of failure. Also,
Pringle (1974) concluded that the key determinants of optimal capital policies are
future-oriented i.e. expectations regarding future loan demand, deposit levels and
financing costs. Capital adequacy guidelines based on static balance sheet ratios
(capital/deposits, capital/risk assets, etc), the usual regulatory approach, thus have
little relevance to shareholder interests.
The trend of de-emphasizing capital ratios started long before academicians
began their debate. For many years academicians seem to be moving towards the
elimination of ratio analysis as an analytical technique in assessing the performance
of a company. Attempts have been made to bridge the gap rather than sever the link
between traditional ratio analysis and the more rigorous statistical techniques which
have become popular among academicians in recent years (Altman, 1968).
In the U.S.A. the ratio of capital accounts to deposits of the average insured
bank is shown by Apilado and Gies (1972) to have declined from 14.7% in 1935 to
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8.7% in 1969. In the U.K. up to 1969, banks were not required to declare their true
profits hence part of the capital and reserves appeared in the balance sheets under
deposits. From 1969, however, Revell (1975) showed that the U.K. clearing and
Scottish clearing banks began to declare true profits and the average ratio of capital
to public liabilities declined from 3.8% in 1969 to 2.5% in 1974. The reason
attributed to the decline is the fact that deposits and assets have grown faster than
capital. Studies have also shown that the decline in capital ratios in the U.S. and U.K.
has had a parallel in almost every European country. Banks in the Netherlands, West
Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries have been roughly
comparable to equivalent U.S banks in size of capital accounts and, in fact, banks in
France and Italy tended to maintain much lower ratios similar to those of the U.K
banks. Major Japanese banks have also maintained lower levels of capital than do
U.S. banks.
Vojta (1973) concluded, after a thorough review of a number of studies on the
relevance of capital ratio in assessing the solvency of banks that:
"The weight of scholastic research is overwhelmingly to the effect
that the level of bank capital has not been a material factor in
preventing bank insolvency, and that ratio 'tests' for capital
adequacy have not been useful in assessing or predicting the
capability of a bank to remain solvent. Further, the documented
insolvency experience of the banking system suggests that the most
important causal factors relating to solvency are competence and
integrity of management."
Thus, according to Vojta, in periods of stability bank failures are likely to be caused
principally by inept or dishonest management practices.
Secrist (1938) studied 1,784 ratios of capital/deposits for national banks in the
U.S. which covered from 1921 to the year of failure and 1,221 ratios from 1921-1931
for national banks which did not fail. Capital/deposit ratio to be maintained in
accordance with the prevailing regulatory standard was 10%. Secrist found that the
ratios were lower for non-failures than for failures, that the earlier the time of failure
the higher the average and prevailing levels of capital. Thus, the assertion that banks
in order to remain solvent must have ratio of at least 10% is illusory. According to
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this standard the safer institutions are those first to fail. The same conclusion was
reached in regard to the ratio of capital funds to total liabilities by Secrist (1938) and
Cotter (1966).
Apilado and Gies (1972) tested statistically the applicability of Federal Reserve
Board of New York's capital/adjusted risk asset tests for capital adequacy and an
excess capital approach as defined by Cotter (1966) in a study covering the period of
1960-69. The overall results show that the Federal Reserve Board's formulation does
not clearly show that banks which failed would likely be capital-deficient at the time
of failure. They found an excess capital approach to be more promising. They agreed
that it could not be unequivocally concluded from the study that ratio analysis is
useful in measuring capital adequacy. Bank failures cannot be attributed to particular
standards of capitalisation that have been maintained. In the depression, banks failed
because they became illiquid as a consequence of the deterioration in asset portfolios.
In more normal conditions, incompetent management practices were the primary
cause of failure. The behaviour of regulators, particularly in the U.S. gave credence
to these conclusions. In the 1950s Federal Reserve regulators moved to a
capital/adjusted risk asset approach to capital adequacy which related capital funds
to risk assets computed as total assets less a more broadly defined category of
relatively riskless assets; the standard usually applied was $1 of capital funds required
for $6 of risk assets in the balance sheet.
In 1952, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York began a new system of
categorising all assets according to risk and assigned capital requirements to each.
Minimum capital required was defined as equal to 100% of computed capital
requirement; banks with capital funds of over 125% were rarely questioned. In 1956
adjusted risk asset approach which introduced a liquidity test, a new dimension to
capital adequacy requirements, was tried. With this system, banks which experienced
liquidity problems required more capital. In 1962 the Comptroller of the Currency
departed from the prevailing regulatory standard by officially de-emphasising
traditional ratio analysis as an approach to capital adequacy in favour of a focus on
managerial performance articulated in general guidelines appropriate for banks
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operating in normal conditions.
The new approach of the Comptroller of Currency may be summarised as
follows: The standard capital to deposit ratios are no longer relied upon because such
arbitrary formulas do not always take into account factors like:
(a) Quality of management.
(b) Liquidity of assets.
(c) The history of earnings and of the retention thereof.
(d) The quality and character of ownership.
(e) The burden of meeting occupancy expenses.
(f) Potential volatility of the banks deposit structure.
(g) The quality of operating procedures.
(h) The bank's capacity to meet present and future financial needs of its
trade area considering the competition it faces.
The following formula which relates capital to the volume of loans and
discounts was introduced:
Gross Loans + Discounts 
Total Capital + Reserves
Where gross loans exceed 7 times the total capital accounts, that is an indication of
problem. Loans are analysed for quality and liquidity. Earnings also are given due
attention and weight.
It was realised that a bank with a good earnings record would enjoy the
following advantages:
(a) pay adequate salaries and thus attract and retain executive talent;
(b) withstand a shrinkage in asset values;
(c) raise new capital because of greater investor appeal;
(d) permit the payment of competitive interest rates on deposits;
(e) support investment in modern and efficient premises, fixtures and
equipment.
A bank with good earnings record is therefore a more viable competitor.
Measurement of asset quality through credit examination and loan
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classification was introduced. The volume of aggregate assets classified doubtful and
loss are related to gross capital funds and reserves.
A very crucial aspect of bank performance is management. In judging the
quality of management the overall condition of the bank was taken into
consideration: for example,
liquidity position;
earnings compared with banks of similar size;
the adequacy of its credit files;
the effectiveness of collection efforts;
-	 the quality and distribution of the investment account;
the adequacy of internal controls; and
the efficiency of operations.
On the whole it can be seen that regulatory opinion in the U.S. is deeply
divided on the issue of capital adequacy. The position is aptly described by Vojta as
follows:
"In essence, the Federal Reserve Board's adjusted risk asset 'liquidity
approach quantifies capital required to protect a bank under abnormal
conditions. Additionally, non balance sheet factors are weighed in judging
the bank's capital position. The FDIC continues to rely on a ratio of capital
funds, net of investments in fixed and sub-standard assets, to average total
assets. The comptroller of the currency de-emphasizes static ratios, relying
instead on guidelines for appraising management performance and viewing
the bank as a going concern under normal conditions."
The conclusion that the capital ratio has not been a good guide in assessing
solvency of banks was brought out more clearly in relation to the post-depression
period in the study conducted by Vojta (1973) as follows:
"FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) experience is the best
record on bank failures available. From 1934 through December 31, 1968,
the FDIC made disbursement to protect depositors in 473 insured banks
with 1.6 million depositors with total deposits amounting to $838.7 million.
99.7%  depositors were fully paid representing 97.1%  of total deposit...
There have been no banks in recent times that were closed principally
because of economic factors."
FDIC also confirmed that the causes of bank failure have been wholly related to
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incompetent or dishonest management.
The logical conclusion from this analysis is that quality of management is of
paramount importance and remains the most effective safeguard against insolvency
or bank failure. Therefore, while it is essential to consider capital in assessing a
bank's ability to perform, it is perhaps more important to investigate the bank's
managerial efficiency. Walter Bagehot had supported this in concluding that, what
is needed for a sound banking system is not good laws but good bankers. Invariably, the
quality of management determines the quality of its assets, and the degree of care
exhibited in risk selection. The quality of management manifests itself in the
soundness of internal control systems, prevention of fraud and ability to manage
liquidity. The truth is that no amount of capital can save a bank that is grossly
mismanaged. Gardener (1981) provided empirical evidence which suggests strongly
that ratios and legalistic approaches to capital adequacy are both inaccurate and
misleading tools when used alone. He suggested a complementary approach which
utilises a computer simulation model to test a bank's prudential strength in a forward
looking setting, which he described as contingency testing.
3.4.2 Liquidity and Solvency in Commercial Banking
Revell (1976) described liquidity as the ability to settle debts on the due date,
and solvency as the ability to settle debts ultimately or at any date. In other words,
liquidity is concerned with ensuring the availability of funds in the day-to-day business
of a bank under normal conditions, whereas solvency is concerned with the
availability of funds under crisis situation. In the long run, both solvency and liquidity
are concerned with the same basic problem, which is the availability of funds in cash
to meet the obligations of the company.
There are other reasons why a bank wants liquidity, apart from settlement of
debts. Encompassed in the settlement of obligations is deposit withdrawals. A bank
is legally required to pay its demand deposits whenever its customers want them,
which alone is sufficient to dictate the bank's concern for liquidity. The other
compelling reason why a bank needs liquidity is the need to be able to meet the
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reasonable loan requests of its customers. Not only are bank loans profitable, but a
bank that would not or cannot make loans to its depositors when they need funds is
not likely to keep those depositors for very long.
Liquidity and capital adequacy are two performance measures required for the
maintenance of a sound banking system. Section 6(2) of the Banks and Other
Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID) of 1991 stipulates that the Central Bank of
Nigeria may specify the minimum ratio which licensed banks shall maintain between
their respective paid-up capital and all retained earnings, on the one hand, and their
loans and advances, on the other. This ratio has varied between 1:12 and 1:10 in
Nigeria in the last decade. Liquidity ratio is another regulatory instrument of the
Central Bank, which is concerned with the amount of cash and short-term funds
which banks must maintain for their day-to-day operations. This ratio has varied
between 25% and 30% during the last 10 years.
(a)	 Cash Flow Analysis Approach
The various sources of liquidity would not be apparent in the conventional
balance sheet as published annually if liquidity is related to the balance sheet
structure alone. To be of use, such conventional balance sheet would need to have
the maturities of deposits and loans specified in aggregate, but instead it is done by
type of assets. Balance sheets would also have to list all lines of credit and other
liquid resources already negotiated by banks. Even if the balance sheet presentation
is modified in this way it would not enable one "to determine how the financial
institution proposed to use the resources of liquidity available; it would show merely what
resources were available at some point in the past" (Revell 1975). We now review
another approach which will show the plans of a bank for ensuring the liquidity of
its operations over the next one year or so through the use and application of the
techniques of cash flow forecast, which will cover in detail all the different types of
cash inflow and outflow.
The procedure is simple. It consists of projecting the inflows and outflows of
cash expected over a future period as a result of the normal operations of the bank
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and predicting the increase or decrease in cash requirements at the end of each
interval of the period. The increases or decreases in cash requirements are then met
by accommodating flows of various kinds. The accommodating flows could be in form
of: (i) purchase or sale of liquid assets; (ii) use of borrowing; and (iii) changes in the
timing of the operating flows by the use of trade credit.
Some advanced models of cash flow forecast attach probabilities to each of the
inflows and outflows, and an optimum level of liquidity is often suggested by the use
of computer simulation. This approach emphasizes the future implication of
operation of the bank on its liquidity. Cash flow analysis has been recommended as
a useful approach to liquidity adequacy because it shifts emphasis away from the
historical data embodied in even the most recent balance sheet and focuses attention
on immediate future plans of operation. And according to Revell (1975), Liquidity
of the company is ensured by budgeting for sources of funds to cover any expected
cash deficiency.
Revell concluded that the cash flow forecast is potentially the most important
accounting document for the use of supervisors. It gets away from the historical data
embodied in even the most recent balance sheet, and it directs attention to the
management plans for the institution for the immediate future.
(b)	 Assessment of Liquidity and Capital Adequacy
Bank of England (1980) provided the basis for assessing the adequacy of
liquidity of all deposit-taking companies, in order to determine their ability to meet
their obligations when they fall due. Such obligations mainly comprise demand
deposits, deposits at short notice, term deposits and commitments to lend, including
unutilised overdraft facilities. Banks are expected to show ability and capacity to meet
these primary obligations. The Bank listed three ways in which the capacity may be
provided.
i) * by holding sufficient immediately available cash or liquefiable assets;
ii) by securing an appropriately matching future profile of cash flows from
maturing assets;
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iii)	 by maintaining an adequately diversified deposit base in terms both of
maturities and range of counter parties (bank and non-bank) which,
depending importantly on the individual bank's standing in the market
and on the general liquidity situation in the system at the time, may
provide the ability to raise fresh deposits without undue cost.
Banks are expected to maintain at all times a prudent mix of these three forms
of liquidity in order to satisfy the Bank of England supervisory objective. The
responsibility for ensuring liquidity was placed on the management of banks as no
specific ratio was imposed on banks. The Bank continues with its normal surveillance
over banks by monitoring their activities including liquidity management. The original
method for measuring involved a comparison of deposit liabilities with specified liquid
assets.
According to Bank of England, this approach has the virtue of simplicity but
does not take account of the development of liability or asset management techniques
for controlling liquidity through cash flows. This approach also involves an over-sharp
distinction between liquid assets and other assets, many of which will be capable of
generating cash in particular circumstances.
The new method recommended by the Bank in 1980 is based on cash flows
approach in which liabilities and assets are inserted in a 'maturity ladder', with the
net positions in each time period being accumulated. In the first maturity bands on
the ladder this measure, by comparing sight and near sight liabilities with cash and
assets capable of generating cash immediately, is similar to a customary liquid assets
ratio. Marketable assets are placed at the start of the maturity ladder, rather than
according to their maturity date, but account needs to be taken of limitations on their
marketability and their susceptibility to price fluctuations. Commitments are
recognised by being included in liabilities or as agreed in specific cases. The measure
is thus a series of accumulating net mismatch positions in successive time bands
(Bank of England, 1980).
Ultimately, a bank with a persistent liquidity problem must curtail its lending
activities, as excessive lending is usually the major cause of a shortage of liquidity. If
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a bank is unable to attract sufficient deposits, but continues to expand its lending
activities, this will result in illiquidity.
3.4.3 On the Relationship Between Liquidity and Capital
Revell (1975) fully examined the ways in which liquidity and capital are related
in modern banking. He identified four forms of liquidity for a bank:
1) the currency, demand deposits and other perfectly liquid assets held by
it;
2) its assets that can be readily sold with little risk of loss;
3) its projected net cash inflows from on-going business; and
4) its ability to acquire additional cash by borrowing.
This item referred to as liability management is a relatively new concept. Items (1)
and (2) are both connected to capital in the same two ways.
On the one hand, a bank reduces its revenues and its net income by remaining
highly liquid, ceteris paribus. By increasing its liquidity, a bank reduces the capacity
of its current earnings to absorb losses without diminishing its previously accumulated
capital and also decreases the amount of net earnings from which it can increase its
capital through retained earnings. On the other hand, by decreasing its liquidity held
in forms of (1) and (2), a bank is increasing the chance that deposit withdrawals or
the maturing of long-term liabilities will wipe out its liquidity and so force it to sell
less liquid assets at a considerable loss. This loss will decrease its net income, from
which new capital can be accumulated through retained earnings, and could even
cause a net operating loss that would reduce the bank's capital. Thus, there is an
optimum liquidity position for the bank that balances lower expected revenue against
lower risk of running out of liquid assets to meet withdrawals.
Underlying this trade-off is the impact on the bank's capital position. Too
much or too little liquidity held in forms (1) and (2) can adversely affect the bank's
capital. According to Short (1978), a high rate of cash inflow suggests a high rate of
net earnings and this implies that a bank can absorb unexpected losses and will be
able to augment its capital through retained earnings. There is certainly the likelihood
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that a bank with a net cash outflow will have to compensate by drawing down its
liquid assets or by borrowing more. The negative cash flow itself suggests a very poor
earning position and actions taken to compensate for reduced liquidity by running
down liquid assets and resorting to liability management may lead to additional
losses. Thus low cash inflow may be a symptom of poor net earnings and may
aggravate this situation.
The fourth form of bank liquidity is a bank's ability to borrow additional funds
to meet unexpected cash needs owing either to withdrawals of deposits and other
short term liabilities or the identification of profitable new lending opportunities.
Although the practice of borrowing to obtain additional funds is very old, the
treatment of and reliance on the potential to borrow as a source of liquidity, which
is referred to as liability management is relatively new to banking. Liability
management is generally thought of as a bank's ability to borrow in a very short-term
interbank market (such as call money or certificates of deposit), but also encompasses
deposits as source of additional borrowing. The essence of liability management is
that, when it is in a bank's interest to do so, it can borrow additional funds instead
of running down its liquid assets or re-allocating its cash flow.
Liability management and capital adequacy are also related. First, a bank's
capacity to borrow partly depends on lenders' assessments of its solvency. Of course
a bank that is believed to be virtually insolvent will be unable to borrow at all.
Second, illiquidity that obliges a bank to borrow to satisfy its cash requirements,
instead of choosing to do so as the profit-maximizing alternative, will reduce the
bank's net earnings and may even cause it to suffer a loss that will have to be charged
to its capital. Moreover, if lenders know about the bank's predicament, they may
require the bank to bear an onerous interest rate. Thus, borrowing that is forced
upon a bank can be destructive, by eroding its net earnings and capital. Short (1978)
aptly summarised this important discussion in the following words: Liquidity can be
viewed as the availability of funds that ensure that a bank can pay its current obligations
(including deposit withdrawals and maturing long-term liabilities), while capital can be
regarded as funds that ensure that all liabilities could be repaid if the bank were to be
81
liquidated. Considered in this manner, the only difference between liquidity and
capital is the time perspective - liquidity referring to the present and capital to some
indefinite period in the future.
3.4.5 Convergence of Capital Measurements and Standards4
In 1974, in the wake of significant international banking disruptions, the
governors of the Central banks of the member countries of the 'Group of Ten' plus
the government of the Central Bank of Switzerland, established in Basle, Switzerland,
the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. This Committee
was more recently renamed the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. Since its
inception, the Committee had cultivated the practice of meeting regularly three to
four times a year. It serves as an informal forum for on-going co-operation on
banking prudential supervision matters.
The Committee's primary aim is to encourage a gradual convergence of bank
supervisory practices of the member regulatory institutions by enhancing the scope
and effectiveness of supervisory techniques for international banking activities, by
studying and making recommendations on specific areas of prudential concern in
international banking, and by facilitating the exchange of information among bank
supervisors so as to upgrade the quality of international bank supervision (Norton,
1992).
The Committee began making its impact with a paper (popularly called the
Concordat) which it prepared in 1975, proposing guidelines for the respective
responsibilities of different bank supervisory authorities regarding the supervision of
banks where those entities were operating in more than one national jurisdiction
(Norton, 1992). This was in response to the identified need to close existing
supervisory gaps with regard to international banking operations. Among other areas
4 This section benefitted a great deal from Norton, J. J. ed. (1992) Bank
Regulation and Supervision in the 1990s (Lloyds of London Press Ltd)
and Pecchioli R.M. (1987) Prudential Supervision in Banking, OECD.
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of practical co-operation among supervisory authorities were, direct transfers of
information, direct inspections by parent authorities on territory of host authority and
indirect inspections by host authorities at the request of parent authorities. The 1975
Concordat was revised and expanded in 1983.
Another significant area in which the impact of the Committee's efforts has
been felt is in the area of evolving capital measurements and capital standards for
banks. The Committee published its report on the risk based capital adequacy ratio
in July, 1988. This represents a modification of the 1987 proposal which it put
forward. The 1987 proposals was similar to the contents of the US/UK accord which
was being implemented from January 1987. The US Federal Banking Regulatory
Authorities and the Bank of England agreed on a common capital adequacy system
which was implemented along with each country's domestic regulatory process/system,
with the hope that eventually, the common system would be installed.
Believing that a weighted risk ratio in which capital is related to different
categories of asset or off balance-sheet exposure, weighted according to broad categories
of relative riskiness, is the preferred method for assessing the capital adequacy of banks,
the committee distinguished two tiers of capital and five risk weights corresponding
to the perceived risk associated with five categories of risk assets. Tier one capital
refers to core capital which compromises equity capital and published reserves. Tier
two capital include perpetual preferred stocks (or preferred stock having an original
maturing date of at least 5 years) and qualified subordinated debt adjustment to
capital.
The 1988 agreement contained several modifications to the 1987 proposals.
Non-cumulative preferred stock is now to be included in the definition of tier one
core capital. The Report also indicated that term debt instruments must have a
minimum original term of maturing of over five years to qualify for inclusion into tier
two capital.
As for the risk weighting of assets, in differentiating between the categories
of risk assets, higher weights are assigned to higher risk assets. The five categories
of risk assets attract risk weights of 0%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 100% on perceived
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credit risks in such categories. Government securities with remaining maturities of
91 days or less would be assigned a 0% risk weight while all other federal government
and agency obligations would be assigned to the 10% risk category.
Assets in the 0% class, reflecting no significant risk, were to include vault cash
and claims on the domestic central bank; the 10% class included short-term claims
of international governments or government agencies; the 20% risk assets such as
short-term claims on domestic or foreign banking institutions and government
guaranteed loans, the 50% group included claims on domestic national government
sponsored agencies and claims on multinational development institutions and all
domestic and local government general obligation claims; and the 100% category
involved the greatest degree of long-term risk, including long-term (over one year)
claims on domestic depository institutions of foreign banks, most claims on foreign
governments, and all other assets.
In Nigeria, short-term assets such as cash in hand, cash balances held with
banks in Nigeria and federal government treasury certificates and treasury bills attract
0% weight. The famous liquidity mop-up instrument; that is, assets held in the form
of stabilisation securities also attract 0% weight. Balances with banks outside Nigeria
attract a risk weight of 20%. As for loans, facilities to government and its agencies
attracts 0% risk weighting, residential mortgage loans attract 50% weight while
private sector commercial loans attract 100% weight. The same applies to other
types of loans as well as fixed and other assets.
The purpose of the capital agreement was to strengthen the capital base of the
banking system. Banks have been observed to have made rapid progress toward
attaining the prescribed standards. A relatively long transitional period of five years
was felt necessary noting the varying degrees of adjustments that would need to be
made by banks in different countries. To, however, aid the attainment of the
minimum standard weighted risk asset ratio of 8% (of which at least 4 percentage
points should be in the form of core capital), a target ratio of 7.25% was prescribed
to be met by the end of 1990 (of which 3.25 percentage points must be in the form
of core capital). These transitional targets were also adopted in Nigeria over the
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same period.
To the extent that Banking hinges a lot on confidence, quite a number of
banks have felt that their market position could be enhanced, by strengthening their
capital position, especially in line with the Basle capital ratio. This has seen a
number of them adhering to the set target even before the take-off date.
Bankers and other observers are known to have claimed as the major objective
of the Basle agreement, the levelling of an uneven playing field among banks and
their international counterparts. This was, however, not so. Principally, it was geared
towards the strengthening of the capital position of the international banking system.
As Hayward (1991) further noted, systems of bank supervision have hardly been
created to ensure fair play, but rather to ensure the safety and soundness of national
banking systems and protect interests of depositors.
3.5	 Investigation of Bank Performance: A Review of Some Significant Approaches
Bank performance can be measured using different proxies. In some instances,
we may restrict our attention to the net profit after tax as the measure of bank
performance, in some profit before tax while yet in others, it may be based on the
level of loans and advances, total assets or deposits. Many measures do exist and have
been adopted and employed both in theory and practice to measure and rate
performance of banks. The measures identified above, not being an exhaustive one
in the least, are essentially magnitudes and the use of such factors has been generally
criticized. They do not really allow for an interbank comparison of performance as
they do not remove the scale effects. More appropriately, financial ratios have been
adopted which, among other things, are capable of giving an indication of
management efficiency, loan composition and risk, liquidity, profitability as well as
capital adequacy. The use of financial ratios has a major advantage in that they do
correct for size and scale and their use by firms in general and banks in particular
dates back over 75 years.
Bank performance has attracted so much investigation due to the fact that
banks occupy a special position in any economy, both developed and developing, and
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play a significant role in the economy. They are, as it were, the bedrock of the
economy. As such, in the history of banking and economies of many nations, banks
have been perhaps the most widely regulated of all businesses (Adekanye, 1986;
Oyejide and Soyibo, 1988). More specifically, the focus on bank performance has
both been along pure and applied research. Efforts have been geared towards
identifying the causes of bank failures, which at a time, was a fairly common
occurence particularly in the United States economy, and the development of signal
systems for detecting impending failure some periods before it manifests itself. The
latter is a preventive approach rather than a curative approach. In the 1940s and
1950s over 100 banks failed in the United States and more are still failing from time
to time. In terms of magnitude this is a relative significant size being an economy that
had over 15,000 banks at the time. However, the significance in terms of proportion
still does not adequately reflect the dangers and problems to the economy, inherent
in such failures.
Bank performance related research have been considerable in respect of both
the determinants or factors that are highly associated with failure/success and the
possibility of knowing before hand that in a short period, if no adequate measures
are taken, the bank may go bankrupt. This latter aspect has attracted and sustained
the attention of researchers, both academics and bankers, as well as the monetary
authorities, for more than 30 years. The research efforts cover the characteristics of
problem banks, predictors of bank failure, predictions of bank failures, analysis of
bank performance, determinants of de novo bank performance, prediction of
commercial bank failure in a deregulated era and identification of problem banks.
Most of these research efforts have been centred upon commercial rather than
merchant banks and, in very many of the cases, unit banks, which form the bulk of
the banking sector of the United States. Also, perhaps over 75% of existing relevant
literature has been based on United States' banks with little or no focus on banks in
developing economies. Awareness, relative lack of experience of bank failure,
relatively small number of banks, and the lack of adequate data are major reasons
for this.
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From the foregoing, we find it necessary to state, at this juncture, that,
although, it would have been desired to review as much as possible the several facets
of research on bank performance, due to space and time constraints, such a
comprehensive survey cannot be embarked upon. Essentially, for the purpose of this
study, we review as much as possible the major efforts and issues on the development
of models which are capable of signalling impending trouble for banks. These models
are more appropriately referred to as Early Warning Systems (EWS). In establishing
an early warning system, the bank regulator's primary desire is to minimise the
misclassification of problem banks as non-problem banks.
In each of the many instances in which such systems of models have been
developed, it has tended to proceed along two main directions:
(i) identification of the significant factors determining the health status of
the banks, and
(ii) based on the best set of factors, attempting a prediction or
classification.
The latter part is usually an attempt to assess, with the view to improving
upon, the predictive capability of the models. These models in many cases are being
adopted by Bank Supervision Departments and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) for classifying banks into problem and non-problem banks in the
United States.
The development of Early Warning Systems (EWS) has been variable with
respect to:
(a) the classification of banks/firms into groups;
(b) the adopted factors of prediction or relative significance;
(c) the adopted techniques of analysis;
(d) the level of aggregation;
(e) the classification of information adopted; and
(f) the conclusion reached.
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Classification of Banks
With respect to the classification of banks, while some have used the
problem/non-problem classification (Sinkey, 1975), some adopt the failed/non-failed
classification, while still some use bankrupt/non-bankrupt classification. Korobow and
Stuhr (1975) used vulnerable/resistant classification while Hunter and Srinivasan
(1990) and Arshadi and Lawrence (1987) adopt the financially successful/non-
financially successful classification. The use of classifications though centres around
bank performance essentially, also portrays that while banks which have failed
completely have been compared with banks which survived during and after the same
period as the latter (as in the case of failed\non-failed classification), in the other
instances in which there have been no failure, measures had been taken prior to
classifying banks into vulnerable and resistant classes with subsequent analysis having
been based on this. Hunter and Srinivasan (1990) used vulnerable/resistant
classification and defined as a financially resistant bank one whose return on assets
(ROA) is at least 80% of the median ROA for established banks with less than $100
million in assets in the same bank's state of charter. The problem/non-problem
classification as adopted by Sinkey (1975) was based on the classification by the
FDIC. A problem bank, going by this classification, is one that, in the eyes of the
Federal Banking Agencies, has violated a law or regulation or engaged in an unsafe
or unsound banking practice to such an extent that the present or future solvency of
the bank is in question.
These problem banks are identified during bank examinations. The purposes
of bank examination being (1) to determine the asset quality of the bank's portfolio,
(2) to determine the nature of liabilities, (3) to ascertain compliance with laws and
regulations, (4) to evaluate controls, procedures, accounting practice and insurance,
(5) to evaluate management and its policies, and (6) to determine capital adequacy.
To the FDIC a problem bank is of significant interest since it poses a greater risk to
its insurance fund than a non-problem bank (Sinkey, 1975).
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Adopted Predictive Factors 
In the second instance, we mentioned the factors adopted for prediction. The
majority of the studies have attempted to characterise or discriminate among the
banks through the use of financial ratios, and other non-quantifiable factors.
Economic conditions have also been reflected as well as demographic conditions. It
has also been shown that the financial condition of a bank can be ascertained based
on an examination of market information such as bond and stock prices (Pettway and
Sinkey, 1980; Simons and Cross, 1991). Pettway and sinkey (1980) established this in
their Early Warning System (EWS) which relied essentially on both accounting
(financial ratio) and market information. Also, these factors can be classified as
endogenous (internal) and exogenous (external) factors. This is based on the believe
that the financial condition of banks is dependent on both factors under the control
of the bank and factors outside its control. One of the high points of EWS research
is to determine the relative importance of these factors. These have been attempted
in Fraser, Phillips and Rose (1974). Arshadi and Lawrence (1987), Pantalone and
Platt (1987) and Hunter and Srinivasan (1990).
It is impossible to compile a list of all financial ratios that have been used in
EWS development research in particular and those used on daily basis over all
financial organisations in general. In most of the studies, very many are tried,
measuring different aspects of performance but are usually not stated in the article
presented. Usually only those previously established to be significant are adopted or
just a few are tried. For instance, in one of the pioneering attempts made by Altman
(1964), twenty-two ratios were used and grouped into five major categories, viz
liquidity, profitability, leverage (gearing), solvency and performance, five of which
were selected and reported as providing the best combination of ratios for the
prediction of bankruptcy. In Hunter and Srinivasan's (1990) model these ratios and
variables were classified into eight areas: (1) bank operating cost structure, (2)
leverage, (3) loan portfolio composition, (4) credit policy, (5) liquidity; being financial
ratio-oriented factors, and (6) local market structure, (7) state branching law and (8)
the economic climate of the local trade areas.
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Korobow and Stuhr (1975) used the set of variables described below: (a)
management quality (interest earned/interest paid), (b) management efficiency
(operating expenses/operating revenue), (c) capital adequacy (gross capital/total assets
and gross capital/total loans), (d) risk exposure (use of federal funds and other
borrowing, average interest on time and savings deposits, total loans/total assets, rate
of return on loans and the ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total loans),
(e) liquidity as reflected by a bank's holding of Government securities; and (f) size,
as measured by total deposits. It is important to mention, in support of our earlier
assertion that Korobow and Stuhr also recognised the existence of other variables
which could in fact be indicators of resistance to financial difficulty or vulnerability,
as their list was not meant to be exhaustive.
Pantalone and Platt (1987) classified the factors used as follows: (i)
profitability; (ii) management efficiency; (iii) leverage; (iv) risk/diversification; and (v)
state economic variables. The state economic variables include the percentage change
in (a) disposable personal income; (b) residential construction; (c) unemployment and
(d) population. Of all these, in the final analysis, only the change in residential
construction was found to be significant as an extraneous determinant of the local
area banks' financial condition. Fraser, Phillips and Rose (1974) considered both
demographic factors and economic factors and those employed included: (a) total
population; (b) urban-rural mix of the population; and (c) population density.
Economic factors included (a) growth of aggregate bank deposits; (b) taxable non-
farm payrolls; (c) growth of urban population and (d) retail sales. None of the
economic factors were found to be significant contrary to Pantalone and Platt's
(1987) findings. However, the demographic factors were significant determinants of
bank performance. Fraser, Phillips and Rose (1974) had considered six major groups
of variables consisting of (a) bank costs, (b) composition of bank credit, (c)
composition of deposits, (d) demographic factors, (e) market structure factors and
(f) economic factors. Of these factors, only the set of economic factors were found
to be insignificant in determining bank performance.
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Predictive Ability of Bank Performance Models 
The research on EWS also highlights the accuracy of these models in the
prediction of bank success or failure, or better still, in the model's ability to predict
ex ante the financial state of the banks upon which the model was developed and
estimated. Many of the models after having been estimated are used to reclassify the
sample banks. The predictive ability of the model is then obtained by examining the
percentage of banks correctly classified and by implication the impressive predictive
capabilities ranging from about 70% to 99% in many instances. The predictive ability
as in the case of already established failed banks and thus in a failed/non-failed
classification, has been shown to diminish the farther the period before failure. In
most cases, the models are capable of signalling impending trouble over a maximum
period of two years. Pantalone and Platt's logit model recorded correct classification
ability of 83.1%, 82.4% and 73.5% for the period 12 months, 18 months and 24
months before failure respectively. The same trend is observed in Korobow and Stuhr
(1975) and Sinkey (1975).
Techniques of Analysis
On the techniques of analysis employed, one can observe as the major
techniques (a) the multiple regression analysis, (b) multiple discriminant analysis; (c)
canonical correlation analysis; (d) probit and (e) logit analysis. Of these techniques,
the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) was employed mainly between the early
1970s and early 1980s while in recent times the more suitable and similar techniques
of probit and logit analysis have been employed. Notable among the studies which
have employed multiple regression analysis are Meyer and Pifer (1970), Orgler (1970)
and Parosh and Tamari (1978); those that have employed MDA include Sinkey
(1975), Pettway and Sinkey (1980), Korobow and Stuhr (1975), Altman (1968),
Altman et al (1977), Deakin (1972), Stuhr and Van Wicklen (1974). The canonical
correlation approach was adopted by Fraser, Phillips and Rose (1974). Probit analysis
was used by Hunter and Srinivasan (1990) and Arshadi and Lawrence (1989) and
Korobow, Stuhr and Martin (1976) while logit and regression approach have been
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used by Martin (1977) and Pantalone and Platt (1987).
Essentially, apart from the multiple regression analysis, all other techniques
are designed for delineating, among many characteristics common to a host of
subjects, which are the most significant for distinguishing the subjects into status
groups. Canonical correlation analysis is different from the others to the extent that
it allows for the inclusion of more than one dependent variable linearly related which
can be explained by a linear combination of other independent variables. While the
MDA is similar to both the logit and probit techniques, it differs in that it cannot
generate probability contribution of each of the independent variables to the
occurence of the dependent variable and it is easier to test for the significance of
each of the independent variables. The logit technique is a modification of the probit
technique, both techniques being very similar. While the probit model is suitable for
two group classifications (success/failure), the logit model is adequate for more than
two groups classifications just as is the MDA. However, for the case of two groups
classification, the logit model yields the same result as the probit models.
Consequently, since only two group classifications have been adopted in EWS
research, those studies which have applied the probit technique could also have
applied the logit technique and vice versa, without any loss of generality. These two
techniques compute the coefficients of the independent variables via an iterative
likelihood estimation procedure.
Information Classification
In highlighting the high points in the development of EWS, we mentioned the
adoption not only of varied group classifications but also of varied information
classifications. We have mentioned applications which have reflected the adoption of
demographic and economic factors. Market information has also been considered
(Pettway and Sinkey, 1980; Simmons and Cross, 1991). In each of the applications,
at least one out of considered factors has been found significant. The implication of
this is that in all instances these various information classes should be considered
though some may turn out to be insignificant. The peculiarities of each situation
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determines the significance of the factors. This has been demonstrated by the order
of importance of Altman's variables which were observed different in Abegunde's
(1990) analysis. The disparities in this illustration are perhaps too significant.
Examples can also be cited for United States bank applications as in Sinkey (1975)
and Pantalone and Platt (1987). The above indication also suggests the variety of
conclusions that have been reached in the various applications.
Other indirect use of MDA in the development of EWS include the
application to the prediction of De Novo expansion in bank merger cases (Gilbert,
1970) and the establishment of On-Site Banking examination priorities by Pettway
and Sinkey (1980). The major aim of this study was to help bank examiners develop
an examination queue based on a dual-screening technique through the use of both
accounting and market information.
Conclusions of Some Relevant Studies 
In concluding our review of approaches to bank performance we review in
fairly specific detail landmark applications and development of EWSs. The pioneering
effort or development of Early Warning Systems in general can be traced to Beaver
(1966) followed by Altman (1968) and Altman (1973). Altman also documented
further applications in Altman and Loris (1976) and Altman et al (1977) where he
developed an early warning system for over-the-counter broker dealers and the Zeta
model respectively, the latter being a new model for identifying bankruptcy risk of
corporations. Deakin (1972) also reports a discriminant analysis or predictors of
business failure.
Briefly, Beaver showed that through the use of a dichotomous classification
test, some financial ratios could predict failure. The test, however predicts the
likelihood of bankruptcy through the use of a given financial ratio only. The test is
criticized because it decides the 'optimal cut-off' point after looking at the actual
status of the firms whereas in real situations, through the use of financial ratios one
has to make his decisions without access to this information. He considered as the
best predictor of failure the ratio with the smallest percentage of misclassification.
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The cash-flow/total debt ratio was found to be the best predictor followed by the
profitability and gearing ratios.
Altman (1968) provided a model which rather than consider one ratio,
considers a number of ratios simultaneously in order to alleviate the problem of
different ratios serving as conflicting indicators of the firm's health status. The model
indicates which ratios are the most important indicators predicting failure and what
weight are attached to them, using the MDA technique. Altman used a non-
failed/failed classification. Of the twenty-two ratios tried, five were found to be
significant. These include working capital/total assets; retained earnings/total assets;
earnings before interest and taxes/total assets; market value equity/book value of total
debt and sales/total assets. The last index was found to be the greatest contributor
as it accounts for the greatest discrimination. Altman's model has a predictive
capability of 95% a year prior to failure while it drops to 72% correct classifications
two years before. In the 1973 study of Railroad bankruptcies, Altman used the same
variables and got about the same results. In this later study he found other additional
variables to be capable of discriminating between failed and non-failed firms.
Perhaps the pioneering attempt at investigating failure predictors for banking
firms is the model of Meyer and Pifer (1970). Four reasons are identified and
postulated for in this study as being the causes of bank failure. These include (a)
local economic conditions; (b) general economic conditions; (c) quality of
management and (d) integrity of employees. A sample of 60 United States banks
were used, 30 each of which belonged to the failed and non-failed categories
respectively. Indeed each sample of failed bank was matched with a non-failed bank
of about the same characteristics to correct for sample bias. Using stepwise regression
the following variables were found significant in the model which demonstrated an
80% correct classification ability one or two years prior to failure: (a) error in
predicting ratio of cash and securities to total assets; (b) variation in the rate of
interest on time deposits; (c) ratio of time to demand deposits; (d) operating
revenue/operating cost; (e) operating income as a ratio of total assets; (f) growth of
cash and securities relative to total assets; (g) variation in loans; (h) real estate loans
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as a ratio of total assets; and (i) fixed assets to total assets ratio.
Sinkey (1975) reported a multivariate statistical analysis of the characteristics
of problem banks by Sinkey and Walker (1974). In this application, newly identified
problem banks are matched with non-problem banks and MDA is applied to test for
group mean difference, to describe overlap between groups and to construct rules to
classify observations. Data was collected on 110 banks while controlling for bias, over
the period 1969-1972. The category of factors considered include liquidity, loan
volume, loan quality, capital adequacy, efficiency and sources and uses of fund. The
findings indicate that different ratios within these categories are significant
discriminators between groups. The predictive ability or correct prediction increases
from 61.8% in 1969 to 77.7% in 1972. Sinkey further stated potential advantages of
an effective early warning system as being: (a) to enable the banks to more efficiently
allocate their resources; (b) to make more efficient use of pre-examination data; (c)
to incorporate some objective criteria; (d) to provide bank-regulatory agencies with
an evaluation of their examination and supervisory performances and (e) to provide
a basis for assessing deposit insurance premiums.
Fraser, Phillips and Rose (1974) report the results of the application of
canonical correlation analysis to the relationship between performance of banks and
the structure of banking markets, demand for bank services, costs and other factors.
Some of the adopted measures/factors have been mentioned earlier. The performance
indices used include (a) interest and fees on loans/total loans; (b) total bank
loans/total assets; (c) income before taxes/total capital; (d) service charges on
accounts/demand deposits; and (e) interest on time and savings deposits/total time
and savings deposits. The internal factors such as bank costs, deposit composition,
and the composition of loans were all found to be important determinants of bank
performance. Of the exogenous factors, only the demographic variables proved to be
consistently important at the 99% confidence level. The market structure variables,
upon which so much interest has been centred at both the regulatory agencies and
in courts, turned out to contribute little explanatory power in affecting the
performance of the sample banks.
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Korobow and Stuhr (1975) in their application used the vulnerability/resistant
group classification. The paper aimed at providing an indication of a bank's ability
to withstand adverse economic or financial developments from data that are regularly
available without on-site examination. The study is essentially a fortification of results
of an earlier analysis (Stuhr and Van Wicklen, 1974; Sinkey and Walker, 1974;
Sinkey, 1975). The ratios employed resembled Sinkey's (1975) and the major
categories have been mentioned earlier. The model reflected increasing predictive
capability from 89.7% to 96.7% between 1969 to 1975, the same period.
Pantalone and Platt's (1987) article, which aimed at predicting commercial
bank failure in an era of deregulation, demonstrates how specific bank failures can
be predicted fairly accurately, well in advance of failure, even when the basis for
these predictions is limited to publicly available information. A variety of ratios from
balance sheet and income statement items were calculated for each six-month period
up to 24 months prior to failure. The financial ratios considered for the analysis
covered a wide range of management activities in an attempt to capture any possible
area of mismanagement. The ratios as earlier mentioned were categorised as
measuring profitability, management efficiency, leverage, risk diversification, and
health of the state economy. The financial variables/ratios included in the final model
are traditional measures of bank performance and risk-taking and they are similar to
measures which have been found to be most successful in predicting bank failure, by
earlier researchers. A major finding of the article which adopted the logit technique
of analysis is that the principal cause of bank failure remains the same as in earlier
decades, namely poor bank management, resulting in excessive risk-taking or a lack
of controls that permits fraud and embezzlement. Deregulation and other factors that
have led to a more competitive environment appear to have affected the overall rate
of bank failure rather than the pattern among banks, and local economic conditions
have had only a peripheral effect on either the overall rate or pattern of bank failure.
Probably the most recent effort at determining bank performance is that of
Hunter and Srinivasan (1990). Two things make this application essentially different
from earlier attempts. These include (1) the use of financially successful/non-
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financially successful classification; and (ii) the use of probit technique of analysis.
The explicit goals of their analysis were to characterize the marginal impact of bank
specific attributes on the probability that a de novo bank will be financially successful
and to determine whether exogenous market and regulatory factors play a significant
role in determining financial success. Using a sample of 169 independent banks
chartered in 1980 from 32 states, one of the findings of their analysis is that being
chartered in a state that allows statewide branching increases new bank's probability
of success. They conclude also that, contrary to Arshadi and Lawrence's (1987)
canonical correlation based results, that market structure variables had no significant
impact on new banks' probability of success. Bank survival is again shown to depend
largely on factors directly under the management's control. This agrees largely with
findings of other researchers.
The above has been an attempt at reviewing determinants of bank
performance with special attention being paid to development of early warning
systems for predicting impending bank failure. Our models and techniques of analysis
will borrow from these experiences comprehensively. The questionnaire which is part
of the sources of information of this study reflects the various factors which will come
into the models.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1	 Introduction
In the earlier chapters we examined both theoretical and practical issues
relating to bank performance. The role of, and the inter-dependence between, capital,
liquidity and risk, among others, were discussed for their observed and expected
significance in determining the performance and thus the financial condition, or
better still, chances of survival of commercial banks. In particular, section 3.5
espouses in a fairly detailed manner the various issues of interest in the research into
determinants of bank performance as well as the development of early warning
systems (EWS), in general. One peculiar aspect of the research effort concerns the
choice of technique of analysis adopted. The analytical techniques as were mentioned
are varied. However, it seems fairly easy to isolate the most popular techniques
adopted including the more recent attempts. Multiple Regression analysis, Canonical
Correlation analysis, Multiple Discriminant analysis as well as the Probit and Logit
techniques of analysis are perhaps the most significant of the techniques adopted.
What we attempt in this chapter is a somewhat watered down description of
each of these techniques of analysis, emphasising their essence, capabilities and
shortcomings. Such a description is deemed necessary as these techniques form the
basis of our empirical analysis in the next four chapters. The questionnaire and survey
design is discussed in the next chapter where it is more appropriate though it forms
an integral part of the research methodology adopted for the study.
4.2	 Exploratory and Multivariate Analysis'
Multivariate regression analysis includes a variety of analytical techniques
which are available for explaining the variation in one variate or characteristic by two
1 This section relied considerably on Tatsuoka (1974) and Pyndick and
Rubinfield (1981).
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or more other characteristics. In some cases this relationship when mathematically
expressed can be used to predict the value of the variable being explained, once the
value of other variates are given and known. In simple regression analysis, one seeks
to explain a particular variable by expressing it as a function of some other variable.
Multiple regression, which is simply an extension of simple regression, explains just
one dependent variable by more than just one explanatory variable. Other
multivariate techniques, in particular the ones discussed here can be classified
ordinarily as multiple and suited to cases in which all variables are continuous. In
such cases the least squares estimation procedure is used to obtain unbiased and
consistent and efficient parameter estimates.
Just as in simple regression equation, the significance of the explanatory
variables can be investigated based on the standard error tests, the t- and F-tests
respectively. The t-test is applied to the significance of individual explanatory
variables while the F-test determines the significance of the entire model
specification. Some other tests do exist for establishing certain characteristics of the
estimated equation. See Pyndick and Rubinfield (1982). Additionally, the direction
of relationship between the dependent variable and each independent variable is
indicated by the sign of each estimated coefficient while the magnitude indicates the
marginal contribution of each dependent variable.
In some other instances however, the independent and dependent variables
may not be continuous variables. There are cases in which the dependent variable is
simply a classification variable reflecting, say value 1 when sex of a person is male
and 0 when female. The performance of the ordinary least squares regression
estimation procedure is defective in these situations, yielding inefficient parameter
estimates. While it is possible for the independent variable to have only two possible
values, cases exist in which the possible values might be 4, 6, or 8 as in questionnaire
responses. Such cases require more attention. In these instances we do not really seek
to predict the value of the dependent variable but more importantly to identify which
characteristics or variables are significant in explaining the variation in the dependent
variable. The Multivariate Discriminant, Probit and Logit techniques are suitable for
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such analysis as described above.
In another instance, rather than seek to explain or determine characteristics
explaining one dependent or response variable, we may desire to identify the best
combination of independent variables, for characteristics which explain the variation
in a combination of independent variables. While the MDA, Probit and Logit analysis
are suited to the case of one dependent variable, the canonical correlation analysis
is developed for the analysis of the type described above. We now take a look at each
of these models. The simple and multiple regression analyses are not included here
for their established popularity and familiarity.
4.2.1 Canonical Correlation Analysis 
Canonical correlation analysis is a natural extension of multiple regression
analysis. The variable to be predicted in the latter consist of a single variable Y which
is the dependent or response variable. However, in some situations the dependent
variable may be composite, consisting of several variables. The method seeks to
determine, therefore, the relationship between two sets of variables. Canonical
correlation analysis identifies linear combinations of independent variables that are
most highly correlated with linear combinations of the dependent variables. It defines
the components of one set of variables that are most highly linearly related to the
'components' of the other set of variables. The highest correlation between the linear
combinations of both dependent and independent variables is called the canonical
correlation.2
Also, the overall correlation between the entire set of dependent variables and
the entire set of independent variables, called the canonical correlation index is
defined as
rcan = 1 k 	 (4.1)
where ics represent the roots of the equations which express the maximum correlation
2 See Fraser, Phillips and Rose (1974) for technical details of the Canonical
correlation technique.
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between the dependent and independent variables. The significance of the canonical
correlation index may be tested by Wilk's criterion which is a chi-square test of the
fore
m
A = TC (1 - ks)	 (4.2)
..i
where m is the number of independent variables which must be less than n, the
number of dependent variables. The statistic A is distributed approximately as a chi-
square with m.n degrees of freedom.
The canonical correlation analysis was employed for analysis of predictors of
bank performance by Fraser, Phillips and Rose (1974) and Arshadi and Lawrence
(1987). A limitation of this method of analysis as was pointed out by Hunter and
Srinivasan (1990), is that it precludes explicit calculation of marginal value or impact
of independent variables on the dependent variable. The best linear combination of
independent variables identified by the technique does not afford the ranking of these
variables by relative importance. The associated tests do not tell whether the
individual market structure variables are significant. This is a serious limitation which
makes this technique quite unsuitable and inappropriate for the attainment of the
objectives of this study in addition to the fact that there are multiple dependent
variables which may be binary or multiple choice and/or continuous in nature. The
study seeks among its major objectives to distinguish between resistant and vulnerable
banks, thus making the dependent variable a single binary choice variable.
Additionally, as a result of the technique's inability to calculate the marginal impact
and direction of relationship of independent variables, the technique cannot be relied
upon for classifying hold-out or out-of-sample banks by performance. This is very
essential for bank supervisors and accounts in the main for why the technique has not
3 This test is suggested by M.S. Bartlett (1947) "The Statistical Significance of
Canonical Correlation", Biometrica, vol.32, pp. 29-38.
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been widely adopted unlike logit and multivariate discriminant analysis techniques.
4.2.2 Multivariate Discriminant Analysis 
The Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) technique is used to classify
an observation into several a priori groupings dependent upon the observation's
individual characteristics. It is used primarily to classify and/or make predictions in
problems where the dependent variable appears in qualitative form e.g. success or
failure, bankrupt or non-bankrupt, resistant or vulnerable . A necessary initial step
in this technique is the establishment of group classifications.
MDA attempts to identify the linear combination of independent variables
which best discriminates/distinguishes between the established groups defined by the
qualitative dependent variable. Alternatively stated, the mathematical objective of
the MDA is to weight and linearly combine the discriminating variables in some
fashion so that the groups are forced to be as statistically distinct as possible (Klecka,
mimeo). The key equation in MDA is called the Discriminant Function and is
similar to a simple regression equation with a dependent variable that represents
group membership. Actually, the groups can be two or more. The coefficients of the
function are not interpreted as in the multiple regression equations. However, they
represent weights which signify the relative importance of the associated explanatory
factors. The larger the weights the greater the associated explanatory variables
contribution to the discrimination of the independent groups. These weights are
therefore similar in essence to the t-tests conducted for individual explanatory
variables in ordinary multiple regression analyses. With only two groups, some
contributors have remarked that discriminant analysis in general is nothing more than
a special case of multiple regression analysis. The reduction, however, holds just for
the two-group case. Also the discriminant function, which are formed in such a way
as to maximize the separation of the groups, once obtained can be used for the
prediction of which group cases with certain characteristics belong. This enables us
to check the predictive ability of the discriminant models. Discriminant analysis is a
problem of finding a linear combination of the original predictor variables that shows
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large differences in group means.
The significance of the discriminant functions may be tested by Wilk's lamda
(or criterion) and their associated chi-square tests of significance. The Wilk's lamda
is distributed approximately as a chi-square with k-1 degrees of freedom where k
represents the number of groups. The larger the lamda, the less the discriminating
power present. Eigen values and the associated canonical correlations are also used
which denote the relative ability of each function to distinguish the groups. The
higher the eigen value and canonical correlation the better.
The MDA is also used for classification after the initial analysis. Once a set
of variables is formed which provides satisfactory discrimination for cases with known
group membership, a set of classification functions can be derived which will enable
the classification of new cases with unknown membership. Often times the
classification functions are also used to classify the same sample cases from which it
was derived. To aid the classification, a classification function is derived for each of
the groups. Each function yields a probability of group membership for each case. A
case is then classified into a group for which it has the highest probability of being
a member. Usually, however, the problem with such procedures is that the rule of
highest probability defines a very strict dividing line. For example, a .51 probability
of being a resistant bank may not be significantly different from a .49 probability of
being a vulnerable bank. We can assess the implications of an erroneous adverse
classification for a typical case bank. To avoid such potential misclassifications, in
practice, a marginal range of probability is defined.
4.2.3 The Probit Model 
The Probit model was developed in an attempt to improve upon the linear
probability model (Pyndick and Rubinfield, 1981). This model belongs to the class of
binary-choice models. Binary-choice models are suitable for those situations in which
the cases considered are faced with a choice between two alternatives and the choice
they make depends on the characteristics of each of the cases. The essence of the
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Probit model is to estimate the choice that a non-sample member will make between
two choices given that we know the characteristics of any choices made by the sample
members. These models are developed to help predict the likelihood that a non-
sample member with given characteristics will make any of the choices. The most
basic of binary choice models assume that the probability of an individual making a
given choice is a linear function of the individual attributes.
The Probit model is associated with the cumulative normal probability
function. Suppose that Zi is a theoretic (that is, not actually measured) index which
is determined by an explanatory variable X1, the index Zi being a continuous variable
which is random and normally distributed. We can then write:
Zi = a + 11-Xi 	(4.3)
The poblem solved by probit analysis is how to obtain estimates for the
parameters a and B while simultaneously obtaining information about the underlying
unmeasured scale index Z which is such that
1 when first choice is selected; and
0 when first choice is not selected.
Assume then that the choice of each individual is such that he chooses
1 when Zi  Zi*
and
0 when Zi < Zis .
Since Z: is assumed to represent the artificial cut-off values which translates the
index into a choice decision and Zi follows the normal distribution, the probability
that Z: is less than or equal to Zi can be computed from the cumulative normal
probability function. That is,
Pi = F(Zi) = F(a + 11.X1)	 (4.4)
where F(.) follows the cumulative normal distribution. The probability Pi resulting
from the probit model can be interpreted as an estimate of the conditional
probability that an individual will choose an alternative, given the individual
characteristic Xi. By the above construction, it is observed that P will lie as is desired
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and expected in the (0, 1) interval. The probit model generally involves non-linear
estimation. The estimation technique is that of maximum likelihood. The Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) procedure has a number of desirable statistical
properties. All parameter estimators are consistent and also efficient and normal. A
detailed estimation of the parameters of the probit model is contained in Pyndick and
Rubinfield (1981, p. 311).
To test the significance of all or a subset of the co-efficients in the probit or
logit model when the maximum likelihood is used, a test using the chi-square
distribution replaces the usual F-test. The probit model has been applied to the
determination of factors significantly affecting de novo bank performance by Hunter
and Srinivasan (1990).
4.2.3 The Logit Model 
The Logit model which is often used as a substitute for the probit model is
based on the cumulative logistic probability function and is specified as:
1
Pi = F(Z1) = F(a + B.Xi) — 		 (4.5)
1 + ezi
The logit (also called logistic) and probit formulations are similar; the only difference
being that the logistic model has slightly fatter tails and is, therefore, more robust.
From the equation (4.5) we obtain
Log {Pi / (1-1)1)} = Zi = a + B.Xi	(4.6)
The independent variable is the characteristic N while the dependent variable
is the logarithm of the odds that a particular choice will be made. This equation
cannot be estimated using ordinary least squares since if P happens to equal 0 or 1,
the ratio Pi / (1-1)1) will equal 1 or co (infinity) respectively and the logarithm will be
undefined. Again the maximum likelihood estimation procedure which applies to
probit model is applied in estimating the parameters of the logit model. The logit
technique has been applied by Pantalone and Platt (1987) for predicting bank failure
during deregulation and Martin (1977).
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4.3	 Statistical Hypothesis Testing
Statistical hypothesis testing is a rather wide aspect of statistics. Generally,
hypothesis testing involves a comparison between a null and an alternate hypothesis.
The null hypothesis could be a basic claim or statement made about a population
while the alternative or composite hypothesis, in most cases is ordinarily the opposite
of the statement. For example, one could say that there is no difference between the
return on asset (ROA) of small banks and big banks in Nigeria. This statement would
represent the null hypothesis while the alternate hypothesis would read there is a
significant difference in return on asset (ROA) between small banks and big banks in
Nigeria.
The testing of this hypothesis requires obtaining information about ROA from
small and big banks in Nigeria and doing a comparison based on statistical
techniques. Usually, a statement is made about a population and the verification of
this statement requires a representative sample to be obtained from the relevant
population from which the truth about the statement can be verified.
Though many different tests of hypotheses do exist, we limit our exposition
here to the test of differences in means between two populations. Suppose there are
two populations 1 (small) and 2 (big) with population sizes N 1 and N2 respectively.
Assume that from each population a small sample of size n1 and n2 is drawn and let,
for a measurable characteristic X (say, return on asset), the sample means for each
population be X1 and X2 with standard deviation s1 and s2. To test the hypothesis
H0 : population means are equal (i.L 2 = 12,2)
VS.
H1 : population means are not equal (F 2 / /42)
we use the Z - statistic (for the normal distribution) defined as
(i1 - i2)
Z — 		 (4.7)
V {On, + s22/n2}
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The decision to be made is based on the following decision rule:
i) accept the null hypothesis H. if IZI s Z. ;
ii) reject the null hypothesis H. if I Z I > Z.
where a is the level of significance and Z. is the Z value at a. The decision rules (i)
and (ii) define the familiar acceptance and rejection zones in hypothesis testing. The
Z-statistic applies when the sample size from the population is large (i.e. n1, 02> 30).
However, for the small samples (i.e. ni, n2 s 30) the West is applied.
The above univariate tests as they are fondly called, can be employed to test
for differences in certain characteristics observed between vulnerable and resistant
banks for example, as would be done in the latter parts of this study. These tests were
employed in the work of Sinkey and Walker (1977) and Sinkey (1975).
4.4	 Comparative Advantages and Limitation of Techniques of Analysis
The various methods of analysis that have been discussed in the earlier parts
of this chapter are to a large extent those observed to have been employed in analysis
of predictors of bank performance and consequently in the development of early
warning systems for commercial banks. These include the multiple regression analysis,
canonical correlation analysis, multivariate discriminant analysis, probit and logit
analysis and simple hypothesis tests of differences in sample means. While the other
techniques are very similar, the univariate (hypothesis) tests differ significantly.
A number of differences exist between these techniques as can be delineated
from our previous discussions. There are also advantages and limitations associated
with the techniques. In application, the canonical correlation analysis differs
significantly from the multiple regression, multivariate discriminant, probit and logit
analyses. It determines the combination of independent variables that best capture
the characteristics of a combination of variables which best explain the variation in
one single variable. Further to this, although the canonical correlation analysis seeks
to explain the variation in a linear function of dependent variables by a linear
function of independent variables, it precludes the explicit calculation of the
coefficients (or marginal impact) of the independent variables. Such calculation is
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possible in the other techniques.
Compared with the other techniques (multiple regression, probit and logit),
the coefficients of the discriminant function cannot be interpreted as marginal impact
of independent variables on the dependent variable. They, however, serve as weights
whose magnitude only signify the relative importance of the associated variables to
the discrimination of the groups defined by the dependent variable. Furthermore,
the estimates of parameters in the probit and logit techniques have additional
properties of being unbiased, consistent and efficient. However, where the dependent
variable is not a binary/multiple choice variable, while they are unbiased, they are not
consistent and inefficient.
The special characteristics of the probit and logit techniques make them more
attractive to researchers in situations in which a binary/multiple choice variable is to
be explained (or distinguished) by one or a combination of explanatory variables. For
our study, we desire to identify the combination of variables, discrete and/or
continuous, which best distinguish resistant from vulnerable Nigerian commercial
banks.
Also, in related bank performance research, the identified models are used for
reclassifying the original sample or a hold-out sample with a view to assessing the
predictive ability of the models. The MDA as well as the probit and logit techniques
provide for this analysis while the ordinary multiple regression model performs
inadequately. In this regard, the logit and probit models have not really been shown
to be better than MDA-based models. They are, however, of greater appeal by virtue
of the fact that they are more robust than the MDA models while their estimates of
parameters can be interpreted just as in simple regression models.
The above discussion reveals that when the dependent variable is categorical
or multiple choice in nature (for example, divided into two groups), the appropriate
statistical techniques, include MDA, logit analysis and probit analysis. Logit and
probit analyses are typically preferred to MDA because the results are more robust,
and the co-efficients can be interpreted as regression coefficients calculated for new
observations as the probability of classification in one of the two groups which is
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arbitrarily chosen (Pantalone and Platt, 1987). However, the use of Logit versus
Probit analysis has no practical consequence with respect to the analysis of the results
(Arnemiya, 1981; Pyndick and Rubinfield, 1981). They differ essentially to the extent
of being based on different cumulative probability distributions, the logit probability
distribution having fatter tails compared with the cumulative normal probability
distribution.
4.5	 Conclusion
For the purpose of this study, we adopt the univariate t-test (or hypothesis
tests), the MDA and Logit analysis respectively. The univariate tests are employed
to compare the sample averages of particular financial ratios between resistant and
vulnerable banks. Where the sample averages are established as being significantly
different, the ratio or factor serves as a distinguishing factor between the categories.
The collection of distinguishing factors would intuitively form a combination which
distinguish between the classes of banks. A limitation of these tests is that they only
assess individual significance of the factors/variables. However, there are reasons to
believe that situations may exist where a combination of factors best distinguish
between the groups of banks.
Both the MDA and Logit analysis are individually employed to correct for this
limitation. The use of both the MDA and Logit techniques is premised on the need
to conduct an assessment and comparison between the identified models. The
objective in this regard was to assess the ability of identified logit models based on
discriminant reclassification and vice-versa. Finally, perhaps a major limitation of the
MDA and Logit analysis in this study is the fact that the results would be sensitive
to the criteria defining vulnerable from resistant banks.
The conclusion with respect to the choice of techniques can be appreciated
from the discussions of the various techniques of analysis, bearing in mind the
comparative advantages and limitations in the light of the objectives of our study.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS
5.1	 Introduction
In this chapter, we dwell essentially on the conduct of the survey, the structure
of the survey instrument and discuss the results of the frequency analysis conducted
on survey results. The next section discusses the state of data on bank performance
in Nigeria. The structure, focus and content of the questionnaire as well as the
process of data collection are discussed in section 5.3 while in section 5.4 we discuss
the qualitative characteristics of sample banks, especially those which can be expected
to affect their performance. This includes their distribution by head office location,
involvement of technical partners, type of management, branch network and structure
as well as ownership. An analysis of the perceived determinants of bank performance
is then discussed bearing in mind the qualitative characteristics to observe any visible
trend. The remaining sections concentrate on the effect of the role of regulatory
authorities and prescribed policy guidelines on bank performance and the views of
bank management as to the effect of the recent influx of banks with the attendant
increased competition also on bank performance.
5.2	 The State of Bank Performance Data in Nigeria
Prior to 1989 when the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) was
established to function in a fashion similar to the U.S. model of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), data on the operating characteristics and
performance of the banking system could be obtained from the reports of the apex
regulatory authority, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Specific data relating to
individual banks could be obtained only from the Annual Reports and Statement of
Accounts of each bank.
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The Central Bank publishes its Annual Report and Statement of Accounts in
addition to monthly economic reports, a half-year report (which started about 2-3
years ago) and economic & financial review published on quarterly basis. The
portion of the annual report which focuses on the banking system contains details of
the year's monetary policy as expressed in its monetary policy circular which spells
out broad operating guidelines, restrictions and aspirations which are expected to
affect the operations of banks in the current year. The report also incorporates the
trend in monthly deposit, lending and minimum rediscounting rates which prevailed
during the year. We have had, apart from the conventional commercial and
merchant banks, other specialised banks such as the Federal Mortgage Bank of
Nigeria (FMBN), Nigeria Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), Nigeria Agricultural
Cooperative Bank (NACB) and the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry
(NBCI). Since 1986, we have also witnessed the establishment of community banks,
private mortgage institutions and the Peoples' Bank.
Also contained in the CBN annual report is the trend in monthly credit from
the banking system to the private and government sectors respectively. The report
also indicates the changes in these indices. The holding of government securities by
the banking system and other institutions and individuals are also indicated just as the
changes in rates on securities.
The quarterly economic & financial review published by the Bank contains the
consolidated balance sheet (asset and liabilities) of the Banking System. The balance
sheets for commercial and merchant banks are separated. From these, the structure
& growth of the assets and liabilities of the categories of banks can be evaluated.
The profitability of the banking system is usually not included. Beyond the statement
of assets and liabilities, the report also contains information on the average deposit,
and lending rates of different financial institutions as well as the minimum rediscount
rates of the Central Bank.
None of the Bank's publications contains details on the profitability of banks.
Also, the performance of each individual bank can not be assessed. Financial
information on each bank can be obtained only from the bank's annual report and
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statement of accounts. The published statement of accounts essentially contain the
bank's balance sheet and the income statement, which are useful for the assessment
of bank performance. These financial statements are usually approved by the Central
Bank before they are published. Copies are sent to the Central Bank and it is not
uncommon to find banks exchanging their annual reports out of courtesy and in some
cases with a view to promoting greater business cooperation between them. The
structure and content of banks' annual reports have changed from time to time. The
banking reforms which have culminated in the revision of the Banking Act of 1969
and the promulgation of Decrees 24 & 25, that is,the Central Bank Decree and the
Banks and other Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID), have brought about changes
in the contents of the financial statements of banks. Much more information is now
revealed by banks than was hitherto the case. The reports are now more
disaggregated than before. The prudential guidelines put in place in 1990 made it
compulsory for banks to reveal the quality of their loan assets and equally make
general provisions for other assets. Non-performing loans are now stated, and
broken into substandard, doubtful and lost components. As a result, loan loss
provisions as well as bank profits are now more realistic.
Banks are now mandated to reveal the structure of their loans by degree of
security and the structure of their deposits by type and maturity. Prior to this time,
some banks had only stated total deposits and liabilities as one figure without an
explicit indication of the composition. Now that the deposit maturity structure is
revealed, it is possible to examine the extent of reliance of the Bank on each type of
deposit. Such is an important information but was seldom revealed until it was made
mandatory. The structure and composition of the operating income and operating
expenses of banks are now expressly revealed in their annual reports. Again, before
the reforms, banks revealed the disaggregation only at will. The notes to the
accounts of both merchant and commercial banks are now more explicit with every
attempt made to examine the major components of the different financial aggregates.
Despite these new demands, it is interesting to note that banks are not yet mandated
to disaggregate their loan portfolio by sector. We can therefore hardly determine
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from a bank's annual report, what proportion of its loan portfolio is accounted for
by the agricultural sector or by manufacturing enterprises. This is quite surprising
given that the sectoral credit allocation policy mandating banks to devote certain
minimum proportions of their total loans to different sectors, has been a major
component of monetary policy and banks' operating guidelines for more than two
decades. Also, non-adherence to policy guidelines has attracted penalties while from
September 1992, any bank violating the policy stood the risk of being classified a
distressed bank. We, however, observed that in banks' monthly and quarterly returns
to CBN they are required to disaggregate their loan portfolio by sector. These
returns, which form the basis of CBN'S aggregate assessment of the banking system's
adherence to policy, are not available to the public. When required they can only be
obtained directly from the banks themselves. This we have attempted to do and it
explains why a questionaire approach was adopted. Since, it has been the practice
by banks, especially prior to deregulation, to only disaggregate financial information
at will from year to year, the need to have consistent and disaggregated information
over our study period explains why a questionnaire approach was required. The
questionnaire demands were based on the presumption that if banks had included
aggregates in their annual accounts, it should be possible to obtain a disaggregation
over quite familiar and uniform lines. The responses revealed that even this was not
totally correct as a number of banks found it difficult to provide disaggregated
information consistently for the study horizon.
Since its inception, the NDIC has also published annual reports which provide
some information on specific banks. It is mandatory for all banks to insure their
deposits with the NDIC. Such information as the number of branches per bank, the
composition of each bank's board, the addresses of each bank's head-office are
provided in the report. Statistics on bank frauds and the number of distressed banks
(under its supervision) are also indicated in the report. Little that could be useful
for assessing the performance of banks is indicated in the report. It is expected that
sometime in the future the NDIC will publish detailed financial information or
operating statistics about banks which will be useful for assessing their individual
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absolute and relative performance.
From the above review of major data sources, the CBN, NDIC and banks'
annual accounts, it can be appreciated that an additional effort is required to obtain
the type of data required for our study. We considered the questionnaire approach
as perhaps the best option. A questionnaire is drawn up and circulated to the Chief
Executive Officers (CEOs) of all commercial banks which form the target population
of the study. Faith in the efficacy of the questionnaire derived from the relationship
of each of the CEOs with the author who was a personal friend to many and equally
held the position of the President & Chairman of Council of the nation's foremost
professional banking institute, the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN).
In the absence of such relationship, it is doubtful whether the response rate would
have been as impressive. Inspite of these positive factors, the returns from a couple
of banks were incomplete and extremely poor.
5.3	 The Construct and Administration of the Questionnaire
As was mentioned earlier, due to the largely unavailable data and other
information as well as the highly restricted access to that which is available, the
questionnaire approach had to be adopted here to gather relevant information
through a survey of selected Nigerian banks. Additionally, some required information
are not usually included in the Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts of
Nigerian commercial banks. Though guidelines exist which indicate the minimum
information requirements which banks must meet in rendering their accounts, the
information content is far from being uniform from our examination of a sample of
annual reports of Nigerian banks. In particular, this is observed to be true for some
of the Banks which form the sample for this study.
For example, Statement of Accounting Standards and the BOFID of 1991, do
not require that banks report the loan portfolio by sector. Hence, in the annual
report of a typical Nigerian bank, it would be difficult to know the volume of loans
to agriculture, manufacturing enterprises or even to the export sector. They are,
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however, mandated to report such loans by degree of security and also by maturity.
Essentially, there would be those loans secured against real estate, those otherwise
secured and those unsecured. As for maturity there is little flexibility allowed in the
determination of time intervals. As such the classifications may differ among banks.
The Prudential Guidelines released in November, 1990, was issued in an attempt to
further ensure that banks made adequate provisions against loan losses. Banks were
also required to classify their loans as performing and non-performing.
Also, it can be difficult ascertaining what proportion of a bank's interest
income is from loans. They are classified by bank and non-bank sources.
Classification of other income faces a similar problem. Some of the key sources here
are foreign exchange, fees, commissions, lease finance and others. While the other
operating income of Commerce Bank Plc essentially followed the above classification
in its 1991 annual report that of FSB International Bank Plc, a government owned
bank privatised in 1991, classified the income under foreign exchange business, profit
from trading activities and other fees and commissions. We observe in this case that
fees and commissions were lumped together. Such classification problems are also
associated with interest expense, total deposits and even total assets.
Apart from the classification problems, we have the problem of lack of
consistency in reported figures. The practice in annual reports in general is to report
along with the current year figures, those of the previous year to aid intertemporal
performance comparison. The inconsistency we refer to comes in when, say the loans
and advances figure reported for 1990 in the 1991 financial year does not tally with
that reported in the 1990 published report itself. In some cases, this may be due to
changes necessitated by regulatory and/or other government authorities. If for
example the Inland revenue department prescribed a profit tax different from the
estimate made by the bank itself, the after tax profit would change and the total
reserves would also change. In these instances, the bank would only have the
opportunity to reflect such changes in the next annual report. In Nigeria, banks are
allowed to publish their annual reports after they have been duly audited and Central
Bank of Nigeria's approval of the audited accounts obtained.
115
Apart from quantitative information which is a major requirement for the
hypotheses in this study to be examined using the multivariate statistical techniques
earlier discussed, we find the questionnaire a very useful tool for seeking the opinion
of management of Nigerian banks on various aspects of bank performance in Nigeria,
their perceived role and importance of such factors as liquidity, capital adequacy and
bank cost structure; the monetary authorities, their various policy guidelines and the
adherence to or compliance with them; and also the effect of the recent influx of new
entrants into the banking industry. Knowing the prevalent attitude of majority of
Nigerian firms toward requests made for the completion of questionnaires and
provision of information, even when not elaborate, the questions were framed in very
simple language and were made very short and concise.
The questionnaire provided tables for the quantitative information. In terms
of structure and content, the questionnaire had aspects which sought information on
the corporate background of the bank, branch network and performance indicators,
and also on the management views concerning significant variables which were
believed to be determinants of bank performance. Corporate background information
includes among others, year of incorporation of business, year licence was applied for,
year licence was granted, the existence or non-existence of foreign technical
partnership agreements and the ownership composition of the bank which is
particularly sought over a ten year period, 1980 to 1989. In Nigeria, three possible
groups of people could own part or the whole of a bank. These include government
(state or federal), private individuals and foreign investors. We covered these in the
classification of ownership. It is postulated that ownership may result as being a
significant determinant of bank performance. This is particularly plausible in the case
of a developing economy. The view is widely held in Nigeria that the majority of
state-owned banks have exhibited generally dismal performance over the years
compared with predominantly private banks. The control of management, whether
predominantly domestic or predominantly foreign, was also requested.
On branch network and employment, we sought information on the number
of branches opened by each bank, their classification by major geographical area
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location and rural/urban composition. In the recent past, Nigerian banks were
mandated to open branches in rural areas which have become substantial loss
avenues for the majority. It is felt that the proportion of rural to urban branches may
affect the performance of a branch. Perhaps a more appealing variable would have
been the ratio of the assets accounted for by this two categories of branches. This was
however thought to be quite a difficult statistic to obtain from Nigerian banks. The
questionnaire responses could be said to have justified this initial thought. The staff
strength and its composition was also required.
The section which followed dwelt on vital statistics. A table is given which
requires information on certain established, important and frequently used
performance measures and other relevant information over the period 1980 - 1989.
Some of the financial information include, aggregate bank loans (divided according
to CBN's sectoral classification - agriculture, manufacturing and other sectors), total
operating expenses, total assets (divided into risk assets and current assets), total
deposit (also sub-divided into time, saving, current and other deposits), operating
income and other measures. The compilation of the list of important variables has
been informed by the requirements for computing the relevant financial ratios as
have been adopted in previous studies.
The identification and selection of the quantitative information requested from
banks in the questionnaire was based on a fairly comprehensive review of relevant
studies in the literature. The financial ratios which have been used to measure
different aspects of a bank's performance were reviewed and compiled for the
purpose of our study. The components of these ratios informed the quantitative
information required in the questionnaire. Beyond the need to know each bank's
total loans, we requested a breakdown to examine the composition of the loan
portfolio. Pantallone & Platt for example observed the ratio of commercial and
industrial loans/total loans to be a significant determinant of commercial bank
performance in the U.S. In Nigeria, the components of total loans are agricultural
loans, manufacturing loans and other loans. This is explained by the sectoral credit
allocation policy which places emphasis on sectoral breakdown of banks' loan
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portfolio. It was expected that the loan concentration along these lines could also
distinguish the performance of Nigerian banks. The general view among professional
bankers is that agricultural loans are more risky and for long have attracted a
relatively lower interest rate. Not until recently have banks begun to adhere to this
policy stipulation. Before now, they had preferred to pay the penalities.
Furthermore, such other schemes aimed at encouraging their response and adherence
to the policy have failed. The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS) is one
of such programmes. The U.S. banking system - based literature have emphasised
in addition to commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans, real estate loans and
other loans.
Ratios based on total assets also have variants which tend to be more specific
relating to risk assets and current assets being the two major categories. Our
definition of risk assets as the difference between total assets and the sum of cash
and short term securities is in line with Sinkey (1975). The composition of total
deposits is able to reveal the degree of dependence of a bank on different sources of
generating funds. The components of deposits - time, current, savings and others,
reflect differences in pricing, maturity and stability. The categorisation employed
reflects the terminology and regulatory requirement as can be found in Nigeria.
Specifically, time (term) deposits are more stable, have longer maturity and are more
expensive. Current (or free) deposits are very cheap. Savings deposits represent the
midway.
Total capital, shareholders funds, bad debt (loan loss) provision, total reserves
are all requirements for calculating important financial ratios reflecting aspects of a
bank's characteristics and performance. We also required total operating income and
its breakdown into major contributing components. The aggregate figure is important
to obtain the managerial efficiency ratio (operating expenses to operating income)
among others. It is also important for the calculation of net income and by
implication the profitability/earnings ratio (net income to total assets) as used by
Pantallone & Platt. In Nigeria also loan income represents a major source of
income. Income from securities is a prominent component only with respect to the
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banks participation in the holding of government treasury assets and not really in
income from the source. The treasury securities are considerably underpriced.
Government securities holdings which are the addition of a bank's holding of
treasury bills and treasury certificates are required to compute liquidity ratios. One
of such important ratios is the ratio of government securities holding to total assets.
Sinkey (1975) used as a measure of a bank's liquidity, the ratio of its cash plus
government securities holdings to its total assets. This accounts for why cash holding
was requested in the questionnaire.
It is important to emphasise that due to the absence of regulations requiring
such articulate and elaborate categorisation in banks' annual reports, it would have
been difficult relying on the annual reports as our only source of information. This
difficulty with data can be appreciated from a close examination of the table of
financial information included in the Appendix. We observe many missing values
where disaggregation of financial information is required. This accounts for why we
were unable to assess the effect or significance of loan composition, revenue
composition and composition of operating expenses on bank performance. If in spite
of the opportunity provided by the questionnaire, these information could still not be
obtained, what would have been possible if our reliance had been only on the annual
reports and accounts of the banks.
The list of financial information required perhaps also indicates minimum
information that should be published in banks' annual reports. Financial ratios are
not directly required from the banking institutions. Rather we obtain the magnitudes
with the aim of computing the financial ratios subsequently ourselves.
The final section in the questionnaire dwelt on the identification of the views
of bank management as to the absolute and relative importance of a number of
critical factors highlighted in the questionnaire. These factors include, capital
adequacy; asset quality; managerial efficiency; loan portfolio; liquidity; revenue
sources and application; ownership; regulatory guidelines and national economic
variables. These factors are also expected to be ranked in order of importance as well
as indicating the perceived direction of relationship. The Nigerian banking industry
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has been under heavy regulation. A number of stipulations exist on the allocation of
credit, cash reserve, liquidity and capital adequacy ratios. We desired to know from
the respondent banks which regulations have been violated and which have been
adhered to over the years. The essence of this for the study, in particular, is to check
the effect of regulations on bank performance. Better still, to check the relationship
between the extent of adherence to regulatory controls and the performance of
Nigerian banks. Other information required included explanation on the expected
role of the monetary authorities in the prevention of bank failure; the factors
adjudged the most important determinants in signalling bank failure, methods of
guiding against bank failure, relationship between regulatory controls and bank
performance as well as the influx of new banks and possibility of failure.
In all, each respondent bank was required to provide answers to 31 questions.
The questionnaire was made fairly close-ended to ensure unambigous answers and
consistency in responses.
A sample of twenty-four banks was selected for this study. The list of sample
banks is given in Table 5.1 with the year in which they commenced banking business
in Nigeria. Given the state of development of the banking industry in Nigeria, such
elegant, theoretical and widely accepted sampling techniques such as simple random
sampling, stratified sampling or even systematic sampling could not be adopted.
Given the scope and intended coverage as well as the objectives of the study, our
intention was, infact, to cover all banks operating within the industry as at 1985, just
before the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).
As of this time only thirty three (33) banks were operating in Nigeria. This list
has however been greatly expanded with the financial liberalisation policy, as a
component of the SAP. As of July 1991, 125 banks were known to be operating
within the industry. The reason for concentrating on 1985 in the determination of our
sample size stems from the fact that the study aims at identifying factors that were
significant in determining bank performance prior to the adoption of SAP.
Furthermore, by considering this category of banks one can have access to
information that dates back a longer period. Also many of the new entrants would
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Table 5.1: List of Respondent Banks 
S. No. Name of Bank Abbreviation Year
1 Habib Nigeria Bank HNB 1983
2 Wema Bank WBN 1945
3 Societe Generale Bank SGB 1977
4 Pan African Bank PAB 1971
5 New Nigeria Bank NNB 1971
6 National Bank of Nigeria NBN 1933
7 Gamji Bank GBN 1984
8 Owena Bank OBN 1982
9 African Continental bank ACB 1947
10 Union Bank UBN 1917
11 Nigeria Arab Bank NAB 1962
12 United Bank for Africa UBA 1961
13 Afri bank AFB 1960
14 Progress Bank PBN 1982
15 Universal Trust Bank UTB 1985
16 Co-operative Bank COB 1954
17 Bank of Credit and Commerce BCI 1979
18 First Bank FBN 1894
19 Savannah Bank SBN 1960
20 Nigeria International Bank NIB 1984
21 Allied Bank ABN 1962
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just be publishing their second annual reports. The availability of information
particularly on 'new' banks and for just two or three years seems largely inadequate
for the attainment of the objectives of our study, if any meaningful results are to be
obtained and useful recommendations made.
Additionally, there have been so many changes within the industry in the years
since SAP and moreso in recent years that have tended to affect the banks that
operated prior to 1985 much more than those just springing up. One major
development in this regard, which although is very welcome by the majority of these
banks, is the policy on prudential guidelines. As we mentioned above, the guidelines
were put in place to ensure that the method of providing for non-performing assets
was uniform among all the banks as well as to ensure that the true nature of the
quality of banks' assets were adequately revealed. Perhaps, this was also put in place
to portray the profits henceforth declared by Banks as true cash profits rather than
paper profits which many had believed the banks declared hitherto.
By ending up with a sample of twenty-four (24) out of the thirty-three (33)
existing banks, one can be said to have covered almost seventy-three (73) percent of
the population of Nigerian commercial banks that were in operation in 1985. The
reasons for the non-inclusion of the majority of these banks include their un-
impressive record in information presentation, both in scope and content, in their
annual reports. The little information that could be gathered were highly disjointed,
largely incomprehensive and inconsistent. Evidently, this is a situation which could
not be helped. It turned out also that the affected banks had insignificant market
shares with their actions having little multiplier effect on the industry as a whole. The
key group of banks were, however, included in the final sample.
To some extent our sample can be said to be a highly representative one in
that it comprises banks with a wide range of characteristics which have the potential
of enriching the analysis and our findings. Among these banks are those having their
head offices located in Lagos, an area with the highest commercial activity level in
Nigeria, and quite a number having head offices located in other capital cities outside
Lagos. There are also those that are predominantly publicly-owned, with a high
123
degree of government intervention, and those that are predominantly private in
ownership. Some have technical partners (and have had them for some time) while
others have none (and have never had). We also include the three largest Nigerian
banks, First Bank PLC, United Bank for Africa PLC and Union Bank PLC.
Additionally, the structure of the branch network of these banks differ from bank to
bank as well as from region to region.
Based on the significance of accurate and consistent information from banks
for the successful completion and conclusion of this study, a high degree of personal
touch was attached to the administration of the questionnaires. By this we mean that
the questionnaires were forwarded directly to the Managing Director/CEO of each
of the sample banks with an introductory letter on the personal letter headed paper
of the author. The author enjoyed the full cooperation of his colleagues who held
him in high esteem being, at the time, the President and Chairman of Council of the
Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN), the only recognised professional
body for practising bankers in Nigeria, and the MD/CEO of a young, dynamic and
a highly reputable commercial bank. After the questionnaires had been despatched,
several telephone calls were made to the Managing Directors by the author on a
cordial note indicating the purpose of the questionnaire and calling for their
cooperation by providing very comprehensive and consistent information. This was,
however, not without a promise that all information would be handled in confidence.
One would have thought that this approach would ensure a prompt completion of the
questionnaires. This was not so in all cases. After about four months, reminders were
sent and followed up with phone calls. This process lasted from July 1989 to October,
1990, and continued until 21 responses were collected. During the course of data
collection, many banks complained that it was difficult to retrieve information which
they had rendered 8 to 10 years ago since they were not computerised then (and were
still at various degrees of partial computerisation). Additionally, certain grey areas
which arose were explained on phone.
The response rate of the survey was very high. Out of the twenty-four (24)
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questionnaires sent out, twenty-one (21) were duly returned, making a response rate
of 87.5 percent (Table 5.1). Of course, the extent to which the required information
was provided varied from bank to bank. Some were hundred percent completed and
this was very impressive. Of note in this regard are United Bank for Africa, AfriBank,
Co-operative Bank and National Bank. Table 5.2 presents our comments on the
quality of responses obtained from each of the sampled banks. The questionnaire
completed by one of the three big banks was very poor and consequently had to be
dropped, at least as far as quantitative information is concerned.
The data questionnaires were also examined for consistency. We confirmed
the correctness of the different sub-totals and also examined the trend of the various
financial variables for possible outliers, the result of which may have been due to data
entry errors or in some cases entry into the wrong columns or rows. Also, it was
necessary to ensure uniformity in the information rendered. For instance, while some
figures were in millions others were stated in thousands or hundreds of thousands for
the different variables.
The following sections discuss in detail the responses of the sample banks to
the qualitative aspects of the information provided, and in addition to the
characteristics of these banks. The quantitative aspect is deferred to the next chapter
where the information is employed for a more comprehensive inferential analyses.
5.4	 Survey Results: Some Characteristics of Sample Banks 
In the first part of the survey questionnaire, we requested for some
background information on each bank. These included the name of the establishment
(bank), the location of its head office, year of incorporation, year applied for banking
licence and year of commencement of banking business in Nigeria. In the same
section we sought information relating to whether or not the bank has engaged
technical partners since it commenced operation as well as the ownership structure
and the type of management.
In many cases the ownership differs from the bank's management, though the
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Table 5.2: Quality of Questionnaires of Respondent Banks
S. No. Name of Bank Quality
1 Habib Nigeria Bank Good
2 Wema Bank Fair
3 Societe Generale Bank Good
4 Pan African Bank Good
5 New Nigeria Bank Good
6 National Bank of Nigeria Excellent
7 Gamji Bank Fair
8 Owena Bank Fair
9 African Continental bank Good
10 Union Bank Good
11 Nigeria Arab Bank Good
12 United Bank for Africa Excellent
13 Afribank Excellent
14 Progress Bank Good
15 Universal Trust Bank Good
16 Co-operative Bank Excellent
17 Bank of Credit and Conmerce Good
18 First Bank Very Poor
19 Savannah Bank Good
20 Nigeria International Bank Fair
21 Allied Bank Good
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activities of the management may be a reflection (or an embodiment) of the implicit
dictates of the ownership. This is characteristic of most publicly-owned Nigerian
banks as well as in a number of the newly licensed banks. In this regard, it is not
uncommon to find severe contention between the management and ownership of
banks for control.
Table 5.3 displays a summary of the banks' characteristics in respect of
technical partnership agreement, structure of ownership, and type of management.
In addition, a summary of information provided in the second part of the
questionnaire relate to bank branch network and employment
We find that 60 percent of the sample banks have (at least until recently), had
technical partnership agreement. In all cases the technical partners are from outside
the African continent. In most cases the technical partners hail from Europe or
America while the others have technical partners from the Far East. 40 per cent or
8 out of 20 banks have never had technical partners. Indeed on close examination
virtually all the state-owned commercial banks in our sample have never had technical
partnership agreement. An exception here is one state bank with technical partners
from Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates.
Table 5.4 shows that the ownership structure of the sample banks has
remained the same over the period 1985 to 1989. Of the twenty (20) banks
comprising the ultimate sample, thirteen (13) are predominantly publicly owned. We
maintain that a bank is predominantly public in ownership if the Federal or State
governments or their agencies own more than 45 per cent of the shares. Also, where
the board of directors of the banks are appointed by the federal or state government,
we categorize the bank as being predominantly public in ownership. The remaining
thirty-five per cent are predominantly private in ownership. Seven (7) of the 13
predominantly public-owned banks are wholly-owned by the government while only
five (5) of the seven predominantly privately owned banks are actually wholly private
in ownership. Hence wholly publicly-owned banks represent 35 percent of the sample
banks. Predominantly publicly-owned banks represent 30 per cent, predominantly
private owned banks 10 per cent and wholly private owned banks represent 25
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Table 5.3: Ownership, Management, Branch Network and Staff Size of Respondent Banks
Year Banks => PBN UTB COB BC! NIB ACB SBN UBN NAB AFB
1989 Tech.
Partnership
No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership WPUB WPRI WPUB WPRI WPRI WPU8 PPUB PPUB PPUB PPUB
Management DON DON DON FOR DON DON DON DON DON DON
No. of
Branches
35 13 55 46 10 117 63 239 41 97
Rural
Branches
6 5 25 22 3 49 30 55 22 27
Staff Size 1211 413 1790 1215 204 4118 2360 11623 1105 3028
1988 Tech.
Partnership
No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership WPUB WPRI WPUB WPRI WPRI WPUB PPUB PPUB PPUB PPUB
Management DON DON DON FOR DON DON DOM DON DON DON
No. of
Branches
35 6 49 35 7 104 55 225 31 91
Rural
Branches
6 2 20 14 2 40 26 52 13 21
Staff Size 1127 172 1758 1105 190 4339 2097 11337 1002 3018
1987 Tech.
Partnership
No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership WPUB WPRI WPUB WPRI WPRI WPUB PPUB PPUB PPUB PPUB
Management DON DON DON FOR DON DON DON DON DON DON
No. of
Branches
28 3 47 32 4 102 44 212 28 85
Rural
Branches
1 0 20 12 0 39 18 48 12 20
Staff Size 931 127 1723 1005 141 4491 1817 11226 908 3100
1986 Tech.
Partnership
No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership WPUB WPRI WPUB WPRI WPRI WPUB PPUB PPUB PPUB PPUB
Management DON FOR DON FOR FOR DON DON DON DON DON
No. of
Branches
22 3 39 28 2 101 34 201 25 69
Rural
Branches
0 0 16 10 0 39 16 36 12 20
Staff Size 925 113 1641 965 101 4551 1645 10735 810 2589
1985 Tech.
Partnership
No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership WPUB WPRI WPU8 WPRI WPRI WPUB PPUB PPUB PPUB PPUB
Management DON FOR DON FOR FOR DON DON DON DON DON
No. of
Branches
16 3 37 26 1 96 34 195 23 61
Rural
Branches
0 0 14 a o 38 16 28 12 20
Staff Size 540 84 1626 920 71 4425 1472 10078 725 2546
Head-office
location
r
Other Lagos Other Other Lagos Lagos Lagos Lagos Lagos Lagos
Notes: For TechnicalPartnership. YES represents existense of such arrangement while NO represents the opposite;
TOilianagement we have Foreign FOR) or Domestic (DON). We have for Ownership. WPUB as wholly publicly-
owned; PPUB, predominantly publ cly-owned; PPR!, predominantly privately-owned; and WPRI, wholly privately-owned.
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Table 5.3 Continued: Ownership, Management. Branch Network and Staff Size of Respondent Banks
Year Banks => NBN PAB NNB HNB SGB UBA ABN GBN oem WBN
1989 Tech.
Partnership
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Ownership WPUB WPUB WPUB WPRI WPRI PPRI PPUB WPUB PPRI PPUB
Management DON DON DON DON DON DON DON DON DON DON
No. of
Branches
112 28 57 20 33 180 64 10 23 50
Rural
Branches
50 18 26 6 23 87 30 5 11 26
Staff Size 3483 912 1812 486 878 8033 1787 147 758 1236
1988 Tech.
Partnership
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Ownership WPUB WPUB WPUB WPRI WPRI PPRI PPUB WPUB PPUB PPUB
Management DON DON DON DON FOR DON DON DON DON DON
No. of
Branches
104 21 53 17 17 164 59 4 20 42
Rural
Branches
43 11 24 3 8 74 26 0 8 22
Staff Size 3399 885 1774 385 841 7655 1517 117 588 1188
1987 Tech.
Partnership
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Ownership WPUB WPU8 WPUB WPRI WPRI PPRI PPUB WPU8 PPUB PPUB
Management DON DON DON DON FOR DON DON FOR DON DON
No. of
Branches
101 21 50 13 16 148 48 3 17 41
Rural
Branches
41 11 22 0 a 69 16 o a 21
Staff Size 3430 896 1440 330 810 7644 1304 86 538 1089
1986 Tech.
Partnership
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Ownership WPUB WPUB WPUB WPRI WPRI PPRI PPUB WPUB PPUB WPUB
Management DON DON DON FOR FOR DON DON DON FOR DON
No. of
Branches
101 21 41 11 16 136 40 1 14 39
Rural
Branches
41 11 20 o 7 60 15 o 5 21
Staff Size 3804 956 1357 250 784 7194 1121 28 513 1000
1985 Tech.
Partnership
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Ownership WPM WPUB WPUB WPRI WPRI PPRI PPUB WPUB PPUB PPUB
Management DON DON DON FOR FOR DON DON DON FOR DON
No. of
Branches
88 21 37 7 14 129 33 1 13 34
Rural
Branches
28 11 16 0 6 60 14 0 4 18
Staff Size 3938 1022 1329 180 780 6620 881 22 484 945
Head-office
location
r
Lagos Other Other Other Lagos Lagos Lagos Other Other Lagos
Motes: For TechnicalPartnership. YES represents exis ense of such arrangement while NO represents the opposite; for
iWement we have Foreign (FOR) or Domestic (DON). We have for Ownership, WPUB as wholly publicly-owned; PPM, pred-
ominant y publicly-owned; PPRI, predominantly privately-owned; and WPRI, wholly private in ownership.
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percent of the sample banks.
Changes in bank management have been recorded in the sample banks (and
perhaps in the entire Nigerian banking industry). We see from table 5.4 that the
management of the sample banks which are predominantly foreign which was 6 out
of the 20 banks in 1985 has been significantly reduced to only 1 out of 20 by 1989.
Thirty (30) percent of the banks were under a predominantly foreign management
in 1985 to 1987. The proportion reduced to 10 per cent in 1988 and further to 5
percent in 1989. Hence by 1989 virtually all the sample banks were under domestic
management. It should be noted here that a distinction exist between a technical
partnership agreement existing between a Nigerian bank and some other overseas
bank and the type of management existing in the bank. While it is clear from the
table that 12 of the banks have technical partners, fourteen (14) on the average
between 1985 and 1989 were under domestic management. A popular misconception
has often been held in this regard where industry watchers associate the existence of
a technical partnership agreement in a bank with foreign control over bank
management.
Also, the banks are varied in the date of commencement of banking business.
Going by the classification given in table 5.3, eleven (11) banks commenced business
between 1894 and 1970, four (4) commenced business between 1971 and 1980 while
six (6) commenced business between 1981 and 1985. This represents 52.4 percent that
started in 1894 - 1970, 19 percent that started in 1971 - 1980 and 28.6 per cent
between 1981 and 1985. All the banks that operated prior to 1971 were
predominantly public in ownership. Of the four (4) which commenced business
between this time and 1980 one (1) was wholly privately owned while (1) one was
predominantly public in ownership. Three (3) of those that commenced business
between 1981 and 1985 were privately owned while the others were wholly state
government owned.
It is common for Nigerian commercial banks to locate their head-office in
Lagos even if and when some other performing branches are located in some other
places outside Lagos. Our sample shows 60 percent of the operating banks to have
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head-offices in Lagos with the remaining 40 percent locating their head offices
elsewhere. One notable feature in the responses in this regard is that a higher
proportion of the state government owned banks have their head offices in their state
capitals which are outside Lagos. All wholly privately owned banks have their head
offices in Lagos.
With respect to the second part of the questionnaire which dwells on
information on branch network and employment, a summary of relevant information
is contained in Table 5.3. In this table we observe that the older banks have a higher
number of bank branches, rural branches and staff employed. This was, however, not
unexpected. Indeed, one cannot say much about the characteristics of the banks in
this regard. Rather than look at the absolute values it will be more useful to consider
the information relative to other financial variables such as profit, total deposit or
total assets. The details in this respect are provided in the chapter that follows.
5.5	 Perceived Determinants of Bank Performance: Analysis of Survey Responses 
Questions 16 to 19 in the survey questionnaire dwelt on the identification of
major determinants of commercial bank performance in Nigeria, from the perception
and belief of the respondents. They were required to rank these factors in order of
importance. They were also to indicate the perceived relationship between bank
performance and its major determinants, which they indicated.
From an extensive survey of previous studies on Bank performance among
which are Fraser and Rose (1971), Fraser, Phillip and Rose (1974), Korobow and
Stuhr (1975), Pantalone and Platt (1987), Hunter and Srinivasan (1990) and Simons
and Cross (1991), the major determinants were classified into twelve (12) sub-groups.
Implicitly, the actual determinants in terms of financial variables and ratios belong
to these sub-groups. We have as the groups (i) Capital Adequacy, (ii) Asset Quality,
(iii) Managerial Efficiency, (iv) Loan Portfolio, (v) Liquidity, (vi) Revenue Sources,
(vii) Revenue Application, (viii) Ownership, (ix) Regulation/Deregulation, (x)
Number and Distribution of Branches, (xi) Violation of Regulatory Guidelines and
(xii) National Economic Variables. These sub-groups are not necessarily non-
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overlapping. The literature is awash with different sub-groupings.
Table 5.5 shows the number and proportion of respondents that indicated that
each of the factors were major determinants of bank performance. The responses by
ownership is also given. More than 80 per cent of the respondents indicated that both
asset quality and managerial performance (or efficiency) are major determinants of
bank performance. About 67% of respondents noted the significance of capital
adequacy and liquidity. For loan portfolio only 52% indicated its importance. Less
than 40% of respondents indicated that the other factors were significant
determinants of bank performance.
If one were to rank the groups of determinants in terms of their importance
based on the proportion of respondents that selected them, managerial performance
will be chosen as the most important. Ninety (90) percent of the respondents chose
managerial performance as a major determinant of bank performance. Asset Quality
follows with 81 percent. Both capital adequacy and liquidity place third followed by
loan portfolio. Given the weights of other factors it is perhaps correct to say that they
are likely to be insignificant in determining the performance of a bank. We notice
that only 29% are of the view that ownership is a major factor in determining bank
performance. In fact less than 50% of predominantly private and predominantly
public banks hold this view. The least significant among them is the number and
distribution of branches. Only 19% of respondents favoured this factor.
From Table 5.5 we observe that over 60% of the banks with predominantly
domestic management support as the most significant determinants of bank
performance the five factors earlier indicated. For less significant factors, less than
35% of this class of banks voted. Going by Head Office location, 92% of banks
having their head offices in Lagos indicated asset quality and managerial performance
as significant factors. A smaller percentage (75%) voted capital adequacy and
liquidity as significant determinants of performance. An even smaller percentage
(50%) voted for loan portfolio. Less than 35% voted for the significance of the other
factors. Based on Lagos respondent banks only, both asset quality and managerial
performance are equally important, followed by both capital adequacy and liquidity
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which are also equally important, followed by loan portfolio.
All respondent banks with head offices outside Lagos indicated managerial
performance as a significant determinant followed by asset quality which was
indicated by 75% of the banks. Of this class of banks 62.5% indicated each of capital
adequacy, loan portfolio and liquidity as significant factors. Revenue sources and
regulation/deregulation were voted significant by 50% of this class of banks.
Table 5.5 shows that 100% of all banks with technical partners indicated
managerial performance as a significant determinant, 92% indicated asset quality as
significant, while 75% of the banks voted for capital adequacy. Liquidity saw more
banks of this group voting for it than loan portfolio. It is only in this case that we
observe capital adequacy having a higher weight than liquidity. The preference for
the factors revealed by the banks with no technical partnership arrangements, is in
line with the preference indicated by the aggregate of the respondent banks.
So far we have based our ranking of the perceived importance of the factors
on the proportion of respondents that indicated they were truly significant. The
factors were then ranked from most important to least important. We had also
requested the respondents to reveal the preference concerning the importance of the
selected factors. Table 5.6 shows the number of respondent banks that associated the
various priorities with the listed factors. The entries on the row indicate for each
factor the number of respondents that associated with it (the factor) the associated
priority.
Taking row one, therefore, we observe that five (5) banks placed capital
adequacy at the first priority, while ten (10) placed managerial performance at this
priority. Five (5) banks also placed liquidity at the first priority. One respondent bank
indicated ownership as the first priority. Going by absolute majority, one would say
that managerial efficiency is, among all the factors, the most important determinant
of bank performance.
Column-wise, indeed taking the capital adequacy column as an example the
entries indicate the number of respondents that gave the factor the associated rank
or priority level. The majority of respondent banks rank capital adequacy as second
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in priority or importance among the listed factors. For asset quality the majority
voted it as the third most important factor. Again managerial efficiency is voted fifth.
An interesting development occurs in the case of liquidity. The majority (5) ranks it
as first priority. Four banks each rank it as third and fourth priority. Obviously it
cannot be first, it cannot be second since capital adequacy has a higher vote, it
cannot be fourth since majority rank asset quality as fourth and it cannot be fifth
since loan portfolio has the highest vote in this respect. Also, it cannot be lower than
the fifth priority. Given that it is equally ranked with capital adequacy, asset quality
and loan portfolio at priority three (3) and these other factors are ranked by the
majority at other different priorities, it implies that liquidity ranks third amongst the
factors. Following the same argument and consideration revenue sources and revenue
application rank 6th and 7th among the factors. The resulting ranks of the other
factors are shown.
The ranking shows the first five most important variables to be the same with
our earlier ranking based on proportions. The ranking is, however, quite different as
Table 5.7 shows. Managerial efficiency ranks first, loan quality ranks third while loan
portfolio ranks fifth, all in line with our earlier finding. However, asset quality which
we ranked second was ranked fourth while capital adequacy which was ranked third
(in most cases) with liquidity, is here ranked second. It seems however that this
ranking is most appropriate, being a direct result of responses to a related question
put forward in the questionnaire. Table 5.7 compares both rankings. The column
marked 1 gives the frequency-based ranking while the second column marked 2 gives
the ranking based on direct response to rank the factors.
Having identified the major determinants and marked them by their
importance we also sought to know which of these factors are believed to be
positively or negatively correlated with bank failure or better still, dismal bank
performance and consequent vulnerability of banks.
From Table 5.8 we find that 71% of respondent banks believed managerial
efficiency to be positively associated with bank performance. This means that the
better the efficiency of management, the greater the likelihood of success of a bank.
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Table 5.7: Comparison of Rankings of Bank Performance Factors
Factors
Ranking
Implied Actual
Managerial Performance 1st 1st
Capital Adequacy 3rd 2nd
Liquidity 3rd 3rd
Asset Quality 2nd 4th
Loan Portfolio 5th 5th
Revenue Sources 7th 6th
Revenue Application 7th 7th
Number & Distribution of
Branches 11th
8th
Violation of Regulatory
Guidelines 12th
9th
Ownership 9th 10th
Regulation/Deregulation 6th 11th
National Economic Variables  10th 12th
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Sixty-seven (67) percent and 62% of respondent banks view loan portfolio and
liquidity respectively, as being positively associated with performance. Supposedly, the
greater the portfolio of loans the greater the potential of success. Also, increased
liquidity is felt to improve the probability of success of the banks. Asset quality is also
highly favoured, at least relatively, as reflected by 57% of respondents. Other notable
factors which are perceived to be positively related to bank performance are capital
adequacy with 48% vote and regulation/deregulation with 43% vote. In this regard,
it would mean that the greater the capital base of the bank, the higher the probability
of success. The regulation factor would indicate that with more regulation, fewer
banks are expected to fail. Thus, banking regulation is expected to aid in the
prevention of bank failure. Though the other factors are also indicated, the number
of respondent banks in these are negligible.
From table 5.8 over 67% of respondent banks with technical partners indicated
that the first five factors are positively correlated with bank performance. Of those
without technical partners 62.5% are of the view that managerial performance, loan
portfolio, liquidity and revenue sources are positively associated with bank
performance. Less than 50% of both classes of banks hold the view that the other
factors are positively related to bank performance. It should be noted especially that
less than 50% of banks without technical partners view capital adequacy as being
positively associated with bank performance.
Similar observations hold when the respondent banks' preferences are
examined in the light of their ownership structure as well as head office location.
More than 62% of predominantly publicly-owned respondent banks view the first five
variables as having positive association with bank performance. Banks with head-
office located in Lagos have a similar orientation. The magnitude of votes for capital
adequacy, managerial performance and asset quality as well as loan portfolio serve
as substantial support that they are positively correlated with bank performance. Only
fifty (50) percent of the banks favoured asset quality and revenue application as
having positive correlation with bank performance. The other class of banks
emphasise asset quality, managerial efficiency, loan portfolio and liquidity in
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preference for capital adequacy and revenue sources. Sixty-two (62) percent of banks
with head office outside Lagos indicate that national economic variables are positively
associated with bank performance. The emphasis on this factor is most significant
here than for any other class of respondent banks (Table 5.8).
Table 5.9 shows the proportion of respondent banks that indicated which of
the determinants are believed to be negatively associated with bank performance. In
particular, table 5.9 shows that regulation/deregulation and number and distribution
of bank branches are most significant among factors that have negative correlation
with bank performance. Seemingly, regulation when intensified could cause dismal
performance among banks. Also, when the bank expands its branch network too fast
it could lead to dismal performance. The indication of negative correlation in this
respect would mean that indiscriminate or unstrategic bank branch expansion could
promote dismal bank performance.
Of course, we do recognise that branch expansion in itself may not cause bank
failure or dismal bank performance. However, when not objectively considered it
could cause a decline in a bank's performance. In this regard we can consider the
case with Nigerian banks. Under the Rural Banking Scheme, banks were compelled
to open up branches in rural areas. In a three-phased programme that lasted about
thirteen (13) years some banks were compelled to open over 200 rural branches.
Firstly, it is doubtful that such banks would have embarked upon such branch
expansion programmes in urban areas let alone in the rural areas of a developing
country. The reason for this will be because the branches are unlikely to be
commercially viable. Opening them, and in such a magnitude is capable of
compromising the profitability of the bank. However, it is likely to have positive
association or correlation with growth in the deposit base of a bank. Some studies
such as Adama (1991) have shown however that these rural branches tend not only
to operate at a loss, they also record overheads that are up to 40% of the deposit
mobilized.
From the same tables we observe that 38% of respondent banks indicate
capital adequacy, ownership, and national economic variables were negatively
if if
1 r*
-.• ..
tr S
- .
Cl -
fri
g
g •
Fl
-. -1.
11 0
a --,
q :0'
-.
P S
a: 0
at -''
-g1
in C
.
-..1
71
;14 1
0
Pt a7'
5 L.-9.
...
3 .
r
.
VP.
3 '2
C 07'
- r•
IM -1.
... Q
Cl- .....'
?
0
7'
-1.
13
, 3 • Cl'
a i
'n. C
1 1, 1 7
•-n
at
3
..7
i
C
111
1/1
2
•A
e ta
vn
..r:
1
0".
-1.
et.
.4
',:;
I.
120
.1
r.
_„
'2.
..,.
0
w e
35,040
i 3.
7llo
,, _,
I"
a.
`4
"2
Do
_
-.
...
41
g,,
a
2'
-
2.0.
PO
.0C
et
.5
TI
MO
n
r1.0
La n-• (...• a 01 to ro a a ra in cn w2
2:m
aatol
=
tt,
.0
La
V
I-.
...1 Lila
a
a
V
a 2 8 0 &I U.0 01la COLa
re
.. 0 Ca IV 0 e. r• 0 0 0 0 0 •12
I-.1.41 0 iNIta raai 0 •-•a Ni0 0 0 0 0 0
1,3 la N3 Ni ta 0-1 NI 0 t. ra •-• 0 - 00
.-.
443
LIN
in0 NiNi NINi .1La .1a 4110 0 la•V I4La la•n-• o
a.
NI Ni .1 Pa la, NI 0 1... ... .. NI .. NC"0Pa
N3in 14.1ia I.Ni ..n3 1a.la NICO 0 NI0 .6v P.V Ni01 .V
a
oN Cl wo up o V in VI 01 at 01 01 -10
-1
La
CO
ril40 ani it Li(a 443a raa naa n)wa laCO NI40 Of
a 1J1 a5 in in as 0 61 AI 0 as L., g
=
E
0
TI
•11
....1
In
m
l'
0
g
0
U.
.
a.
....,
la
CT 4
ca
1 T, 0 0 t a,..., 05'U La-... af
a ... to a La ... 1-• NI LO LO Ial 6/N
o
=
in0 t,av laLa aa LoV r-.In Fa0 a0 6,1V UNV LIJ1.3 01La a e
w IA 01 CO V a La 1,1 a in CO V a
0
7.0
2
-4
00 t 8 8 0 & ;.74 8 A Vr+ 020 0 0
0 I.6 0 o .. 1-. .... 0 s. a wt. .... §
0 •-•v 0 0 .NJ ..0 NIt11 0 .1a NI0 PPImo, paNs
Ul UN a% WI 1•1 a N.1 ... 1%.1 a La Pt3
-4
1,1in
-1
1.1
rs
=
.oa
m73Let
=ttti
.0
ONLi Lin
Ot LT1
UN
NI
UN
UI
V
IJI0 NI0 NI01 UNV Li43 NIin if
1.1/ .1 IP1 0 IT ta NV 41. 01 La a at 0
LaV ..••n1 0IN aIll VIJI ala. 010 CO0 V•-• JibLa ITV VU1 JP
141
correlated with bank performance. With respect to national economic variables, a
worsening of the general economic condition is expected to affect the performance
of banks. With respect to ownership the lower the share of the government in a bank
the higher the chance of survival. Notice that ownership here is viewed as whether
the bank is predominantly public or predominantly private.
In the case of capital adequacy, the responses here can hardly be reckoned
with, since a much higher percentage (57%) of respondent banks had favoured it as
being positively associated with bank performance. Indeed, it will be quite difficult
to comprehend that the higher the shareholders' funds of a bank the greater the
decline in its performance. Viewed in isolation this may be the case. However, viewed
against the background of other developments in the industry as well as within the
bank itself, over time, this can happen. It may simply be an observed trend. For
instance, no matter the capital base of a bank, if its management is highly inefficient
and the quality of its assets poor, dismal bank performance will likely result. As
expected the other factors are poorly rated as having negative correlation with bank
performance.
Going by type of ownership, head-office location, management and technical
partnership aggreement, we observe here also that the lower proportion of the
various classes of the banks voted the factors, except regulation and number and
distribution of branches, as being negatively correlated with bank performance. The
higher proportion favoured regulation and branch expansion as being negatively
correlated with bank performance as shown in Table 5.10.
In summary, the larger proportion of banks voted capital adequacy, asset
quality, managerial performance, loan portfolio, liquidity as being positively
correlated with bank performance. The factors that are found to be negatively
correlated with bank performance include regulation, number and distribution of
branches, national economic variables, and ownership. Based on the responses the
direction of relationship between revenue sources, revenue application, and violation
of regulatory guidelines is not clear. Table 5.10 summarises the identified
relationships.
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Table 5.10: Perceived Correlation of Factors with Bank Performance
Factors
Correlation
Positive Negative Uncertain
Capital Adequacy YES
Asset Quality YES
Managerial Performance YES
Loan Portfolio YES
Liquidity YES
Revenue Sources YES
Revenue Application YES
Ownership YES
Regulation/Deregulation YES
Number & Distribution of
Branches
YES
Violation of Regulatory
Guidelines
YES
National Economic Variables YES
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Table 5.11 displays the responses of sample banks as to which of the factor(s)
they believe is most significant in signalling possible bank failure. That is, which
factor can be relied upon as an early warning aid in respect of bank failure. Ninety
percent (90%) of the respondent banks indicated liquidity, 57% indicated asset
quality, managerial efficiency and loan portfolio while 52% indicated capital
adequacy. The other factors are insignificant, based on the proportion of respondent
banks that indicated them, being less than 25% in all cases.
Examining the nature of the above response in the light of the previous
ranking of factors in order of importance we observe the tendency to favour liquidity
as one factor most significant for signalling bank failure. This development in this
regard tends to reflect the orientation of bankers and management of banks in
general, particularly since the adoption of the SAP. The fact is that the exchange rate
was deregulated as a component of the SAP package while interest rate was also
deregulated. These were consistent with the market forces orientation. These were
followed by a considerable depreciation in the Naira value coupled with rising interest
rates. To control this, the monetary authorities identified excess liquidity in the
economy as the source and has relied on the compulsory issuance of stabilisation
securities to mop up excess liquidity from the system. Indeed, since 1987 liquidity
mop-up has been a major preoccupation of the CBN and consequently gained the
attention of the operating banks. The National Bank problem began due to illiquidity
and it has since been expelled from the clearing house as a result. It is necessary to
mention, however, that the problem of illiquidity which crippled this bank started
largely with the poor quality of its assets. The peculiar case of the bank is discussed
in a subsequent chapter for its significance as perhaps the only Nigerian commercial
bank which has come very close to failing in recent times. Lately the Central Bank
of Nigeria formally announced its take-over of the Bank, with the subsequent turning
over of its management to the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC).
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Table 5.11: Survey Responses on the Most Important Bank Performance Factors
Factors
MANAGEMENT
TOTAL 3/4 of
RESPONDENTSFOR % DON 4
Capital Adequacy 11 100 0 0 11 52
Asset Quality 11 92 1 8 12 57
Managerial Performance 11 92 1 8 12 57
Loan Portfolio 11 92 1 8 12 57
Liquidity 18 95 1 5 19 90
Revenue Sources 5 100 0 0 5 24
Revenue Application 1 50 1 5 2 10
Ownership 3 75 1 25 4 19
Regulation/Deregulation 1 100 0 0 1 5
Number & Distribution
of Branches
0 0 0 0 0 0
Violation of Regulatory
Guidelines
4 80 1 20 5 24
National Economic
Variables 
1 100 0 0 1 5
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5.6	 Regulatory Authorities, Regulatory Guidelines and Bank Performance: 
Analysis of Survey Responses 
We examine in this section the views of the sample banks as they concern
whether or not regulatory authorities should help prevent bank failure, the variety of
reasons for the views expressed, and also whether bank failure could result in Nigeria
from consistent violation of key monetary guidelines. These include the cash ratio,
liquidity ratio, capital adequacy and sectoral credit allocation ratios. Also, indications
were requested as to which guidelines of the monetary authorities are believed to be
beneficial and those detrimental to commercial bank performance in Nigeria.
From Table 5.12 we find that 70% of sample banks share the opinion that the
CBN should help protect and prevent bank failure in Nigeria. Only 30% share an
opinion opposite to this. The majority of banks favour CBN preventing bank failure
as part of their regulatory functions. Of the wholly public banks, 75% are in favour
of CBN preventing bank failure. The vote in support of this view is 80% for
predominantly public banks, 67% for predominantly private banks.
Respondent banks with head offices in Lagos support the opinion that CBN
should prevent bank failure, going by the 67% response in this regard. The banks
with head offices outside Lagos are also in favour, going by the 75% support. Sixty
eight percent (68%) of domestically managed banks support the view just as the only
foreign managed bank. Based on the existence or non-existence of technical
partnership agreement, we find that 58% of those banks with such agreements favour
the opinion which is equally favoured by 88% of banks without. A significant
proportion of banks with technical partners seem not to share the opinion that CBN
should prevent bank failures. Given the closeness in response rate for and against the
opinion it is difficult to say that an obvious preference exist in this regard for banks
with technical partnership arrangements. In what follows we highlight the reasons
which sample banks have given, looking at those which support prevention of failure
and those that are against.
Among the banks in favour of prevention, the arguments revolved around the
need to maintain and enhance the trust and confidence of depositors in the banks.
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The prevention of bank failure, as indicated by one of the three largest banks, will
generate a lot of confidence not only on the part of depositors but also, and
importantly too, enhance confidence on the part of local and international investors.
This is felt to be all the more necessary as the industry is still growing and
consequently any development that could endanger the trust reposed in it by
depositors should be avoided. This is due to the fact that, as pointed out by yet
another bank in support of the opinion, at this stage of the economy's development,
bank failure would have a bandwagon effect which could affect negatively, the evolving
banking habit and culture. Individual failures would weaken or, at least to some
extent, destabilize the entire financial system.
There is also this view that as the banker of all banks or better still the lender
of last resort the CBN is expected to do anything that will forestall the erosion of
public confidence in the banking system. It is also expected to protect the depositors'
funds and if it is observed that failure of a bank is inevitable, it should minimize the
loss associated with such failure. This has the potential of cushioning the bandwagon
effect that may arise.
Finally, an important point is believed to have been made by one of the wholly
private owned banks. Pointing out that protection and prevention of bank failure
need not be limited to assistance at the point of failure, it views that policies that aim
at preventing failures should be put in place by the monetary authorities. The CBN
rules and guidelines should be more preventive and equally protective while banking
supervision should be made more meaningful and effective.
One assumption that runs through all the viewpoints of this set of banks is
that the CBN is capable and has the capacity to protect and prevent failure. If this
is the case, one wonders then why the problems of the state-owned bank mentioned
earlier were not detected earlier. The structure of the balance sheet of the bank over
the years as well as its profitability, if adequately examined, would have revealed the
true state of the bank. For it to have run into the kind of problem it finds itself in
today, it could not have occurred overnight. Perhaps, this formed the basis of the
view that banking supervision should be more meaningful and effective. The bank has
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not failed due only to the fact that it is government-owned. Also, in Nigeria, CBN
examiners carry out inspections on banks annually. One expected they should have
known the state of things and consequently raised an alarm and set the correction
process in motion.
The case of a multinational bank, Bank of Credit and Commerce
International, BCCI, whose affiliate in Nigeria recently changed its name and which
belongs to our sample of banks, and the Bank of England is still fresh. The Bank of
England appeared to have insufficient information about the happenings in this bank.
Also, in China, the government had advised depositors not to withdraw their funds
from BCCI in the wake of the developments in other parts of the world. The next
day after the announcement the government itself closed down the bank.
The need for a further elaboration on the response of the management of
National Bank of Nigeria Limited is desirable. A bank failure is considered an
indication of the inability of the monetary authorities to correctly diagnose the crucial
problems in good time to avert such failure. The response continued by maintaining
that monetary authorities can hardly be fully exonorated from blame for watching the
situation deteriorate. Neither could they be exonerated for ineffectively hying to deal with
whatever the problems might have been for so long as to defy solution, given the
preventive and curative sanctions available under the appropriate regulations and
guidelines to assist a troubled bank in overcoming its problems before degenerating into
a compounded and hopeless situation. Again, we believe the comment presumes that
the CBN is capable of preventing failure. It tends to portray in this case, however,
that the CBN must have known long before this time that the Bank was in serious
trouble and yet nothing was done to avert it when there was still ample time.
The views of the opposing banks are equally interesting. Many are based on
the recent development in the industry wherein more than 80 new banks have started
operation since the adoption of SAP. The central argument against prevention of
bank failure by CBN is that it will promote and sustain inefficiency in the banking
industry. This in their view is contrary to the new market orientation. It seems they
believe that the essence of the keen and increasing level of competition that has been
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on since SAP is to sort the wheat from the chaff. Only efficient banks should be
allowed to operate. The argument for deregulation is one for efficiency of the
banking system in particular and the financial system in general. No
protection/prevention policy, one bank rightly observes, has the potential of making
the banks sit up, ensuring higher degree of professionalism in decision making by the
board of directors and management of most banks as well as causing the public to
be more cautious in choosing a bank. One bank distinguishes the protection of
depositors' interest by law from the prevention of bank failure. While being in favour
of the former the bank is vehemently against the latter, as can be seen from its
response. It holds that protection, apart from fostering inefficiency, will encourage
avoidable and unnecessary risk taking by banks.
The pre-eminence of collective rather than individual survival is reflected by
one of the opposing banks. The bank profers a solution which may be considered one
of a compromise nature. This is that rather than prevent bank failure on an
individual basis, it should be prevented by encouraging take-overs by other well-
managed and performing banks, since the collective survival is more important.
From the views of this group of banks we identify two crucial points. First is
that the prevention of bank failure is or can be distinct from protection of depositors
interests, while the second is that banks may not be allowed to actually fail by
recognising and putting in place a framework that encourages take-overs by other
sound banks. It is noteworthy that both seem to have taken care of two key issues
raised by the class of banks that favour prevention of bank failure. One issue is that
of protecting the depositors interest. Granted that a bank may fail while its depositors
are protected then perhaps there may be no need for deliberate efforts at preventing
bank failure, at least when viewed ordinarily. On the other hand, however, with too
many of such developments, we may begin to see the trust and confidence depositors
have in the industry being eroded. A decline in banking habit would result, and for
an economy that is making efforts at harnessing a larger amount of financial
resources, particularly from the rural areas, this development would have a negative
impact.
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The other issue has to do with the ability of the CBN to protect the banks and
prevent bank failure. In line with the suggestion that this objective can be achieved
by putting in place rules and guidelines, these may be geared towards establishing the
framework that will encourage and promote take-overs. In all these we have not in
any way attempted to play down the importance of bank supervision. This is still very
essential to the extent that it will ensure that banks' operations are in line with
regulations.
In response to whether or not the persistent violation of a number of CBN
monetary policy guidelines would eventually lead to bank failure, 71% of the banks
responded positively to the cash ratio and 81% responded positively to both the
liquidity and capital adequacy ratios. Only 50% responded positively to the sectoral
allocation ratio.
One can appreciate the basis for this view. While the cash, liquidity and capital
adequacy ratios relate directly to the operations of the bank and are precautionary
measures aimed at either protecting the depositors or guiding the banks'
performance, the sectoral credit allocation ratios represent government policy aimed
at achieving diversification in the administration of credit, in particular toward the
real sectors or so-called high priority sectors. The sectoral credit allocation policy
stipulates that a minimum of 15% and 35% respectively, of the aggregate credit of
each bank be directed at activities in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. What
the response seems to be indicating is that, while in complying with this restriction
some income may be compromised, this need not be to the extent that would
adversely affect a sound bank. Consequently, if violated it must imply that more
credit has been directed to the non-preferred sectors which include exports, wholesale
and retail trade as well as transport among others. The credit to this sector is
conventionally priced higher than those to the priority sector, particularly,
Agriculture. Hence, some benefits may actually be derived from a violation in this
case. The high price as well as the high repayment rate are pluses that may promote
such development. There is a penalty, however, which states that in the event of a
violation the bank would deposit an amount equivalent to the shortfall at the CBN
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for three months in the first instance and without interest. A study has, however,
shown that it may be more profitable for banks to deliberately violate the restriction
since the returns from its violation can exceed considerably the penalty paid (Alejo,
1988).
Some interesting responses were noticed among the general responses. Four
respondent banks held the view that a persistent violation of all the guidelines would
not cause bank failure. Of these, two banks felt that not even the liquidity ratio nor
the capital adequacy ratio were critical enough to cause bank failure if persistently
violated by banks. Perhaps, the fact that the question stated would eventually lead to
bank failure brought about these views. However, one would find it difficult to
comprehend the view that a persistent violation of these guidelines in particular
would not increase the probability of bank failure. When asked to indicate which CBN
policies were beneficial to bank performance, however, one indicated increasing
emphasis on capital adequacy while the other cited liquidity, cash and capital
adequacy ratios. Given these replies one then wonders whether there is not a
contradiction. If the guidelines which are put in place by the CBN and which are
meant to be followed by the banks are thought to aid bank performance, it stands to
reason that a lack of adherence to them would tend to compromise bank
performance.'
One of these banks represents a state-owned non-performing bank with head-
office located outside Lagos, a domestic management without a technical partnership
agreement. One cannot help thinking that in preparing their response to this question
the management was informed by the circumstances that lead to its own dismal
performance. If indeed the violation of these guidelines had little to do with their
performance then one can appreciate their comments.
4 It is thought that perhaps banks should be allowed to decide their own
liquidity levels, in line with the policy of deregulation, as it is done in U.K. for
example. The current state of affairs may, however, not be unconnected with
our relatively inadequate experience in banking, and the level of development
of the economy.
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One other represents a fairly new bank with excellent performance. Two
others are older predominantly government owned banks. One can only view their
responses as being inconsistent with their answers to subsequent questions.
Table 5.12 summarises the guidelines of the CBN which the respondent banks
felt to be beneficial to bank performance. In this regard, 62% of the banks indicated
the beneficial nature of the liquidity ratio while capital adequacy ratio was voted
beneficial by 76% of the banks. The cash revenue requirement or cash ratio is
beneficial according to 33% of the banks.
Some other important guidelines, which were thought to be beneficial include;
the prudential guidelines, sectoral credit allocation, interest rate policy, new branch
opening policy, equipment leasing guidelines, equity participation, ceiling on
aggregate credit, the deregulation of foreign exchange and the uniform accounting
standards among banks. The prudential guidelines were put in place to ensure a
uniform standard which were to be used by banks to make provisions for loan losses
and other non-performing assets. This policy came into force in November 1990. We
earlier explained the focus of the sectoral credit allocation policy. The interest rate
policy borders on the deregulation of interest rates wherein banks had the free will
to fix rates based on demand for credit. With respect to new branch policy, the CBN
is expected to appraise applications for location of new branches. Also, commercial
banks are now allowed to engage in equipment leasing to the tune of 15% of their
aggregate assets. The deregulation of foreign exchange rate is similar to the interest
rate deregulation. The Naira exchange rate is now determined by the interaction of
demand and supply forces at the foreign exchange market in which the CBN is the
sole supplier of foreign exchange and the licensed banks are the only authorised
dealers. The uniform accounting standard is similar to the prudential guidelines in
their objective. We do not intend to go into details of these guidelines for their
seemingly insignificant relevance.
Among the guidelines believed to be detrimental to bank performance, as
cited by the respondent banks, we have: the mopping up of excess liquidity or
compulsory issuance of stabilisation securities; aggregate credit ceiling; rural banking
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policy; foreign exchange allocation; sectoral credit allocation; interest payment on
current accounts; tax on savings deposits; and frequency of changes in regulation and
liquidity management.
Four banks hold that the sectoral credit allocation policy were beneficial to
bank performance while only one voted otherwise. Quite a number of banks detest
the aggregate credit ceiling. This disposition need only be appraised within the new
economic policy orientation. Banks had expected that with deregulation all credit
controls would be removed. To date, however, this has not materialised as the ceiling
is still stipulated while in addition there is the sectoral credit allocation. There is little
room for banks to manouevre, hence the change being observed in their asset
structure away from lending and interest income to fee income activities (Sotonwa,
1991)
The rural banking policy has been cited earlier. Foreign exchange allocation
has been raised here as being distinct from the deregulation of foreign exchange. It
seems that the problem here has to do with the method of allocating available foreign
exchange at the foreign exchange market. Successful banks at the market get a fixed
amount of foreign exchange irrespective of the level of demand. The identification
of the frequency of changes that have plagued the industry since SAP makes the
management of the assets and liabilities of banks more difficult with the tendency for
banks to be exposed to greater risk. Furthermore, this situation may cause banks to
be more conservative, a disposition which is likely to involve a compromise in bank
performance. Finally, the payment of interest on current account which is made
compulsory was decried by quite a number of banks.
5.7 Influx of New Banks and Bank Failure: Analysis of Survey Results 
The concluding part of the questionnaire sought to isolate the views of the
banks and their management as to whether or not they are in support of the view
that the recent influx of new banks into the industry may result in bank failure or a
decline in the performance of banks.
Among the respondent banks, 60% do not agree that the influx of new banks
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will result in failure, while 40% hold a contrary view. Also 60% of banks with head
offices in Lagos do not believe that bank failure would result from the increase in the
number of banks. Same is the view of 58% of banks with technical partnership
agreements as well as 61% of banks with domestic management. A half of the banks
with head office located outside Lagos each voted for and against the view.
The reasons for the pros and cons regarding the view are considered in what
follows. First, we consider those of the banks that believe that there will be bank
failure as a result of the influx of new banks. In general while some view that any
existing bank could fail others believe that the failure would be among the new banks
only. One of these banks claims that the current state of the Nigerian economy does
not require an influx of more banks and that if at all new banks were to be allowed,
only a few new ones which can be piloted effectively in conjunction with the existing
ones would suffice.
Some others did indicate that the influx would increase the competition among
banks and this may in turn lead to failure of inefficient banks that cannot survive the
competition. One, in particular, stated that only banks with a reasonable market share
would survive. What is not known here is the definition of reasonable market share.
It is also the view of this category of banks that the new banks in particular
lack competent staff and professional bankers; are in most cases personalised with
incessant occurrence of board squabbles; are over-reliant on foreign exchange trade
as a source of income; while they also have high potential for frauds arising from
control inadequacies. The quality of bank staff as well as that of the management
team is emphasized here as being a potential cause of failures. Bank failures are also
capable of resulting due to the fact that adequate CBN supervision is doubtful. The
expansion in the industry if too rapid may pose supervision problems to CBN.
Consequently bank failures may result.
Respondents in the opposing group view among others that banks will not
necessarily fail if they are properly monitored, although there will be increased
competition which will enhance efficiency and innovativeness. A role is carved out for
the CBN, which emphasises the essence of proper management. It seems that
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emphasis is being placed on the supervisory role of the CBN. These banks also
believe that opportunities abound in the industry that can be exploited. There is still
unsatisfied demand for banking services. This is contrary to the claim earlier made
by management of some opposing banks that the economy cannot afford additional
banks, at least not as many as we now have. It is also pointed out that with adequate
database, what really is believed to be needed is the licensing of more commercial
banks in preference for merchant banks. The important points that are made by the
banks are that (i) the free entry of new banks was not designed primarily to
precipitate bank failures but to enhance efficiency, improve funds mobilization and
meet unsatisfied demand; and (ii) that the existing number of banks is not a factor
in bank failure.
A bank in particular noted that the new banks will not fail due to the fact that
they possess a dynamic crop of management personnel mostly selected from well
established older banks which have spent fortunes training them. They are highly
innovative, building up high quality of assets and have minimal overhead expenses.
It is noted also that with the influx of banks the industry risk will be spread even
more. These views make sense though some of the opposing banks which believe that
new banks will fail claim they have poor management which are mostly inexperienced.
Quite frankly a number of them are doing well from an examination of their
profitability and asset structure and quality (Sobodu and Sotonwa, 1991). Those that
are malperforming, more often than not, have boardroom crises or some management
squabbles as has been rightly pointed out by the banks.
Finally, it is necessary to examine one interesting response from one of the
banks that believes bank failure would not result. The bank's reason for its position
is based on its claim that present regulations indirectly subsidize banks and it is this
subsidy that causes the influx of new banks into the industry. The bank claims that
it is only when banks are allowed to compete on their own merits, by withdrawing the
subsidies, that failure could result.
In effect the bank seems to be claiming that the CBN has thus far put in place
policies that are geared toward protecting and preventing bank failure. The bank had
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earlier held a mid-way view about whether or not the CBN should help to protect or
prevent bank failure. Some comments seem necessary at this point.
One finds it difficult to see current banking regulation as a subsidy in its
orientation. Perhaps the subsidy refers to the price of official foreign exchange,
compared with the parallel market rate, which appears to be more responsive to
market forces. The same bank had been the only one among all the respondent banks
which cited as a detrimental guideline of the CBN, the method of allocating foreign
exchange. A closer look at the method of allocation at the FEM reveals that each
authorised dealer or bidding bank can be sure of an almost constant income once it
is successful. At the FEM the maximum amount of foreign exchange which a bank
can buy depends upon its category. At the early stages of the functioning of the
market, banks were classified into big, small and new banks with each having a ceiling
on the quantity of foreign exchange it could purchase. The categorisation, the basis
of which was not particularly clear to the bidding banks, had been changed a few
times. Up to March 5, 1992, five categories of banks existed with associated foreign
exchange purchase limits. The market was fully deregulated on March 5, 1992.
The obvious flaw in the previous arrangement was that the quantity each bank
obtains from the market was fixed. This left little room for the price of foreign
exchange to be a true reflection of its worth. The fact that some banks could be sure
of foreign exchange and hence income on a constant basis by virtue of the allocation
method was, admittedly, a subsidy. The view was infact widely held that the larger
majority of the new banks relied significantly on income from foreign exchange
sources. It had turned out to be such a constant source of considerable income. For
some of these banks, income from foreign exchange has accounted for over 30 per
cent of their total operating income. Consequently, without foreign exchange many
of the banks that have minimally diversified portfolio of assets would be exposed. The
point being made here therefore seems to be that the foreign exchange arrangement
was a policy that served to sustain banks without any reference to their efficiency.
The consensus is that the new scheme is by far better and more efficient.
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CHAPTER SIX
RESULTS OF UNIVARIATE ANALYSES
6.1	 Introduction
This chapter relies heavily on the quantitative information provided in the
questionnaires. This information covers the number of urban and rural branches, the
number and composition of staff, the magnitude and composition of the loan
portfolio, the magnitude and composition of operating expenses, the magnitude and
composition of the deposit portfolio, operating income and bank capital among
others. Essentially, the information provided was requested for the period 1980 to
1989. The reason for this is that the more the information available the greater is the
potential level of accuracy that can be achieved and the greater our ability to check
for the internal consistency in the data. The period was also stated deliberately to
provide considerable information prior to SAP and since SAP, to enable comparison
of the results along this line.
On close examination, only about seven (7) respondent banks provided
comprehensive quantitative information for periods prior to 1985. The observed trend
was such that the longer the period the greater the scanty nature of the data. Also,
some banks only began operation in the mid-80s and quite obviously did not have
information for the years prior to 1985. Given the state of the data, we decided to
concentrate on the period 1985 to 1989. This period still provides us with the
opportunity of comparing the results obtained for the years prior to SAP and the
periods since SAP.
Also, there are instances in which one or two data points are missing in the
data available for 1985 to 1989. The analysis is thus based on the available data
points in all cases. This, as well as the above situation, imposes some limitation on
the results of our analyses and the extent to which we can generalise as a result.
Due essentially to the large differences in the size of these respondent banks
measured in terms of the deposit base, the asset base, the loan portfolio, the capital
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base, as well as such factors as age and ownership, we concentrate on certain
financial ratios to make for effective comparative analysis among the banks. The
financial ratios which are identified and highlighted were compiled from a wide
variety of sources which include Deakin (1968), Meyer and Pifer (1970), Fraser,
Phillips and Rose (1974), Korobow and Stuhr (1975), Sinkey (1975), Sinkey and
Walker (1977), Hunter and Srinivasan (1990) and Pantalone and Platt (1987).
These ratios are grouped under a number of headings that describe their
essence and scope. They are (i) Profitability, (ii) Liquidity, (iii) Capital Adequacy,
(iv) Risk/Asset Quality/Loan Volume, (v) Management Efficiency, (vi) Match of
Liability and (vii) Bank Size/Bank Branch Structure/Revenue Sources. These headings
are informed by the previous attempts in the literature. In addition to the more
conventional ratios we also add a few ratios that we believe will reflect more of the
peculiar characteristics of the banking industry in a developing economy. These ratios
are related to the number and distribution of bank branches and the staff size.
The 37 financial ratios used are listed as follows:
A.	 Profitability
1. Net Income Before Taxes =NITA
Total Assets
2. Net Income Before Taxes =NITC
Total Capital
3. Operating Income =OITA
Total Assets
4. Operating Income =OITC
Total Capital
5. Net Income Before Taxes =NISS
Staff Size
6. Operating Income =OISS
Staff Size
7. Operating Income =OINB
Number of Branches
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8.
B.	 Liquidity
Operating Income =OIRB
Number of Rural Branches
1. Total Loans =TLD
Total Deposits
2. Cash and Short-Term Funds =CSTA
Total Assets
3. Government Securities Holding =GSTA
Total Assets
C.	 Capital
1.
Adequacy
Total Capital =TCTA
Total Assets
2. Total Loans =TLSF
Shareholder's Funds
3. Total Capital =TCRA
Risk Assets
4. Total	 Loans =TLCLL
Shareholder's Funds + Loan Loss Provision
D.	 Risk/Asset Quality/Loan Volume
1. Total Loans =TLTA
Total Assets
2. Loan Loss Provision =LLTL
Total Loans
3. Risk Assets =RATA
Total Assets
4. Current Assets =CATA
Total Assets
5. Loan Loss Provision =LLOE
Operating Expenses
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E.	 Management Quality/Managerial Efficiency
1. Operating Expenses =0E0I
Operating Income
2. Operating Expenses =OETA
Total Assets
3. Operating Expenses =OETC
Total Capital
4. Operating Expenses =OERA
Risk Assets
5. Operating Expenses =OESS
Staff Size
6. Operating Expenses =OENB
No. of Branches
7. Operating Expenses =OERB
No. of Rural Branches
8. Total Dividend =DVOI
Total Income
F.	 Match of Liability
1. Time Deposits =TDCD
Current Deposits
2. Time Deposits =TDTTD
Total Deposits
3. Cash and Short-term Funds =CSCD
Current Deposits
4. Cash and Short-term Funds =CSCSD
Current + Savings Deposits
5. Total Loans =TLCD
Current Deposits
161
G.	 Bank Size/Bank Branch Structure/Revenue Sources
1. Loan Income =LIOI
Total Income
2. Total Deposits =TTDNB
No. of Branches
3. Total Deposits =TTDSS
Staff Size
4. No. of Rural Branches =RBUB
No. of Urban Branches
A number of these ratios are widely used in the U.S. for assessing bank
performance and indeed there exists some norms or benchmarks for these ratios
which aid in the assessment of the health of operating banks. In our review of ratios
for which widely accepted norms exist, we also examine averages for all or a
representative of U.S. commercial banks of other ratios as benchmarks for adequate
performance. This is believed to be applicable since inspite of the spate of failures
in the U.S. banking system, more than eighty percent of operating banks are not
problem banks. We have not reviewed the norms for all ratios due to the fact that
some have been introduced only in this study especially to reflect the peculiarities of
our case study.
The return on assets among U.S. commercial banks is observed to vary with
the banks' asset size. For banks with asset base of less than $500 million, the
acceptable range for the non-problem banks is between 1.25% and 1.50%. Those
with assets ranging between $500 million and $2 billion tend to exhibit a lower ROA
of between 1.00% and 1.25%. For banks recording assets in excess of N2 billion, an
ROA of between 0.5% and 1.00% is deemed adequate (Johnson and Johnson, 1984).
Fraser and Fraser (1990) indicated that for all U.S. banks insured by the FDIC, the
average ROA was 0.78%, 0.75%, 0.72%, and 0.71% in 1983, 1985, 1987 and 1989
respectively. For all U.S. banks, the ROA was 0.75%, 0.89%, 0.99%, 0.55% and
1.02% in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 respectively (French, 1991, p3). The
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profitability of banks not insured by the FDIC seems responsible for the increased
average profitability of the U.S. banks. Indeed, French (1991) also indicated that
banks with capital ratios in excess of 6.0% (which is considered the norm), were more
profitable. For this class of U.S. banks, the average ROA was 0.96%, 0.96%, 1.06%,
1.07% and 1.07% respectively in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990. Our net income
to total assets ratio measure of profitability is considered a good proxy for the ROA.
A return on total capital of between 13% and 16% is considered adequate for a U.S.
bank (Johnson and Johnson, 1984). Between 1978 and 1982, for all U.S. banks, the
return on capital employed averaged between 12 % and 14%.
Our liquidity ratios include the ratio of total loans to total deposits, cash and
short term funds to total assets and government securities holding to total assets.
According to Johnson and Johnson, a bank with a loan-asset ratio in excess of 75%
is considered to have an aggressive loan strategy while one with a ratio that is at most
65% in considered to operate a very conservative loan strategy. The Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago (1984) revealed the average loan-asset ratio of all U.S. banks to be
60.5%. For Hunter and Srinivasan's (1990) sample of 169 U.S. commercial banks,
the ratio was between 66% and 67% over the period 1981 to 1988. For a sample of
130 commercial banks representative of the U.S. banking industry, Johnson and
Johnson revealed that the ratio of cash and short-term assets to total assets averaged
between 15% and 19% over the period 1973 to 1982. Indeed, while the holding of
cash has declined, the holding of government securities has been on the increase,
both in relation to assets. Sinkey (1975) observed that liquidity measured by the
same ratio was higher for surviving banks. The holding of government securities in
relation to total assets has grown, based on this sample, from about only 3% in 1973
to about 11% in 1988. This ratio averaged 12% to 15% for a sample of problem
banks and 17% to 18.5% for a control sample of non problem banks in 1970 -72 as
presented in Sinkey and Walker (1974). In Short et al's (1985) analysis of bank
failures, failed banks were found to have recorded on the average a ratio of 5.5% as
against 10.7% for non-failed banks in the 1982/83 period. Again we observe that the
healthier banks would seem to be more liquid than the problem banks.
163
The Federal Reserve guidelines indicate a capital-asset ratio of 7% as being
appropriate for most U.S. banks. For practical purposes however, a ratio of between
5% - 6% is considered adequate for money-center banks and regional banks. The
capital-asset ratio for all U.S. banks in 1984 averaged 9.2% (FRB Chicago, 1986, p.
49). Short et al (1985) also adopted this ratio in their analysis. For the period
1982/83, they observed an average ratio of 6.62% for a sample of failed banks and
10.29% for a sample of non-failed banks. Failed banks had relatively lower capital-
asset ratios compared with non-failed banks, at least in the U.S. Sinkey used the
ratio of loans to equity capital plus reserves as an alternative ratio for assessing
capital adequacy. He observed on the average for surviving banks that loans were
between 5.5 and 5.8 times the shareholders' funds for the period 1970 to 1972 and
indicated that the average for failed banks was much higher. The ratio of capital to
risk assets was also penciled down for assessing bank capital adequacy in our study.
An approprite ratio, going by the capital-asset ratio considered, would be in the range
of 10% to 12%. For problem banks, the ratio used by Sinkey and Walker (1974)
averaged between 9% and 12% while for the control sample banks the ratio averaged
at least 12.5%.
The loan-asset ratio, a measure of risk and diversification, averaged between
52% and 56% for a sample of 130 U.S. commercial banks between the ten-year
period 1973 and 1982 (Johnson and Johnson, 1984). Short et al (1985) found that
the ratio for a sample of failed banks averaged 70% in 1982/83 as against 58% for
non-failed banks. We have used as a proxy for the asset quality measure of non-
performing assets to total loans, the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans. A
bank with a ratio of non-performing assets to total loans of less than 3% is deemed
to exhibit above average asset quality while those with higher ratios are cases which
call for concern (Morgan Bank, 1986)5 The sample of commercial banks considered
by Johnson and Johnson would suggest that a risk-asset ratio of 84% - 85% is
deemed adequate for a U.S. commercial bank. This average ratio was observed with
5 Morgan Bank (1986) "Bank Analysis", mimeograph, october.
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very little variation for the ten-year period 1973 and 1982. The same sample
indicated as an acceptable benchmark a loan loss provision to operating expenses
ratio of between 2% and 4%. Around late 1972 the ratio tended more towards 4%
while since the early 1980s a marked reduction towards 2% was observed.
Inspite of the popularity of the ratio of operating expenses to operating
income as a measure of managerial efficiency, it does appear that no specific
percentage is deemed appropriate. However, an attempt to compare any two banks
would suggest that the one with the lower ratio is more managerially-efficient. Sinkey
in his 1975 paper obtained an average ratio of less than 80% for non-problem banks
and more than 80% for problem banks. Another ratio for measuring managerial
efficiency is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. A closely related ratio is
the ratio of overheads to total assets. According to Johnson and Johnson, as at 1984,
a ratio of less than 3% was considered low while a ratio in excess of 5% was
considered high. We also have as a measure of managerial efficiency the ratio of
dividends to total income. A closely related ratio is the ratio of cash dividends to net
income which should be between 30% to 40% for a performing bank.
The ratio of time to total deposits would reflect the degree of dependence of
a bank on high cost and long term funds. For a retail bank this ratio is expected to
be low while for a wholesale bank it stands to reason that it should be high. Hunter
and Srinivasan adopted this ratio in their analysis of newly chartered U.S. banks.
Between 1981 and 1988, they observed a reduction in the average ratio for a sample
of 169 U.S. banks from 31% in 1981 to 21% in 1985 and further to 17% in 1988.
This would suggest an increasing reliance on other types of deposits over time.
An assessment of the income profile of the earlier referenced sample of U.S.
commercial banks revealed that between 1973 and 1982, total interest income
accounted for between 88% and 92% of their total income. Indeed, Sinkey and
Walker's (1974) study showed that loan income accounted for between 60% and 70%
of the total income of U.S. banks. It may be right to use as a benchmark a 60 - 70%
contribution of loans to total income especially when loans constitute the bulk of the
assets of banks and have equally constituted the most profitable asset of banks.
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In what follows we compute the financial ratios and discuss the trend observed
among banks for each year of the study horizon as well as conduct a comparative
analysis over the study period. We have not attempted an explicit comparison of the
ratios observed for Nigerian commercial banks with the benchmarks and norms for
the U.S. banks. As noted by Morgan Bank (1986), side-by-side comparisons of banks
in different countries are not always analytically meaningful, and substantial
adjustments may be necessary to effect some measure of uniformity. For example,
different financial classifications exist which are in use in different countries. The
accounting standards differ just as the demands of the regulatory authorities as
regards financial reporting. With the pioneering work of the Basle committee in
defining a uniform international capital adequacy ratio, perhaps in the near future,
with greater international cooperation, a good basis may exist for inter-country
comparison. Furthermore, some U.S. banks have limited branching status.
Categorising them with those having unlimited branching status in reporting of
aggregate financial information on banks in the U.S. would not make for reasonable
comparison with similar information on Nigerian commercial banks which have
unlimited branching status (so to speak).
6.2	 Trends in Selected Financial Ratios for Nigerian Commercial Banks 
From Table 6.1 we have for 1985 the minimum and maximum values for each
of the computed ratios as well as the mean and standard deviation over all the
sample banks. As previously highlighted the profitability ratios range from the return
on assets as defined by net income before taxes divided by total assets (NITA) to the
ratio of operating income to number of rural branches (OIRB).
The minimum return on assets was -7.53% while the maximum was 9.09% with
the mean over all sample banks being 1.96%. The return on capital (NITC) was as
low as -113.5% and as high as 251.5% among the sample banks. Relative to the
capital base which essentially was thin in this period the returns were very high for
some banks and low for others, presumably the weak or vulnerable ones. The net
income per staff (NISS) was as low as -N0.021 million and as high as NO.105 million
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Table 6.1: Summary Statistics of Financial Ratios for 1985
Number
of Obs.
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
20 NITA -7.52 9.09 1.96 0.036
NITC -113.58 251.45 61.20 0.870
OITA 3.97 12.45 8.52 0.019
OITC 34.55 812.32 263.07 1.974
NISS* -0.021 0.105 2.13 0.031
0155* 0.011 0.171 0.061 0.048
OINB* 0.536 12.113 2.699 3.011
OIRB* 1.023 18.628 6.522 5.952
TLD 21.78 118.19 56.69 0.233
CSTA 2.87 95.18 35.99 0,285
GSTA 0.00 51.31 18.33 0.180
TCTA 0.99 17.93 4.86 0.036
TLSF 104.87 6056.72 1329.20 12.959
TCRA 1.25 95.18 11.07 0.212
TLCLL 101.98 1506.75 582.75 3.245
TLTA 15.59 86.88 43.57 0.189
LLTL 0.00 26.27 8.84 0.084
RATA 18.80 93.46 68.25 0.199
CATA 0.02 100.00 53.19 0.357
LLOE 0.00 268.59 66.86 0.766
OEOI 27.00 288.36 85.38 0.584
OETA 2.35 11.52 6.56 0.025
OETC 46.73 813.68 201.87 1.847
OERA 3.53 46.89 11.58 0.098
20
.t_
	
OESS* 0.016 0.092 0.039 0.026
OENB* 0.506 5.078 1.661 1.359
OERB* 0.955 11.949 4.375 3.965
DVOI 0.00 8.24 1.52 0.024
TDCD 26.97 242.97 118.52 0.669
TDTTD 14.50 88.64 38.13 0.186
CSCD 9.49 349.37 143.07 1.101
CSCSD 3.59 250.51 1.06 0.902
TLCD 39.20 333.41 1.76 0.854
RBUB - - -
LIOI 24.71 69.83 44.31 16.324
TTDNB* 4.725 155.380 25.799 35.324
TTDSS* 0.170 2.188 0.562 0.524
e: Aster j skedRatios are measured in Million Naira.
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with a mean of NO.021 million. The mean operating income per staff was NO.061
million while the same per branch was N2.639 million.
The liquidity ratios follow; namely, the ratio of loans to deposits (TLD), the
ratio of cash and short-term funds to total assets (CSTA) and the ratio of
government securities holding to total assets (GSTA). TLD was as low as 21.78% and
as high as 118.1%. This means that the exposure of the banks exceeded their deposit
base by as high as 18% in the most extreme case. On the average however, the ratio
was 56.69%. As measured by CSTA, the average liquidity of the sample banks is 36%
while as measured by GSTA the average was 18%. By implication cash and short-
term funds averaged 36% for the sample banks while government securities averaged
18% of total assets respectively.
The capital adequacy ratios follow, defined by the ratio of total capital to total
assets (TCTA), ratio of total loans to equity capital (TLSF), ratio of total capital to
risk assets (TCRA), ratio of total loans to total capital plus loan loss provision
(TLCLL). As for TCTA the average over the banks was 4.86% which was quite low.
The maximum was 17.93% with the lowest being 0.99% which was dangerously low.
Measured by the risk assets ratio, TCRA, the average was 11.07% while the minimum
and maximum values were 1.25% and 95.2% respectively. The latter value was rather
high but impressive still. Considering TLSF we find that the loan portfolio of the
sample banks was on the average 13.29 times the shareholders' funds. Of the banks,
the lowest was about 1.05 times the equity capital while the highest was 60 times the
same. The latter is of course ridiculous but it shows the state of some of the Nigerian
commercial banks prior to SAP. The authorised share capital as at 1985 was about
N12 million which had not been fully subscribed by quite a number of the banks. In
recent times the share capital was initially increased to N20 million and was revised
upward again to N50 million for commercial banks. This was in recognition of the
state of the industry as a whole as exemplified by the ratio, among others.
The TLCLL ratio is viewed a better ratio than the TLSF ratio (Sinkey and
Walker, 1977). It is infact used by the Comptroller of the Currency as a first test of
capital adequacy. It was also found in Sinkey and Walker (1977) to perform the best
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in distinguishing between financially sound and vulnerable banks. This ratio averaged
5.83 for commercial banks in 1985. While the minimum was 1.02, the maximum was
15.06. These values reveal further the inadequacy of the capital and other provisions
of Nigerian banks.
The ratio of loans to assets (TLTA), loan loss provision to total loans (LLTL),
risk assets to total assets (RATA), current assets to total assets (CATA) and loan loss
provision to operating expenses (LLOE) are used for assessing the risk or asset
quality of commercial banks, among other existing ratios. The LLOE was used in
Sinkey (1975) to assess loan quality.
TLTA averaged 43.57% while LLTL averaged 8.84%. RATA, CATA and
LLOE averaged 68.2%, 53.2% and 66.86% respectively. The fairly low value of the
LLTL should not be accepted on its face value. It is common knowledge that at this
time many Nigerian banks had under-provided for bad and doubtful debts. Loans also
have accounted for less than half of the total assets of the banks though more than
half of the assets, almost 70%, is risky. The ratio of loan loss provision being 66.86%
of operating expenses is still high and it would have been higher had the banks made
realistic provision for Loan Losses.
Managerial efficiency is measured by the ratio of operating expenses to
operating income (0E0I),which is perhaps the most popular in this class. The ratio
of operating expenses to total assets (OETA), operating expenses to risk assets
(OERA) and dividend to operating income (DVOI) are among other notable ones.
OEOI averaged 85.38%, OETA averaged 6.56%, OERA averaged 11.58% while
DVOI averaged 1.52%. The managerial efficiency indicators are not impressive in
particular with operating expenses being 85% of operating income. That is, of every
naira earned 85 kobo is spent. The margin for the banks is relatively low. This is
confirmed by the NITA which averaged 1.96% for the same period. Also, dividend
has been a maximum of 8.24% of operating income. Needless to note that, with
proper control of operating expenses the profit margin could be enhanced
considerably.
With respect to the ability of the banks to match properly its liabilities and
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also to ensure a good cost structure we examine the ratio of time deposits to current
deposits (TDCD), time deposits to total deposits (TDTTD), and total loans to
current deposits (TLCD). The average of TDCD is 118.5%, for 1985. This implies
that for every Ni of free fund the banks had N1.18 of high cost funds. Such cost
structure is of course not ideal. The banks would be better off with a higher
proportion of free funds. In this regard, the highest ratio was 242% while the lowest
was 26.97%.
Time deposits averaged 38% of total bank deposits being as high as 88.6% in
some banks. The average of TLCD was 1.75%. This implies that the current deposits
of the banks were eroded largely to finance loans which has in most cases longer
maturity profiles. The average deposit per branch was N25.80 million while per staff
it averaged NO.562 million.
In 1986 as shown in table 6.2 the return of asset averaged 1.97% while the
return on capital averaged 5.97%. The maximum return on asset (NITA) was 6.52%.
OITA and OITC averaged 8.62% and 2.57% respectively. Also net income per staff
(NISS) averaged NO.037 million while operating income per branch averaged N3.645
million. The profitability of Nigerian commercial banks still remained fairly low as
reflected by the return on asset.
With respect to liquidity, total loans as a ratio of total deposits (TLD)
averaged 62.22%, CSTA averaged 32.93% while GSTA averaged 11.17%. These
figures represent lower degree of liquidity for the banks in 1986 compared with 1985.
The capital adequacy ratios TCTA, TLSF, TCRA, TLCLL averaged 5.19%,
13.68%, 8.7% and 629.7% respectively. Again, total loans exceeded the addition of
shareholders' funds and loan loss provision. The capital ratios of 5.19% and 8.7% for
TCTA and TCRA are still low and perhaps could be said to have been largely
inadequate.
The ratios defined by TLTA, LLTL, RATA which measure risk and asset
quality averaged 44.54%, 8.78% and 70.29% respectively. Others such as CATA and
LLOE averaged 56% and 70.07%. We observe essentially an increase (about 2%
points) in the RATA compared with 1986. The LLTL is low and indeed about the
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Table 6.2: Summary Statistics of Financial Ratios for 1986
Number
of Obs.
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
20 NITA -8.41 6.51 1.97 0.035
NITC -102.83 216.93 59.76 0.808
OITA 3.65 10.82 8.61 0.015
OITC 24.22 932.28 257.24 1.861
HISS* -0.041 0.419 0.04 0.094
OISS* 0.011 0.538 0.087 0.115
OINB* 0.487 27.110 3.645 5.840
OIRB* 0.929 17.580 6.591 5.479
TLD 28.57 119.94 62.22 0.233
CSTA 5.72 98.04 32.93 0.264
GSTA 0.00 47.52 11.18 0.142
TCTA 0.87 19.21 5.19 0.044
TLSF 188.60 6987.12 1368.23 14.622
TCRA 1.06 53.02 8.71 10.956
TLCLL 176.89 1591.03 629.79 3.714
TLTA 17.15 86.10 44.54 0.181
LLTL 0.72 39.03 8.877 0.100
RATA 31.71 96.26 70.29 0.204
CATA 5.52 90.30 56.00 0.347
LLOE 3.00 314.11 70.08 0.898
OEOI 22.19 330.33 84.65 0.649
OETA 1.85 12.05 6.65 0.029
OETC 54.04 932.28 197.48 2.025
OERA 3.57 28.65 9.90 0.054
20
-
OESS* 0.015 0.156 0.049 0.040
OENB* 0.557 6.030 1.961 1.743
OERB* 1.035 12.130 4.116 3.395
DVOI 0.00 27.60 2.79 0.061
TDCD 51.64 378.54 133.96 0.842
TDTTD 20.51 73.32 35.28 0.125
CSCD 16.59 687.97 175.18 1.821
CSCSD 16.21 671.65 135.86 1.739
TLCD 52.45 578.87 233.03 1.217
RBUB 0 116.67 54.72 0.39
LIOI 32.44 91.41 59.76 0.179
TTONB* 5.368 194.685 28.407 41.723
TTDSS* 0.171 3.855 0.682 0.833
NotèAsterisked Ratios are neasured in Million Naira.
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same with 1985. Loans as a proportion of total assets also increased though it is still
less than half of the asset portfolio.
The ratio 0E0I, OETA, OERA and DVOI were on the average, 84.65%,
6.65%, 9.09% and 2.79% respectively. Managerial performance or efficiency was low
also in 1986 with the same ratios not being significantly different from those in 1985.
The proportion of operating income paid as dividend however improved, being 2.79%
compared with 1.52% in 1985.
The trend in the matching of banks' liabilities still remained the same in 1986.
TDCD averaged 133.95%, TDTTD averaged 35.28% while TLCD averaged 233%.
A significant increase was recorded for TLCD when compared with the value of
175.80% in 1985. The deposit per branch and deposit per staff were N28.41 million
and NO.682 million respectively. Also, with respect to revenue sources, loan income
accounted on the average for 59.76% of total operating income. The minimum was
32.4%, while the maximum was 91.4%.
Table 6.3 renders similar information for 1987. By this time the SAP had been
in force. More banks had been licensed, interest rates deregulated and foreign
exchange also deregulated. The liquidity mop-up exercise had also began with
compulsory issuance of stabilization securities.
Return on assets averaged 2.64% though it was as low as -6.38% and as high
as 12.72%. Return on capital was also 83.59% on the average with a minimum of
-163.76% and a maximum of 299%. OITA and OITC averaged 10.07% and 449.39%
respectively. The net income per staff and operating income per branch averaged
NO.132 million and N4.829 million respectively. These figures reveal a better
performance for the sample banks in general in 1987 than in both 1985 and 1986. In
particular the return on assets at 2.64% is about 1 percentage point better than the
average of 1.96% recorded for 1985 and 1986.
The liquidity ratios are indicated by TLD, CSTA and GSTA. The loan deposit
ratio (TLD) averaged 55.7%, the cash and short-term funds to total assets ratio
(CSTA) averaged 48.1% while the average was 9.66% for government securities as
a ratio of total assets. One had expected the banks to be less liquid during this
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Table 6.3: Summary Statistics of Financial Ratios for 1987
Number
of Obs.
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
20 NITA -6.38 12.72 2.64 0.038
NITC -163.76 299.14 83.59 1.016
OITA 6.88 15.25 10.07 0.017
OITC 77.02 1586.79 449.39 4.250
NISS* -0.052 0.908 0.065 0.200
0155* 0.028 1.089 0.132 0.232
OINB* 0.792 38.400 4.829 8.255
OIRB* 1.548 28.050 8.969 7.547
TLD 15.78 90.54 55.79 0.197
CSTA 4.79 87.64 48.14 0.431
GSTA 0.00 42.24 9.66 0.114
TCTA 0.78 10.52 3.94 0.027
TLSF 253.31 7977.04 1946.34 22.797
TCRA 0.96 14.40 6.32 0.041
TLCLL 205.54 2884.69 698.96 6.574
TLTA 10.94 63.92 39.68 0.163
LLTL 5.61 39.82 9.91 0.113
RATA 31.71 98.33 65.82 0.186
CATA 4.79 92.05 53.04 0.323
LLOE 38.26 292.64 64.28 0.833
OEOI 16.61 160.52 74.94 0.315
OETA 2.53 16.92 7.42 0.034
OETC 51.48 1394.97 365.80 4.128
°ERA 4.88 53.37 13.07 0.113
20
  11055*
OESS* 0.024 0.181 0.066 0.053
OENB* 0.669 6.889 2.481 2.106
OERB* 1.306 22.550 6.423 5.814
DVOI 0.00 6.78 1.48 0.023
TDCD 42.54 801.51 175.75 1.654
TOTTO 19.42 86.54 47.44 0.466
CSCD 13.56 559.68 220.17 1.629
CSCSD 13.56 471.19 154.57 1.295
TLCD 49.30 401.77 204.01 0.902
RBUB 0 110.00 54.60 0.381
LIOI 34.16 95.92 61.81 0.168
TTDNB* 6.202 174.580 29.826 38.653
0.199 4.953 0.807 1.069
o e: Asterikéd ratios are measured in Million Naira.
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period. The figures for TLD and GSTA confirm this while an increase was observed
in the ratio of cash and short-term funds to total assets. This development has been
confirmed also by Sobodu and Sotonwa (1991) as one due to the deregulation of
foreign exchange. The banks had to increase their holding of short-term assets to
facilitate foreign exchange trading and also as a cushion against harsh liquidity
conditions.
We recall that TCTA, TLSF, TCRA and TLCLL are capital adequacy ratios.
These averaged respectively 3.93%, 1946.3%, 6.3% and 698.95% in 1987. Quite
obviously they indicate a decline compared with 1985 and 1986. The total loans to
equity capital is frightening. Infact the same applies to the other ratios. Total loans
as shown by the value of TLCLL is 7 times equity capital plus loan loss provision.
The observed trend is that the state of bank capital had been on the decline
progressively.
With respect to risk element and the quality of bank assets TLTA and LLTL
averaged 39.68% and 9.91% respectively. The maximum value of LLTL was 39.8%.
RATA and CATA averaged 65.8% and 53% respectively. This, in particular, follows
the previous trends, though a slight decline is observed in RATA which is, of course,
consistent with the increase in CSTA. Loan loss provision as a proportion of
operating expenses (LLOE) averaged 64.28%. This represented a lower value
compared with 1985 and 1986 though still high in absolute terms. The loan loss
provision as a proportion of total loans (LLTL) being 9.91% represents an increase
over similar figures for the previous periods.
The managerial efficiency ratios, 0E0I, OETA, OERA and DVOI averaged
74.95%, 7.43%, 13.07% and 1.48% respectively. The value of OEOI indicates that for
every Ni earned by the banks, on the average 75 kobo goes as operating expenses.
This marks an improvement in the efficiency of management. A decline was however
experienced with respect to the dividend/operating income ratio from 2.79% in 1986
to 1.48% in 1987. Also, operating expenses increased as a proportion of both total
assets and risk assets. This implies that the rate of growth of operating expenses was
higher than that of total and risk assets respectively.
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Average operating expenses per staff was NO.066 million compared with
NO.049 million in 1986 and NO.039 million in 1985. The operating expenses per
branch was N2.481 million in 1987.
The average of TDCD, TDTTD and TLCD were 117.75%, 47.49% and
204.01%. TDCD shows that for every Ni of free funds, the banks had on the average
N1.75 of time deposits. The TDTTD also shows that time deposits accounted for
about 47% of total deposits on the average. The ratio of total loans to current
deposits is also significant and it increased compared with similar values in both 1985
and 1986.
Although the ratio of loans to assets decreased, the proportion of loan income
to total operating income increased to average 61.8% in 1987. This can be accounted
for by the significant jump in interest rates during the period as a result of interest
rate deregulation.
Total deposit per branch averaged 1429.825 million while deposit per staff
averaged NO.807 million. The ratio of rural branches to urban branches averaged
54.6% with the rural branches of some banks being about 1.10 times the number of
urban branches.
The ratios as computed for 1988 and 1989 are presented in tables 6.4 and 6.5
respectively. The return on assets averaged 3.74% for 1988 while return on capital
averaged 80.39%. NISS and OINB averaged NO.055 million and N4.953 million
respectively. A further improvement was observed for the banks in 1988 at least in
respect of profitability. NITA was highest in 1988 compared with 1985 to 1987.
The liquidity-ratios TLD, CSTA and GSTA averaged 48.9%, 42.6% and
10.6%. The proportion of deposits that is lent (TLD) further declined from 55.7%
in 1987. The degree of liquidity measured by CSTA and GSTA is about the same
with that of 1989.
Regarding capital adequacy, TCTA, TLSF, TCRA and TLCLL averaged
5.14%, 1337.47%, 10.37% and 481.51% respectively. These ratios still show significant
inadequacy of bank capital among Nigerian commercial banks. Compared with the
previous periods, an improvement was observed in all the indicators. As a proportion
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Table 6.4: Summary Statistics of Financial Ratios for 1988
Number
of Obs.
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
20 NITA 0.02 11.11 3.74 0.033
NITC 0.50 237.31 80.39 0.759
OITA 0.89 30.39 12.19 0.055
OITC 102.93 1688.89 341.89 3.424
NISS* 0.066 0.444 0.055 0.096
OISS* 0.043 1.072 0.156 0.225
OINB* 1.211 29.089 4.953 6.154
OIRB* 2.312 101.810 15.379 22.133
TLD 14.85 88.26 48.95 0.208
CSTA 2.09 91.24 42.64 0.463
GSTA 0.00 51.55 10.63 0.157
TCTA 0.58 14.09 5.13 0.034
TLSF 136.35 8997.28 1337.48 19.931
TCRA 0.72 41.01 10.37 0.105
TLCLL 88.19 1298.73 481.52 3.222
TLTA 2.58 61.11 37.02 0.183
LLTL 3.99 63.81 13.25 0.166
RATA 7.16 90.31 61.10 0.215
CATA 9.03 78.36 56.38 0.301
LLOE 4.38 332.25 67.37 0.889
OEOI 31.53 100.52 71.24 0.223
OETA 0.78 23.50 8.44 0.046
OETC 71.16 1688.89 261.49 3.592
OERA 6.69 61.46 15.77 0.133
20
..-
OESS* 0.029 0.628 0.101 0.133
OENB* 0.768 17.034 3.265 3.694
OERB* 1.742 59.620 9.939 13.039
DVOI 0.00 17.18 2.17 0.041
TOCD 36.92 549.92 143.06 1.041
TOTTD 20.37 65.90 38.80 0.113
CSCD 16.39 1021.89 198.77 2.169
CSCSD 19.26 284.40 116.46 0.837
TLCD 44.99 423.77 172.80 1.007
RBUB 0 110.00 62.10 0.302
L101 30.22 88.49 60.74 0.173
TTONB* 10.076 107.601 27.687 22.979
TT0SS* 0.313 3.964 0.849 0.829
Note: Asterfked ratios are measured in Million Mira.
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Table 6.5: Summary Statistics of Financial Ratios for 1989
Number
of Obs.
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
20 NITA -16.24 17.62 4.54 0.065
NITC -29.54 1021.94 133.79 2.192
OITA 8.90 51.47 17.15 0.092
OITC 268.57 1123.30 767.24 24.686
14155*
-0.073 0.699 0.066 0.153
0155* 0.056 1.014 0.169 0.208
OINB* 1.737 20.695 4.539 4.075
OIRB* 3.890 68.983 12.307 14.268
TLD 16.21 166.24 55.56 0.336
CSTA 3.66 94.8/ 41.08 0.266
GSTA 0.00 43.41 7.66 0.124
TCTA 1.21 17.56 5.50 0.069
TLSF 138.25 46330.25 2816.30 102.584
TCRA 18.69 125.29 17.52 0.295
TLCLL 113.43 823.59 389.93 2.183
TLTA 17.22 93.37 39.32 0.189
LLTL 0.34 61.91 16.96 0.163
RATA 3.64 97.97 58.20 0.215
CATA 28.63 85.24 62.74 0.262
LLOE 0.63 373.15 63.01 0.812
0E01 31.03 194.84 74.16 0.339
OETA 6.02 44.76 12.61 0.096
OETC 43.90 1021.84 633.45 22.583
OERA 10.04 146.06 34.97 0.560
20
_
OESS* 0.039 0.314 0.103 0.071
OENB* 1.106 6.421 2.925 1.579
OERB* 2.360 21.403 7.655 5.258
DVOI 0.00 21.74 3.00 0.052
TDCD 8.82 416.22 95.37 0.834
TDTTD 4.77 78.91 28.26 0.161
CSCD 9.97 768.30 197.20 1.800
CSCSD 9.97 609.50 121.98 1.317
TLCD 54.34 527.32 171.54 1.030
RBUB 20.69 230.00 87.37 0.489
LIOI 21.49 91.76 54.73 0.192
TTDNB* 7.321 45.329 19.479 10.301
TTOSS* 0.224 1.802 0.664 0.383
Nte:Mterisked ratios are measured in Million Naira
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of total and risk assets, total capital has shown an increase. TLSF and TLCLL have
both declined due essentially to the de-emphasis of lending in the structure of assets
emerging as a result of deregulation.
For the risk and asset quality measures, TLTA, LLTL, RATA, CATA and
LLOE averaged 37.0%, 13.25%, 61.1%, 56.38% and 67.36% respectively. The de-
emphasis in lending is more obvious from the 37.0% value of TLTA. The loans-to-
assets ratio was 39.67% in 1987. The proportion of total loans provided for increased
also to 13.25%. This had been less than 10% prior to 1988. This is not really a result
of a substantial increase in loan loss provision but more a result of the relative
decline in loan portfolio. The proportion of risk assets decreased while current assets
increased slightly. The LLOE has been about the same with that of the different
periods.
Managerial efficiency further improved in 1988 with OEOI averaging 71.24%.
The average for OETA, OERA and DVOI were 8.44%, 15.77% and 2.17%. DVOI
increased again in 1988 compared with 1987. Again operating expenses increased by
more than the increase in risk assets and total assets. Operating expenses per staff
was NO.101 million on the average while operating expenses per branch was N3.265
million.
TDCD, TDTTD and TLCD in 1988 averaged respectively 143.07%, 38.8% and
172.80%. The ratio of time deposits to current deposits still exceeded 100% implying
from the figure that for every Ni of current deposit the banks had on the average
N1.43 of time deposit. This represents a reduction, however, compared with 1987. A
reduction was also experienced in the proportion of time deposits in total deposits.
At this period deposit rates had continued to grow and it was becoming imperative
for banks to dilute their deposit base. Deposit per branch averaged N27.687 million,
while deposit per staff averaged NO.849 million.
The proportion of rural to urban bank branches averaged 62.1% compared
with 54.6% in 1987 while loan income averaged 60.74% as a proportion of total
operating income. The proportion was 61.80% in 1987.
Notable developments in 1989 include the 4.54% return on assets and 133.79%
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as return on capital. The industry had been even more profitable by 1989 given these
figures. The liquidity level remained about the same with that for 1988 given the fact
that TLD, CSTA and GSTA averaged 55.56%, 41.07% and 7.67% respectively. The
capital adequacy ratio again worsened in 1989 as can be observed from the average
values of TCTA, TLSF, TCRA and TLCLL being 5.50%, 2816.3%, 17.5% and
389.9% respectively. Only TLCLL showed an improvement which, relative to the
average values recorded for the previous periods, is very significant.
The risk and asset quality of the banks can be assessed by an examination of
the average values of TLTA, LLTL, RATA, CATA and LLOE as done in the
previous periods. The average values are given as 39.31%, 16.96%, 58.2%, 62.7% and
63.0%. The loan loss provision as a proportion of total loans (LLTL) increased
significantly with the maximum value of 93.37%. The risk assets as a proportion of
total assets declined from 61.1% in 1988 to 58.2% while the current assets to total
assets ratio improved from 56.4% to 62.7% over the same period. Loan loss provision
as a proportion of operating expenses declined from an average of 67.37% to 63.0%
still over the period 1988 to 1989.
With respect to managerial efficiency, OEOI averaged 74.16%, OETA
averaged 12.6% and OERA averaged 34.9%. The average for DVOI for 1989 is
3.00%. The OEOI average is still relatively high in addition to the fact that it
worsened in 1989. The same is the case for OETA and OERA. The 34.97% average
figure for OERA in particular represents a relatively high figure compared with about
15% in 1988 and less than 10% between 1986 and 1987. This is perhaps a result of
the significant decline in the level of risk assets. Recall that RATA declined
considerably in 1989.
The OENB remained about the same with the 1988 value with a value of
NO.103 million while a decline in OESS was observed from N3.265 million in 1988
to N2.925 million.
The TDCD ratio averaged 95.37% in 1989. That is, for every Ni of current
deposits, banks had on the average 97 kobo of time deposits. This reveals a major
change in the structure of banks' deposit liabilities. Efforts can be said to have been
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made to reduce the cost of funds utilized by the average Nigerian bank. We have
seen also that on the average time deposits comprise 28.26% of total deposits.
Total deposits per branch has averaged NO.664 million. Also, loan income has
reduced considerably to 54.73% from 60.74% in 1988. Also, the rural to urban branch
ratio increased substantially to 87.37% compared with 62.10% in 1988. Some banks
have 2.3 times more rural branches than urban branches.
Table 6.6 displays comparative figures for the study horizon 1985 to 1989. This
also provides information on the various ratios for comparison between the pre-SAP
and SAP periods. The table reveals that the profitability of banks had been on the
increase between 1985 and 1989. The average return on assets over the period 1985
and 1986, pre-SAP, is 1.96%. The minimum return on assets over the SAP period is
2.64% recorded in 1987 while the maximum return is 4.54% recorded in 1989. Bank
profitability has been higher over the SAP period than over the pre-SAP period. In
this view we also find the average operating income per staff to be higher for the
SAP than the pre-SAP period. In fact, the jump in OISS between 1986 and 1987
when SAP was adopted has been the most significant over the period. The same
trend is observed for the operating income per branch.
Amongst the liquidity ratios one could observe a significant trend. The degree
of liquidity as measured by the CSTA has improved between the pre-SAP and SAP
period. The ratio was less than 36% in 1985 and 1987, jumped to 48.14% in 1988 and
has decreased consistently to 41.07% in 1989. This reveals at least a 5% percentage
point jump in CSTA and a higher level of liquidity. The holdings of government
securities has however declined in the SAP period compared with the pre-SAP
period. The decline however can be noticed from the year 1985. The slight reduction
that can be observed between the pre-SAP and SAP periods, on the average values
of loans to deposit ratio (TLD) is in line with the above trend. Quite clearly, this
trend can be accounted for by the desire of banks to participate effectively at the
foreign exchange market in which they (the banks) were the only authorised dealers.
They needed to be more liquid to achieve this. This is inspite of the liquidity mop-up
exercise which the CBN embarked upon from time to time.
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A close look at the capital adequacy ratios reveals essentially that the banks
and perhaps the Nigerian banking industry is under-capitalised. The total loan to
equity capital ratio is over 1000 percent. Averagely, this has grown worse in the SAP
period. The ratio has been high also for TLCLL. This is the ratio of total loans to all
provisions or resources available as backup. This ratio was initially worsened between
1985 and 1987 then grew from 582.75% to 698.96% before it declined consistently
to 389.92%. In this regard the SAP period has been better than the pre-SAP period.
We earlier mentioned the steps currently taken by the CBN to correct this position.
The 1989 report of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) had also
revealed this development. In fact it showed that in reality quite a number of the
banks have negative shareholders' funds particularly if more realistic provisions are
made for loan losses.
The loan to asset ratio averaged 44% for the sample banks over 1985 and
1986, while it declined slightly to about 38% since the adoption of SAP. The 6
percentage point decline shows a trend towards reducing emphasis on lending for
other assets, which perhaps are more liquid in nature. Provision for loan losses as a
ratio of total loans has been on the increase and, infact, had doubled by 1989. Quite
obviously the provision for loan losses as a proportion of total loans has been higher
over the SAP period compared with the pre-SAP period. This is expected to increase
further in the light of the implementation of the new Prudential Guidelines.
Apart from an increase in the risk asset to total asset ratio observed in 1986,
there has been a consistent decline in the ratio since 1985. From 70.29% the ratio of
risk assets to total assets has declined to 58.20%, being infact the lowest over the
study period. It seems that the SAP period has been characterised by a deliberate
attempt to reduce this ratio. Also, the increase in CSTA is consistent with this trend.
The table provides enough evidence to hold that managerial performance or
efficiency has improved significantly over the SAP period compared with the pre-SAP
period. The OEOI ratio averaged 84.8% between 1985 and 1986 and this has
declined to about 72.4% since the adoption of SAP. Compared with 1988, however,
the efficiency in 1989 worsened. As a ratio of total and risk assets respectively
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operating expenses has been on the increase. As a ratio of risk assets, it rose as high
as 35% in 1989, being more than twice the 1988 value. Quite clearly the operating
expenses per staff as well as per branch has been on the increase since 1985. The
DVOI ratio fluctuated between 1985 and 1989. The highest value was however
observed in 1989 to be 3.00%.
Regarding trends in matching deposit liabilities, the ratio of time to current
deposits (free funds) increased consistently and significantly between 1985 and 1987.
At this period, time deposits exceeded current deposits. Though this continued till
1988, a decline was observed since 1988, reducing to about 95% by 1989. Time
deposits as a proportion of total deposits has been on a consistent decline since 1987.
The ratio was 28.26% in 1989, representing the lowest since 1987.
Deposit per staff has increased consistently between 1985 and 1988 before
declining significantly from NO.84 million per staff in 1988 to NO.664 million in 1989.
The deposit per branch increased between 1985 and 1987, before it declined from
N29.826 million to N19.479 million in 1989. Finally, loan income which averaged 60%
pre-SAP has been on the decline over the SAP period. The proportion averaged
54.73% in 1989.
6.3	 Bank Vulnerability and Resistance: Definitions and Univariate Analyses
One of the major objectives is to determine which factors and/or financial
variables are major determinants of the financial condition, soundness or otherwise,
of Nigerian commercial banks. To do this requires the definition of what is
considered to be sound financial condition for a resistant bank and a weak financial
condition that makes a bank vulnerable.
As was earlier mentioned, in the literature such classifications as problem/non-
problem banks, failed/non-failed, financially successful/non-financially successful as
well as potentially vulnerable/resistant banks exist. While it has been a lot easier
classifying banks according to problem/non-problem and failed/non-failed, the other
classifications have been highly subjective. In defining vulnerable and resistant banks
we adopt a definition similar to that of Hunter and Srinivasan (1990). In this attempt
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a bank was considered financially successful (or resistant) if the return on assets is
at least 80 per cent of the median return on assets. As was observed in the study as
well as in Korobow and Stuhr (1975) who first used the vulnerable/resistant
classification, the separation between banks deemed resistant and those considered
vulnerable can be expected to be imperfect.
In our case we adopted three different definitions as follows:
(a) A resistant bank is one with the return on assets (NITA) being at least
the median return on assets;
(b) A resistant bank is one with the return on assets (NITA) being at least
80% of the median return on assets; and
(c) A resistant bank is one with the return on assets (NITA) being at least
50% of the median return on assets.
Using each of these definitions, we define three classification variables namely
BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3 associated with (a), (b) and (c) respectively. Notice
that the classification gets increasingly less restrictive as one goes from (a) to (c).
Essentially, the definitions are expected to be good enough to clearly
distinguish between the two groups of banks. That is, going by our return-on-assets
based definition, we expect that the mean NITA for each of the class of vulnerable
and resistant banks should be statistically significantly different. As a result a
univariate analysis was carried out using the PROC TTEST procedure offered by the
SAS software package version 6.04 for personal computers.
Table 6.7 presents the median return on assets for each of the periods 1985
to 1989 as well as the mean return on asset for the groups represented by the
different classification variables. Due to the fact that we also aim to find out if there
are any significant differences between the banks and bank performance in general
in respect of ownership, head-office location and the existence or non-existence of
technical partnership agreement we add the classification variables ROWN, HOL and
TP.
ROWN defines the categories of predominantly publicly owned banks and
predominantly privately owned banks while HOL defines the category of banks with
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head office located in Lagos and those with head office outside Lagos. The
classification variable TP defines the category of banks with technical partnership
aggreements and those without.
In 1985, going by the bank performance related classification variables,
BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3, the average return on assets for the vulnerable banks
was negative while the average return for resistant banks was 4.5% based on BANK1.
This was 3.9% and 3.2% for BANK2 and BANK3 respectively. The return on assets
for banks classified as resistant according to classification variable BANK1 exceeded
1.789% which is less than the average return on assets for all sample banks. We also
observe the decline in return on assets for both vulnerable and resistant classification
over the various classification variables, BANK1 to BANK3. This is bound to be the
case, indeed for all periods, due to the fact that an attempt to classify more banks as
resistant implies a lowering of the cut-off return on assets, as is also reflected by our
definition for the classification variables.
While the overall rate of return on assets in 1987 had tended to give the
impression of an insignificant change in bank performance in that year, compared
with 1986, the average return on assets for the year tells a clearer story. We observe
that significant improvements were recorded by resistant banks while some
improvement, though marginal, was also observed for vulnerable banks. The return
on assets of vulnerable banks were however still negative.
The observed improvement in bank profitability earlier in the SAP period
compared with the pre-SAP period is further confirmed by the average return on
assets of both vulnerable and resistant banks over the period 1987 to 1989. By 1988
average return on assets for all vulnerable banks going by BANK1, BANK2 and
BANK3 were positive and as high as 1.1%. The same positive return was observed
for vulnerable banks according to BANK1 in 1989. Also, by 1989, resistant banks
showed relatively high return on assets. The ratio was 8.6%, 7.9% and 7.1%
according to BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3 respectively. The median return on assets
had also increased significantly to 4.50%.
The univariate T-test of differences of sample means was adopted to test the
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hypothesis that the means of the different ratios earlier highlighted are equal for the
different categories of banks based on the classification using BANK1, BANK2 and
BANK3. The result of the test is displayed in table 6.8 to 6.10 for 1985. Each of
these tables presents the number of observations (banks) in each category of
vulnerable and resistant banks upon which the means are computed. The results of
the test of difference in means are displayed for equal and unequal population
variances. The result of the test of equality of sample variances indicated by Prob >
F' determines which results are to be followed, for equal or unequal variances.
For 1985, the value of Prob > F' being in excess of 0.05 (5%) implies the
equality of sample variances for NITA for vulnerable and resistant banks. The
Prob > ITI value for equal sample variances is thus followed. This indicates that the
average return on assets is significant statistically from Table 6.8. This development
gives some credence to our basis for classification. Among the profitability ratios
NITC, NISS, OISS and OINB were statistically significant at 5% level. The ratio
OITA is statistically significant at 15% level.
Of the liquidity ratios only the GSTA ratio was significant at 5% significance
level. We notice that the ratio is higher for the resistant banks than the vulnerable
banks. It is expected that the resistant banks will be more liquid than vulnerable
banks.
None of the capital adequacy ratios was significant, even at 15% level. One
may not be surprised as both the vulnerable and resistant banks were shown to be
highly under-capitalised. Hence, one can hardly rely on capital ratios for
distinguishing bank performance categories. Interestingly the quality of assets or
degree of risk is not a significant factor in determining bank performance among
Nigerian banks as at 1985. No relevant ratio in this regard was observed to be
significant even at 15%. This implies that there is no sufficient evidence to believe
that the quality of asset or degree of risk taking differs between vulnerable and
resistant banks as at 1985.
Managerial efficiency made a difference between vulnerable and resistant
banks based on the BANK1 classification variable in 1985. This is due to the
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Table 6.8: Results of Univariate 1-Test for BANK1 in 1985
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable Resistant Vulnerable Resistant
Prob > T
NITA 9 9 -0.005 0.045 0.0031 0.0007 0.5611
NITC 9 9 -0.003 8.227 0.0028 0.0006 0.1755
OITA 9 9 0.078 0.092 0.1535 0.1344 0.9959
OITC 9 9 2.616 2.644 0.9778 0.9775 0.3753
NESS 9 9 -0.022 0.044 0.0017 0.0003 0.0069
NISS 9 9 0.03 0.091 0.0105 0.0043 0.0549
0168 9 9 0.996 4.401 0.0211 0.0113 0
ORB 6 8 2.12 9.828 0.0092 0.0095 0.0006
TLB 9 9 0.639 0.495 0.2193 0.2013 0.0174
CSTA 9 9 0.433 0.282 0.3055 0.2899 0.2929
GSTA 9 9 0.0118 0.249 0.1442 0.125 0.6621
TCTA 9 9 0.055 0.042 0.4864 0.4761 0.0018
TLSF 9 9 16.786 9.798 0.2814 0.265 0.0006
TCRA 9 9 0.159 0.063 0.364 0.0357 0
TLCLL a 9 6.631 5.113 0.3865 0.3519 0.0434
TLTA 9 9 0.501 0.37 0.1648 0.1458 0.0001
LLTL a 9 0.075 0.1 0.5605 0.5443 0.4466
RATA 9 9 0.633 0.732 0.324 0.3089 0.2202
CATA 9 9 0.601 0.483 0.4916 0.8006 0.0001
LLOE 8 9 0.521 0.8 0.4807 0.472 0.8248
0E01 9 9 1.191 0.517 0.0186 0.0095 0.0019
OETA 9 9 0.084 0.047 0.0018 0.0003 0.8414
OETC 9 9 2.62 1.417 0.1928 0.1742 0.0802
OERA 9 9 0.116 0.065 0.0384 0.0249 0.0003
. 0ESS 9 9 0.033 0.046 0.2898 0.2737 0.4294
OENB 9 9 1.083 2.24 0.087 0.0689 0.0023
OERB 9 a 2.353 5.892 0.078 0.9993 0.001
DVOI 9 9 0.002 0.028 0.0281 0.0165 0.0001
TOCO 9 9 0.776 1.594 0.012 0.0052 2237
TDTTD 9 9 0.344 0.419 0.4202 0.4087 0.3446
CSCD 9 9 1.278 1.584 0.3649 0.571 0.444
CSCSD 9 9 0.857 1.266 0.4414 0.3511 0.3824
TLCD 9 9 1.593 1.923 0.4637 0.4299 0.7414
RBUB 11 9 0.469 0.604 0.3378 0.4625 0.6129
L101 9 9 8.349 0.514 0.0747 0.3232 0.0001
TTDNB 9 9 10.154 41.444 0.556 0.0573 o
TIOSS 9 9 0.313 0.81 0.0089 0.0398 770.0114
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Table 6.9: Results of Univariate 1-Test for BANK2 in 1985
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable I	 Resistant Vulnerable	 I	 Resistant
NITA 7 11 -0.011 0.039 0.0089 0.0013 0.0001
NITC 7 11 -0.085 1.055 0.005 0.003 0.2682
OITA 7 11 0.077 0.091 0.1815 0.1437 0.6592
OITC 7 11 2.806 2.519 0.8024 0.7733 0.1308
NISS 7 11 -0.004 0.037 0.003 0.004 0.0192
OISS 7 11 0.034 0.779 0.0434 0.55 0.1091
OINB 7 11 1.103 3.714 0.0368 0.0713 0.0003
OIRB 5 9 2.335 8.852 0.0167 0.0441 0.0013
TLD 7 11 0.662 0.507 0.2879 0.1776 0.0031
CSTA 7 11 0.487 0.279 0.2114 0.136 0.1079
GSTA 7 11 0.139 0.2115 0.4304 0.4217 0.9335
TCTA 7 11 0.058 0.043 0.5115 0.3983 0.0001
TLSF 7 11 18.665 9.873 0.2905 0.1671 0
TCRA 7 11 0.186 0.063 0.3786 0.2444 0
TLCLL 7 10 6.546 5.325 0.533 0.463 0.237
TLTA 7 11 0.519 0.382 0.2287 0.1362 0.0232
LLTL 7 10 0.851 0.091 0.9046 0.8975 0.4339
RATA 7 11 0.624 0.72 0.4195 0.335 0.0583
CATA 7 11 0.584 0.505 0.7106 0.694 0.6447
LLOE 7 10 0.594 0.721 0.7519 0.749 0.9457
0E01 7 11 1.292 0.575 0.0429 0.0066 9.0012
OETA 7 11 0.088 0.051 0.0023 0.0007 0.4217
OETC 7 11 2.910 1.463 0.2019 0.112 0.0198
OERA 7 11 0.183 0.073 0.0726 0.0162 0.0003
OESS 7 11 0.037 0.041 0.7538 0.7611 0.6132
OENB 7 11 1.245 1.926 0.2322 0.3135 0.0042
OERB 5 9 2.632 5.344 0.1275 0.2343 0.0002
DVOI 7 11 0.002 0.232 0.0445 0.0799 0.0017
IOU 7 11 0.855 1.395 0.0799 0.0953 0.177
TDTTD 7 11 0.376	 ' 0.385 0.934 0.9261 0.2476
CSCD 7 11 1.44 1.424 0.9766 0.9771 0.6789
CSCSD 7 11 0.983 1.111 0.07721 0.7784 0.6337
TLCD 7 11 1.712 1.788 0.8699 0.8608 0.5462
HUB 9 11 0.488 0.596 0.4277 0.4192 0.9001
LIPI 7 11 10.594 0.51 0.3465 0.2107 0.0001
TTDNB 7 11 11.366 34.984 0.1034 0.1736 0
TTDSS 7 11 0.348 0.697 0.1294 0.1749 0.0448
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Table 6.10: Results of Univariate T Test for BANK3 in 1985
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable I	 Resistant Vulnerable	 1	 Resistant
NITA 4 14 0.024 0.032 0.0578 0.002 0.3212
NITC 4 14 -0.275 0.866 0.0373 0.0154 0.7267
OITA 4 14 0.069 0.089 0.1716 0.9475 0.3188
OITC 4 14 2.23 2.459 0.7045 0.5076 0.0102
NISS 4 14 -0.009 0.029 0.0097 0.0245 0.1282
OISS 4 14 0.023 0.071 0.0123 0.0809 0.033
OINB 4 14 0.848 3.228 0.0184 0.1699 0.001
01R8 3 11 2.225 7.697 0.0319 0.1662 0.0562
TLD 4 14 0.733 0.52 0.3642 0.1084 0.0144
CSTA 4 14 0.552 0.305 0.3395 0.1325 0.0962
GSTA 4 14 0.046 0.222 0.0278 0.0528 0.1232
TCTA 4 14 0.0692 0.043 0.5288 0.1903 0
TLSF 4 14 24.512 10.086 0.3445 0.0457 0
TCRA 4 14 0.266 0.066 0.4471 0.0965 0
TLCLL 4 13 3.847 6.437 0.1526 0.1699 0.5956
TLTA 4 14 0.554 0.401 0.3703 0.1629 0.0124
LLTL 4 13 0.145 0.0709 0.2428 0.1218 0.4875
RATA 4 14 0.684 0.682 0.9924 0.9879 0.0488
CATA 4 14 0.58 0.531 0.8556 0.8105 0.2998
LLOE 4 13 1.015 0.562 0.3759 0.3168 0.7831
0E01 4 14 1.565 0.651 0.1381 0.0024 0.0005
OETA 4 14 0.093 0.058 0.238 0.0101 0.5829
OETC 4 14 3.506 1.594 0.3405 0.0013
()ERA 4 14 0.2 0.092 0.3164 0.0482 0.0006
OESS 4 14 0.0325 0.042 0.452 0.559 0.3592
OENB 4 14 1.179 1.799 0.184 0.4371 0.0167
OERB 3 11 2.818 4.799 0.1689 0.4651 0.0019
DVOI 4 14 0 0.019 0.0179 0.1738 0
TDCD 4 14 0.685 1.328 0.0146 0.09 0.0367
MID 4 14 0.305 0.403 0.2337 0.3703 0.2439
CSCD 4 14 1.554 1.395 0.8248 0.8082 0.7486
CSCSD 4 14 1.089 1.053 0.9472 0.9464 0.0001
TLCD 4 14 1.785 1.75 0.954 0.9453 0.5317
RBUB 6 14 0.444 0.567 0.5643 0.5405 0.7989
L101 4 14 17.866 0.593 0.39822 0.0592 0.0001
TTDNB 4 14 9.798 30.375 0.0717 0.3183 0.001
TTOSS 4 14 0.279 0.642 0.074 0.2315 0.0639
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significance of 0E0I, OETA and OERA as well as DVOI, among the efficiency
ratios. The operating expenses per branch (OINB) was also observed to be
statistically significant. We expect, as might be observed in the table, the ratio
expressed by 0E0I, OETA and OERA to be higher for vulnerable than for resistant
banks. However, the ratio DVOI is in line with expectation also as it has a higher
value, 2.8% for resistant banks.
Of the ratios bordering on match of liability the ratio of time to total deposits
was found statistically significant at 5% level. The ratio is higher for resistant than
for vulnerable banks. This implies that the resistant Nigerian banks in 1985 had a
higher proportion of time deposits than vulnerable banks. This means that resistant
banks are high cost banks. Also, the deposit per branch and deposit per staff is
significantly different between vulnerable and resistant banks, with the resistant banks
having a higher value than vulnerable banks.
For BANK2, among the profitability ratios NITA, NITC, NISS, OISS and
OINB were significant at 5% with OITA being significant at 15% level. Only the
ratio of cash and short-term funds to total assets (CSTA) was significant at 15%
level. This ratio is higher for vulnerable than for resistant banks. None of the capital
adequacy and risk ratios were observed to be significant. Among the ratios for
assessing managerial performance only 0E0I, OETA, OERA, OERB and DVOI
were statistically significant at 5% level. For liability match, only the ratio TDCD was
significant at 10% level. The deposit per branch and deposit per staff ratios were also
statistically significant.
For the classification variable BANK3, of the significant variables found to
distinguish bank performance going by BANK2 definition, all but the ratio OINB,
CSTA and OERA were statistically significant. In addition the ratio GSTA was found
significant.
The ratio NITA, NITC, OISS, OINB and OIRB were found statistically
significant for distinguishing between the vulnerable and resistant banks going by the
the BANK1 classification in 1986. Tables 6.11 to 6.13 presents the results for 1986.
The GSTA ratio was also found statistically significant among liquidity ratios, at 5%
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level, the ratios TLSF and TLCLL were statistically significant at 10% level among
the capital adequacy ratio, and TLTA, among the risk ratios was found statistically
significant at 5% level. Among the managerial efficiency ratios, 0E0I, OETA, OETC
and OERA were significant statistically at 5% level; OERB and DVOI were
significant at 10% and 15% level respectively. The significance of loan income to
total income (LIOI) ratio at 5% indicates the significance of revenue sources as a
significant group of factors for distinguishing between the different classes of banks.
None of the ratios assessing the match of liability was found statistically significant
for distinguishing these classes of banks at least according to the classification
variable BANK1.
With respect to BANK2 classification, NISS was found significant statistically
while OISS and OIRB were now statistically insignificant, among ratios that had
earlier been found significant among profitability ratios for BANK1. In addition to
GSTA, the ratio, CSTA, was found statistically significant with respect to BANK2,
among liquidity ratios. The TLCLL capital ratio which was found significant at 10%
level for BANK1 was dropped for BANK2 and TLSF was found significant at 15%
level in contrast to 10% as was the case for BANK1. Also, the dividend related ratio
for assessing managerial performance which was significant statistically at 15% level
with respect to BANK1 was dropped for BANK2. The LIOI ratio still remained
significant at 5% level for BANK2.
For BANK3, still in 1986, among the profitability ratios NITA, NITC, NISS
and OISS were found significant at 5% level, the liquidity ratio GSTA was still found
significant statistically for BANK3 classification of banks at 5% level, CSTA was
dropped and the ratio of loans to deposits (TLD) was also found significant at 5%
level. Only the loan-to-asset ratio (TLTA) among asset quality ratios, was found
significant in relation to BANK3 at 5% level. The ratios 0E0I, OETC, OERA,
OERB and DVOI were found significant according to the BANK3 classification of
banks. Both the ratio TDCD and TDTTD were found to be statistically significant
at 5% and 15% levels respectively for distinguishing bank performance according to
the classification variable, BANK3. None of the ratios in this class had been found
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Table 6.11: Results of Univariate T-Test for BANK1 in 1986
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > I
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable I	 Resistant Vulnerable	 1	 Resistant
NITA 10 10 -0.006 0.0456 0.0009 0.001 0.0467
NITC 10 10 0.02 1.175 0.0013 0.0002 0.4321
OITA 10 10 0.082 0.907 0.2301 0.2143 0.0424
OITC 10 10 2.932 20213 0.413 0.402 0.0003
NISS 10 10 -0.004 0.078 0.0646 0.0496 0
OISS 10 10 6.044 0.13 0.1128 0.0959 0.00094
OIN8 10 10 1.435 5.856 0.1074 0.0907 0
OIRB 6 9 1.998 9.653 0.0023 0.0031 0.001
TLD 10 10 0.69 0.55 0.2201 0.2041 0.6941
CSTA 10 10 0.4 0.258 8.2541 0.2389 0.2635
GSTA 10 10 0.46 0.177 0.0473 0.0339 0.0087
TCTA 10 10 0.06 0.044 0.4607 0.451 0.0001
TLSF 10 10 18.973 8.392 0.1241 0.1071 0
TCRA 10 10 0.104 0.07 0.5197 0.5113 0
TLCLL 9 10 7.917 4.841 0.1001 0.0698 0.0089
TLTA 10 10 0.543 0.348 0.0203 0.0115 0.2557
LLTL 9 10 0.085 0.09 0.9172 0.9137 0.1707
RATA 10 10 0.736 0.67 0.4899 0.4808 0.6746
CATA 10 8 0.607 0.501 0.5417 0.5341 0.9476
LLOE 9 10 0.589 0.802 0.6265 0.6206 0.9547
OEM 9 10 0.589 0.802 0.6265 0.6206 0.9547
OETA 10 10 0.088 0.045 0.001 0.0002 0.9559
OETC 10 10 2.912 1.038 0.0479 0.0344 0
OERA 10 10 0.13 0.068 0.0143 0.0072 0.0067
OESS 10 10 0.047 0.052 0.8189 0.8163 0.6269
OENB 10 10 1.62 2.302 0.4078 0.3967 0.5587
OERB 6 9 2.267 5.348 0.0533 0.0844 0.0024
DVOI 10 10 0.007 0.049 1461 0.1291 0
TOO 10 9 1.185 1.512 0.4319 0.4137 0.4442
TDTTD 10 9 0.325 0.384 0.3431 0.316 0.1427
CSCO 10 9 2.095 1.371 0.4017 0.4028 0.1512
TLCD 10 9 2.481 2.163 0.5848 0.3747 0.0001
RBUB 10 10 0.523 0.572 0.7907 0.7877 0.165
LIOI 10 9 0.677 0.509 0.0507 0.0374 0.7365
TTONB 10 10 14.646 42.168 1614 0.1445 0.0003
TTDSS 10 10 0.436 0.927 0.2106 0.1944 0.0077
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Table 6.12: Results of Univariate T Test for BANK2 in 1986
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > 7
Equal
Prob > I Prob > F'
Vulnerable I	 Resistant Vulnerable	 I	 Resistant
NITA 9 11 -0.009 0.043 0.0017 0.0001 0.0697
NITC 9 11 -0.019 1.102 0.0018 0.0005 0.46
OITA 9 11 0.082 0.0896 0.3542 0.3074 0.0293
OITC 11 11 3.069 2.166 0.3529 0.2923 0
NISS 9 11 -0.004 0.071 0.0611 0.0723 0
OISS 9 11 0.047 0.12 0.1439 0.0636 0.0012
OINB 9 11 1.507 5.395 0.1214 0.1427 0
OIRB 6 9 1.998 9.653 0.0023 0.0031 0.001
TLD 9 11 0.705 0.554 0.1823 0.1547 0.4953
CSTA 9 11 0.43 0.247 0.1594 0.1246 0.2032
GSTA 9 11 0.048 0.164 0.0637 0.0677 0.0187
TCTA 9 1 0.061 0.044 0.4708 604147 0
TLSF 9 11 20.131 8.406 0.1232 0.0731 0
TCRA 9 11 0.1090 0.069 0.4827 0.4253 0
TLCLL 8 11 7.923 5.116 0.174 0.1053 0.0076
TLTA 9 11 559 0.352 0.0182 0.0068 0.183
LLTL 8 11 0.094 0.083 0.8316 0.814 0.128
RATA 9 11 0.721 0.688 0.7255 0.7241 0.7862
CATA 9 9 0.568 0.552 0.9244 0.9232 0.9944
CATA 9 9 0.568 0.552 0.9255 0.9232 0.9944
LLOE 8 11 0.654 0.734 0.8576 0.8542 0.8793
0E01 9 11 1.52 0.515 0.025 0.0074 0.0001
OETA 9 11 0.091 0.049 0.0007 0.0001 0.9686
OETC 9 11 30.088 1.064 0.0525 0.0213 0
OERA 9 11 0.136 0.069 0.016 0.0024 0.0035
OESS 9 11 0.051 0.048 0.891 0.8871 0.5492
OENB 9 11 1.732 2.148 0.6096 0.6089 0.678
OERB 6 9 2.267 5.348 0.1533 0.0844 0.0024
DVOI 9 11 0.008 0.045 0.1643 0.089 0.0002
TDCD 9 10 1.226 1.442 0.5945 0.5914 0.5974
WO 9 10 0.322 0.38 0.3289 0.3255 0.2635
CSCD 9 10 2.28 1.277 0.2714 0.2413 0.1027
CSCSD 9 10 1.745 1.011 0.4002 0.3733 0.0922
TLCD 9 10 2.613 2.075 0.3729 0.3505 0.3108
RBUB 9 11 0.581 0.52 0.7511 0.7379 0.2853
L101 9 10 0.7 0.505 0.0239 0.013 0.689
TTONB 9 11 15.474 38.989 0.1937 0.2188 0.0011
TTOSS 9 13 0.465 0.859 0.2829 0.3058 0.0161
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Table 6:13: Results of Univariate 1-Test for BANK3 in 1986
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable I	 Resistant Vulnerable I	 Resistant
NITA 7 13 -0.015 0.038 0.0009 0.0002 0
NITC 7 13 -0.162 1.007 0.0017 0.0005 0.4254
OITA 7 13 0.082 0.088 0.5339 0.4416 0.0607
OITC 7 13 3.059 2.31 0.5513 0.405 0
HISS 7 13 -0.009 0.062 0.0404 0.1061 0.0001
OISS 7 13 0.04 0.112 0.0981 0.1882 0.0032
OINB 7 13 1.47 40816 0.1218 0.2312 0.0005
OIRB 5 10 2.167 8.803 0.0052 0.0204 0.002
TLD 7 13 0.761 0.548 0.098 0.048 0.3236
CSTA 7 13 0.412 0.284 0.4062 0.312 0.1347
GSTA 7 13 0.026 0.156 0.0142 0.0437 0.0014
TCTA 7 13 0.071 0.416 0.3261 0.1633 0
TLSF 7 13 22.186 9.103 0.182 0.0535 0
TCRA 7 13 0.128 0.065 0.4007 0.2276 0
TLCLL 7 12 7.554 5.566 0.3815 0.2724 0.0237
TLTA 7 13 0.617 0.353 0.005 0.0004 5471
LLTC 7 12 0.107 0.0766 0.6091 0.5422 0.0957
RATA 7 13 0.753 0.676 0.463 0.4383 0.7862
CATA 7 11 0.566 0.556 0.9598 0.9572 0.5967
LLOE 7 12 0.744 0.675 0.8851 0.8794 0.7296
0E01 7 13 1.367 0.566 0.0524 0.0048 0.0001
OETA 7 13 0.097 0.05 0.0003 0.0001 0.2132
OETC 10 13 3.221 1.304 0.15 0.0396 0
DERA 7 13 0.143 0.075 0.039 0.0044 0.0123
OESS 7 13 0.0492 0.0489 0.9774 0.9749 0.424
OENB 7 13 1.844 2.024 0.8369 0.8328 0.9137
OERB 7 10 2.513 4.917 0.094 0.2073 0.0018
OVOI 5 13 0.002 0.0418 0.0802 0.1807 0
TDCD 7 12 0.959 1.562 0.1049 0.1363 0.1543
TDTTD 7 12 0.284 0.392 0.0432 0.0646 0.0775
CSCD 7 12 1.718 1.772 0.9515 0.9528 0.716
CSCSD 7 12 1.176 1.165 0.7155 0.7375 0.3516
TLCD 7 12 2.705 2.111 0.4074 0.3184 0.0903
RBUB 7 13 0.58 0.529 0.8022 0.7907 0.6997
1101 7 12.--.\ 0.691 0.543 0.0957 0.0815 0.8182
TTONB 7 13 16.163 35 0.2406 0.3492 0.0112
TTOSS 7 13 0.438 0.813 0.2651 0.3503 0.0596
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significant for BANK1 and BANK2. The revenue sources ratio was still statistically
significant at 5% level for BANIC3. Infact, we find that the ratio is higher for
vulnerable banks than the resistant banks.
In summary in 1986, profitability, liquidity and managerial efficiency as well
as the revenue sources ratios were found significant in distinguishing between the
classes of banks according to BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3 respectively. In 1985, this
characteristic was observed for profitability ratios, managerial efficiency ratios and
liability match ratios.
In 1987, only three of the profitability ratios were found significant at 5% level
for the classification variable BANK1. These include NITA, NITC and OITC as can
be observed from Tables 6.14 to 6.16. All the liquidity ratios were found significant
statistically at 5% and 10% levels. The CSTA and GSTA ratios were significant for
BANK1 at 10% level. Of the capital ratios TLSF and TLCLL were found statistically
significant at 5% and 10% levels respectively according to the BANK1 classification.
This is similar to the case of BANK1 in 1986. Also, the risk ratio was found
significant for distinguishing between bank performance according to BANK1. The
specific ratio here is TLTA. Of the managerial efficiency ratios, 0E0I, OETA,
OETC and OERA were all significant at 5% level for BANK1. Liability match was
also significant. Thus TDCD ratio was significant at 10% and TDTTD was significant
at 15% and TTDSS was significant at 5% level.
For BANK2, of the profitability ratios found significant for BANK1, OISS was
dropped and OITC was found significant at 5% level. Among the liquidity ratios,
CSTA was dropped in distinguishing banks according to BANK2 classification, the
same ratios were significant for the managerial efficiency category though OERA was
found significant statistically at 15% level rather than at 5% level as was the case for
BANK1. Both the ratios TDCD and TTDSS were dropped for BANK2, TDTTD was
found statistically significant at 5% and then the ratio TLCD was found statistically
significant at 15% level.
Going by the BANK3 classification only the variables NITA and NITC were
found significant at 5% level among the profitability ratios, no liquidity ratio was
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Table 6:14: Results of Univariate T Test for BANK1 in 1987 
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable i Resistant Vulnerable I	 Resistant
NITA 10 10 0.002 0.097 0.069 0.0462 0
NITC 10 10 0.379 1.292 0.0552 0.041 0.7176
OITA 10 10 0.101 0.338 0.3403 0.3274 0
OITC 10 10 6.43 2.558 0.0516 0.0377 0
NISS 10 10 0 0.131 0.1659 0.149 0
OISS 10 10 0.057 0.206 0.1722 0.1554 0
OINB 10 10 2.221 7.438 0.1766 0.1631 0
AOIRB 9 7 7.15 110308 0.2854 0.2894 0.3737
TLD 10 10 0.674 0.442 0.0108 0.0049 0.905
GSTA 10 10 0.052 0.141 0.099 0.0824 0.0245
TCTA 10 10 0.032 0.354 0.3316 0.3184 0
TLSF 10 10 31.071 7.856 0.0288 0.0181 0
TCRA 10 10 0.054 0.098 0.2615 0.2464 0.0183
TLCLL 9 10 10.006 4.275 0.0854 0.0549 0.0001
TLTA 10 10 0.488 0.31 0.0368 0.0271 0
LLTL 9 10 0.103 0.096 0.9034 0.9001 0.3446
RATA 10 10 0.658 0.642 0.8767 0.8771 0.6465
CATA 9 10 0.608 0.485 8.5792 0.5782 0.4045
LLOE 9 101 0.529 0.745 0.5898 0.5861 0.656
0E01 10 10 0.974 0.525 0.0014 0.0003 8262
OETA 10 10 0.099 0.048 0.0013 0.0004 2564
OETC 10 10 6.051 1.265 0.012 0.0057 0
OERA 10 10 0.165 0.075 0.0364 0.042 0
OESS 10 10 0.057 0.076 0.4598 0.45 0.6514
OENB 10 10 2.181 2.782 0.5462 0.5385 0.6246
OERB 9 7 6.603 6.192 0.8907 0.894 0.3752
DOI 10 10 0.008 0.021 0.2308 0.215 0.5631
TOCO 9 10 1.11 2.34 0.1074 0.0171 0.0003
TDTTD 9 10 0.302 0.63 0.1259 0.1286 0
CSCO 9 10 2.5 1.933 0.4851 0.4648 0.2138
CSCSO 9 10 1.527 1.562 0.9567 0.9542 0.3019
TLCD 9 10 2.396 1.72 0.1191 0.0137 0.6943
RBUB 10 10 0.62 0.472 0.4121 0.401 0.3297
1101 10 10 0.643 0.593 0.5281 0.52 0.4011
TTONB 10 10 16.959 42.693 0.1576 0.1406 0.0177
TTOSS  10  10 0.431 1.183 0.135 0.1179 0.004
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Table 6.15: Results of Univariate T Test for BANK2 in 1987
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable I	 Resistant Vulnerable	 I	 Resistant
Prob > T
NITA 8 12 -0.001 0.045 0.0071 0.0036 0.5667
NITC 8 12 0.197 10262 0.0323 0.017 0.7844
OITA 8 12 0.099 0.102 0.2407 0.7788 0.0043
OITC 8 12 5.861 3.583 0.2812 0.2586 0.679
NISS 8 12 -0.002 0.11 0.1554 0.2315 0
OISS 8 12 0.061 0.179 0.197 0.2742 0.0001
OINB 8 12 2.35 6.482 0.2095 0.2846 0.0006
OIRB 7 9 4.53 12.422 0.0347 0.0324 0.0904
CSTA 8 12 0.577 0.417 0.04748 0.4307 0.2964
GSTA 8 12 0.049 0.128 0.1038 0.1277 0.0959
TCTA 8 12 0.032 0.045 8.3052 0.2833 0.8491
TLSF 8 12 28.101 13.705 0.2025 0.1727 0.7215
TCRA 8 12 0.054 0.069 0.504 0.4624 0.3054
TLCLL 7 12 110726 4.227 0.1726 0.0116 0
TLTA 8 12 0.487 3.337 0.3603 0.0401 0.8178
LLTL 7 12 0.072 0.115 0.4141 0.449 0.3379
RATA 8 12 0.684 0.641 0.6405 0.6259 0.7242
CATA 7 12 0.505 0.545 0.814 0.8027 0.6539
LLOE 7 12 0.342 0.818 0.1823 0.24 0.0872
0E01 8 12 1.007 0.578 0.0045 0.0009 0.7874
OETA 8 12 0.101 0.054 0.0017 0.566 0.0001
OETC 8 12 5.665 2.32 0.1013 0.0748 0.7335
OERA 8 12 0.178 0.099 0.1979 0.1276 0.055
OESS 8 12 0.062 0.069 0.7871 0.7837 0.0001
OENB 8 12 2.561 0.8444 0.8422 0.0001 0.0001
OERB 7 9 4.692 7.77 0.2936 0.3007 0.1661
DVOI 8 12 0.01 0.018 0.4956 0.4903 0.911
TDCD 7 12 1.15 2.11 0.1446 0.2313 0.0043
TDTTD
, 7 12 0.289 0.583 0.1012
4
0.1927 0
CSCD 7 12 2.571 1.986 0.5266 0.4654 0.2215
CSCSD 7 12 1.569 1.532 0.9602 0.9542 0.1915
TLCD 7 12 0.48 1.784 0.133 0.1063 0.8992
HUB 8 12 0.633 0.488 0.4144 0.4213 0.6167
L101 8 12 0.67 0.584 0.2763 0.2758 0.6776
TTDNB 8 12 18.702 37.242 0.2609 0.3059 0.779
TTDSS 8 12 0.475 1.029 0.213 0.2674 0.0248
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Table 6.16: Results of Univariate T Test for BANK3 in 1987
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable I	 Resistant Vulnerable I	 Resistant
NITA 6 14 -0.006 0.041 0.0165 0.0063 0.8313
NITC 6 14 -0.045 1.213 0.0225 0.0071 1
OITA 6 14 0.01 0.101 0.8513 0.8966 0.0084
OITC 6 14 5.595 4.022 0.4628 0.4633 0.8948
NISS 6 14 -0.004 0.095 0.1429 0.322 0
OISS 6 14 0.067 0.16 0.2522 0.4268 0.0034
OINB 6 14 2.521 5.819 0.2636 0.4278 0.0089
OIRB 5 11 3.486 11.462 0.0106 0.0456 0.0047
TLD 6 14 0.703 0.496 0.0388 0.0262 0.7477
CSTA 4 14 0.621 0.422 0.4824 0.3571 0.0896
GSTA 4 14 0.022 0.128 0.0099 0.0521 0.0024
TCTA 6 14 0.027 0.445 0.1415 0.1713 0.4159
TLSF 6 14 30.439 14.759 0.2329 0.1613 0.5078
TLCLL 6 13 22.898 4.263 0.0732 0.004 0
TCTA 6 14 0.531 0.339 0.0396 0.0116 0.6306
LLTL 6 13 0.054 0.12 0.1901 0.2427 0.2866
RATA 6 14 0.717 0.632 0.4429 0.3638 0.3651
CATA 5 14 0.434 0.565 0.5036 0.4507 0.6478
LLOE 6 13 0.289 0.806 0.1504 0.2179 0.1669
0E01 6 14 1.058 0.617 0.0143 0.0017 0.6145
OETA 6 14 0.106 0.061 0.021 0.0024 0.4293
OETC 6 14 5.64 2.809 0.1845 0.1656 0.9296
OERA 6 14 0.189 0.105 0.2936 0.1303 0.0124
OESS 6 14 0.071 0.064 0.8241 0.8065 0.5911
OENB 6 14 2.623 2.421 0.8638 0.8504 0.6002
OERB 5 14 4.109 7.475 0.2025 0.2987 0.1352
DVOI 6 14 0.011 0.016 0.6671 0.6353 0.6064
TDCD 5 14 1.271 1.931 0.2762 0.4592 0.0362
TDTTD 5 14 0.298 0.537 0.1177 0.3381 0
CSCD 5 14 2.787 1.993 0.5296 0.3643 0.056
CSCSD 5 14 1.786 1.46 0.7467 0.6429 0.0516
TLCD 5 14 2.825 1.76 0.496 0.0185
RBUO 6 14 0.62 0.515 0.5566 0.5866 0.5887
L101 6 14 0.732 0.57 0.0403 0.0449 0.3998
TTDNB 6 14 20.67 33.747 0.4352 0.5043 0.2891
TTOSS 6 14 0.534 0.924 0.3663 0.4687 0.1324
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found significant, the capital ratio TLCLL was found significant at 10% level, the risk
ratio TCTA was found significant at 5% level, and of the managerial performance
ratios only OEOI and OETA were significant at 5% level. The liability match was
also retained as a significant determinant of bank performance. The ratio TD 1 lll
was still found significant at 15% level. The revenue sources ratio was also found
significant at 5% level. Again, LIOI was observed higher (73%) for vulnerable than
for resistant banks (57%).
Comparing the significant determinants of bank performance according to the
classification represented by BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3, the ratios NITA, NITC,
TLD, GSTA, TLCLL and TCTA are most significant ratios. Others are 0E0I,
OETA and TDTTD. This means that profitability, liquidity, capital, risk, managerial
performance and liability match ratios were significant determinants of bank
performance in each classification.
Factors that are major determinants of bank performance according to
BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3 classifications were also investigated for 1988. The
results are shown in tables 6.17 to 6.19. All profitability ratios were observed to be
statistically significant except OISS. NITA, NITC and NISS were statistically
significant at 5% level, OITA was significant at 10% while OINB and OIRB were
both significant at 15% level. Of the liquidity ratios only GSTA was found significant
at 15% level. No capital ratio was significant while only LLTL was found significant
among the risk and asset quality related ratios at 15% level. Also, among the
managerial efficiency ratios only OEOI and DVOI were significant at 5% and 10%
levels respectively. Also, TDTTD, used for assessing the match of deposit liabilities
was significant at 5% level while both TIDNB and TTDSS were significant at 10%
level in distinguishing the performance of banks based on BANK1 classification.
In relation to BANK2 classification, still in 1988, all profitability ratios were
found significant at 5% level, only GSTA remained significant at the same level
among the liquidity ratios, no capital or risk related ratio was found significant, the
ratios OESS and OENB were both found significant in addition to OEOI and DVOI
which were still confirmed significant at 5% levels as was the case for BANK1 while
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Table 6.17: Results of Univariate I Test for BANK1 in 1988
Variable
, 	
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable I	 Resistant Vulnerable	 I	 Resistant
VITA 10 10 0.011 0.063 0.0003 0 0.0108
NITC 10 10 0.227 1.381 0.0005 0 0.0001
OITA 10 10 0.1 0.144 0.0951 0.0786 0.126
OITC 10 10 3.919 2.919 0.5363 0.5284 0
HISS 10 10 0.01 0.1 0.449 0.0318 0
OISS 10 10 0.072 0.24 0.1128 0.0959 0
OINB 10 10 2.621 7.285 0.1069 0.0902 0
OIRB 10 9 7.52 24.113 0.1417 0.104 0
TLD 10 10 0.546 0.433 0.2523 0.237 0.8281
CSTA 10 10 0.4112 0.441 0.8942 0.8927 0.0301
GSTA 10 10 0.053 0.16 0.1486 0.1316 0.0034
TCTA 10 10 0.047 0.056 0.5795 0.5726 0.768
TLSF 10 10 18.74 8.009 0.2538 0.2385 0
TCRA 10 10 0.106 0.101 0.9287 0.9277 0.6188
TLCLL 10 10 5.246 4.384 0.5714 0.5643 0.0785
TLTA 10 10 0.406 0.334 0.4099 0.3989 0.4981
LLTC 10 10 0.194 0.071 0.115 0.0981 0.0677
RATA 10 10 0.589 0.633 0.6708 0.6656 0.3267
LLOE 10 10 0.795 0.553 0.5646 0.5573 0.7334
0E01 10 10 0.89 0.534 0.0002 0 0.0494
OETA 10 10 0.089 0.08 0.6926 0.6879 0.0859
OETC 10 10 3.692 1.538 0.2034 0.187 0
OERA 10 10 0.167 0.145 0.7671 0.7637 0.1372
OESS 10 10 62 0.14 0.2133 0.1972 0
OENB 10 10 2.243 4.288 0.406 0.225 0.0001
OERB 10 9 6.435 13832 0.2671 0.2268 0.0001
DVOI 10 10 0.004 0.039 0.0733 0.0578 0
TDCD 10 10 1.129 1.733 0.2187 0.2027 0.0004
TDTTD 10 10 0.325 0.451 0.0152 0.0079 0.123
CSCD
-
10 10 1.866 2.109 0.8122 0.8095 0.002
CSCSD 10 9 1.089 1.248 0.6984 0.6984 0.6423
TLCD 10 10 1.921 1.535 0.4161 0.4052 0.6009
RBUB 10 10 0.688 0.554 0.3499 0.3372 0.929
LI0! 10 10 0.619 0.596 0.7715 0.7682 0.1862
TTDNB 10 10 18751 36.6222 0.098 0.0814 0.0072
TTDSS 10 10 0.514 1.185 0.0847 0.0686 0.0023
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Table 6.18: Results of Univariate T Test for BANK2 in 1988
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable	 I	 Resistant Vulnerable	 I	 Resistant
NITA 7 13 0.006 0.054 0.0001 0.0004 0.0018
NITC 7 13 0.164 2.149 0.0006 0.0026 0.0003
OITA 7 13 0.092 0.138 0.06646 0.0717 0.3748
OITC 7 13 4.838 0.655 0.3492 0.1807 0
HISS 7 13 0.004 0.083 0.0237 0.0767 0
OISS 7 13 0.05 0.213 0.0459 0.1237 0
OINE 7 13 1.85 60324 0.0349 0.0988 0
OIRB 7 12 6.011 20.845 0.0856 0.1647 0
TO 7 13 0.541 0.462 0.4484 0.4288 0.8702
CSTA 7 13 0.309 0.49 0.3165 0.4209 0.0191
GSTA 7 13 0.038 0.143 0.1007 0.1581 0.0586
TCTA 7 13 0.034 0.06 0.1436 0.1444 0.6291
TLSF 7 13 23978 7.665 2245 0.0801 0
TCRA 7 13 0.073 0.12 0.2644 0.3451 0.074
TLCLL 7 13 6.358 3.985 0.2276 0.1186 0.0277
LLTL 7 13 0.142 0.127 0.8442 0.8513 0.6209
RATA 7 13 0.589 0.624 0.7434 0.716 0.4149
CATA 7 13 0.489 0.604 0.4944 0.4318 0.2871
LLOE 7 13 0.451 0.794 0.3167 0.4258 0.013
0E01 7 13 0.932 0.594 0.0001 0.0002 0.0081
OETA 7 13 0.086 0.084 0.9206 0.9278 0.3724
OETC 7 13 4.674 1.506 0.1935 0.0574 0
OERA 7 13 0.144 0.165 0.6732 0.7537 0
OESS 7 14 0.046 0.13 0.0883 0.1826 0
OENB 7 13 1.706 4.105 0.0775 0.172 0.0001
OERB 7 12 5.448 12.558 0.166 0.2631 0.0016
DWI 7 13 0.002 0.032 0.049 0.1247 0
TDCD 7 13 1.043 1.639 0.127 0.2311 0
TDTTD 7 13 0.302 0.435 0.0061 0.0075 0.1259
CSCD 7 13 1.57 2.213 0.4395 0.5417 0.0125
CSCSD 7 12 0.713 1.428 0.0395 0.0709 0.0214
TLCD 7 13 1.969 1.598 0.4829 0.4465 0.79
RBUB 7 13 0.636 0.613 0.8741 0.8726 1
L101 7 13 0.657 0.581 0.3343 0.3574 0.5134
TTDNB 7 13 13.42 35.369 0.0377 0.0002 0
TTOSS 7 13 0.365 1.11 0.0143 0.0523 0
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Table 6.19: Results of Univariate T Test for BANK3 in 1988
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable	 Resistant Vulnerable Resistant
NITA 6 14 0.004 0.052 0.0001 0.001 0.0007
NITC 6 14 0.145 1.086 0.0007 0.007 0.0011
OITA 6 14 0.087 0.137 0.0088 0.0595 0.5217
OITC 6 14 5.331 2.599 0.319 0.1032 0
NISS 6 14 0.003 0.078 0.0217 0.11 0
OISS 6 14 0.046 0.203 0.0405 0.1597 0
OINB 6 14 1.585 6.396 0.0223 0.1109 0
OIRB 6 13 4.532 20.386 0.0459 0.1517 0
TLO 6 14 0.555 0.461 0.4198 0.3683 0.6163
CSTA 6 14 0.307 0.478 0.335 0.4634 0.571
GSTA 6 14 0.008 0.149 0.0096 0.0651 0
TCTA 6 14 0.031 0.06 0.0907 0.083 0.7061
TLSF 6 14 27.074 7.504 0.2136 0.0405 0
TCRA 6 14 0.069 0.119 0.2495 0.3415 0.1624
TLCLL 6 14 7.058 3.854 0.1475 0.0377 0.0272
TLTA 6 14 0.393 0.36 0.7802 0.7232 0.1262
LLTL 6 14 0.12 0.138 0.818 0.8282 0.6906
RATA 6 14 0.572 0.628 0.6682 0.6039 0.252
CATA 6 14 0.408 0.631 0.1993 0.1321 0.5169
LLOE 6 14 0.369 0.804 0.1813 0.3299 0.0152
0E01 6 14 0.945 0.613 0.0001 0.0006 0.007
OETA 6 14 0.083 0.85 0.9052 0.9133 0.5688
OETC 6 14 5.186 1.513 0.1994 0.0319 0
OERA 6 14 0.143 0.164 0.6371 0.7518 0.0012
OESS 6 14 0.044 0.125 0.07 0.2189 0
OENB 6 14 1.5 4.022 0.0454 0.1676 0
OERB 6 13 4.236 12.571 0.0754 0.2038 0,0001
DVOI 6 14 0 0.031 0.0266 0.1246 0,
TDCD 6 14 1.098 1.573 0.1953 0.3641 0.004
TDTTO 6 14 0.318 0.418 0.0215 0.0661 0.0257
CSCD 6 14 1.586 2.16 0.48 0.6012 0.0404
CSCSD 6 13 0.708 1.375 0.0525 0.1079 0.0585
TLCD 6 14 2.032 1.598 0.4648 0.3912 0.3919
RBUB 6 14 0.692 0.59 0.5085 0.5044 0.9481
LIOI 6 14 0.687 0.573 0.1582 0.1844 0.4674
TTONB 6 14 12.044 34.391 0.0053 0.0427 0
TTOSS 6 14 0.354 1.061 0.013 0.0796 0
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for liability match category of ratios only TDTTD and TLCD were found significant
at 5% and 10% levels respectively.
The number of significant ratios increased in the case of BANK3 classification.
all the profitability ratios remained significant at 5% level, only the GSTA remained
significant at 5% level among the liquidity ratios, TCTA and TLCLL were significant
at 10% and 5% levels in the class of capital ratios, CATA was significant at 15%
level as a risk ratio while only OESS, OENB, OERB were significant at 5% level in
the class of managerial efficiency indicators. As for liability match, with respect to the
BANK3 classification in 1988, only the ratios TDTTD and CSCSD were significant
at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. Also, 1 -1 DNB and TTDSS were significant at
5% level.
The above discourse in relation to the significant determinants of bank
performance based on the classification represented by BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3
confirms the key role played by profitability, liquidity, managerial efficiency and
liability match as at 1988.
From table 6.20 to 6.22 and the summary contained in 6.23 we observe that
liability match had ceased to become important as a determinant of bank
performance by 1989. Prior to 1989, we observed that the ratio of time deposits to
current deposits (TDCD) was significantly higher for resistant banks than vulnerable
banks. A close look at the 1989 figures reveals an insignificant difference for both
categories of banks. The same trend was observed using the TDTTD ratio. Resistant
banks tended to reflect higher proportion of time deposits in their aggregate deposit
base. We had found a trend, going by table 6.7, which reflected a deliberate change
in the structure and composition of bank deposit liabilities. Specifically, both the ratio
of time to current deposits (TDCD) and time to total deposits (TDTTD) were
consistently reduced, infact to the lowest levels ever since 1985. This development
perhaps is responsible for the relative insignificance of liability match in distinguishing
between vulnerable and resistant banks.
In relation to BANK1, the profitability ratios NITA, OITA and NISS were
significant at 5%, 10% and 15% levels respectively in 1989. Bank liquidity expressed
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Table 6.20: Results of Univariate 1-Test for BANK1 in 1989
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable I	 Resistant Vulnerable I	 Resistant
NITA 10 10 0.005 0.086 0.0062 0.0023 0.2456
NITC 10 10 1.606 1.07 0.6048 0.5984 0.5984
OITA 10 10 0.13 0.213 0.0518 0.0379 0.0007
OITC 10 10 12.986 2.359 0.3618 0.3494 0
NESS 10 10 0.012 0.121 0.1334 0.1163 0
OISS 10 10 0.107 0.232 0.202 0.1856 0.0001
OINB 10 10 3.646 5.433 0.353 0.3404 0.0014
OIRB 10 10 9.549 15.065 0.4129 0.4019 0.0005
TLD 10 10 0.52 0.591 0.6541 0.6486 0.1499
CSTA 10 10 0.361 0.461 0.4289 0.4183 0.697
GSTA 1 10 0.029 0.125 0.1004 0.0838 0.0016
TCTA 10 10 0.013 0.097 0.0081 0.0033 0.3287
TCRA 10 10 0.141 0.21 0.6206 0.6145 0.0043
TLCLL 10 10 4.728 3.071 0.1063 0.0869 0.7311
TLTA 10 10 0.392 0.394 0.9832 0.983 0.1515
LLTL 10 10 0.202 0.137 0.3999 0.3886 0.5102
RATA 10 10 0.637 0.527 0.2772 0.2625 0.086
CATA 10 10 667 0.588 0.5255 0.5173 0.5637
LLOE 10 10 0.926 0.557 0.0191 0.0106 0.032
0E01 10 10 0.926 0.577 0.0191 0.0106 0.032
OETA 10 10 0.125 0.127 0.9576 0.957 0.2429
OETC 10 10 11.38 1.289 0.3438 0.3309 0
OERA
OESS 10 10 0.094 0.111 0.06156 0.6094 0.1251
OENB 10 10 3.233 2.616 0.4065 0.3953 0.734
OERB 10 10 8.536 6.774 0.478 0.4687 0.4917
DOI 10 10 0.009 0.051 0.086 0.0699 0.0004
TDCD 10 10 0.875 1.033 0.6881 0.6833 0.0038
TDTTD 10 10 0.244 0.321 0.3131 0.2994 0.0927
CSCD 10 10 2.128 1.816 0.7136 0.7093 0.0614
CSCSD 10 10 1.263 1.176 0.8888 0.8873 0.0075
TLCD 10 10 1.775 1.656 0.8082 0.8054 0.0071
RBUB 10 10 0.847 0.9 0.8201 8175 0.4036
1101 10 10 0.576 0.519 0.5323 0.5243 0.7289
TTDNB 10 10 22.498 16.46 0.2138 0.1976 0.3643
TTDSS 10 10 0.629 0.699 0.702 0.6974 0.1392
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Table 6.21: Results of Univariate T Test for BANK2 in 1988
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > I
Equal
Prob > T Prob > E.
Vulnerable I	 Resistant Vulnerable	 I	 Resistant
NITA 8 12 -0.005 0.079 0.0123 0.0021 0.1559
NM 8 12 1.639 1.137 0.6997 0.6292 0
OITA 8 12 0.126 0.202 0.0427 0.071 0.0017
OITC 8 12 15.101 2.72 0.403 0.2836 0
N1SS 8 12 0.004 0.108 0.0857 0.0385 0.0001
OISS 8 12 0.091 0.221 0.1154 0.1781 0
OINE 8 12 3.317 5.354 0.2172 0.2852 0.0039
OIRB 8 12 9.873 13.93 0.4832 0.5478 0.006
TLD 8 12 0.45 626 0.2052 0.2625 0.0163
CSTA 8 12 0.439 0.392 0.6973 0.7125 0.3624
GSTA 8 12 0.036 0.104 0.1818 0.2404 0.0094
TCTA 8 12 0.008 0.086 0.0286 0.0093 0.2429
TLSE 8 12 60.528 6.586 0.3802 0.2601 0
TCRA 8 12 0.166 0.181 0.9266 91107 0.001
TLCLL 8 12 4.292 3.637 0.5334 0.5257 0.9925
LLTL 8 12 0.365 0.412 0.5716 0.5959 0.2732
RATA 8 12 0.229 0.13 0.2063 0.1951 0.8444
CATA 8 12 0.605 0.567 0.7421 0.7134 0.1793
LLOE 8 12 0.649 0.613 0.7878 0.775 0.5361
0E01 8 12 0.665 0.607 0.861 0.8787 0.0278
OETA 8 12 0.131 0.123 0.8528 0.8578 0.5307
OETC 8 12 13.462 1.583 0.3801 0.26 0
OERA 8 12 0.483 0.261 0.4829 0.4001 0.009
OESS 8 12 0.088 0.113 0.4037 0.4514 0.0754
OENB 8 12 3.168 2.764 0.5859 0.589 0.733
OERB 8 12 9.251 6.592 0.2874 0.2792 0.8373
DVOI 8 12 0.011 0.043 0.1381 0.1956 0.0032
TOED 8 12 0.856 1.018 0.6349 0.682 0.13
TDTTD 8 12 0.226 0.321 0.1848 0.2044 0.2549
CSCD 8 12 2.612 1.545 0.2765 0.2022 0.0603
CSCSO 8 12 1.543 1.004 0.4715 0.3842 0.0052
TLCD 8 12 1.728 1.707 0.6916 0.9662 0.0476
RBUB 8 12 0.658 1.017 0.0847 0.1091 0.614
1101 8 12 0.532 0.557 0.7843 0.7843 0.7339
TTDNB 8 12 22.135 17.708 0.4126 0.3604 0.2328
TTOSS 8 12 0.602 0.705 0.5526 0.57 0.4072
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Table 6.22: Results of Univariate T Test for BANK3 IN 1989
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Vulnerable 1	 Resistant Vulnerable I	 Resistant
Prob > T
NITA 6 14 -0.015 0.071 0.0384 0.0032 0.0968
NITC 6 14 2.001 1.054 0.5934 0.5934 0.3903
OITA 6 14 0.12 0.194 0.0305 0.0988 0.0124
OITC 6 14 19.113 2.769 0.4211 0.1816 0
MISS 6 14 -0.033 0.096 0.0662 0.0909 0.0021
OISS 6 14 0.076 0.209 0.0595 0.1965 0
OINB 6 14 2.963 5.214 0.1256 0.2688 0.0082
OIRB 6 14 9.558 13.485 0.4603 0.5866 0.0358
TLD 6 14 0.447 0.602 0.2081 0.3586 0.0171
CSTA 6 14 0.42 0.407 0.3603 0.4895 0.0526
GSTA 6 14 0.046 0.090 0.3603 0.4895 0.0526
TCTA 6 14 -0.005 0.081 0.0539 0.0071 0.1151
TLSF 6 14 77.973 6.816 0.3985 0.1605 0
TCRA 6 14 0.201 0.614 0.874 0.8074 0.0001
TLCLL 6 14 3.867 3.913 0.9629 0.9669 0.4767
TLTA 6 14 0.353 0.411 0.4587 0.5455 0.1773
LLTL 6 14 0.277 0.123 0.0707 0.0502 0.9032
RATA 6 14 0.532 0.604 0.5749 0.5084 0.3502
CATA 6 14 0.578 0.649 0.6414 0.5941 0.4539
LLOE 6 14 0.82 0.549 0.3781 0.509 0.0458
OEOI 6 14 1.045 0.611 0.0666 0.0051 0.0074
OETA 8 14 0.135 0.122 0.8074 0.8017 0.9038
OETC 6 14 17.113 1.715 0.407 0.1682 0
OERA 6 14 0.593 0.246 0.4073 0.2123 0.0013
OESS 6 14 0.079 0.113 0.2316 0.3396 0.1025
OENB 6 14 3.021 2.884 0.861 0.8649 0.8251
OERB 6 14 9.358 6.925 0.3788 0.3569 1
DVOI 6 14 0.006 0.04 0.0638 0.1922 0.001
TDCD 6 14 0.834 1.005 0.6035 0.6871 0.0995
TDTTD 6 14 0.246 0.298 0.4777 0.5202 0.4782
CSCD 6 14 2.042 1.942 0.8993 0.9135 0.3433
TLCD 6 14 1.506 1.805 0.4363 0.5661 0.0355
RBUB 6 14 0.634 0.977 0.1074 0.1556 0.2348
LIOI 6 14 0.494 0.57 0.384 0.4357 0.4146
TTDNB 6 14 20.658 18.974 0.7828 0.7473 0.3582
TTOSS 6	 _ 14 0.524 0.724 0.2243 0.2978 0.2342
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by GSTA was also significant at 10% level. Capital adequacy represents also a
significant determinant of bank performance going by BANK1 classification due to
the statistical significance at 5% and 10% levels respectively of TCTA and TLCLL.
Among the managerial efficiency ratios, OEOI and DVOI were statistically significant
at 5% and 10% levels.
The ratio OISS was found significant statistically in distinguishing between the
categories of banks according to the BANK2 classification in addition to NITA,
OITA and NISS which were also observed significant according to BANK1
classification. OISS was however significant at 15% level. The capital ratio, TCTA
was also found significant at 5% level. Only the managerial efficiency ratio, 0E0I,
was observed to be statistically significant at 5% level. The branch structure variable,
RBUB was found to be statistically significant at 10% level. We find that resistant
banks on the average had a higher rural to urban branch ratio than the vulnerable
banks. The average for resistant banks by BANK2 classification was 102.7%
compared with 65.8% for vulnerable banks.
For BANK3 classification, the ratio OINB was found statistically significant
at 15% in addition to profitability ratios shown to be significant according to BANK2
classification. The capital ratio, TCTA remained significant at 10% level, the asset
quality ratio, LLTL, was also significant at 10% level while both OEOI and DVOI,
being managerial efficiency indicators were significant at 5% level. Just as was the
case for BANK2, no liquidity ratio was found significant in distinguishing the
performance of banks which belong to the two categories.
We find that profitability, capital adequacy and managerial efficiency were
central to bank performance in 1989 going by all the classifications BANK1, BANIC2
and BANK3. Neither liquidity nor asset quality made any difference. This is not
really in line with our expectations. In particular, one had expected liquidity to be a
significant factor due to the liquidity crisis which many faced in 1989 as a result of
the withdrawal of government funds from the banks as well as the liquidity squeeze
which has characterised CBN policy orientation since the adoption of SAP.
Perhaps, the observed insignificance reflects the fact that the liquidity squeeze
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is an industry-wide policy which has had an effect on virtually all banks. In reality
however, the effect was more serious for some banks such as National Bank than for
others. Statistically, the few adverse cases may not be sufficient to distinguish
vulnerable from resistant banks.
A look at table 6.23 reveals that both bank profitability and managerial
efficiency have been significant determinants of bank performance all through the
study horizon. Specifically, the significant profitability ratios are NITA and NITC
while the significant managerial efficiency ratio was 0E0I. Liability match was
significant in 1985 as well as in both 1987 and 1988 while capital adequacy was
significant in 1987 and 1989. Liquidity was significant between 1986 and 1988. The
prominent ratio in this regard is the government securities holding to total assets
ratio. The most significant profitability ratios throughout this period was NITC and
NITA. Actually one may not be surprised at the significance of NITA since our
different classifications are based on it. Asset quality was significant only in 1987,
with the ratio TLTA. The deposit per branch and deposit per staff indicators were
significant in 1985 as well as in 1987 and 1988.
6.4	 Bank Ownership. Head-Office Location and Technical Partnership: 
A Univariate Analysis 
Our study also sought to determine the main factors that distinguish the
performance and characteristics of banks predominantly publicly-owned from those
that are predominantly privately-owned; those whose head-offices are located in
Lagos from those with head-offices outside Lagos; those with technical partnership
agreements from those without. The results of the univariate analyses are displayed
in Tables 6.24 to 6.38 with the summary of significant distinguishing factors for the
period 1985 to 1989 presented in Table 6.39.
By 1985, profitability, liquidity and branch structure distinguished
predominantly public banks from predominantly private banks. The operating income
per staff (OISS), the operating income per branch (OINB) and OIRB were
significant in distinguishing between the two categories of banks according to their
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Table 6.24: Results of Univariate 1-Test for ROWN IN 1985
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal Equal
Prob > T Prob > F.
Public I	 Private Public	 I	 Private
Prob > T
NITA 13 5 0.017 0.027 0.4392 0.5926 0.0395
NITC 13 5 0.459 0.009 0.2897 0.2407 0.7983
OITA 13 5 0.087 0.082 0.6038 0.6224 0.7758
OITC 13 5 2.457 3.081 0.6002 0.5642 0.7012
HISS 13 5 0.011 0.047 0.1166 0.0243 0.1361
OISS 13 5 0.037 0.122 0.0163 0.0001 0.0293
OINB 13 5 1.386 6.112 0.0596 0.0007 0
01R8 11 3 4.503 13.936 0.1385 0.0081 0.2192
TLD 13 5 0.635 0.391 0.0449 0.0437 0.4885
CSTA 13 5 0.374 0.324 0.7545 0.7485 1
GSTA 13 5 0.131 0.317 0.1377 0.0468 0.2813
TCTA 13 5 0.054 0.034 0.1699 0.3113 0.0651
TLSF 13 5 14.445 10.294 0.4121 0.5589 0.063
TCRA 13 5 0.131 0.528 0.3194 0.528 0.0006
TLCLL 12 5 6.187 4.964 0.3643 0.4965 0.0847
TLTA 13 5 0.485 0.308 0.0544 0.0733 0.3286
LLTL 12 5 0.084 0.098 0.7896 0.7744 0.7558
RATA 13 5 0.691 0.659 0.7905 0.7657 0.6009
CATA 13 5 0.592 0.411 0.3756 0.3337 0.8081
LLOE 12 5 0.72 0.544 0.6236 0.6803 0.3356
0E01 13 5 0.929 0.656 0.2156 0.3912 0.0259
OETA 13 5 0.07 0.054 0.2053 0.2472 0.4671
OETC 13 5 1.998 2.072 0.9342 0.9423 0.5156
OERA 13 5 0.122 0.098 0.5961 0.6552 0.3777
OESS 13 5 0.026 0.074 0.0075 0 0.0462
OENB 13 5 0.975 3.447 0.0165 0 0.0004
OERB 11 5 3.11 9.014 0.125 0.0149 0.48
DVOI 13 5 0.009 0.029 0.2876 0.7311 0.0853
TDCO 13 5 0.935 1.836 0.0354 0.006 0.6254
TDTTO 13 5 0.323 0.533 0.1308 0.0273 0.0958
CSCD 13 5 1.409 1.486 0.902 0.9002 1
CSCSD 13 5 0.956 1.333 0.514 0.4435 0.4898
TLCD 13 5 1.8 1.648 0.7992 0.746 0.2172
HUB 14 5 0.609 0.344 0.2174 0.1743 0.787
LIOI 13 5 5.913 0.579 0.3366 0.5509 0
TTONB 13 5 11.491 63.001 0.0967 0.0023 0
11098 13 5 0.31 1.216 0.0294 0.0001 0
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ownership. The ratios were higher for predominantly private banks than for the
predominantly public banks. Liquidity was also found to be a significant distinguishing
characteristic at 5% level. In this regard the ratios TLTA and TLD were significant.
Going by the ratios, public banks are generally less liquid than private banks. The
branch structure ratios T1 'DNB and TTDSS (as they could be called) were found
significant to distinguish the two categories of banks. The deposit per staff (TTDSS)
averaged N1.216 million for private banks compared with an average of NO.310
million for public banks. The same trend is observed for deposit per branch
(TTDNB).
The ratios OISS and OINB remained significant at 5% and 15% levels
respectively in 1986; TLD and GSTA also remained significant statistically at 10%
and 15% level while TTDNB and TTDSS were also found significant at 15% and
10% levels respectively. In addition to these factors both risk and managerial
efficiency were found to be important factors in distinguishing public from privately
owned banks. Specifically, the risk ratio, TLTA, was significant at 15% level while the
managerial efficiency ratios OESS, OENB and OERB were all significant at 5% level.
In each of the cases the ratios are higher for private than for public banks. In the
main, this development reveals the fact that remuneration in the private banks is
substantially higher than in public banks. The liability match ratio, TDCD, also
remained significant at 10% level. In this regard private owned banks have on the
average N2.08 of time deposits for every 141.00 of current deposit compared with
141.27 for public banks. We recall that we had observed previously higher TDCD
ratio for resistant than for vulnerable banks.
A similar set of factors were observed significant in distinguishing private from
publicly owned banks in 1987 (Table 6.26). The profitability ratios remained
significant, that is, OINB and OIRB, at 5% level. The same applied to the liquidity
ratio (TLD), the risk ratio (TCTA), the managerial efficiency ratios (OESS, OENB
and OERA) and branch structure or bank size ratios (TTDNB and TTDSS). Public
banks are observed to be associated with higher levels of risk since they have on the
average 45% of their assets as loans while private banks recorded, on the average
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Table 6.25: Results of Univariate I Test for ROWN in 1986
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > I
Equal
Prob > I Prob > F'
Public	 I	 Private Public Private
NITA 14 6 0.016 0.028 0.5202 0.5276 0.8248
NITC 14 6 0.555 0.697 0.7705 0.7302 0.3197
OITA 14 6 0.085 0.088 0.7131 0.6926 0.7152
OITC 14 6 2.562 2.596 0.9593 0.9715 0.012
NESS 14 6 0.014 0.092 0.2989 0.0882 0
OISS 14 6 0.041 0.193 0.0853 0.0037 0
OINB 14 6 1.566 8.496 0.129 0.0106 0
0188 14 3 4.783 13.824 0.1111 0.005 0.3246
TLD 14 6 0.681 0.485 0.0971 0.083 0.8032
CSTA 14 6 0.351 0.279 0.5558 0.5889 0.5438
GSTA 14 6 0.066 0.218 0.1407 0.0239 0.0024
TCTA 14 6 0.058 0.037 0.1849 0.3349 0.0144
TLSF 14 6 14.993 10.623 0.4259 0.5546 0.0403
TCRA 14 6 0.102 0.054 0.1943 0.3711 0.0016
TLCLL 13 6 6.165 6.586 0.8347 0.8258 0.7825
TLTA 14 6 0.488 0.346 0.1263 0.1103 0.8538
LLTL 13 6 0.095 0.073 0.6572 0.6747 0.6579
RATA 14 6 0.679 0.756 0.517 0.4568 0.4624
CATA 12 6 0.582 0.517 0.7274 0.7213 1
LLOE 13 6 0.819 0.445 0.3299 0.4155 0.1716
0E01 14 6 0.904 0.713 0.4685 0.5606 0.147
OETA 14 6 0.069 0.061 0.584 0.588 0.8713
OETC 14 6 2.007 1.899 0.8958 0.9166 0.1631
OERA 14 6 0.108 0.078 0.1229 0.257 0.0138
OESS 14 6 0.027 0.1 0.0051 0 0.0001
OENB 14 6 1.048 4.092 0.0099 0 0
OERB 12 6 3.018 8.506 0.1153 0.0064 0.3499
DVOI 14 6 0.013 0.063 0.3027 0.0981 0
TOCO 13 6 0.997 2.082 0.0685 0.005 0.0012
TDTTD 13 6 0.324 0.414 0.303 0.1509 0.0178
CSCD 13 6 1.267 2.802 0.2375 0.0878 0.006
CSCSD 13 6 0.774 6.626 0.1528 0.0263 0
TLCD 13 6 2.144 2.735 0.4981 0.339 0.0071
RBUB 14 6 0.63 0.354 0.1963 0.152 0.776
L101 14 6 0.6 0.591 0.9384 0.9236 0.296
TTONB 14 6 13.017 64.317 0.1115 0.0076 0
TTDNB 14 6 0.337 1.487 0.0666 0.002 0
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Table 6.26: Results of Univariate T-Test for ROWN in 1987
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Public I	 Private Public	 I	 Private
NITA 14 6 0.0196 0.042 0.2934 0.2241 0.0001
NITC 14 6 0.675 1.212 0.2857 0.2909 0.7626
OITA 14 6 0.099 0.103 0.8322 0.7569 0.0001
OITC 14 6 4.838 3.691 0.4836 0.5938 0.0689
NISS 14 6 0.013 0.187 0.2834 0.0745 0
OISS 14 6 0.054 0.314 0.1579 0.0172 0
OINB 14 6 1.923 11.61 0.1356 0.0117 0
OIRB 13 6 7.547 15.134 0.1789 0.1194 0.9522
TLD 14 6 0.633 0.384 0.0209 0.0059 0.8999
CSTA 14 6 0.541 0.344 0.2479 0.3631 0.0862
GSTA 14 6 0.068 0.164 0.2158 0.0825 0.0353
TCTA 14 6 0.042 0.034 0.4386 0.3325 0.1503
TLSF 14 6 23.09 11.001 0.1705 0.2891 0.0534
TCRA 14 6 0.068 0.053 0.413 0.4859 0.2702
TLCLL 13 6 7.997 4.807 0.2233 0.3397 0.0516
TLTA 14 6 0.451 0.27 0.0358 0.0187 0.9135
LLTL 13 6 0.096 0.107 0.8473 0.8505 0.8386
RATA 14 6 0.637 0.707 0.5397 0.4581 0.0001
CATA 13 6 0.523 0.545 0.901 0.8994 0.0001
LLOE 13 6 0.693 0.533 0.6595 0.709 0.2509
0E01 13 6 0.8 0.632 0.2519 0.2886 0.4795
OETA 14 6 0.08 0.06 0.1724 0.234 0.253
OETC 14 6 4.164 2.479 0.3074 0.4176 0.1082
OERA 14 6 0.149 0.086 0.1081 0.2629 0.0013
OESS 14 6 0.041 0.127 0.0079 0.0001 0.136
OENB 14 6 1.444 4.902 0.0106 0.0001 0.0262
OERB 13 3 5.5 10.424 0.2074 0.1957 0.7816
DVOI 14 6 0.012 0.021 0.4943 0.4391 0.5273
TDCD 13 6 1.276 2.8 0.22 0.0595 0.0001
TDTTD 13 6 0.356 0.731 0.3046 0.1044 0
CSCD 13 6 2.07 2.486 0.6601 0.6191 0.4752
CSCSD 13 6 1.258 2.169 0.2813 0.1596 0.0984
TLCD 13 6 2.204 1.685 0.3107 0.2543 0.605
RBUB 14 6 0.603 0.412 0.4045 0.3162 0.3189
L101 14 6 0.603 0.412 0.4045 0.3162 0.3189
TTDNB 14 6 13.538 67.832 0.0618 0.0015 0
TTOSS 14 6 0.378 1.809 0.0798 0.0029 0
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27.0%. Public banks are also less liquid given the average loan to deposit ratio (TLD)
as 63.3% compared with 38.4% for private banks. As a ratio of risk assets, operating
expenses is higher on the average for public banks (N0.149 million) than for private
banks (N0.086 million).
The distinguishing factors changed slightly by 1988 as shown in table 6.27.
Profitability, managerial efficiency and branch structure/size remained significant
factors with virtually the same set of variables. Capital adequacy and asset quality
were observed significant in addition to the above groups of factors. With regard to
capital adequacy, the ratio TLCLL was found significant at 10% level while the asset
quality ratio RATA was also significant at 10% level. The capital position of public
banks can be said to have been worse than that of private banks as TLCLL averaged
538.4% and 348.8% respectively for the different categories of banks. The RATA
averaged 72.5% for private banks and 56.2% for public banks.
By 1989, the same set of factors observed significant in 1988 were significant
except for capital adequacy (Table 6.28). The asset quality ratios LLTL and LLOE
were observed significant at 5% and 10% levels respectively. In both cases, higher
average values were associated with public than with private banks, indicating that the
quality of assets of private banks is higher than for public banks. Among the
managerial efficiency ratios, an additional ratio, DVOI, was found significant at 5%
level. Privately owned banks had an average of 7.3% compared with 0.7% for public
banks.
In summary, between 1985 and 1989, profitability, liquidity, asset quality and
managerial efficiency in addition to branch structure and size were significant factors
that distinguished predominantly public from predominantly private banks. Private
banks are confirmed to be more profitable, more liquid, more efficient and have
better quality assets. The specific ratios that were predominantly significant include
OINB, OISS, TLD, OESS as well as TTDNB and TTDSS.
In 1985, a comparison between banks with head-office located in Lagos and
those located outside Lagos reveals that the distinguishing factors are profitability
(NITA and NITC), managerial efficiency (0E0I and OETA) and match of liability
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Table 6.27: Results of Univariate 1-Test for ROWN in 1988
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal Equal
Prob > I Prob > F.
Public I	 Private Public	 I	 Private
Prob > I
NITA 14 6 0.039 0.035 0.7719 0.8323 0.0367
NITC 14 6 0.813 0.784 0.917 0.94 0.0301
OITA 14 6 0.124 0.116 0.6931 0.7634 0.0801
OITC 14 6 3.775 2.588 0.3177 0.4924 0.0026
NISS 14 6 0.028 0.12 0.22 0.0458 0
OISS 14 6 0.077 0.341 0.1359 0.012 0
OINB 14 6 2.611 10.417 0.1003 0.0055 0
OIRB 13 6 7.291 32.907 0.1273 0.0141 0
TLO 14 6 0.515 0.429 0.4756 0.4088 0.4394
CSTA 14 6 0.493 0.272 0.2148 0.3408 0.0535
GSTA 14 6 0.062 0.209 0.1897 0.0538 0.0096
TCTA 14 6 0.053 0.048 0.6832 0.7637 0.0427
TLSF 14 6 16.06 7.109 0.2044 0.3715 0.0052
'KRA 14 6 0.119 0.068 0.166 0.3309 0.0036
TLCLL 14 6 5.384 3.488 0.1371 0.2377 0.073
TLTA 14 6 0.402 0.296 0.2812 0.2473 0.8597
LLTL 14 6 0.15 0.091 0.4191 0.4814 0.3373
RATA 14 6 0.562 0.725 0.0846 0.1213 0.2548
CATA 14 6 0.566 0.559 0.965 0.9661 0.8123
LLOE 14 6 0.566 0.559 0.965 0.9661 0.8123
0E01 14 6 0.718 0.699 0.8129 0.8672 0.0158
OETA 14 6 0.086 0.081 0.7769 0.8342 0.0464
OETC 14 6 2.962 1.804 0.342 0.5235 0.0005
OERA 14 6 0.177 0.112 0.1581 0.3317 0.0009
OESS 14 6 0.049 0.221 0.0948 0.0046 0
OM 14 6 1.722 6.868 0.0643 0.0017 0
OERB 14 6 4.709 21.271 0.0884 0.0059 0
DVOI 14 6 0.011 0.047 0.2326 0.0095 0.0017
TDCD 14 6 1.474 1.329 0.7307 0.7825 0.1643
TDTTD 14 6 0.374 0.421 0.4911 0.4025 0.3042
CSCD 14 6 2.207 1.475 0.4018 0.5042 0.1258
CSCSD 14 6 1.034 1.529 0.3901 0.2686 0.2743
TLCD 14 6 1.95 1.211 0.0808 0.1367 0.1436
RBUB 14 6 0.638 0.582 0.6971 0.7164 0.6333
1101 14 6 0.627 0.563 0.5476 0.4635 0.2448
TTDNB 14 6 17.139 52.299 0.0323 0.0004 0
TTDSS 14 6 0.5 1.664 0.06 0.0015 0
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Table 6.28: Results of Univariate 1-Test for ROWN in 1989
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > I
Equal
Prob > I Prob > F'
Public	 I	 Private Public Private
NITA 13 7 0.036 0.062 0.3829 0.4021 0.5736
NITC 13 7 1.607 0.837 0.3338 0.4686 0
OITA 13 7 0.179 0.158 0.5873 0.6477 0.0987
OITC 13 7 10.44 2.533 0.3714 0.5093 0
RISS 13 7 0.024 0.146 0.2401 0.0906 0
OHS 13 7 0.098 0.301 0.1444 0.0326 0
OINB 13 7 2.922 7.540 0.0848 0.0111 0
OIRB 13 7 8.063 20.188 0.1974 0.0682 0
TLD 13 7 0.569 0.53 0.8035 0.8112 0.6591
CSTA 13 7 0.433 0.369 0.6292 0.6242 0.9896
GSTA 13 7 0.062 0.104 0.5268 0.4924 0.5964
TCTA 13 7 0.047 0.07 0.413 0.4953 0.0659
TLSF 13 7 40.391 5.454 0.3422 0.4825 0
TCRA 13 7 0.2 0.129 0.524 0.6216 0.0058
TLCLL 13 7 4.263 3.223 0.2635 0.3222 0.1782
TLTA 13 7 0.449 0.29 0.0672 0.0701 0.4522
LLTL 13 7 0.218 0.08 0.0354 0.0694 0.0294
RATA 13 7 0.542 0.657 0.299 0.2623 0.7197
CATA 13 7 0.636 0.61 0.8283 0.8389 0.5233
LLOE 13 7 0.82 0.278 0.0874 0.1597 0.0139
0E01 13 7 0.794 0.644 0.2809 0.3571 0.0940
OETA 13 7 0.142 0.096 0.1953 0.3122 0.0027
OETC 13 7 8.833 1.695 0.3778 0.515 0
OERA 13 7 0.456 0.152 0.1331 0.2571 0
OESS 13 7 0.074 0.156 0.0522 0.009 0.0286
OENB 13 7 2.241 4.197 0.0228 0.0046 0.3471
OERB 13 7 6.215 10.329 0.1445 0.0957 0.5065
DVOI 13 7 0.007 0.073 0.0489 0.0035 0
TDCD 13 7 1.053 0.769 0.4158 0.4812 0.1469
TDTTO 13 7 0.282 0.284 0.9761 0.9752 0.8397
CSCD 13 7 1.788 2.314 0.6317 0.5478 0.0364
CSCSO 13 7 0.906 1.802 0.2995 0.1517 0.0004
TLCD 13 7 1.919 1.337 0.1771 0.2378 0.1184
RBUB 13 7 0.84 0.936 0.7326 0.6883 0.1783
L101 13 7 0.563 0.517 0.657 0.6238 0.4648
TTONB 13 7 15.547 26.782 0.0729 0.0154 0.0162
TTOSS 13 7 0.518 0.935 0.0691 0.0157 0.0338
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(TDCD). See table 6.29. Banks that are Lagos-based (so to speak), seem to be more
profitable than the other category of banks. The average return on assets (NITA) is
3.5% for the former and -0.5% for the latter. Relating these to those observed for
classification variables BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3, it would appear that the
majority of Lagos-based banks are resistant while the others are vulnerable. The
average values of OEOI and OETA for both classes of banks reveals that Lagos-
based banks are more efficient.
While profitability and managerial efficiency remained significant as observed
from the corresponding ratios OITC and OERA respectively, liquidity, capital
adequacy and risk also were significant in 1986 as can be observed from table 6.30.
Lagos-based banks recorded an average cash and short-term funds to total assets
ratio (CSTA), of 24.2% compared with outside Lagos-based banks that had 46.1%
on the average. Consequently, there is sufficient reason to believe that Lagos-based
banks were less liquid. Their capital position seemed worse than that of the other
group of banks going by the average value of TCTA which was 3.7% for Lagos-based
banks compared with 7.4% for banks with head-office outside Lagos. Banks with
head office in Lagos reflect a lower CATA ratio than those in the other category.
CATA averaged 45.3% for banks based in Lagos and 72.8% for those outside Lagos.
This reveals that Lagos-based banks undertake essentially greater risk than those with
head-office based outside Lagos. This development is consistent with the above
observation that Lagos-based banks are less liquid.
Table 6.31 shows that profitability, asset quality and managerial efficiency still
were the significant distinguishing factors for banks regarding head office location as
at 1987. NITA and NITC were significant at 5% and 10% levels respectively. While
the return on assets of Lagos-based banks averaged 4%, it averaged 0.6% for the
other class of banks. Regarding asset quality, loan loss provision as a proportion of
operating expenses (LLOE) averaged 90.7% for Lagos-based banks compared with
28% for outside Lagos-based banks. This still does confirm the higher level of risk
associated with assets of Lagos-based banks. Expectedly, Lagos-based banks were
more efficient in 1987 going by the average value of OEOI of 63.9% compared with
218.
Table 6.29 Results of Univariate 1-Test for HOL in 1985
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Lagos	 [	 Outside Lagos I	 Outside
NITA 11 7 0.035 -0.005 0.0412 0.0173 0.5021
NITC 11 7 0.812 0.298 0.3054 0.2327 0.1628
OITA 11 7 0.092 0.075 0.0916 0.0591 0.6419
OITC 11 7 2.861 2.269 0.5732 0.5516 0.7005
HISS 11 7 0.031 0.004 0.8033 0.0784 0.5399
OISS 11 7 0.049 0.05 0.536 0,5234 0.9238
OINB 11 7 3.36 1.659 0.2049 0.2544 0.0799
OIRB 10 7 6.841 5.733 0.8048 0.7667 0.453
TLD 11 7 0.574 0.556 0.9052 0.8784 0.0061
CSTA 11 7 0.299 0.455 0.3689 0.2755 0.0339
GSTA 11 7 0.184 0.183 0.9919 0.992 0.7794
TCTA 11 7 0.04 0.062 0.3408 0.2202 0.0004
TLSF 11 7 15.11 10.435 0.4048 0.4723 0.0331
TCRA 11 7 0.059 0.192 0.3391 0.2055 0
TLCLL 10 7 5.334 6.532 0.544 0.4713 0.0129
TLTA 11 7 0.438 0.44 0.9471 0.9367 0.0308
LLTL 10 7 0.101 0.071 0.544 0.4958 0.1802
RATA 11 7 0.724 0.617 0.3659 0.2781 0.0566
CATA 11 7 0.45 0.685 0.2029 0.1639 0.6393
LLOE 10 7 0.836 0.429 0.3116 0.2949 0.9486
0E01 11 7 0.626 1.21 0.1018 0.0336 0.0039
OETA 11 7 0.057 0.079 0.0792 0.0625 0.8673
OETC 11 7 2.048 1.971 0.9257 0.9337 0.1478
OERA 11 7 0.079 0.173 0.1303 0.0457 0.0003
OESS 11 7 0.035 0.462 0.4399 0.3944 0.4184
OENB 11 7 2.759 1.506 0.6839 0.7125 0.191
OERB 10 4 4.398 4.57 0.9102 0.9131 1
DVOI 11 7 0.019 0.008 0.2763 0.3237 0.1246
TDCD 11 7 2.392 0.862 0.0913 0.1021 0.2637
TDTTD 11 7 0.379 0.385 0.948 0.942 0.2758
CSCD 11 7 2.509 1.308 0.7254 0.7181 0.9058
CSCSD 11 7 1.15 0.922 0.6169 0.6159 0.8614
TLCD 11 7 2.002 1.374 0.2019 0.1317 0.1493
RBUB 12 8 0.603 0.42 0.3421 0.3221 0.8637
1101 11 7 6.84 0.647 0.3488 0.4494 0
TTDNB 11 7 31.461 16.901 0.3357 0.4104 0.0179
TTDSS 11 7 0.587 0.522 0.7995 0.8067 0.5713
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Table 6.30:Results of Univariate T Test for HOL in 1986
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > I Prob > F'
Lagos I	 Outside Lagos Outside
NITA 12 8 0.029 0.006 0.2263 0.1711 0.2329
N1TC 12 8 0.733 0.395 0.3514 0.3743 0.3219
OITA 12 8 0.089 0.081 0.3061 0.2178 0.0126
OITC 12 8 3.083 1.807 0.1093 0.1366 0.0782
MISS 12 8 0.051 0.016 0.3526 0.4264 0.0031
OISS 12 8 0.104 0.061 0.368 0.4295 0.0207
OINB 12 8 4.764 1.966 0.2313 0.3065 0.001
OIRB 10 5 6.978 5.816 0.7413 0.7137 0.5837
TLD 12 a 0.635 0.603 0.7926 0.7701 0.1977
CSTA 12 8 0.242 0.461 0.1359 0.0673 0.0118
GSTA 12 8 0.109 0.117 0.9085 0.9054 0.7907
TCTA 12 8 0.037 0.074 0.1481 0.0654 0.0001
TLSF 12 8 27.069 8.602 0.1546 0.2131 0.0048
TCRA 12 8 0.055 0.136 0.2101 0.1078 0
TLCLL 12 8 5.783 7.006 0.5372 0.4945 0.1552
TLTA 12 8 0.444 0.448 0.9686 0.9645 0.1196
LLTL 11 8 0.207 0.062 0.4137 0.3539 0.0653
RATA 12 8 0.734 0.656 0.4503 0.417 0.5025
CATA 11 7 0.453 0.728 0.1414 0.1043 0.6424
LLOE 11 8 0.9 0.427 0.2972 0.2702 0.6994
0E01 12 8 0.683 1.091 0.269 0.1754 0.0039
OETA 12 8 0.061 0.074 0.3583 0.338 0.0001
OETC 12 a 2.35 1.412 0.2547 0.3233 0.0058
OERA 12 8 0.082 0.125 0.1467 0.0762 0.0001
OESS 12 8 0.053 0.045 0.6666 0.6896 0.222
OEN8 12 8 2.295 1.46 0.2435 0.3069 0.0113
OERB 10 5 4.328 3.69 0.7168 0.7451 0.4474
ovoi 12 8 0.034 0.019 0.5652 0.6237 0.0049
TOCD 12 7 1.476 1.105 0.3717 0.369 0.8273
TDTTD 12 7 0.347 0.363 0.7625 0.7982 0.0682
CSCD 12 7 1.593 2.024 0.6887 0.6332 0.0917
CSCSD 12 7 1.224 1.589 0.7211 0.672 0.1012
TLCD 12 7 2.609 1.852 0.2086 0.1987 0.8283
RBUB 12 8 0.59 0.482 0.5824 0.559 0.5685
L101 11 8 0.576 0.628 0.582 0.5461 0.2084
TTDNB 12 8 36.372 16.46 0.2332 0.3084 0.0010
TTOSS
	 	 12 8 0.797 0.508 0.4026 0.4623 0.0236
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Table 6.31: Results of Univariate 1-Test for HOL in 1987
_	
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > I Prob > F'
Lagos I	 Outside Lagos	 I	 Outside
NITA 12 8 0.04 0.006 0.0488 0.0424 0.0001
NITC 12 8 1.165 0.342 0.1009 0.075 0.7556
OITA 12 8 0.105 0.095 0.2012 0.2115 0.943
OITC 12 8 4.856 3.95 0.6744 0.6529 0.4814
NISS 12 a 0.102 0.011 0.2509 0.3356 0
OISS 12 8 0.167 0.079 0.3416 0.4223 0.0005
OINB 12 8 6.409 2.461 0.2274 0.3074 0.0001
OIRB 10 6 8.25 10.168 0.6947 0.6391 0.1151
ILO 12 8 0.541 0.584 0.6718 0.646 0.3767
CSTA 12 8 0.459 0.515 0.791 0.7871 0.9475
GSTA 12 8 0.098 0.094 0.9486 0.9444 0.3796
TCTA 12 8 0.035 0.046 0.4363 0.3957 0.3858
TLSF 12 8 20.536 17.854 0.815 0.8044 0.565
TCRA 12 8 0.057 0.073 0.4162 0.4038 1
TLCLL 11 8 5.192 9.461 0.2549 0.1684 0.0002
TLTA 12 8 0.397 0.396 0.9905 0.9895 0.2216
LLTL 11 a 0.132 0.054 0.2033 0.1453 0.0888
RATA 12 8 0.687 0.616 0.4678 0.4172 0.2124
CATA 12 7 0.493 0.595 0.5752 0.5239 0.2733
LLOE 11 8 0.907 0.28 0.1313 0.1071 0.8271
0E01 12 8 0.685 0.753 0.5025 0.5194 0.4295
OETA 12 8 0.065 0.089 0.1661 0.1182 0.2996
OETC 12 8 3.691 3.608 0.9671 0.9662 0.8448
OERA 12 8 0.093 0.187 0.1564 0.0698 0
OESS 12 8 0.065 0.068 0.9084 0.9104 0.656
OENB 12 8 2.706 0.144 0.5413 0.5727 0.1851
OERB 12 6 5.045 8.721 0.331 0.2329 0.0923
OVOI 12 8 0.011 0.021 0.4529 0.3928 0.1233
TDCD 12 7 1.651 1.94 0.7903 0.7251 0.0002
TDTTD 12 7 0.387 0.624 0.4447 0.2984 0
CSCD 12 7 2.376 1.903 0.5667 0.5564 1
CSCSD 12 7 1.663 1.345 0.6338 0.6194 0.8147
TLCD 12 7 2.17 1.817 0.5126 0.4267 0.0617
RBUB 12 8 0.564 0.519 0.8158 0.8035 0.4811
L101 12 8 0.584 0.669 0.3109 0.2827 0.7111
TIONB 12 8 38.506 16.806 0.1654 0.2281 0.0031
TOSS 12 8 0.982 0.545 0.3172 0.3845 0.0097
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Table 6.32: Results of Univariate T-Test for HOL in 1988
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Lagos I	 Outside Lagos I	 Outside
NITA 12 8 0.041 0.032 0.5111 0.5264 0.4579
NITC 12 8 0.914 0.693 0.4303 0.4433 0.499
OITA 12 8 0.12 0.125 0.8717 0.8454 0.0028
OITC 12 8 4.115 - 2.374 0.1996 0.2768 0.0001
NISS 12 8 0.068 0.036 0.3977 0.4706 0.0029
OISS 12 8 8.182 0.117 0.4756 0.5444 0.0027
OINB 12 8 5.886 3.554 0.3481 0.4213 0.0035
OIRB 12 7 17.924 11.018 0.4361 0.5273 0.01
TLD 12 8 0.499 0.476 0.8172 0.8137 0.9398
CSTA 12 8 0.322 0.582 0.3308 0.2278 0.0007
GSTA 12 8 0.109 0.103 0.9427 0.9402 0.6934
TCTA 12 8 0.047 0.057 0.5928 0.5427 0.1051
TLSF 12 8 17.532 7.138 0.1888 0.2642 0.0001
TCRA 12 8 0.073 0.149 0.2063 0.1154 0.0013
TLCLL 12 8 4.245 5.671 0.401 0.346 0.2051
TLTA 12 8 0.388 0.344 0.6418 0.612 0.339
LLTL 12 8 0.156 0.098 0.5163 0.4581 0.0984
RATA 12 8 0.699 0.479 0.0505 0.0202 0.167
CATA 12 8 0.52 0.63 0.482 0.4401 0.3226
LLOE 12 8 0.801 0.483 0.5037 0.4483 0.1325
0E01 12 8 0.685 0.753 0.5025 0.5195 0.4295
OETA 12 8 0.078 0.093 0.5681 0.4885 0.0027
OETC 12 8 3.202 1.735 0.299 0.3852 0
OERA 12 a 0.114 0.223 0.1652 0.0744 0
OESS 12 a 0.113 0.082 0.5527 0.6125 0.0048
OENB 12 8 3.765 2.516 0.4051 0.4735 0.0067
OERB 12 7 11.297 7.61 0.4826 0.5671 0.0138
DVOI 12 8 0.023 0.02 0.84 0.8532 0.1731
TDCD 12 8 1.222 1.744 0.39 0.2833 0.0001
TOTTO 12 8 0.357 0.434 0.202 0.1372 0.1018
CSCD 12 8 1.436 2.815 0.2703 0.1698 0.0007
CSCSD 12 7 0.957 1.52 0.2148 0.1636 0.4857
TLCO 12 8 1.59 1.935 0.5458 0.4673 0.006
RBUB 12 a 0.671 0.546 0.4322 0.3822 0.2481
L101 12 8 0.623 0.584 0.6701 0.6382 0.2515
TTDNB 12 a 31.643 21.751 0.3164 0.3596 0.103
TTDSS 12 8 0.939 0.714 0.5219 0.5657 0.0729
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91.6% for other class of banks. Same trend is established from the values of OETA.
The return on asset (NITA) and risk (RATA) were significant at 5% level in
1988. Table 6.32 confirms this. In 1989, risk (RATA) remained significant at 5%
while the ratios CATA and TTDNB were additionally significant at 15% and 10%
levels. We can confirm this from the results in Table 6.33.
Over the study period, significant factors that distinguish Lagos-based from
other banks are profitability and risk/asset quality. Managerial efficiency had been
significant in the pre-SAP period as well as in the first year of SAP. Quite clearly, we
find that Lagos-based banks are much more profitable than other banks just as they
undertake higher risk.
Also comparing banks with technical partnership agreements with those
without, we find from Tables 6.34 to 6.38 that over the study period the significant
distinguishing factors are profitability, liquidity, managerial efficiency and bank
structure/size. Specifically, the banks with technical partnership agreements seem to
be more profitable than those without as measured by both the return on assets
(NITA) as well as the return on capital (NITC). Operating income per staff (OISS)
has also been higher for banks with technical partners.
Liquidity was observed significant over the period 1985 to 1987. Measured by
the ratio of loans to deposits (TLD), banks with technical partners were less liquid
than those without. On close examination of the classification of banks with and
without technical partners we find that those without they are in most cases wholly
state government owned. Their low profitability can thus be appreciated.
OEOI averaged 58.2% for banks with technical partnership agreements and
90.8% for other class of banks going by 1988 figures. The trend is similar from 1985
to 1987. This suggests that banks with technical partners are more efficient than those
without. The trend was similar for DVOI. While banks with technical partners paid
on the average 3.6% of their operating income as dividend the corresponding average
was 0% in 1988. Both the deposit per staff as well as deposit per branch were
observed to be higher for banks with technical partners compared with the other class
of banks. Between 1985 and 1987, banks with technical partnership agreements were
223
also more liquid than those without. This can be observed from an investigation of
the comparative average values of GSTA over the 1985 to 1987 period.
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Table 6.33: Results of Univariate 1-Test for HOL in 1989
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > I
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
Lagos I	 Outside Lagos	 I	 Outside
NITA 12 8 0.045 0.046 0.9733 0.9773 0.0055
NITC 12 8 1.887 0.514 0.1142 0.1761 0
OITA 12 8 0.156 0.194 0.4703 0.3797 0.0029
OITC 12 8 11.664 1.685 0.3006 0.3903 0
MISS 12 8 0.086 0.037 0.4175 0.4996 0
OISS 12 8 0.193 0.133 0.4724 0.5418 0.0024
OINB 12 8 5.236 3.494 0.2905 0.3632 0.0036
OIRB 12 8 14.414 9.086 0.3503 0.4246 0.0028
TLD 12 8 0.524 0.603 0.6705 0.62 0.0369
CSTA 12 8 0.344 0.511 0.2184 0.178 0.4888
GSTA 12 8 0.056 0.108 0.4543 0.3659 0.0054
TCTA 12 8 0.042 0.075 0.3236 0.3102 0.9803
TLSF 12 8 44.616 3.483 0.3041 0.3942 0
TCRA 12 8 0.084 0.312 0.176 0.0889 0.0006
TLCLL 12 8 3.909 3.885 0.9828 0.982 0.6539
TLTA 12 8 0.382 0.41 0.7898 0.76 0.0718
LLTL 12 8 0.178 0.157 0.81 0.788 0.1636
RATA 12 8 0.661 0.463 0.0826 0.0403 0.7296
CATA 12 8 0.554 0.738 0.1573 0.1276 0.7119
LLOE 12 8 0.602 0.672 0.8829 0.856 0.0002
0E01 12 8 0.742 0.74 0.9878 0.9896 0.0093
OETA 12 8 0.111 0.148 0.472 0.4127 0.1189
OETC 12 8 9.777 1.172 0.3288 0.4186 0
OERA 12 8 0.17 0.619 0.1746 0.0784 0
OESS 12 8 0.107 0.096 0.7223 0.7404 0.26
OENB 12 8 3.218 2.486 0.2772 0.3227 0.079
OERB 12 8 8.408 6.526 0.4085 0.4479 0.137
DVOI 12 8 0.032 0.028 0.8626 0.8717 0.2731
TDCD 12 8 0.813 1.165 0.4617 0.3697 0.0024
TUTU 12 8 0.255 0.324 0.4347 0.3647 0.0615
CSCD 12 8 1.67 2.425 0.3532 0.372 0.3817
C5CSD 12 8 1.148 1.327 0.7475 0.775 0.0601
TLCD 12 8 1.569 1.935 0.5352 0.4519 0.0031
-
RBUB 12 8 0.878 0.868 0.9648 0.9651 0.7823
-
LIOI 12 8 0.572 0.51 0.5671 0.498 0.0177
TTDNB 12 8 22.678 14.68 0.063 0.0889 0.023
.  MSS 12 8 0.727 0.57 0.3691 0.3847 0.4405
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Table 6.34: Results of Univariate 1-Test for TP in 1985
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
1With TP Without
TP
With TP Without
TP
NITA 10 8 0.041 -0.007 0.0068 0.0017 0.5823
NITC 10 8 1.13 -0.036 0.0039 0.0017 0.21
OITA 10 8 0.09 0.078 0.2376 0.2132 0.7589
OITC 10 8 2.659 2.596 0.9522 0.9489 0.2079
NISS 10 8 0.041 -0.003 0.0016 0.0009 0.008
OISS 10 8 0.091 0.023 0.0014 0.0009
OINB 10 8 4.193 0.83 0.0122 0.0133 0
OIREi 8 6 9.828 2.12 0.0092 0.0095 0.0006
TL0 10 8 0.468 0.691 0.0721 0.0389 0.0753
CSTA 10 8 0.333 0.393 0.6864 0.6702 0.4183
GSTA 10 8 0.275 0.069 0.0122 0.011 0.0094
TCTA 10 8 0.041 0.058 0.383 0.3182 0.0008
TLSF 10 8 9.396 18.161 0.2266 0.1599 0.0002
TCRA 10 8 0.064 0.169 0.3866 0.3147 0
TLCLL 10 7 5.177 6.756 0.4219 0,3395 0.0167
TLTA 10 8 0.349 0.545 0.0472 6.0238 0.0001
LLTL 10 7 0.091 0.085 0.3068 0.8999 0.4365
RATA 10 8 0.692 0.671 0.8434 0.8378 0.6514
CATA 10 8 0.483 0.616 0.4552 0.4318 0.5459
LLOE 10 7 0.72 0.595 0.7553 0.7525 0.9413
0E01 10 8 0.556 1.226 0.0338 0.0106 0.0023
OETA 10 8 0.049 0.086 0.002 0.0004 0.8276
OETC 10 8 1.528 2.632 0.2712 0.2177 0.0446
OERA 10 8 0.08 0.161 0.1286 0.0799 0.0154
OESS 10 8 0.05 0.026 0.0515 0.0536 0.0318
OENB 10 a 2.007 0.954 0.0383 0.0443 0.0005
OERB a 6 5.892 2.353 0.078 0.0993 0.0001
DVOI 10 8 0.025 0.002 0.0349 0.0401 0.0005
TOCD 10 8 1.621 0.654 0.0012 0.0006 0.0063
TDTTD 10 a 0.466 0.276 0.0272 0.0268 0.0221
CSCD 10 8 1.633 1.177 0.4008 0.3995 0.5835
CSCSO 10 8 1.319 0.739 0.1843 0.1815 0.3857
TLCD 10 8 1.773 1.739 0.9355 0.9347 0.9259
RBUB 12 8 0.49 0.59 0.6106 0.5941 0.7088
L101 10 8 0.559 9.272 0.3475 0.2732 0.0001
TTDNB 10 8 39.521 8.647 0.0513 0.063 o
TTDSS 10 8 0.816 0.244 0.0152 0.0162 0.0003
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Table 6.35: Results of Univariate 1-Test for TP in 1986
Variable
No.	 of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > I
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
With TP Without
TP
With TP Without
TP
---> 
NITA 12 8 0.037 -0.006 0.0145 0.0042 0.4862
NITC 12 8 0.949 0.069 0.0083 0.0126 0.0087
OITA 12 8 0.087 0.084 0.7885 0.761 0.1014
OITC 12 8 2.359 2.892 0.6265 0.5446 0
NISS 12 8 0.063 -0.002 0.0764 0.1298 0
OISS 12 8 0.128 0.029 0.0256 0.0507 0
OINB 12 8 5.46 0.923 0.0482 0.0887 0
OIRB 9 8 9.652 1.998 0.0023 0.0031 0.001
TLD 12 8 0.551 0.729 0.1333 0.0944 0.4364
CSTA 12 8 0.301 0.371 0.6161 0.5754 0.18781
GSTA 12 a 0.166 0.031 0.0173 0.0329 0.0002
TCTA 12 8 0.041 0.069 0.2748 0.1674 0
TLSF 12 8 9.741 19.595 0.2479 0.144 0
TCRA 12 8 0.064 0.122 0.367 0.2512 0
TLCLL 12 7 5.966 6.866 0.6708 0.6245 0.2049
TLTA 12 8 0.356 0,58 0.115 0.0032 0.5892
LLTL 12 7 0.078 0.103 0.6732 0.6131 0.0771
RATA 12 8	 • 0.688 0.725 0.704 0.7065 0.7569
CATA 10 8 0.519 0.611 0.6085 0.5916 0.5464
LLOE 12 7 0.687 0.727 0.9307 0.9268 0.6888
0E01 12 8 0.587 1.236 0.0735 0.024 0.004
OETA 12 8 0.05 0.09 0.002 0.0007 0.3915
OETC 12 8 1.409 2.823 0.221 0.1296 0.0021
OERA 12 8 0.073 0.138 0.028 0.0045 0.003
OESS 12 a 0.064 0.281 0.0272 0.0475 0.0012
OENB 12 a 2.585 1.026 0.0252 0.0467 0.0001
OERB 9 6 5.348 2.267 0.0533 0.0844 0.0024
DVOI 12 8 0.045 0.002 0.0759 0.1293 0
TDCD 11 a 1.677 0.875 0.0279 0.0363 0.0085
TDTTD 11 a 0.379 0.316 0.2494 0.286 0.0459
CSCD 11 8 2.137 1.222 0.2668 0.2928 0.1337
CSCSO 11 8 1.846 0.689 0.1231 0.1578 0.0064
TLCD 11 8 2.518 2.072 0.4233 0.4452 0.2314
RBUB 12 8 0.476 0.653 0.3745 0.3341 0.4371
LIDI 11 8 0.563 0.645 0.3509 0.3446 0.799
TTDAB 12 8 41.223 9.184 0.051 0.0928 0
TTDSS 12 8 0.965 0.257 0.032 0.0606 0
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Table 6.36: Results of Univariate 1-Test for TP in 1987
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob > T
Equal
Prob > T Prob > F'
With TP Without
TP
With TP Without
TP
NITA 12 8 0.038 0.009 0.0599 0.1031 0
NITC 12 8 1.14 0.38 0.086 0.1029 0.1297
OITA 12 8 0.102 0.098 0.6129 0.6355 o
OITC 12 8 3.948 5.313 0.5566 0.4965 0.0594
HISS 12 8 0.106 0.004 0.1921 0.2756 o
OISS 12 8 0.195 0.037 0.0843 0.1419 o
0188 12 8 7.184 1.297 0.0695 0.1207 o
OIRB 9 7 10.849 6.552 0.3257 0.2729 0.1442
TLO 12 8 0.468 0.693 0.0218 0.0082 0.5404
CSTA 12 8 0.369 0.649 0.2516 0.1603 0.0047
GSTA 12 a 0.14 0.031 0.0179 0.0319 0.0012
TCTA 12 a 0.035 0.046 0.4632 0.3857 0.0223
TLSF 12 8 12.656 29.675 0.1899 0.103 0.0019
TCRA 12 8 0.061 0.066 0.8194 0.8034 0.3181
TLCLL 12 7 5.099 10.23 0.2302 0.1019 0
TLTA 12 8 0.315 0.519 0.0134 0.0031 0.3327
LLTL 12 7 0.102 0.094 0.9105 0.8955 0.1392
RATA 12 8 0.643 0.682 0.6461 0.6572 0.5099
CATA 11 8 0.543 0.513 0.8602 0.8507 0.386
LLOE 12 7 0.7 0.546 0.72 0.7094 0.8224
0E01 12 8 0.65 0.899 0.0491 0.0842 0.0003
OETA 12 8 0.065 0.089 0.0861 0.1193 0.0223
OETC 12 8 2.808 4.933 0.3403 0.2708 0.0907
OERA 12 8 0.121 0.145 0.6329 0.6616 0.1556
OESS 12 8 0.088 0.033 0.0088 0.0179 o
OENB 12 a 3.358 1.167 0.0094 0.0181 0.0003
OERB 9 7 7.063 5.601 0.6639 0.6343 0.1685
DVOI 12 8 0.025 0 0.0075 0.0166 0
TDCD 11 8 2.351 0.941 0.043 0.0646 0
TDTTD 11 8 0.591 0.314 0.1556 0.2103 o
CSCD 11 8 2.19 2.218 0.9722 0.9712 0.70750
CSCSD 11 a 1.735 1.286 0.4653 0.4713 0.5546
TLCD 11 8 1.937 2.182 0.5922 0.5747 0.6505
RBUB 12 8 0.492 0.627 0.4749 0.4523 0.703
1101 12 8 0.598 0.648 0.5155 0.5254 0.5687
TTON8 12 8 43.242 9.702 0.0277 0.0546 o
TTDSS 12 8 1.155 0.286 0.0392 0.0739 0
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Table 6.37: Results of Univariate T-Test for TP in 1987
Variable
No. of Observation Mean Unequal
Prob> T
Equal
Prob> T Prob > F'
With TP Without
TP
With TP Without
TP
NITA 12 8 0.053 0.015 0.0127 0.0082 0.5035
NITC 12 8 1.207 0.199 0.0008 0.0013 0.0006
OITA 12 8 0.123 0.121 0.9539 0.9443 0.002
OITC 12 8 2.744 4.431 0.4068 0.2927 0
HISS 12 8 0.087 0.008 0.0362 0.0684 0
OISS 12 8 0.219 0.062 0.0781 0.1308 0
OINB 12 8 6.849 2.109 0.0519 0.0917 0
OIRB 12 7 21.564 40779 0.0495 0.1128 o
110 12 8 0.456 0.539 0.4443 0.3984 0.2949
CSTA 12 8 0.3 0.616 0.2355 0.1395 0.001
GSTA 12 8 0.164 0.02 0.0225 0.0412 0.004
TCTA 12 a 0.049 0.055 0.7811 0.7405 0.0087
TLSF 12 8 8.064 21.341 0.2585 0.149 o
TCRA 12 8 0.074 0.149 0.2238 0.1196 o
TLCLL 12 8 4.178 5.771 0.3735 0.291 0.0242
TLTA 12 8 0.338 0.419 0.4019 0.3443 0.1763
LLTL 12 8 0.106 0.172 0.4765 0.4043 0.0373
RATA 12 8 0.678 0.51 0.143 0.0852 0.0993
CATA 12 8 0.572 0.552 0.9032 0.892 0.1715
LLOE 12 8 0.659 0.696 0.9363 0.9320 0.2837
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Table 6.38: Summary of Significant Variables for Other Classifications
Based on the T-Test (1985-1989) 
Variable 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Cannon
Variables
ROWN OISS*,01N8**, OISS*,0INB***, OINB*,01R11*,
TLD*,
OISS**,OINB** OISS***,0INB**, OIN8,01SS
01R8*,TLD* TLD**,GSTA***, TLTA*,0ERA** OIRB**,TLCLL** TLTA**,LLTL*, TLOCI
(1985-81)
TLTACI(1988
-89),
GSTA*,TTEWIB**, TLTA***,OESS*, TUNB**, RATA**, LLOE**,0ERA***,
TTDSS* OENB*,0ERB*, TTDSS** OESS**.OENB** OESS***,0ENB*, 0ESS91986-8
9),
TDCD**,TTIMIB*** OERB** OERB***,DV01*, TTDNB,TTDSS
TTDSS** TTDNB*, TTEINB*,TTDSS*
TTDSS*
HOL NITA*.N1SS**, OITC**,CSTA***, NITA*,NITC** NITA* RATA*
0E01**OETA** TCTA***,CATA**, LLOE**,
0E01**
RATA*** CATA*
TDCD** KRA*** OETA* TTDNB
TP NITA*,NITC*, NITA*,NITC*,NISS** NITA**,
OISS**,
NITA*,NITC*, NITA,NITC,
NISS*,0ISS*, OISS*,OINB*,01R8* OINB**, NISS*,OISS** OISS,TLD
('85-87)
0E01,0ESS,
DVOI,
OINB*,01R8*, TLD*,GSTA*,TLTA*, TLD*,GSTA*, OIN8**,01RB**
TLD*,GSTA*, OEOI**,OETA*, TLTA*, GSTA*,RATA**, TTONB,TTOSS
OENB*,0ERB**, OERA*,OESS*, 0E01*,OESS*, 0E0I*,0ERA**, GSTA.
DV01*,TDCD*,OESS*,
0E01*,OETA*,0ERA*,
OENB*,0ER8**,
DVOI**,TDCD*,
OENB*,DVOI*, OESS***,
OENB***
TDTTD*,TTDNB* CSCSD**, TDCD*,TTDNB* DV01*,
TTDSS* TTDNB**,TTOSS* TTDSS* TTONE1*,TTDSS*
otes:	 iiples variabTfs sign	 ant at	 eve
** implies variable is significant at 10% level
*** implies variable is significant at 15% level.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCRIMINANT AND LOGIT ANALYSES
7.1	 Introduction
Having discussed the responses from the survey in chapter five, we examined
in chapter six the significance of the various categories of bank performance factors
by testing the individual significance of the various ratios under each category of
factors for each of the period covering 1985 to 1989. In this chapter, we conduct
more rigorous analyses to further confirm the individual and, perhaps, more
importantly the combined significance of some groups of factors. This, as was earlier
explained, stems from the dictates of intuition as well as banking theory and the
conclusions of earlier research, that bank failure or dismal performance is caused by
a combination of factors rather than a single factor.
In the section that follows we discuss the features of the disciminant analysis
module of the SAS Software, being the statistical package which is employed for our
analysis and is further expected to aid an understanding of the results of our analysis.
The results of both the discriminant and logit analyses is discussed and an assessment
of the ability of the models also conducted.
7.2	 The SAS Software for Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis involves the computation of various discriminant
functions for classifying observations into two or more groups on the basis of one or
more quantitative variables. For a set of observations containing one or more
quantitative variables and a classification variable defining groups of observations, the
discriminant analysis attempts to develop a discriminant criterion from this data set
to classify each observation into one of the groups.
Once the discriminant functions have been derived, they provide for the
pursuant of the two research objectives for which the technique was developed, vis:
analysis and classification. The analysis aspects provides tools such as statistical tests
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for assessing the success with which the discriminating variables actually discriminate
between the groups defined by the response/dependent variable. Next comes the use
of the technique for classification. Once a set of variables is found which provides
satisfactory discrimination for cases with known group membership, a set of
classification functions are derived which permit the classification of new cases with
unknown membership. It is in this sense that the technique may be said to be
'predictive' since it attempts to classify the new case into one of the defined groups
based on the information on discriminatory variables.
For our purpose we desire to determine the important quantitative variables
that can be used to derive a discriminant function to classify our sample banks into
vulnerable and resistant categories of bank performance. Given that we are
considering 37 financial ratios in addition to total deposits which is a measure of
bank size, and other relevant indicators such as ownership (ROWN), Head-office
location (HOL) and existence or non-existence of technical partners (TP), the
selection of the best set of discriminatory/explanatory variables would be a difficult
task. This is often the case in research, where the researcher is faced with the
situation in which there are more discriminating variables than necessary to achieve
satisfactory discrimination. To alleviate this choice/selection problem, the stepwise,
forward and backward methods have been developed.
The SAS software for personal computers version 6.04 which was adopted for
conducting the T-test in both sections 6.3 and 6.4 also provides procedures for
selecting, based on discriminant analysis, a set of variables from a larger set of
variables, that are capable of classifying a set of observations into two or more
categories. The PROC STEPDISC is one such procedure that we found highly
suitable for our analysis. The STEPDISC procedure performs a stepwise discriminant
analysis by forward selection, backward elimination, or stepwise selection of
quantitative variables that can be useful for discriminating among several variables
(Week, 1980; SAS/STAT, 1990). Each of these cases involves a step-by-step
evaluation of each variable in the variable set for entry into or exit from the list of
variables that best explain the nature of the dependent variable. Hence, while some
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variables would be selected, some others may be dropped or excluded.
In each of the instances, variables are chosen to enter or leave the model
according to one of two criteria:1
(a) the significance level of an F-test based on an analysis of covariance,
where variables already chosen act as covariates and the variable under
consideration is the dependent variable; or
(b) the squared partial correlation for predicting the variable under
consideration from the classification variable, controlling for the effects
of the variables already selected for the model.
Notable differences exist between these criteria. On one hand, the significance level
and the squared partial correlation criteria select variables in the same order,
although they may select different number of variables. On the other hand,
increasing the sample size tends to increase the number of variables selected when
using the significance level criteria but has little effect on the number selected using
squared partial correlation. Costanza and Afifi (1979) using monte Carlo studies
conclude that the use of a moderate significance level, in the range of 10% to 25%,
often performs better than the use of a much larger or a much smaller significance
level. The threshold significance level of 15% which is also the default in the SAS
software is employed for our analysis. The 15% level is informed by the conclusions
of Costanza and Afifi (1979).
As previously indicated, a stepwise, forward and backward discriminant
analysis can be conducted when an attempt is being made to select from within a
larger set of variables, the combination that best explain a dependent variable. The
forward selection procedure begins with no variables in the model. At each step, of
all candidate variables, the variable is entered that contributes most to the
discriminatory power of the model as measured by the Wilks' Lambda (A), the
likelihood ratio criterion and also satisfies the entry criterion. The entry criterion is
I See Volume 2 of the SAS/STAT User's Guide.
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that the variable must be found significant based on the F-test (explained above) and
the threshold significance level. At the step where none of the unselected variables
is found to meet the entry criterion, the process stops (SAS/STAT, 1990, p. 1494).
The selected variables then represents the best combination for distinguishing the
dependent variable.
The backward elimination begins unlike the forward selection, with all
variables in the model. That is, all variables are assumed to satisfy the entry criterion.
At each step the variable which contributes least to the discriminatory power of the
model as measured also by Wilks' lambda is removed. The procedure continues until
when all remaining variables meet the criterion to stay in the model. At this point,
the backward elimination process stops. The 'staying' criterion is similar to the 'entry'
criterion in the forward procedure.
Stepwise selection begins like forward selection with no variables in the model.
First, the single best-discriminating variable according to Wilks Lambda is selected.
A second variable is next selected, which represent the variable not included yet in
the model but with the ability to best improve the discriminatory power of the model
in combination with the first variable. At each step when the model is examined, if
the variable in the model that contributes least to (or reduces) the discriminatory
power of the model when combined with already selected variables (as measured by
Wilks' lambda) fails to meet the criterion to stay, then the variable is removed.
Otherwise, the variable not in the model that contributes most to the discriminatory
power of the model and meets the entry criterion is entered. When all variables in
the model meet the criterion to stay and none of the other not in the model variables
meets the criterion to enter, the stepwise selection process stops.
In each of these procedures, in the selection of variables for entry, only one
variable can be entered into the model at each step. One limitation of these
processes is that, at each step they do not take into account the relationship between
variables that have not yet been selected. As a consequence, some important
variables could be excluded in the process. The stepwise procedure can be said to be
more robust since it involves both the Forward and Backward criteria in addition to
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the Wilk's Lambda for assessing the discriminating power of variables within and
outside the model at every step. To this extent the resulting model would tend to be
better specified while that of the other procedures would almost invariably be
overspecified. The square partial correlation of the resulting model based on either
the forward or backward selection procedures, would be exaggerated due to the
relatively longer list of selected variables compared with the stepwise procedure.
The STEPDISC procedure prints, for each of the selection methods, summary
statistics associated with the variable chosen at each step, including the final step
when the model is compiled or fully identified. Those we find relevant include; the
step number or rank of variable, number of variables in the model, partial R 2, Prob
> F which is the probability level for the F-statistic for entering the variable, the
average squared canonical correlation (ASCC) and Pr > ASCC based on the F-
approximation.
7.3	 A Discriminant Analysis of Commercial Bank Performance in Nigeria
Tables 7.1 to 7.5 present the results of both stepwise and forward discriminant
analysis for the bank performance classification variables BANK1, BANK2 and
BANK3 as well as the other classifications such as Ownership (ROWN), Head-Office
Location (HOL) and Technical Partnership (TIP) from 1985 to 1989. We first
concentrate on the bank performance based classification.
Table 7.1 reveals that existence or non existence of technical partnership
agreements (TP), cost structure (TD I	 D), liability match (TDCD), branch structure
(I I	 DNB) as well as profitability (OISS) are chosen as the best set of variables, out
of 35 variables, that discriminate between vulnerable and resistant banks based on the
stepwise selection method. Going by the R2 value, technical partnership (TP)
explains 80% of the variation in bank performance. This is followed by TDTTD or
cost structure which explains 45.6% of the variation and hence the ranking of cost
structure as the second most important factor. The combination of selected variables
exhibit an ASCC of 0.95 which is very impressive. We observe from table 6.23 that
the set of significant variables were among the set of financial variables found
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Table 7.1: Results of Multivariate Discriminant Analysis for Different Perfomance Criteria in 1985
EQ. Class
Selected
Variables Rank le Pr > F ASCC Pr > ASCC
No. of
Variables
Selection
Method Comment
1 BANK1 TP 1 0.8000 0.0001 0.8000 0.0001 35 Stepwise * Technical
Partnership
TOTTD 2 0.4564 0.0029 0.8912 0.0001 * Cost Structure
TDCD 3 0.2185 0.0679 0.9150 0.0001 * Liability Match
TTDNB 4 0.2063 0.0890 0.9325 0.0001 * Branch Structure
OISS 5 0.2259 0.0859 0.9478 0.0001 * Profitability
* Technical
Partnership
2 BANK2 TP 1 0.439 0.0027 0.4389 0.0027 35 Stepwise
TDTTD 2 0.2523 0.0399 0.5805 0.0015 * Cost Structure
3 BANK3 OEOI 1 0.4471 0.0024 0.4471 0.0024 35 Stepwise * Managerial
Efficiency
TLSF 2 0.317 0.0186 0.6224 0.0007 * Capital Adequacy
4 ROWN OESS 1 0.7309 0.0001 0.7309 0.0001 34 Stepwise * Managerial
Efficiency
TTDNB 2 0.2274 0.0529 0.7921 0.0001 * Branch Structure
TTO 3 0.2769 0.0363 0.8496 0.0001 • Bank Size
CATA 4 0.1798 0.1152 0.8767 0.0001 • Asset Quality &
Risk
5 HOL 0E01 1 0.2524 0.0336 0.2524 0.0336 34 Stepwise * Managerial
Effiency
TLCD 2 0.1976 0.0738 0.4001 0.0216 * Liability Match
TTO 3 0.1956 0.0863 0.5174 0.0145 * Bank Size
6 BANK1
•
MISS 1 0.5729 0.0003 0.5728 0.0003 32 Forward * Bank Size
TTD 2 0.5014 0.0015 0.7870 0.0001 * Branch Structure
TTDNB 3 0.3783 0.0112 0.8676 0.0001 * Liability Match
CSCSD 4 0.3536 0.0194 0.9144 0.0001 * Capital Adequacy
TCRA 5 0.2191 0.0914 0.9332 0.0001 * Asset Qualtiy &
Risk
CATA 6 0.252 0.0804 0.95 0.0001 * Managerial
Efficiency
DVOI 7 0.2637 0.0877 0.9632 0.0001 • Profitability
NITC 8 0.2359 0.1299 0.9719 0.0001
RBUB 9 0.3921 0.0528 0.9829 0.0001
7 BANK2 NITC 1 0.4323 0.0030 0.4323 0.0030 32 Forward * Profitability
OETC 2 0.1949 0.0760 0.543 0.0028 * Managerial
Efficiency
7 BANK2 TTD ' 3 0.1754 0.1064 0.6231 0.0028 * Bank Size
8 TP TTD 1 0.3752 0.0089 0.3752 0.0001 33 Stepwise * Bank Size
NITC 2 0.4172 0.0069 0.8299 0.0001 * Profitability
CSCSD 3 0.2369 0.0658 0.8702 0.0001 * Liability Match
TOTTO 4 0.1878 0.1216 0.8946 0.0001
MISS 5 0.1982 0.1106 0.9121 0.0001
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significant by the univariate test in distinguishing between vulnerable and resistant
banks according to BANK1.
For BANK2 classification of bank performance, technical partnership and cost
structure were the combination of variables selected as best for discriminating
between the categories of banks based on the stepwise selection. Both the partial R2
reduced in this case and so also is the maximum ASCC which is 0.58.
A different set of financial variables were found the best combination for
BANK3 in the same year and based on the same selection method. In this case we
have managerial efficiency (0E0I) and capital adequacy (TLSF). Associated with
this combination of variables is an ASCC of 0.62. The ratio OEOI was observed to
be significant for BANK3 in 1985 by the univariate T-test (Table 6.23). In each of
these first three discriminant analysis, it would seem that the distinguishing factors
vary with the performance criteria. The stepwise analysis finds TP and TDTTD, in
that order, to be significant when the performance criteria is BANK1 or BANK2.
A completely different set of variables was found significant for BANK3.
A discriminant analysis based on all the financial variables except HOL,
ROWN and TP, which were initially adopted for distinguishing bank performance
according to the different criteria, BANK1, BANK2, and BANK3 was conducted
again. This analysis depended on the forward selection procedure. Dropping these
qualitative (choice) variables was designed to reveal the effect of trying to capture the
major performance determinants from only the financial ratios. From this and similar
analysis, it is expected that the significance of the identified (and peculiar) qualitative
factors for distinguishing bank performance would be revealed. With this second set
of discriminant analysis, we have equally used a different selection method - the
forward selection method, to observe whether any major selection differences will
occur especially between such results as in BANK1 and BANK2 which revealed a
subset of common significant ratios/factors.
For BANK1, also shown in Table 7.1, the combination of financial variables
selected included bank size, branch structure, liability match, capital adequacy, asset
quality/risk and managerial efficiency. The combination of ratios recorded an ASCC
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of 0.982 which is higher than the 0.94 recorded for the stepwise selection. While only
five (5) variables were selected based on the stepwise method, nine (9) were selected
when TP was removed and the forward selection method was used. This
development can be appreciated by considering the combination of variables selected
by the stepwise discriminant analysis as being capable of classifying the banks by
technical partnership factor.
From the same Table 7.1, we observe that the new variables selected include
TTD (total deposits), NITC, CSCSD, TDTTD and NISS. Prior to the removal of TP
(technical partnership), from the list of candidate financial variables, TDTTD had
been chosen as one of the key variables for discriminating between vulnerable and
resistant banks as defined by BANK1. When IT was dropped, in its place the
variables TTD, NITC, CSCSD and NISS were added to the list of selected variables.
The same set of variables were found to be the significant factors which distinguished
banks by technical partnership (TP), as revealed from the stepwise discriminant
analysis. In effect, the factors that characterise banks according to TP, also play the
role of TP if and when it is found a significant discriminatory variable as in the above
case.
When the forward selection procedure was adopted for BANK2, managerial
efficiency remained a significant discriminating factor though the ratio selected was
OETC rather than 0E0I. Profitability and bank size also were among the
combination of factors from the selection of NITC and TTD respectively. The
maximum ASCC of 0.62 is higher for the forward selection-based model than the
model on stepwise selection. Indeed, the increase in the ASCC for the forward
selection-based models ordinarily suggest that they are better models. With forward
selection the combination of variables remained the same for classification variables,
BANK3, ROWN and HOL. These results are not reproduced in the table for
precisely this reason. The results would reveal that the same models, when subjected
to forward selection MDA, would tend to include more variables and exhibit (possibly
as a result) higher ASCC than when subjected to stepwise MDA. The higher ASCC
may infact be explained only by an increase in the number of selected variables rather
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than a significant increase in the significance of the resulting model. Perhaps, which
of these causes that would explain the development could have been isolated if a
correlation analysis had been conducted to assess the degree of correlation between
the financial variables. This represents a shortcoming of our analysis and is revealed
from table 7.1 to 7.5 as various combinations in the tables differ.
In 1986, for BANK1 classification, table 7.2 shows the combination of selected
variables as belonging to the class of technical partnership, managerial efficiency and
branch structure factors. In addition to technical partnership with a partial R 2 of
66.7%, OESS, OENB and NITC are the other variables selected which recorded
partial R2 of 36.2%, 58.7% and 15.3% respectively. These variables yield a 0.9255
value of ASCC and are individually significant in the model. For this analysis only
28 variables were utilized due to at least one missing value among the data points for
the individual ratios that were deleted. In effect, about thirteen (13) variables have
been dropped to enable the conduct of this analysis. This development reveals the
fluctuation in the quality of information obtained even from the use of the
questionnaire approach. The changes in the number of candidate variables from year
to year need also be taken into consideration in attempting to explain the results of
the analysis and also compare results from one year to another. This limitation
imposed by the quality of the data constitutes another major shortcoming of our
analysis.
The variables selected for explaining BANK1 performance classification were
also retained for BANK2 except for NITC which was dropped and replaced with
RBUB and OETC. Hence while technical partnership and managerial efficiency
were retained as significant factors, branch structure (RBUB) was added. Again
under stepwise MDA, a set of similar variables are found significant for distinguishing
bank performance going by the performance criteria expressed by BANK1 and
BANK2. This does not happen for BANK3, though in this case it shares a common
factor, TP, with the other performance criteria. These developments would suggest
that greater distinction exist between BANK3 and each of BANK1 and BANK2
criteria than exist between BANK1 and BANK2. It is noteworthy that the BANK3
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Table 7.2: Results of Multivariate Discriminant Analysis for Different Performance Criteria in 1986
Eq. Class Variable Rank R: Pr > F ASCC Pr > ASCC Var.	 No. Method Comment
1 BANK1 TP 1 0.6667 0.0001 0.6667 0.0001 28 Stepwise * Technical
OESS 2 0.362 0.0064 0.7873 0.0001 * Management
OENB 3 0.5869 0.0002 0.9121 0.0001 * Profitability
NITC 4 0.1525 0.1212 0.9255 0.0001
2 BANK2 TP 1 0.2757 0.021 0.2757 0.0002 28 Stepwise * Technical
OESS 2 0.1662 0.0931 0.6983 0.0002 * Management
OENB 3 0.3359 0.0147 0.7979 0.0001 * Branch
RBUB 4 0.1751 0.0946 0.8178 0.0001
OETC 5 0.1156 0.1306 0.8461 0.0001
3 BANK3 NITC 1 0.5 0.0005 0.4999 0.0005 28 Stepwise * Profitability
TP 2 0.2536 0.0279 0.6268 0.0002 •	 Technical
4 ROWN OESS 1 0.7362 0.0001 0.7362 0.0001 27 Stepwise * Management
ITO 2 0.2535 0.028 8031 0.0001 * Bank Size
5 HOL TP 1 0.1406 0.1033 0.1406 0.1033 27 Stepwise * Technical
TLSF 2 0.2298 0.0378 0.338 0.03 * Capital
6 BANK2 NITC 1 0.5004 0.0005 0.5004 0.0005 28 Forward * Variables
ETC, RATA and
TLSF added;
OETC dropped.
TP 2 0.2757 0.021 0.6381 0.0002
OESS 3 0.1662 0.0931 0.6982 0.0002
OENB 4 0.3359 0.0147 0.7997 6.0001
RBUB 5 0.166 0.1172 0.8329 6.0001
RATA 6 0.2034 0.0916 0.8669 6.0001
TLSF 7 0.2864 0.0486 0.905 6.0001
7
-
TP NITC 1 0.2989 0.126 0.2989 0.0126 27 Forward * Ownership
ROWN6 2 0.3442 0.0083 0.5402 0.0014 * Profitability
NISS 3 0.1579 0.1025 0.6128 0.0014 * Management
DVOI 4 0.21 0.0643 0.6941 0.0009 * Bank Size
OENB 5 0.3299 0.0200 0.795
,
0.0002 •	 Head-Office
TTD 6 0.2434 0.0616 0.8449 0.0001 * Branch
Structure
01N8 7 0.4403 0.0097 0.9131 0.0001
TTDNB 8 0.3369 0.0375 0.9424 0.0001
HOL 9 0.4555 0.016 0.9687 0.0001
nriT In n Al1C n n19A 0 QA17 n nnni
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performance classification is the most liberal of the three criteria.
For .BANK3, the combination of selected variables include NITC and TP,
highlighting yet again the importance of profitability and technical partnership. For
all classifications technical partnership was found to be a significant discriminatory
factor of bank performance. The discriminant analysis conducted to identify the
combination of variables that distinguish banks with respect to the existence or non-
existence of technical partnership agreements (equation 7 in table 7.2) indicated the
significance of bank ownership, profitability, managerial efficiency, bank size, head-
office location and branch structure. Profitability is indicated by the selection of
NITC, NISS and OINB while managerial efficiency, by the selection of DVOI, OENB
and OETC. All the selected ratios in this combination of variables had been shown
to have significantly different means for banks with technical partners and those
without (Table 6.38). Also, if TP was dropped in the analysis relating to BANK1,
BANK2, and BANK3 classifications, it seems likely that it will be accounted for by
all or a combination of the variables selected as best in discriminating banks
according to TP.
When the forward selection procedure was adopted this time with TP, ROWN
and HOL still retained as part of candidate variables to be selected, the result of the
discriminant analysis remained the same for all classification variables except BANK2
(equation 6). The new combination of variables included according to their previous
ranks, all but the variable OETC which was replaced with RATA and TLSF, to
suggest the importance of risk/asset quality and capital adequacy. This new set of
variables has an ASCC value of 0.91 compared with 0.84 associated with the previous
set of variables. This difference may simply have been accounted for by the longer
list of variables relative to other models. The resultant longer list of variables for one
model and the retention of the same list for other models tends to support the
tendency for the forward selection analysis to include more variables in the model.
It would seem, therefore, from the results of our analysis that the most
significant factors that discriminate between vulnerable and resistant banks are
technical partnership in addition to managerial efficiency and profitability.
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Based on the classification variable BANK1, in 1987, a combination of
managerial efficiency, asset quality, risk, ownership, branch structure, technical
partnership and revenue sources ratios recorded an ASCC value of 0.99 as table 7.3
reveals. Both the ratios OEOI (managerial efficiency) and TTDNB (branch
structure) with partial R2 of 60.2% and 65.7% respectively were among the highly
correlated variables with BANK1. For this stepwise analysis, 38 variables were
considered (Table 7.3), being one of the periods with almost complete and good
quality data.
In the stepwise analysis relating to BANK2, also in 1987 and as displayed in
table 7.3, managerial efficiency, head-office location, capital adequacy, branch
structure and profitability are significant distinguishing factors each being individually
significant in the model. These are represented by the variable 0E0I, HOL,
TLCLL, RBUB and OITC with partial R2 of 46.2%, 25.7%, 49.7%, 23.8% and 23.4%
respectively. The average squared canonical correlation is 0.88 which indicates a
good model. Among the selected variables OEOI and TLCLL had been confirmed
by the univariate test as being significant factors which distinguish, according to
BANK2 classification variable, resistant from vulnerable banks.
Capital adequacy, head-office location, managerial efficiency and match of
liability are significant factors for discriminating between vulnerable and resistant
banks according to classification variable BANK3. Capital adequacy, specifically
TLCLL, represents the most significant ratio based on its partial R 2 of 45.9% and
the level of significance (Prob > F) which is 0.2%. The ratio TLSF was chosen as
an additionally significant capital ratio. In related studies, there has been a tendency
to retain one ratio among a set which measure the same performance characteristic,
say capital adequacy, as the significant ratio. Two or three ratios within a broad
group have seldom been retained in a predictive model. The inclusion of both TLSF
and TLCLL, both of which are capital ratios, suggests that the combination has been
found to distinguish vulnerable from resistant banks according to the criteria
expressed in BANK3. They jointly explain 61% of the variability in the BANK3
performance distinction. The peculiarity of our circumstance, wherein two ratios
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within the same category are included in a model, would seem to convey that while
they are different measures of the same performance characteristic, they differ in
their efficacy.
When forward selection was adopted all selected combination of significant
financial variables remained the same as with the stepwise selection except for the list
of variables associated with BANK2. The variable TTDNB was added to the list and
ranked 4th, higher than RBUB and OITC, which were now ranked 5th and 6th. The
value of ASCC consequently increased from 0.88 to 0.92. From table 7.3, for
convenience and due to space limitation, only the newly added variables are shown
against variants of the main models.
Table 7.4 shows the results for 1988. The stepwise discriminant analysis for
BANK1 selected as the group of discriminatory factors, managerial efficiency revenue
sources, profitability, branch structure, liquidity, capital adequacy and risk. Asset
quality is not chosen. Managerial efficiency is represented by OETA, revenue
sources by LIOI, profitability by OINB and NITC, branch structure by RBUB, and
capital adequacy by TCRA. Liquidity is represented by CSTA while other variables
include CATA and TTDSS. Risk is represented by CATA. Of these factors,
liquidity reflects the highest partial R2 of 60.6% though it ranks 7th among the
significant variables. For this model, maximum ASCC is 0.987.
All factors were found to play some significant role in discriminating between
vulnerable and resistant banks according to the stepwise discriminant analysis based
on BANIC2 classification. We have OEOI (managerial efficiency), ROWN
(ownership), LLOE (managerial efficiency), CSTA (liquidity), TP (technical
partnership), TLCLL (capital adequacy), TDTTD (bank cost structure), OETC
(managerial efficiency), RATA (risk/asset quality), HOL (head-office location),
TTDNB (branch structure) and LIOI (revenue sources). OEOI has the highest
partial R2 of 56.0% followed by RATA and TTDNB with 44.75% and 44.57%
respectively. The maximum ASCC of 0.9995 has been the highest of the models
identified thus far.
Technical partnership, managerial efficiency, risk, liquidity and capital
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Table 7.4: Results of Discriminant Anal ysis for Different Performance Criteria in  1988
EQ. Class
ifiarliediluck
Rank IF Pr > F ASCC Pr > ASCC
Number of
Variables
Selection
Method Comment
1 BANK1 OETA 1 0.2328 0.0426 0.7663 0.0001 38 Stepwise * Managerial
Efficiency
1101 2 0.1476 0.1279 0.8008 0.0001 * Revenue Sources
OINB 3 0.2782 0.0358 0.8562 0.0001 * Profitability
RBUB 4 0.2137 0.0827 0.8869 0.0001 * Branch Structure
NITC 5 0.1665 0.1475 0.9058 0.001 * Liquidity
TTOSS 6 0.2273 0.0995 0.9272 0.0001 * Capital Adequacy
CSTA 7 0.6062 0.0028 0.9713 0.0001 * Risk
TCRA 8 0.4121 0.0244 0.9829 0.0001
CATA • I 0.9866 0.0001
2 BANK2 0E01 1 0.5602 0.0002 0.5602 0.0002 38 Stepwise * Managerial
Efficiency
ROWN 2 0.4255 0.0033 0.7473 0.0001 * Ownership
•LLOE 3 0.4248 0.0006 0.9537 0.0001 * Liquidity
* Asset Qualityi Risk
TP 5 0.359 0.0182 0.0984 0.0001 * Technical
Partnership
TLCLL 6 0.2965 0.0441 0.9877 0.0001 * Cost Structure
TDTTD 7 0.2327 0.095 0.9905 0.0001 * Head-Office
Location
* Revenue Sources
3 BANK3 •TP 1 0.6346 0.0001 0.6346 0.0001 38 Stepwise * Technical
Partnership
OERA 2 0.8814 0.0001 0.9567 * Managerial
Efficiency
DETA 3 0.2985 0.0285 0.9828 0.0001 * Asset Quality
i Risk
RATA 4 0.72 0.0001 0.9952 0.0001 * Capital Adequacy
TLD 5 0.3846 0.018 0.997 0.0001
TCTA • 0.2785 0.0525 0.9978 0.0001
4 ROSIN 37 Stepwise * Cost Structure
TOTTO 2 0.2436 0.0441 0.6902 0.0004 * Managerial
Efficiency
OERA 3 0.2787 0.0356 0.7766 0.0002 * Capital Adequacy
OENB 4 0.5612 0.0013 0.9019 0.0001 * Asset Quality
TTDSS 5 0.3179 0.0357 0.9507 0.0001 * Bank Size
TCRA 6 0.2287 0.0984 0.9619 0.0001 • Liquidity
0.4353 0.0141 0.9741 0.0001
.
TTO 8 0.2981 0.0663 0.9818 0.0001
TLD 9 0.2479 0.1191 0.9864 0.0001
CATA 10 0.3028 0.993 0.9904 0.0001
5 HOL RATA 1 0.3489 0.0078 0.3489 0.0078 37 Stepwise •	 Asset Quality
TLCLL 2 0.3842 0.0061 0.599 0.0007 * Capital Adequacy
CSCSD 3 6.3447 6.0132 0.7373 0.0001 * Liability Match
TLD 4 0.2863 0.0327 0.8125 0.0001 * Branch Structure
RBUB 5 0.1776 0.1776 0.8458 0.0001 * Liquidity
CATA 6 0.2052 0.1038 0.8774 0.0001
6 TP 37 Stepwise * Management
Efficiency
ROWN 2 0.5284 0.0006 0.7892 0.0001 * Ownership
TTO 3 0.4388 0.0038 0.8817 0.0001 * Bank Size
TDTTD 4 0.2695 0.0393 0.9136 0.0001 * Cost Structure
CSCSD 5 0.1651 0.1328 0.9278 0.0001 * Capital Adequacy
TCRA 6 0.4187 0.0124 0.958 0.0001 * Risk Asset
-
7 BANK! 0E01 1 0.6953 0.0001 • 38 Forward * Variables Added
TDCD 11 0.2787 0.1441 0.9914 0.0001 * Managerial
Efficiency
OISS 12 0.5578 0.0333 0.9962 0.0001 * Match of
Liability
OERA 13 0.5854 0.0454 0.9984 0.0001 * Asset quality
TLTA 14 0.5377 0.0972 0.9993 0.0001
8 BANK2 0E01 1 0.5602 0.002 0.5602 0.0002 38 Forward * Managerial
Efficiency
OERA 3 6818 0.0001 0.9909 0.0001
9 8ANK3 TCRA 7 0.3011 0.0521 0.9978 0.0001 38 Forward
LLOE 3 0.4354 0.0039 0.9755 0.0001
10 ROWN TTDNB 1 0.4792 0.001 0.4791 0.0001 37 Forward *Dropped variables
OITC 6 0.3353 0.03 0.9348 0.0001
TTOSS, TCRA, LLTL,
TTD, TLD, CATA
7 0.3011 0.0521 0.9545 0.0001
8 0.1989 0.1462 0.9635 0.0001
9 0.2902 0.0873 0.9741 0.0001
245.
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adequacy comprise the important factors for classifying vulnerable and resistant banks
according to BANK3. Managerial efficiency is indicated by OERA and OETA with
partial R2 of 88.1% and 29.85% respectively, liquidity by TLD with partial R 2 of
83.46%, risk (RATA) with partial R2 of 72.0% and capital adequacy with R2 of
27.9%. These factors produce a model with maximum ASCC of 0.9978 which is
really impressive.
When the discriminant analyses were conducted with the forward selection
method as has been done in all the previous periods, with respect to BANK1, 14
instead of 9 variables were selected indicating the addition of 5 variables. The added
variables as indicated in equation 7 in table 7.4 include OEOI ranked first this time
and TDCD, OISS, OERA and TLTA respectively which were ranked from 11th to
14th. The new ASCC was 0.993 compared with 0.9866 which was initially recorded.
Both still represent very good models, at least as far as the correlation coefficient is
concerned. The addition of five other variables could also have accounted for the
improvement in ASCC though each of them was found individually significant.
With respect to BANK2, the variables OINB, OETC, RATA, HOL, TTDNB
and LIOI were dropped while OEOI and OERA were added and ranked 1st and 3rd
respectively. This development caused only a slight reduction in the ASCC from
0.9995 which was earlier recorded, to 0.9909. Really, one would expect the predictive
ability of both models for classification of sample banks to be the same, particularly
for small samples. It is noteworthy that this is one instance in which the forward
selection analysis yielded a shorter list of significant variables. A net reduction of
four variables is implied. In the previous sets of analysis, the tendency has been to
include more variables. Also, for BANK3, the capital ratio TCTA was dropped and
replaced with TCRA while LLOE (managerial efficiency) was included. The ASCC
remained essentially the same, standing at 0.9978.
The stepwise discriminant analysis yielded models with ASCC values 0.9866,
0.9966, 0.9173 for classification variables BANK1, BANK2, and BANK3 respectively
for 1989. The respective models contain 11, 10 and 6 selected variables out of the
40 (financial and other) variables considered. In all the cases managerial efficiency
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and risk were significant factors.
Specifically, for BANK1, capital adequacy (TLSF, TCTA), managerial
efficiency (0E0I, DVOI), risk (CATA), liquidity (CSTA) and profitability (OITC,
OIRB) were significant groups of factors that were selected. We also have head-
office location (HOL) and liability match (TDTTD) or better still cost structure. Of
these variables DVOI had the highest partial R 2, 40.88%.
Profitability (OITA, OIRB, OITC, OINB) and managerial efficiency, OETA,
OERA, OETC) account for the majority of selected financial variables for BANK2
classification. Others include RBUB (branch structure), CATA (risk), TDCD
(liability match), TLCD (liability match) and ROWN (ownerhsip). OITA accounts
for the highest partial R2 of 47.2% followed by OINB with 41.1% and TLCD with
40.31%.
The six variables selected for BANK3 include TTD (bank size), RATA (risk),
TCTA (capital adequacy), OETC (managerial efficiency), OITC (profitability) and
LIOI (revenue sources). The highest partial R2
 is exhibited by the managerial
efficiency assessment ratio, OETC, being 35.5%
The selected variables changed when the forward selection method was
adopted, however, only for BANK2 and BANK3. With respect to BANIC2, the
variables TTDSS with partial R2 of 35% and 42.5% respectively, were included while
the ownership variable was dropped. The ASCC remained about the same 0.9969
compared with 0.9966 which represents the value for the initial model.
For BANK3 six (6) new variables were added. They include 0E0I, LLTL,
OERA, GSTA and TTDNB. ASCC improved with this 12-variable model compared
with the 6-variable model. ASCC was 0.9909 for the former and 0.9173 for the latter.
Among the selected variables TTDNB has the highest R2 of 59.86% though it was
selected last.
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 revealed an average of 38 and 40 variables respectively was
considered in the analysis for 1988 and 1989. Tables 7.1 to 7.5 have exhibited a
consistent increase in the number of variables considered; indeed, from 35 in 1986
to 40 in 1989. By 1989, there was comprehensive data for all variables. Again, this
248.
Table 7.5: Results of Discriminant Anal ysis for Different Performance Criteria in 1989
EQ. Class
Selected
Variables Rank le Pr > F ASCC Pr > ASCC
Number of
Variables
Selection
Method Comment
1 BANK1 TCTA 1 0.3887 0.0033 0.0389 0.0033 40 Stepwise * Capital
Adequacy
CATA 2 0.265 0.0241 0.5566 0.0011 * Managerial
Efficiency
TTONB 3 0.4116 0.0041 0.7356 0.0001 * Head-Office
Location
TLSF 4 0.3736 0.0091 0.8344 0.0001 * Risk and
Asset
Quality
DVOI 5 0.4088 0.0077 0.9021 0.0001 * Liquidity
TOTED 6 0.2707 0.0468 0.9286 0.0001 *
Profitability
HOL 7 6.2436 0.0729 0.9459 0.0001 * Liability
Match
OIRB 8 0.3465 0.0343 0.9646 0.0001
,
0E01 9 0.2913 0.071 0.975 0.0001
NITC 10 0.2861 0.09 0.9821 0.0001
CSTA 11 0.2485 0.1425 0.9866 0.0001
2 BANK2 0E01 1 0.3727 0.0043 0.3727 0.0043 40 Stepwise * Managerial
Efficiency
OETA 2 0.2706 0.0224 0.5424 0.0013 * Branch
Structure
RBUB 3 0.1789 0.0803 0.6243 0.011 * Risk i
Asset
Quality
CATA 4 0.1569 0.1155 0.6832 0.0011 * Liability
Match
TDCD 5 0.1898 0.0917 0.7433 0.0009
Profitability
OITA 6 0.4717 0.0047 0.8644 0.0001 * Liquidity
OIRB 7 0.4031 0.0147 0.909 0.0001 * Ownership
OERA 8 0.2724 0.0818 0.9617 0.0001
OETC 9 0.3698 0.0471 0.9758 0.0001
OITC 10 0.3618 0.0658 0.9846 0.0001
3 ROHN TLC° 11 0.4025 0.0665 0.9908 0.0001
OINB 12 0.4109 0.0868 0.9945 0.0001
ROHN 13 0.3955 0.0949 0.9966 0.0001
4 BANK3 111) 1 0.3322 0.0098 0.3322 0.0007 40 Stepwise * Bank Size
RATA 2 0.2094 0.0562 0.6628 0.0005 * Risk
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goes to show that the data situation improved the closer we got to the end of the
study horizon. As previously indicated, the changes in the number of variables
considered in the analysis has probably had an effect on the variables selected in each
model.
For 1989, based on the forward selection method bank liquidity is also seen
to be significant with respect to all classifications BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3
(table 7.5). Also, we should mention that the variable TP was not considered in the
above discriminant analysis.
The discriminant analyses conducted in respect of BANK1, BANK2 and
BANK3 reveals in the results, the significance of different combinations of factors in
distinguishing between vulnerable and resistant banks, or better still bank
performance among Nigerian commercial banks. The analysis on BANK1 reveals
that the existence or non-existence of technical partnership agreements distinguished
between vulnerable and resistant banks during 1985 and 1986, being the pre-SAP
period. We observe also from the same table that, of the factors identified for
distinguishing between banks based on technical partnership, three, namely TTD,
NITC and NISS, were found to be significant in both 1985 and 1986. A summary of
the combination of financial variables selected by the discriminant analysis is
presented in Table 7.6.
The significance of TP in 1985 and 1986 as well as in 1987 can be appreciated
from the cross-tabulation of the technical partnership agreement variable (TP) with
the different bank performance classifications, BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3.
We find from Table 7.7 that for BANK1, all the banks without TP are
classified as vulnerable while 25% of those with technical partnership agreement are
also classified as vulnerable in 1986. The trend is very similar for 1987. While all the
banks without TP agreement were still classified as vulnerable, going by BANK1
classification, 16.7% of the other category of banks were classified as vulnerable. The
same trend still remained in 1987. However, in 1988 one (1) of the eight (8) banks
without TP agreement and which had hitherto been classified as vulnerable was
classified as resistant. The figure increased to three (3) in 1988, along with the
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Table 7.6: Summary of Selected Significant Variables of the Discriminant Analysis
(1985-1989)
Variables 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
1 BANK1 TP TP OEOI OETA TCTA
TDTTD OESS RATA LIOI CATA
TDCD OENB ROWN OINB TTDNB
TTDNB NITC TTDNB RBUB TLSF
OISS RBUB NITC DVOI
OISS TTDSS TDTTD
TP CSTA HOL
LIOI TCRA OIRB
NITC CATA 0E01
LLOE NITC
CSTA
2 BANK2 TP TP 0E01 OEOI OEOI
TOTTD OESS HOL ROWN OETA
OENB TLCLL LLOE RBUB
RBUB RBUB CSTA CATA
OETC OITC TP TDCD
TLCLL OITA
TOTTO OIRB
OETC OERA
RATA OETC
HOL OITC
TTDNB TLCD
LIOI OINB
ROWN
3 BANK3 OEOI NITC TLCLL TP TTD
TLSF TP TLSF OERA RATA
NITC OETA TCTA
HOL RATA OETC
HOL TLD OITC
CSCD TCTA 1101
DVOI
TTDSS
4 ROWN OESS OESS OESS HISS DVOI
TTDNB TTD TTD TDTTD HISS
TTD TDTTD OERA RBUB
CATA OITC OENB TTDNB
TISF TTDSS LLTL
TCRA OINB
LLTL
TTD
CATA
5 HOL OEOI TP TP RATA RATA
TLCD LSF TDTTD TLCLL TTD
TTD TLD CSCSD HISS
RBUB ROWN
TLD
CATA
6 TP TTD NITC OEOI OEOI
NITC ROWN ROWN ROWN
CSCSD HISS HISS TTD
TDTTD DVOI HOL TDTTD
HISS OENB TLD CSCSD
TTD RACA TCRA
OINB OENB CATA
TTDNB DVOI TLCLL
HOL
OETC
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number of banks which had TP agreement that were classified as vulnerable. This
development between 1988 and 1989 seems responsible for the insignificance of TP
among the selected variables from the discriminant analysis. This shows essentially
that relative to other banks, those without TP agreement improved in performance
over 1988 and 1989, though much more in 1989.
Going back to our earlier discussion, with respect to BANK1 classification,
over the SAP period, 1987 to 1989, notable determinants of bank performance, as
shown in Table 7.6 include managerial efficiency and risk. Branch structure and
revenue sources were significant in 1987 and 1988 while capital adequacy and
liquidity had been significant in 1988 and 1989.
During the pre-SAP period, technical partnership agreement still remained
very significant in association with bank performance. Recall as noted above, that
over this period all banks without technical partnership aggreement were classified
vulnerable for BANK1. Again, managerial efficiency was prominent in each of the
periods 1987, 1988 and 1989. In particular, the variable OEOI ranked first among
the selected variables. Head-office location and capital adequacy were significant
factors between 1987 and 1988. It seems that while the significance of TP agreement
can be appreciated from the cross-tabulation in table 7.7, that of head-office location
(HOL) may not be easily appreciated from table 7.8. We find from this table that
the cross tabulation in respect of BANK2 for 1987 is not significantly different from
1988. The distribution in 1988 is exactly the same as that in 1986, the period in
which HOL was deemed seemingly unrelated to bank performance. The distribution
in 1989 is also the same with that of 1987 and HOL was not found significant in
1989.
Ownership has since 1988 been found to be a significant determinant of bank
performance based on BANK2 classification (see Table 7.6). Looking at table 7.9 a
cross-tabulation of ownership and bank performance is displayed for each of the
classification variables. For BANK2, we find that the pattern has been the same
since 1985 and up till 1987. It can be said to have changed significantly between 1988
and 1989.
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Examining the discriminant results for BANK2, no common trend could be
observed between 1985 and 1986. However, between 1987 and 1989, capital
adequacy was found to be significant in each period as well as managerial efficiency.
In 1988 and 1989, risk (RATA) was significant.
Table 7.6 also reveals the significance of managerial efficiency (OESS) and
bank size (TTD) in distinguishing between predominantly-public and predominantly-
private banks. We found that privately owned banks had significantly higher
operating expenses per staff. This is also confirmed from the univariate tests in
Tables 6.24 to 6.27. Also, we found that over the period total deposits (TED) was
higher on the average, for private than public banks. Capital adequacy was
significant in 1987 and 1988 while asset quality (LLTL) was significant between 1988
and 1989. Tables 6.27 and 6.28 reveals that the quality of assets of private banks was
higher than that of public banks, as measured by LLTL.
With respect to head-office location, the selected factors for 1985 and 1986
had nothing in common. Over 1987 to 1989, liquidity (TLD) made the difference
between 1987 and 1988 while risk (RATA) also made a difference in 1988 and 1989.
It is interesting that the univariate tests did not reveal any significant differences in
liquidity based on TLD, between banks with head-office in lagos and those outside
Lagos in 1987 and 1988. Risk, however, in the form of RATA was found to be
significantly different for the classes of banks in 1988 and 1989. Indeed, on the
average RATA was higher for Lagos-based banks than the other banks.
7.4	 An Assessment of the Classification Ability of the Discriminant Models
Usually a discriminant model or criterion can be evaluated by its performance
when adopted in the classification of the same set of sample observations or a
completely different set of future observations. This is necessary to obtain estimates
of the error rate associated with the model. Two types of errors can occur in this
classification. They are the type I and type II errors. The type I error is made when
a bank that is actually vulnerable is wrongly classified as a resistant bank while a type
II error is made when a resistant bank is wrongly classified as a vulnerable bank.
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Both are misclassifications. The type I error can be referred to as a False Positive
Rate (FPR) since it tends to give an indication that all is well with a problem bank,
while the type II error is the False Negative Rate (FNR) as it portrays a resistant
bank as vulnerable thus generating a false alarm. The FPR is the percentage of
vulnerable banks wrongly classified as resistant while the FNR is the percentage of
resistant banks wrongly classified as vulnerable. The overall error rate estimate is
defined as the proportion of MisClassified observations in the total sample
observations. This is represented in the relevant tables by MC. The overall correct
classification rate is denoted by CC, which is (1 - MC).
The discriminant model is rarely employed to reclassify the same set of sample
observations upon which it was based due to possible bias that may result from such
classification. It is felt, therefore, that its appropriateness/adequacy can be evaluated
and further established when it is used to reclassify a separate set of sample
observations for which there exist full a priori information. This is referred to as
"resubstitution" analysis.
In the assessment of the classification ability of the discriminant models the
(i) Resubstitution and (ii) Crossvalidation results, therefore, come in useful. Results
of both assessments indicate the classification of sample banks into vulnerable and
resistant groups. As earlier mentioned, ideally, in resubstitution analysis, the models
should be applied to the classification of an independent sample. However, since no
independent sample exists in our case, we rely on the resubstitution results for the
same sample as both a preliminary and indicative assessment, noting the potential
bias.
To further enhance our reliance on the models, we embark upon the cross-
validation analysis which yields a nearly unbiased sample classification. This other
method to reduce bias is the product of Lachenbruch and Mickey (1968).
Crossvalidation treats n-1 out of n training observations as a training set. It
determines the discriminant functions based on these n-1 observations and then
applies them to classify the excluded observation. This procedure is continued until
each observation has been excluded once and by implication, each has been classified
260
once. Though this method is known to achieve a nearly unbiased estimate it will
normally be associated with a relatively large variance (SAS/STAT, 1990). The same
technique was adopted in Sinkey (1975) to assess the adequacy or performance of
discriminant models developed for assessing the characteristics of problem banks.
The crossvalidation (Lachenbruch) error rates were generally found to be higher than
those associated with the resubstitution results.
In the latter sections of this chapter we also specified the discriminant models
as logit models to enable a further assessment of their reliability (by resubstitution)
and to trigger whatever differences may distinguish discriminant from logit models.
Both the resubstitution and crossvalidation analyses are embarked upon to inform us
of the appropriateness of each of the identified models as well as aid comparison
between those based on stepwise methods and those based on forward or backward
methods. Intuitively, one can expect such analyses to provide a framework for the
selection of a suitable or 'best' discriminant model by a typical regulatory/supervisory
authority. Indeed, the same would be the case for assessing the suitability of the
performance criteria. In this light, it can be appreciated that while it is very important
to identify factors critical to commercial bank performance, it is equally important
to be able to evaluate the different models that may be isolated for their adequacy.
The same applies to the basis for classifying banks. In what follows, we have
attempted to initiate preliminary efforts in this regard.
The results of resubstitution and crossvalidation for the discriminant models
earlier discussed with some variants are presented in Table 7.10. SSY represents
sensitivity as used in the SAS LOGISTIC procedure to mean the proportion of
vulnerable banks that were correctly predicted as vulnerable while SFY represents
specificity, being the proportion of resistant banks rightly classified as resistant. FPR,
FNR, CC and MC have been previously explained. The models examined are
limited to the 1989 period due to space and the belief that it will suffice to indicate
the ability of other models obtained for the other periods.
The first model in Table 7.10 represents the full model obtained in a
discriminant analysis relating to BANK1 based on the stepwise selection method.
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The results of resubstitution indicate that the discriminant model is perfect for
classifying the sample banks upon which it was based, in terms of performance.
Vulnerable and resistant banks were respectively correctly classified. As mentioned
earlier, however, one should suspect bias, since the same sample served as the basis
for model estimation. Interestingly, however, the crossvalidation results were also very
impressive. The overall correct classification rate is 95%. Specifically, 90% of
vulnerable banks were correctly predicted while 100% of resistant banks were
correctly predicted. Consequently, the false positive rate (FPR) or type I error rate
is 10%.
Two variants of the model for BANK1 were also assessed. One specified the
full model with the exception of liquidity (CSTA) while the other was the full model
without profitability (NITC) and 0E0I, a managerial efficiency related variable. The
ratio DVOI, however, still represented a managerial efficiency related variable in the
two models. The resubstitution and crossvalidation results were the same with that
of the full model. This suggests that the models are equally good. This may be
appreciated when it is found out (table 7.5) that the maximum ASCC of the full
model is 0.9866, without CSTA, 0.9821 and without OEOI and NITC, 0.9750. It may
be the case that for small samples they could yield the same results. However, as the
sample becomes large, one may then begin to observe major differences.
The full discriminant model obtained in respect of classification variable
BANK2 also predicted the performance class of the sample banks with 100%
accuracy going by the resubstitution results. All vulnerable and resistant banks were
correctly classified. The crossvalidation results indicate an overall correct
classification rate of 94.7%. The FPR from the crossvalidation results is 12.5% while
the FNR is 0% indicating that all the resistant banks were correctly classified.
Two variants of this model were also examined. Firstly, we assessed the full
model without the risk variable, CATA, which as can be observed from table 7.5 had
the lowest partial R2 (0.1569) with BANIC2 among all selected variables. The
resubstitution result also correctly classified all resistant and vulnerable banks. This
development, however, reduced the correct classification rate for the crossvalidation
264
results, from 94.7% to 79.2% Also, both the FPR and FNR increased significantly.
The FPR was 25%, indicating that a quarter of all vulnerable banks were
misclassified as resistant banks. This error rate is rather high. Inspite of the fact that
CATA ranks lowest in terms of the partial R2, it ranked 4th in order of selection of
variables into the model. It seems quite a significant variable going by the
crossvalidation results.
The second variant of the model excluded CATA as well as the last seven (7)
variables with regard to the partial R 2. Only six (6) variables were used, reflecting
profitability and managerial efficiency as significant factors. The results of this model
was the same with the crossvalidation results for the first variant. The credibility of
the model declined considering the resubstitution results. While all the resistant
banks were correctly predicted, 12.5% of vulnerable banks were wrongly classified as
resistant banks.
The resubstitution results for the full model obtained for BANK3 reflected
correct classification of all banks. The crossvalidation results also reflect correct
classification of all resistant banks. However, the FPR is 16.7% while the overall
error rate is 8.3%. A variant of the model which involved all variables, except RATA
that has the lowest partial R2 was analysed. The resubstitution results remained
unchanged, showing 100% correct classification. The overall classification ability of
the model is reduced in this case following the crossvalidation results. Infact the FPR
remained the same while the FNR worsened. In this case the FNR was 7.1%
compared with 0% for the full model . To the extent that the type I error as
indicated by the same value for FPR is the same and the cost of FNR (i.e classifying
a resistant bank as vulnerable) is not as high as that associated with FPR, this
development is not really critical.
From the above discussions we find that the full models perform very well
based on resubstitution results. The crossvalidation results also indicate good
performance, though the FNR gets as high as 12.5% in some cases. This seems
rather high. Also, we find that as the classification criterion is relaxed (from BANK1
to BANK3) it becomes more difficult to identify factors that clearly distinguish the
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categories of banks as the correct classification rate declines correspondingly. This
rate was 95.5% for BANK1, 94.7% for BANK2 and 91.7% for BANK3.
The resubstitution results indicated, in respect of ownership (ROWN), that the
identified factors are able to classify all banks correctly in terms of ownership. SSY
being 100.0% in the crossvalidation results indicates that all predominantly public
banks were correctly classified. On the other hand, 14.3% of private banks were
wrongly classified. The overall correct classification rate of 92.9% is impressive. It
should be noted that the implications of type I and type II errors in this case are not
of any adverse consequence. The essence of such a model was to identify factors that
distinguish banks by ownership. That is, perhaps based only on an examination of
these factors one can identify the ownership of these banks. Dropping the last
selected variable, OINB, made no change in both the resubstitution and
crossvalidation results. The maximum ASCC for this and the earlier (full) model
were 0.8750 and 0.8972 respectively.
The ability of the discriminant model to classify banks by head-office location
was rather weak. While 91.7% of banks with head-office in Lagos were correctly
classified, 75.5% of the other set of banks were correctly classified. The overall
correct classification rate is 83.3%. The error rate is rather high. The rate grew
worse with the dropping of two variables, NISS and ROWN. Of all the models, this
seems the weakest. The misclassification rate for the modified model was 35.4%.
The poor performance of this model can be appreciated from an examination of the
ASCC associated with the model. The maximum ASCC was 0.5621. This does not
compare with the ASCC for other models which was in most cases about 0.91 (see
table 7.5).
7.5	 A Logistic Analysis of Commercial Bank Performance in Nigeria
Logit or Logistic analysis represents an alternative method of analysis to the
discriminant analysis for classifying observations into two or more known groups on
the basis of one or more quantitative variables. The LOGISTIC procedure also
available in the SAS packages which fits linear regression models for binary or
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ordinary classification variables using the method of maximum likelihood (SAS/STAT,
1990, p.1072) was adopted for the analysis in this section. The Logit analysis was
conducted essentially as an alternative method of attaining one of the major
objectives of this study as well as to serve as a basis for the identification of
alternative model specifications to which the discriminant models can be compared,
especially in terms of the number of and the particular variables comprising the
models and consequently the classification ability. In previous studies, either of the
two and not both have been used with the claim that the results could not have been
much different since they both represented similar tools for solving a particular
problem. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the LOGISTIC procedure is
similar to the STEPDISC procedure in that it is capable of selecting the best models
or combination of models via various methods such as the Forward, Backward and
Stepwise selection methods.
In the forward selection method, the intercept is first estimated. Next, an
adjusted chi-squared statistic is examined for each variable excluded from the model,
and the most significant at the significance level specified for entry into the model,
is entered. And once a variable is entered it is not removed. This process continues
until none of the remaining variables meet the specified level for entry based on their
individual adjusted chi-squared statistic.
The backward selection method is the opposite of the forward selection
method. In this case, the parameters for the complete model (with all the candidate
variables) are first estimated. The univariate tests based on the Maximum Likelihood
Estimates (MLEs) of model parameters are examined and the least significant
variable that does not meet the significance level specified for staying in the model
is dropped. Once a variable is dropped, it cannot be re-entered. The model is again
estimated with the remaining variables and this process continues until no other
variable in the model meets the specified level for removal.
The stepwise selection method is similar to the forward method except that
variables already in the model do not necessarily remain. Variables are entered into
and removed from the model in such a way that each forward selection step is
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followed by one or more backward elimination steps. That is, after the entry into the
model of a qualifying variable (which meets the significance level specified for entry),
then the model is fully estimated via the MLE method and the parameters of the
model subjected to univariate tests to ascertain their individual significance. If all are
found to be significant, the existing variables stay in the model. However, if any is
found to be insignificant, the associated variable is dropped from the model and
never reconsidered at subsequent steps. Next, the adjusted chi-squared statistic is
examined for variables not in the model (which have not been dropped in earlier
steps) for the most significant qualifying for entry and this is introduced into the
model. The stepwise selection process terminates if no further variable can be added
into or dropped from the model.
The LOGISTIC procedure generates quite a large amount of output and those
that are relevant for our purpose include; the table which gives simple statistics for
explanatory variables such as mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum
values criteria or statistics for assessing model fit and the analysis of MLEs. The
various criteria for assessing model fit include the -2 Log L(ikehhood) and the Score
statistics which are based on the maximum likelihood for fitting a model with and
without intercepts. These test the joint effect of the selected explanatory variables.
The chi-square statistics and prob-values for both statistics are given. These indicate
the level at which each of the selected variables in the model are significant. The
analysis of MLEs consists of the MLE of the parameters, the standard error, the
Wald chi-square which is computed as the square of the parameter estimate divided
by its standard error estimate and the prob-value of the Wald chi-square statistics.
There is also the classification table which can be generated to assess the
ability of the models to reclassify the sample upon which they were based. This is
essentially similar to the resubstitution results obtained in the discriminant analysis.
Specificity (SFY), Sensitivity (SSY), FNR, FPR, CC and MC are also meaningful
here.
Initially when the logit regression analysis was conducted, it was difficult to
obtain convergence for the MLEs. These trials had been based on the default
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significance entry and staying levels (5%) stipulated for the LOGISTIC procedure,
the maximum number of iterations (25) and the convergence criterion (0.0001).
These were thought to be quite strict. An increase in the maximum number of
iterations did not resolve the issue. Consequently, the significance level was
reviewed upward to 15% to coincide with the significance levels considered in the
univariate tests as well as that adopted in the discriminant analysis. The latter, it was
thought, would make for effective comparison of the models specified by both
methods. The covergence criterion was reduced to 0.01 due to the fact that there are
imperfections in the data. These changes produced convergence in the models and
some interesting results.
The results of the logit regression analyses are presented in tables 7.11 to 7.20.
We present also an assessment of the predictive ability of the logit models using the
resubstitution and crossvalidation results of a corresponding discriminant analysis on
the logit model specification. In the table on results of logit forward analysis we have
the prob-values for the Wald chi-square, the rank of selected variables, the prob-
values associated with the -2 Log L and score statistics (or better still, the level at
which the model is significant) and the diagnostics (SSY, SFY, FPR, FNR, CC & MC)
based on the classification table. The latter part of the table (VV, VR, RV, RR)
indicate the details of classification results. Under column VV we indicate for each
model the number of Vulnerable banks correctly classified as Vulnerable and for VR,
the number of Vulnerable banks wrongly classified as Resistant banks. RV and RR
are explained in a similar fashion.
For 1985, the technical partnership (TP) agreement variable and the risk
variable (RATA) were selected as the most significant variables among the list of 20
variables considered. Both factors were significant at 5% level as revealed by the
Pr > X2 values. The entire equation or model is also significant at 1% level given
the prob-value corresponding to both -2 Log L and Score statistics. The model
performed creditably well as can be assessed from the zero values of both the FPR
and FNR as well as the MC. All vulnerable and resistant banks were correctly
predicted.
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The model performance based on the (re)classification table obtained by the
LOGISTIC procedure is the same for BANK2 and BANK3 also. In each case all
vulnerable and resistant banks were correctly predicted. For BANK2, the TP
agreement was significant at 1% level while profitability was significant at 10% level.
The equation still represents a good model given the associated goodness-of-fit
statistics. Also, for BANK3, managerial efficiency (0E0I) made the difference in
bank performance at 1% level while total deposits (TTD) was significant at 15%
level. Comparing these models, a close look at the prob-values for the score statistic
will seem to indicate that we expect the model for BANK1 to be better than that for
BANK2 which in turn should be better than the model for BANK3, in their
predictive abilities. We observe an increase in the prob-values for the respective
models.
In table 7.12 we have the resubstitution and crossvalidation results of these
models based on a discriminant analysis. This procedure was adopted to reduce
potential bias inherent in the Logit reclassification of the sample observations; an
argument that is in line with why crossvalidation analyses are necessary after the
initial resubstitution analyses. The results of the MDA classification using same logit
model specification do not particularly look as impressive as they tended to be
portrayed by the logit classification. The false positive rate (FPR) or better still the
type I error was positive and higher when logit models are subjected to discriminant
reclassification. The FPR was 11% for BANK1, 14.3% for BANK2 and 50% for
BANK3. That for BANK3 was unduly high, thus considerably discrediting the model.
These reclassification results confirm our earlier observation on the declining ability
of the models to classify sample banks by performance as reflected by the increasing
prob-value of the score statistic. In the case of BANK1 and BANK3 all resistant
banks were rightly classified. Only 81.8% were rightly classified for BANK2.
Interestingly, in all cases the resubstitution and crossvalidation results were the same.
This fact may be taken to indicate that the results represent a true assessment of the
models. Furthermore, it perhaps reflects the added advantage and benefits associated
with comparing the discriminant model analyses with a corresponding logit analyses,
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which many studies have simply explained away by virtue of the similarity of purpose
of the two distinct techniques.
The models obtained for ROWN, HOL and TP respectively, which are shown
to have good classification ability by the logistic analysis in the resubstitution and
cross-validation results of the discriminant analysis indicated less than impressive
models. For ROWN, the FPR for resubstitution was 30.8% while it was 38.5% for
crossvalidation. The FNR is also too high, at 80.0%. The HOL and TP models are
better models going by the lower values of FNR. While the FPR for resubstitution
associated with HOL was 9.1%, it increased to 27.3% based on the crossvalidation
results. The crossvalidation and resubstitution results for TP were the same.
Managerial efficiency and profitability essentially distinguished between banks with
head-office located in Lagos and those with head-office outside Lagos.
For 1986, technical partnership (TP) agreement and managerial efficiency
(OETC) made the difference for BANK1, profitability (NITC) and managerial
efficiency (0E0I) were significant for BANK2 while only NITC was significant for
BANK3 as shown in table 7.13. In all the models the selected variables were
significant at 5% level while the models were significant at 1% level. All the models
rightly classified the banks by performance in 1986. The prob-values for the score
statistic indicate that the classification ability of BANK1 model is bound to be better
than that of BANK3 which in turn will be better than that of BANK2. The
resubstitution and crossvalidation results in table 7.14 confirm this.
Overall, based on the CC rate, the BANK1 model performs better than
BANK3 model which is better than BANK2 model. The CC rate for these models
were 90%, 88.5% and 85.3% respectively. Going by the FPR, BANK3 is better than
that of BANK2 which is better than that of BANK1. These are 0%, 11.1% and 20%
respectively. Recall that this has more significant adverse implication than the overall
rates, since the FPR represents the probability of occurrence of the event of a wrong
;lassification of a vulnerable bank as a resistant bank. Again the resubstitution and
trossvalidation results are the same.
The models for ROWN, HOL and TP are generally much better than those
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obtained in 1985. Again, managerial efficiency (OESS, OENB) was found significant
for distinguishing bank ownership in 1986. OESS was significant at 1% level also in
1986. Technical partnership agreement and capital adequacy (TLSF) were significant
at 10% level for distinguishing banks according to head-office location (HOL), in
1986, while the significant variables for distinguishing banks according to TP
agreement were NITC and OESS. The FPR was 0% for ROWN and 16.7% for
HOL, both in the resubstitution and crossvalidation results. The ability of the TP
model worsened under the crossvalidation test.
In 1987, the logit forward selection analysis identified only managerial
performance (0E0I) as the significant factor in distinguishing banks' performance.
We see this in table 7.15. Both the variable and the equation were significant at 1%
level going by the value of Pr > X2. For BANK2 the significant factors were
managerial efficiency (OETC) and capital adequacy (TLCLL) while they were capital
adequacy (TLCLL), technical partnership agreement (TP) and head-office location
(HOL) for BANK3. In BANK3 model, HOL was significant at 15% level while both
TLCLL and TP were significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively. The entire models
were significant at 1% level.
With respect to performance, as portrayed by the logit classification table, the
BANK2 and BANK3 models performed better than the BANK1 model. While the
former had zero value of FPR, the FPR for BANK1 was 12.5%. One out of the
eight (8) vulnerable banks was wrongly classified as a resistant bank. Interestingly,
one out of the eight (8) resistant banks was also wrongly classified as a vulnerable
bank.
Another interesting development is observed from the resubstitution and cross-
validation results for the models. The BANK1 model performed better than both the
BANK2 and BANK3 models. Based on the resubstitution results, the FPR for
BANK1 was 0%, 25% for BANK2 and 20% for BANK3. While only 90% of
resistant banks were classified correctly as was the case also in the logit classification
table, 100% of vulnerable banks were classified correctly compared with 87.5%
obtained from the logit classification. The figure remained the same for the cross-
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validation results for BANK1. Indeed, overall, the BANK1 model remains a better
one than the other models.
The FPR which had been zero for both BANIC2 and BANK3 under the logit
classification rose to 25% and 20% respectively, according to the resubstitution
results. While the results remained the same for BANK2 under crossvalidation, the
FPR doubled for BANK3. Based on the logit classification, the discriminant
resubstitution and crossvalidation results, the model for BANK1 seems the best of
the three models.
The variable OESS was still found to be the distinguishing factor with respect
to bank ownership in 1987. Managerial efficiency (0E0I) and head-office location
(HOL) were the distinguishing factors for technical partnership agreement. Both
models had zero FPR going by the logit classification and this increased to 7.1% and
25% respectively for the resubstitution and crossvalidation results. A decline in the
FNR was observed from the logit classification to the crossvalidation results.
Managerial efficiency was found significant for distinguishing bank
performance in each of the classifications BANK1, BANK2, and BANK3. In each
case the variable was significant at 1% level. In addition to 0E0I, TLCD was found
significant at 10% level for BANK1 while TP was significant at 1% level for BANK3.
All these models were significant at 1% level. The logit classification results indicate
correct classification of all vulnerable and resistant banks. The resubstitution results
for BANK1 and BANK3 models also reflect correct classification of all banks. The
FPR for BANK2 was also zero for the resubstitution and crossvalidation results just
as it was for BANK1 and BANK2. The FNR for models BANK1 and BANK2
worsened in the crossvalidation results. The BANK3 model is such a perfect model
in that it classified all banks correctly under the logit classification, resubstitution and
crossvalidation results.
The significant variables identified for TP remained the same in 1988 as in
1987 (tables 7.17 and 7.18). Managerial efficiency (DVOI) still continued to be
significant in distinguishing between predominantly public and predominantly private
banks. TTDNB was also significant at 1%. The ROWN model is quite satisfactory
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going by the FPR for the classification results. The HOL model also performed well.
RATA, TLCLL and CSCSD are the significant variables for distinguishing banks by
head-office location.
Again, the managerial efficiency variable OEOI was found significant in 1989
for the BANK1, BANK2 and BANK3 classification variables as we can observe from
table 7.19. In addition to this variable, we have TCTA (capital adequacy) also
significant at 1% level for BANK1, OETA significant for BANK2 at 5% level. The
prob-value for the Score statistic was lower for BANK3 than for BANK2 which was
also lower than that of BANK3. The logit classification results indicated that all the
models are able to correctly classify all the banks. The model for BANK2 remained
impressive going by the zero FPR for the resubstitution and crossvalidation results
of the discriminant analysis as can be seen from table 7.20. Under both situations
all banks were correctly classified. This development further indicates the
significance of managerial efficiency according to classification variable BANK2.
The resubstitution results for BANK1 indicated 100% correct classification of
all sample banks. The FPR rose to 20% under the crossvalidation results while the
FNR still remained the same. The BANK3 model was not as impressive and credible
as the others. While the resistant banks were correctly classified under the
resubstitution analysis, the FPR was 33.3%. This is too high. The rate, infact,
increased to 50% under the crossvalidation results.
The ROWN, HOL and TP all had FPR of 0% under the logistic classification,
0%, 8.3% and 41.7% respectively under the resubstitution analysis and 15.4%, 33.3%
and 41.7% respectively under the crossvalidation analysis.
Table 7.21 presents a summary of the significant variables selected by the logit
analysis over the study period. Technical partnership agreement significantly
distinguished bank performance according to the classification variable BANK1
during the pre-SAP period. For BANK2, over this period NITC remained
consistently significant. No such trend was observed for BANK3. Over the SAP
period managerial performance represented by the ratio OEOI was found significant
for distinguishing bank performance according to BANK1 classification. Indeed this
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Table 7.21: Summary of Bank Performance Determinants Selected By the Loclit Analysis
S. No. Variable 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
1 BANK1 TP TP 0E01* OEOI* TCTA*
RATA OETC* TLCD 0E01*
2 BANK2 TP NITC* OETC* 0E01* OEOI*
NITC 0E01* TLCLL* OETA
3 BANK3 OEOI* NITC* TLCLL* TP 0E01*
TTD TP OERA TTD
HOL
4 ROWN OESS OESS* OESS* TTDNB* DVOI*
TTD OENB* DVOI RBUB
TTONB*
5 HOL OEOI* TP TP RATA* RATA*
NITC TLSF MUD TLCLL TTDNB
OITC TLD CSCSD ROWN
RBUB RBUB TLCLL
TLCD LIOI
6 TP NISS* NITC* OEOI* OEOI* ROWN
OESS* HOL HOL OINB
HOL
TDCD
Nate: The asterisked variables were also found significant by the
univariate T-Test
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has been the case since 1986, except in 1989 when the variable OETC was significant.
The same was observed for BANK2. While only managerial performance was found
significant in 1987 for BANK1, it was the only factor for BANK2 in 1988 and 1989.
Between 1988 and 1989 the managerial efficiency factor was significant for BANK3.
A trend is observed also with respect to bank ownership. The variable OESS
has been very significant over the period 1985 and 1987 while DVOI was significant
in 1988 and 1989. These two variables still indicate managerial efficiency. TTDNB
was significant also in 1988 and 1989.
In 1988 and 1989, risk and capital adequacy were identified as significant
factors for distinguishing banks by head-office location. Risk is expressed by RATA
while capital adequacy is expressed by TLCLL. We found that banks with Lagos
head-offices had significantly higher average RATA than those having head office
outside Lagos going by the univariate tests for 1988 and 1989. This was not the case
for TLCLL.
Both managerial efficiency (0E0I) and head-office location (HOL)
differentiate banks with technical partnership agreement from those without. The
univariate tests in tables 6.36 and 6.37 confirm the significance of 0E0I. In fact the
ratio was significantly higher for banks without technical partners indicating they are
less efficient.
The logistic and the discriminant analyses confirmed risk (RATA) as a factor
distinguishing Nigerian commercial banks by location of head-office in 1988 and 1989.
Finally, the ratio OEOI was also selected by both logit and discriminant selection
analysis as being significant for classifying banks according to head-office location.
7.6	 Conclusion
The analysis has served as a follow-up to the univariate analysis reported in
chapter six. While the univariate analysis was able to identify individual factors which
significantly differ for the two categories of banks ( and therefore indicated factors
significant for distinguishing such), the multivariate analyses (both discriminant and
logit) were to identify the combination offactors which determine the performance of
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Nigerian commercial banks. Further to this, the results of similar techniques adopted
in this regard provided for an interesting comparison. The discriminant models'
classification ability were further investigated by subjecting same to logit analysis and
vice-versa.
Overall, we find that given the same enny and staying significance level, 15%,
the discriminant analysis selects more variables than the logit selection analysis. The
number of variables per model is two (2) for the logit models. Also, the discriminant
models with high average squared canonical correlation (ASCC), seem more credible,
based on the smaller false positive rates (FPR) for resubstitution and crossvalidation
results than the logit models. The only discriminant model checked using the logit
analysis was found to be highly credible going by the classification generated through
it using logit analysis.
Both methods of analysis confirm that among all the factors considered,
managerial efficiency is the most prominent for classifying banks by performance
based on the different classification rules. The same factor distinguished banks by
ownership over the study period though in addition to this has been the level of risk.
The predominantly public banks are confirmed to be less efficient compared with
predominantly private banks. Also, vulnerable banks are observed to be significantly
less efficient than resistant banks. The predominantly-public banks also have had a
lower value of DVOI compared with the other category of banks.
Also, in the last two periods of the SAP period, banks with head-office in
Lagos had a higher proportion of risk assets than the other category of banks. Since
the adoption of SAP, our analysis reveals that banks with technical partnership
agreements were more efficient than those without. We should note however, that
61.5% of banks that are predominantly-publicly owned were without technical
partnership agreements.
The discriminant models showed a tendency for a decline in classification
ability as the performance criteria is relaxed; that is, as we move definition from
BANK1 to BANK3. This was, however, not clear with the logit models. And perhaps
to the extent that discriminant models performed creditably well even when subjected
287
to logit analysis while the logit models failed to live up to such similar expectation
when subjected to discriminant analysis, the authenticity of this conclusion seems to
be further enhanced. This is one observation that calls for further research.
Our comparison of logit with discriminant models in the manner in which it
has been carried out can be said to have pointed to one possible method of
determining and selecting a most appropriate model for the classification of banks
by performance by the supervisory authorities. This is not readily observable in the
conclusions in the literature. The discriminant models also performed extremely well
when subjected to reclassification under the logit technique with the FPR declining
considerably in many of the models. The logit models, when subjected to
reclassification under the discriminant analysis technique, recorded FPRs higher than
those under logit analysis. This conclusion is not in line with the claim that the
different techniques are interchangeable in multiple choice regression analysis. It
tends to show that where the response or group variable is a binary choice variable,
the MDA proves to be a better technique. The same conclusion may not hold where
the response variable is multiple in nature.
The results of our analysis also reveals no significant difference between the
classification analysis of models based on the stepwise method compared with those
based on the forward selection method, though as earlier mentioned the later
confirmed our expectations regarding the inclusion of a greater number of variables
into the model; a development which in most cases could be said to have accounted
for the slight improvements in the ASCC associated with the full models. We do
note, however, that this conclusion may not quite hold where a larger independent
sample is adopted in assessing the classification ability of the model except, of course,
in some cases where both selection procedures yielded exactly the same model.
The need for more rigorous analysis of bank performance determinants such
as we have undertaken by the adoption of the multivariate techniques was further
brought to light in our analysis. We found, for example, that while liquidity (via the
ratio of total loans-to-total deposits was identified in combination with some other
factors to be a significant factor distinguishing banks by head-office location, all
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through the SAP era, the univariate analyses which sought to establish individual
significance of factors, did not reveal any significant differences in the liquidity (TLD)
between banks with different head-office locations. Hence, we observe in line with
theoretical expectations that while a factor may be insufficient to capture the
distinguishing charateristics between the groups of banks, it may be found helpful in
combination with other factors. This further reveals the danger in excluding certain
factors from the multivariate analyses simply because they were not found significant
by the univariate analysis.
One notable characteristic of our analysis thus far is that we have, deliberately
though, restricted our analysis to single year periods. This is informed by the fact
that the considerable variations which have been observed within the financial sector
especially over the study horizon, suggest that our analysis would make more meaning
if we could capture these changes in the identification of bank performance factors.
The results thur far have also confirmed this, as some factors identified to be
significant in certain periods were observed to be insignificant in other periods.
We do recognise, however, that the rather small sample size upon which our
analyses has been based poses quite a limitation to the universal applicability of our
findings. Quite often, one way of tackling this limitation is to 'pool' the data by
combining, for example, the data of the sample banks over several time periods.
Based on this, our analyses can then be conducted. This technique has not been
employed in this study, essentially due to our belief that it would tend to implicitly
assume that the banks operated under about the same economic and regulatory
environment over the period and perhaps also due to space constraints. The special
factors which characterise the performance of banks in each of these periods could
then be ignored. Furthermore, although the pooling of cross-sectional and time-
series data increases the information available, and hence the efficiency of the
estimates, several problems may arise (O'Keefe, 1992). 2 As a result, while noting the
2 O'Keefe, J. (1992) Bank Failure Resolutions: Implications for Banking Industry
Structure, Conduct and Performance, FDIC Banking Review, vol. 5, no. 1,
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potentials of basing our analysis on pooled data, we also identify this as a good area
for further research.
Spring/Summer.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
BANK VULNERABILITY AND RESISTANCE IN NIGERIA:
AN APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL BANK
8.1	 Introduction 
In this chapter we critically examine the case of a bank in the Nigerian
banking industry which has come closest to failing. It is believed to be a good
example of a vulnerable bank both as may be perceived by an ordinary observer of
events in the industry as well as by our three definitions. In addition to examining
the financial state of the bank over the period 1980 to 1989, and especially in relation
to the industry (sample) averages (between 1985 and 1989), we also pay close
attention to the responses provided in the questionnaire which the bank completed.
It is expected that the results which have been obtained in both the uni- and
multivariate analyses will be further substantiated through this critical appraisal and
comparison. In particular, the issues of bank ownership, managerial efficiency and
head-office location as they relate to bank performance will be assessed. Next, we
assess the trends in some financial variables of interest recorded by the Bank. This
is followed by a discussion of key features of the survey responses from the Bank as
well as the lessons which can be learnt from the experiences of the Bank both as
revealed in the survey and as can be obtained from other formal and informal
sources.
8.2	 Trends in Relevant Financial Variables for National Bank: 1980 to 1989
The net income for the bank was only N2.71 million in 1980 with an asset base
of N468.49 million. The net income declined by 58.3% by 1981 before increasing to
N4.4 million in 1982 when the asset base was N620.09 million. Between 1983 and
1989, the available information as contained in table 8.1 reveals that net income
before tax fluctuated though with a declining trend. Net income was a mere NO.09
million in 1987, a period in which the total assets had reached N1.04 billion. Going
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by the trend in bank profitability and total assets, it was obvious that the performance
of the bank was declining significantly. Over the period 1981 to 1989, the average
growth of the bank's assets during the pre-SAP period was about 15% which
increased significantly during the SAP period to about 28%. The significant jump
could have been boosted by the increase in inflation rate since the SAP period.
Over the ten year period, the return on assets for this bank was highest at
7.54% recorded in 1980. Indeed since 1984, the return on assets was less than 1%.
The return on capital has been very high over the period. This, however, can only
be truly assessed in the light of the adequacy of the bank's capital. The equity capital
was N3.92 million in 1980, when the total assets was N465.49 million and the loan
portfolio was N192.77 million. However, as in Table 8.2, average asset growth was
about 15% between 1981 and 1986, while that of the loan portfolio was at least 10%.
The growth in equity capital averaged 13% between 1981 and 1983 and barely
changed between 1984 and 1988. The equity capital declined between 1988 and 1989
by 92.05%.
Relative to the industry average, the profitability ratios of the Bank were
ridiculously low. The return on assets was just 0.47% in 1985, when the same
averaged 1.96% for the sample of banks. This position hardly improved through the
five-year period (1985 to 1989) in contrast with the industry trend. While the return
on assets was 4.54%, on the average, for sample banks, it was for National Bank only
0.97%. Given this trend, it is obvious why the Bank was classified vulnerable over all
the periods as was shown in Table 6.7.
The return on equity of the Bank, relative to the sample average was equally
poor. Between 1985 and 1988, the Bank's return on equity was in the range of 14%
to 22%. It jumped significantly between 1988 and 1989 due essentially to a 92.05%
decline in its capital (Table 8.2). The average return on equity for the sample banks
between 1985 and 1986 was about 60%, increasing to 81% between 1987 and 1988.
For 1989, it was 133.79% (see Tables 6.1 - 6.5).
Quite obviously the bank was grossly under-capitalized. The credit exposure
of the bank was in excess of 1000% of the equity capital over the 10 year period. In
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fact, this grew to as high as 46383.2% in 1989. Between 1985 and 1989, the ratio
grew from 2332.58% to 46383.2%. The sample average on the other hand grew
steadily from 1329.2% in 1985 to 1946.34% in 1987 and again to 2876.3% in 1989.
At all times the Bank's position was considerably poor when compared with the
industry. Also going by the capital-asset ratio one also confirms that the bank had
since 1980 been under-capitalized relative to the industry. This ratio has been largely
under 3% over the 10-year period, having declined consistently from 2.4% to 0.1%
over the last five years. Indeed, it fell during the SAP period compared with the pre-
SAP period, showing only 0.1% in 1989. The industry average pre-SAP of 4.94%
declined slightly to 4.86% over the SAP period (Table 6.6).
Sinkey and Walker (1977) defined an interesting capital adequacy ratio which
was found in their study to be a significant determinant of bank performance. This
is the ratio of total loans to the addition of equity capital and loan loss provision
(TLCLL). For National Bank this ratio has been over 280% between 1980 and 1981,
averaged 546% between 1982 and 1988 and was 365.72% in 1989. This trend is in
line with the industry trend. The ratio averaged 582.75% in 1985 and increased to
698.96% in 1987 before declining steadily to 389.92% in 1989. The loan loss
provision made by the bank in respect of a loan portfolio of N192.77 million in 1980
was N52.42 million, indicating a 27.2% provision. This reveals the quality of the
assets of this bank as at 1980. The provision far exceeds what was the industry
average at the time. Though the loan portfolio increased, the loan loss provision also
increased at a slower pace. Consequently, the loan loss proportion (LLTL) declined
consistenly to 12.5% in 1982, averaged 14% between 1983 and 1988 before jumping
significantly to 27.13% in 1989. For the industry, this ratio was 8.84% in 1985, rising
to 9.91% in 1987 after declining slightly in 1986. Since this period, it grew steadily
reaching as high as 16.96% in 1989. The decline in the loan loss provision between
1980 and 1988 should not be seen as an indication of an improvement in the quality
of assets. We found indeed, over this period, an increase in the Bank's risk assets as
a proportion of total assets. This rose from 25.33% in 1980 to 87.67% in 1986.
Interestingly, the provision against non-performing assets was greater as a proportion
297
in 1980 when the proportion of risk assets was lower. Since 1987 the risk assets
proportion has been on the decline reaching 71.36% by 1989, perhaps in a conscious
attempt to improve the bank's poor liquidity position. The industry averages were
69.27% and 61.71% over both the pre-SAP and SAP periods.
In this regard we find from Table 8.3 that cash and short-term funds as a
proportion of total assets (CSTA) increased consistently from 12.33% in 1986 when
the liquidity position was lowest, to 28.64% in 1989. Over the same period the
industry ratio increased from 32.93% to about 41%. It is interesting to observe that
as a proportion of total assets, government securities holding of the Bank has really
been on the decline since 1980 and moreso since 1987. Infact, it was only 0.95% in
1989. The development since 1987 is largely a result of the unattractive return on
government securities. This seems in line with industry trend as the ratio averaged
14.76% and 9.32% respectively over the SAP and pre-SAP periods.
Also, measured by the loan-to-deposit ratio the bank could be seen to have
grown increasingly less liquid between 1980 and 1987. The ratio increased from
50.43% to 78.97% over the period. The degree of liquidity for the Bank has been
quite low in particular as from 1982. Both the loan-to-deposit (TLD) and risk assets
ratio had been over 70%. From Tables 6.8 to 6.21 we find that the average loan-to-
deposit ratio for resistant banks based on the three different classifications for the
period 1987 and 1989 was about 50% while the overall sample average was 53.43%.
For National Bank the ratio averaged 74% between 1987 and 1988 before improving
to 54.39% in 1989. This development is known to be a result of an attempt by the
bank's new management in 1989 to improve the liquidity of the bank. The bank had
been expelled from the clearing house in 1989, due to the poor state of its liquidity.
With respect to managerial efficiency, National Bank, from the ratio of
operating expenses to operating income, 0E0I, is grossly inefficient. Between 1981
and 1989 the ratio had been as low as 80.3% and as high as 97.5%. This ratio has
averaged about 55-60% for resistant banks according to the various performance
classifications. On the other hand, the industry average was 73.45% over the SAP
period. The same conclusion is reached when the Bank's ratio of operating expenses
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to total assets is examined relative to the industry average. Since 1983, the Bank's
ratio has rarely been lower than 9.14%, reaching 10.11% in 1987 only to decline
consistently over the next two years to 9.73% in 1989. The industry average for the
ratio was 6.61% and 9.49% over the pre-SAP and SAP periods respectively. More
specifically, the industry average was 6.56% in 1985 and it has increased steadily
reaching 12.61% in 1989. National Bank's performance in this regard exceeded the
industry average only in 1989. It would be observed that such improvements as this
only began to show as steps were being taken to rescue it from problems.
The bank's cost structure does not portray it as a high cost bank. We observe
that the bank had on the average about 40 kobo of time deposit for every Ni of
current deposit between 1980 and 1983. This averaged about 78 kobo between 1984
and 1988 before it again declined to almost 54 kobo in 1989. At this time current
deposit were free funds. The situation has changed since 1990 with the monetary
authorities' directive that banks pay interest on this category of deposits. Again, a
look at the industry average revealed that the deposit composition of National Bank
was low cost in nature. Over the pre-SAP and SAP periods, the industry average was
N1.26 kobo and N1.38 kobo of time deposit for every Ni of current deposit. Over
the 10-year period, time deposit (high cost funds) as a proportion of total deposits
was at most 34.8% while the same was about 37% for the industry between 1985 and
1989. The substantial advantage of the Bank as revealed by the current deposit bias
compared to the industry performance seemed to have been more than offset by the
other components of deposits - savings & other; given the similarity in the ratio of
time deposits to total bank deposits over the first five years. The unimpressive
performance of National Bank does not seem to have been positively associated with
the bank's cost structure. The major problem has been with the low quality of the
bank's assets, managerial inefficiency, illiquidity and the low and seemingly
unreasonable level of provision for loan losses. We also find that the level of risk in
the asset portfolio was unduly high. A comparison with industry average under all
performance criteria clearly reveals that the Bank performed well below average.
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83	 Some Lessons from the Survey Responses and Experiences of National Bank
National Bank represents the first surviving indigenous bank, having been set
up in 1933. The bank, with head-office in Lagos, is owned by the governments of
Oyo, Ogun and Ondo states, and only recently, Osun state. Indeed, they own 99.8%
of the bank. This has been the case since 1980 and prior to this time. The bank has
never engaged technical partners since it was established.'
Due to the liquidity crisis that had rocked the bank since 1988, the board of
the bank was dissolved by the owner governments. The owners engaged a firm of
management consultants to take over its management and terminated the
appointment of a number of top management staff. Prior to this time, the
government, by virtue of its ownership of the bank, had changed the board and
management of the bank at will, and also rather frequently. The study questionnaire
for this case bank was apparently completed by a management which was essentially
external to the bank. The responses in the questionnaire, being very comprehensive,
indicate quite positively, the factors observed to have brought trouble for the bank.
The response to the questionnaire indicated that capital adequacy, asset
quality, managerial performance, loan portfolio, liquidity, revenue sources, revenue
application, ownership and number and distribution of branches were major
determinants of bank performance. It is necessary, as one discusses the responses
made by this bank, to bear in mind that they are really based on the findings of the
interim management and to address them as such.
The survey response from the bank not only indicated that the ownership of
the bank is a major determinant of bank performance, among the identified factors,
it indicates that the ownership factor is the most significant. Managerial performance
is seen to be second to the ownership factor in the significance of the factors
followed by liquidity. We had identified in section 8.2 that the managerial
1 It is worthy of note, however, that arising from the owners' perception of the
state of the Bank, Messrs Akintola Williams & Co. (Chartered Accountants)
were engaged as technical managers of the Bank. This was however at the
early stages of its crises, about 1989.
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performance of the bank was very poor while the level of liquidity had been quite low
absolutely, and in comparison with the industry average. Managerial performance
really is related to ownership as the National Bank situation exemplifies.
In the response, it was not clearly stated whether the cash ratio, liquidity ratio,
and capital adequacy ratio, if consistently violated, would eventually lead to bank
failure or at least dismal performance. In response to the extent of adherence to
some of these CBN guidelines, we find that National Bank violated the credit
expansion ceiling consistently between 1985 and 1988, after having done so way back
in 1981. The indigenous credit allocation stipulation has been adhered to. This CBN
policy states the minimum proportion of aggregate bank credit that should go to
indigenous borrowers. The Bank was set up in 1933 to provide credit to indigenous
businesses when it was observed that the foreign owned banks which existed prior to
the time were clearly biased towards foreign businesses in the administration of
credit. The Bank has since stuck to this positive objective.
The adverse aspect of their commitment to this goal is the fact that the Bank
is widely known to have been unmindful of the ability or willingness of the indigenous
borrowers to repay the loans. Its credit decisions had been motivated more by
factors other than economic. There have been reports that the Bank's managers
refuse or accept to grant facilities depending on what private benefits would accrue
to them prior to disbursement of such facilities rather than on the economic viability
of the project. The quality of the bank's assets has thus been very poor, yet
successive managements failed to tackle the problem and continued to make
inadequate provisions for bad and doubtful debts. This is known to have been the
case with the Bank's adherence to small scale credit and rural credit policy
stipulations respectively, of the CBN. The small scale credit policy stipulates that a
bank must allocate a minimum proportion of indigenous credit to small scale business
while the rural credit policy stipulates that banks should apply a minimum proportion
of rural deposits mobilized to the same rural areas as credit. The bank had also
performed creditably in this area. It is known also that many banks have violated
these policy stipulations due to the high rate of default associated with small-scale
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and rural (mostly agricultural) credit. Adherence to these credit stipulations has the
potential effect of lowering the quality of assets of a typical Nigerian commercial
bank.
Between 1980 and 1985, National Bank just barely satisfied the monetary
authorities' liquidity ratio requirement. Since 1986 the bank consistently violated the
stipulated liquidity ratio. The trend with regard to the bank's attempt to adhere to
the liquidity ratio reveals the difficulty it has been having as far back as 1980.
One observation from the assessment of the bank's adherence to CBN
stipulations is that adherence to the credit guidelines could weaken the asset quality
of the bank if not handled with care, while non-adherence to the liquidity ratio could
lead to financial crisis. These two factors were largely the case for National Bank.
It is in this light that the bank's response indicated that liquidity and capital adequacy
ratios are CBN's guidelines that are beneficial to commerical bank performance.
The survey responses with respect to the factors believed to be most important
in signalling possible bank failure (and increasing the chances of dismal performance)
was also found to be quite interesting. It is believed that the most evident signal of
impending bank failure is shortage of cash and short-term funds (liquidity) to meet
customer's regular demands. The management's response indicated that this situation
can be corrected and indeed prevented by improved managerial efficiency. Efficient
management of resources and loans by ensuring regular matching of loans tenor with
that of deposit liabilities are important, while good asset quality and adequate capital,
on which the bank can fall in case of need to raise necessary funds, are also essential.
The bank, from our analysis in section 8.2 was shown to have had problems in these
various areas.
Explaining the circumstances under which it is believed that a bank could fail,
the questionnaire response emphasized the board and management factor. It
identifies that a bank could fail if there is improper discharge of its normal day to day
running of the bank, as well as if and when there is lack of integrity within the
composition of either the board or top management team. Other factors indicated
include: disregard for banking guidelines, bad fund management, violation of banking
1
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regulations, lack of integrity on the part of the key bank personnel, low number and
quality of professional staff and general staff indiscipline. It is widely believed that
this has been the situation at National Bank for quite sometime.
Of all the problems or factors that led to the fall of National Bank, that
relating to the frequency of change and compositon of management and the board
remains the most prominent factor. In fact, it seems to have led to the other
problems. The fact is that since inception it has been government owned, the board
and consequently the management, has changed with the same frequency at which
the government changed. On one hand, whenever any of the Governors of the four
owner states changed, that would almost certainly lead to a dissolution of the bank's
board! Each governor or government would want to put a new representative on
the board. On the other hand when the state commissioners are changed even by the
same state government, the board changes since all the finance commissioners of the
three states automatically become members of the board with one serving as
chairman. The frequency of change hampered policy continuity a great deal. Usually
the new board members would come on stream with different motives altogether.
Only very few, if indeed any, of the members had the progress of the bank at heart.
In line with this view is the addendum on board of directors provided to the
questionnaire. It is believed that this addendum was felt necessary by the new
management simply to re-emphasize the board problem as being an overridding
problem. It is stated in this addendum that there must be a reflection of self-esteem and
reasonable contentment with what (material and financial resources) the generality of the
board members already have, to ensure that, by and large, they would be there (on the
board) to serve the bank and not for the financial benefits rendered, or to take advantage
of the fringe benefits and other priviledges, offered or solicited, which may be associated
with the position. Additionally, it has been indicated that the board composition
hardly reflected a good mix of diverse and practical background of members in
2 The position of the Managing Director was politicised and made almost
rotational among the owner states.
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finance, economics, law, business management experience as well as banking. Also
the board of such banks usually have been known to have an overbearing influence
on the management. There are in fact cases in which the managing director of the
bank could be directly removed by the state government. Such acts have the
potential of promoting managerial inefficiency as efforts will be made by managers
to acquire as much financial benefits as they possibly can since they could be
removed, particularly from key positions, at any time.
Consistent with this orientation is a widely acknowledged report that loan
officers and branch managers of the bank took a percentage of the credit facilities
provided to customers. Whoever was not going to play along seemingly was not in
need of credit. This practice purportedly led to a situation in the bank in which staff
competed vigorously to be at the branch. Also, there are reports of loan applications
which were not credible that were approved with managers exceeding their credit
limits with impunity. The level of indiscipline among the staff was high. When the
asset base grew, the level of risk assets also grew considerably thus lowering its
liquidity as the quality of the assets also declined. It was not surprising that the bank
could not embark upon effective debt recovery due to the fact that borrowers
requested the branch managers to first pay back the percentage they had earlier
collected having been (indirect) beneficiaries of the same credit facilities.
The Bank's response indicated that there was enough time for the situation
to be corrected rather than for it to be allowed to degenerate to the point of total
failure, if owner governments had taken appropriate remedial action. The unfortunate
development was also blamed on the inability of the monetary authorities to correctly
diagnose the crucial problems in good time. In this case it is believed that the CBN
could have directed and supervised the control and management of the bank to
ensure good results. The failure of the CBN to take control could perhaps be
explained by the fact that the bank had and still has considerable government
influence on both its board and management. From our analysis, the bank's position
in 1980 was not impressive and one would have expected that something would have
been done about it particularly knowing that the bank had such comprehensive and
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revealing quantitative information as it provided.' The situation deteriorated to such
an extent that in 1987 its net income was a mere N90,000 with an asset base of
N656.39 million. Other banks with similar asset portfolio made profit in the tens of
millions about the same period.
The problem of the board and management is not only limited to National
Bank. In Nigeria, the trend is similar among all the wholly state government owned
banks. Recently, similar situations have been experienced in other state owned
banks. There have been incessant clashes between the board and management of
these banks. In recent times these have become worse as both strived to have control
over the allocation of foreign exchange which had become very profitable both for
the banks and individuals. These clashes are affecting many of these Banks. The
same problem is already rearing its ugly head among privately-owned newly licensed
banks. Quite a number of these banks are owned by a small group of individuals who
being members of the board seek almost total control over the banks' management.
Many managing directors have been made more of figure heads with little or no
managment discretionary power while some non-executive chairmen have suddenly
assumed executive responsibilities. A number of cases are pending in the courts
presently on bank ownership, board composition and between the board and
management of some banks. Above all other factors that could threaten the
corporate existence of a bank in the future in Nigeria, with the influx of new banks,
the appointment, composition and stability of the board and its relationship with the
management are rated the highest. A case was reported recently which degenerated
into physical assault between a board chairman and his managing director/chief
executive leading to hospitalisation of the latter!
3 It is necessary to state in this regard that the degree of comprehensiveness was
achieved as a result of the author's personal relationship with the head of the
technical management team which provided the information coupled with his
interest in the focus and outcome of this study.
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8.4	 Conclusion
We have examined aspects of the financials of National Bank which is a
Nigerian commercial bank on the brink of collapse. The trend in the financials,
respectively, going by the ratios, revealed among others, the poor financial state that
the Bank has been in since the early '80s. In comparison with industry averages
(assumed to be the average of sample banks), the Bank's performance has been
consistently below average. It has been shown to be considerably less profitable, less
liquid, managerially inefficient as well as possessing a low quality of assets. The low
profitability coupled with the lack of managerial intuition and direction as well as the
sheer magnitude and low quality of its assets has left it highly under-capitalised in the
80s. The quality of assets has been accounted for by the conflict of corporate
objectives with individual objectives and the seemingly over-zealous attitude towards
providing credit for domestic clients and businesses, and even to state government
socially-oriented projects under the auspices of its owner states.
Our discussion has also revealed the critical nature of board and management
to the performance of a commercial bank. The peculiarities of the typical developing
economy in which political, social and individual persuasions override economic
considerations in board and management composition as well as in the evaluation of
credit have been emphasized. This fact would seem to hold irrespective of the type
of government, civilian or military.
In model reclassifications, especially with the logit models which were further
assessed under the resubstitution and crossvalidation analysis associated with
discriminant analysis, the Bank was consistently correctly classified as a vulnerable
Bank. The same was the case with discriminant model classifications. We also recall
in this regard that this model performed extremely well when assessed under the logit
resubstitution analysis. In essence, the models captured the essential determining
factors which, as our discusssions have revealed, are peculiar also to National Bank.
In all, the National Bank case further confirms that in a typical developing
economy, managerial efficiency, liquidity, capital adequacy, ownership structure, and
asset quality are the most significant determinants of commercial bank performance.
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CHAPTER NINE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 Summary
This study has attempted to identify significant factors, both financial and
otherwise, that determine the performance of commercial banks in a typical
developing economy. In particular, we have used Nigeria as our case study.
The study concentrated on the commercial banks that existed as at 1985 just
prior to the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). A sample of
twenty-four (24) Nigerian commercial banks was used while the questionnaire
approach was adopted to collect the relevant quantitative information in addition to
other qualitative information that bordered, among others, on the factors that banks
believed to be the most significant determinants of bank performance and their
perceived relationship with bank performance. We also sought respondents' views on
whether or not the CBN should help protect banks and prevent bank failures, on the
policies of CBN that are believed to be beneficial to and those detrimental to bank
performance as well as on whether or not the financial deregulation which has
brought about a significant increase of new entrants into the banking industry would
result in bank failure,
Based on the quantitative information obtained, a list of ratios were compiled
and computed for assessing the trends in the financial position of the banks relative
to the industry performance. Also, this was used to evolve a definition or criterion
for classifying banks into the Vulnerable and Resistant performance categories
respectively.
For robustness in the analysis and greater insight into bank performance
determinants in Nigeria, three different criteria were used for each period of the
analysis. First, we defined as Resistant banks only those whose return on assets
exceeded the median return on assets for all the banks. The second, stipulated as the
resistant banks those with return on assets in excess of 80% of median return on
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assets while the proportion used in defining the third criterion was 50%. The second
definition tallies with that of Hunter and Srinivasan (1990).
A univariate test was carried out for each of the different performance
classifications and involving all the thirty seven (37) financial ratios designed as a first
stage analysis to identify which factor or group of factors were significant in
distinguishing between the classes of banks. The significance tests were conducted
at 5%, 10% and 15% levels.
Following this, both the logit and the discriminant techniques respectively were
employed as a form of secondary and confirmatory analysis to consider and assess the
adequacy models for discriminating or distinguishing vulnerable and resistant banks
according to each of the three classifications. The validity or better still the
classification ability of these models were checked and cross-checked using the
classification option of the logit analysis as well as both the resubstitution and
crossvalidation options available for assessing the performance of discriminant models
(Lachenbruch and Mickey, 1968). The discriminant models were tried out using logit
analysis while the logit models were also validated using discriminant analysis.
Finally, we undertook a case analysis of National Bank which is widely
acknowledged within the industry as perhaps the most vulnerable of all banks in
Nigeria today. This was undertaken with a view to assessing and perhaps confirming
the significance of the factors earlier selected by the regression analyses approach and
perhaps also to confirm the existence of other non-financial factors which significantly
affect bank performance such as ownership, board and management composition.
The univariate analyses as well as both the logit and discriminant analyses
respectively were conducted to identify factors that distinguish banks by ownership,
head-office location and existence or non-existence of technical partnership
agreements. The analyses was conducted to identify the major characteristics
distinguishing between the categories of banks and also to confirm or refute such
claims as that made recently by the management of one of the sample banks, which
suggested that the performance (profitability) of banks with head-office in Lagos was
better than those based outside Lagos.
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The conclusions of our various analyses are highlighted in the section that
follows. In addition, we deemed it necessary to make some recommendations
emanating from the study's conclusions and the study's limitations. Finally, some
suggestions for further studies are made.
9.2	 Conclusions
The conclusions that can be drawn based on the results obtained in this study
are stated in what follows:
1. The study results revealed that, of the twelve (12) groups of factors listed five
were deemed by the majority of respondent banks to be the major factors
determining banks' performance in Nigeria. These factors include capital adequacy,
asset quality, managerial efficiency, loan portfolio and liquidity. All these factors
except capital adequacy were also indicated by the majority to be positively correlated
with bank performance. This implies for example that an improvement in asset
quality has the effect of improving bank performance in Nigeria.
2. The industry ranking of these factors in terms of their importance, as obtained
from the responses, put managerial efficiency as the most important followed by asset
quality, liquidity and capital adequacy. It is noteworthy that the same ultimate
conclusion was reached in the studies conducted by the Comptroller of the Currency
in the United States (Clarke, 1988).1
The significance of liquidity and capital adequacy to bank performance was
also confirmed from the indication that the consistent violation by banks, of the cash,
liquidity and capital adequacy ratios prescribed by the monetary authorities, could
promote dismal bank performance. These policy stipulations were also largely
accepted as beneficial for bank performance in Nigeria. Among the policies believed
1 See Clarke, R.L. (1988) "Banking in Troubled Times: What Hurts? What
Helps?" Paper presented by the Comptroller of the Currency at ABA's Stonier
Graduate School of Banking, June 20.
311
by the majority of operating banks to be detrimental to bank performance include:
(i) the liquidity mop-up operation, (ii) the aggregate credit ceiling, (iii) the rural
banking policy and (iv) the sectoral credit allocation policy.
3. The response of the banks with regard to the possibility of bank failures as a
consequence of the influx of new banks was not conclusive. The major points
indicated among others include the fact that:
(a) the industry still has room for more banks as some respondents
believed there are unexploited opportunities and unsatisfied demand;
(b) the influx will improve efficiency in service delivery which may not
necessarily lead to failure; and
(c) rather than explicit failures, what may result could be mergers or
acquisitions.
Those who indicated these as possibilities used the overriding argument that only a
phased programme for licensing new banks which will ensure adequate supervision
and monitoring as well as allow for consolidation of the banks' positions can help
reduce the risk of failure. This view is supported and infact further amplified by
Snoek (1988) in a discussion of the problems of bank supervision in developing
countries, especially those implementing financial reform programs such as in
Nigeria.' A need to reduce or do something about the incessant clashes between the
board and management of banks, if failure is to be forestalled, was also emphasized
in the survey results.
4. The discriminant analysis indicated that during the pre-SAP period the
existence or non-existence of technical partnership agreements in banks was
significant in determining the banks' performance.
According to the first criterion, managerial efficiency was found significant all
' Snoek, H. (1988) "Problems of Bank Supervision in Developing Countries"
Paper presented at the IMF Central Banking Seminar, November.
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through the study period, 1985 to 1989; risk was found to be significant in addition
between 1987 and 1989; liquidity was significant along with capital adequacy between
1988 and 1989. Both managerial efficiency and capital adequacy were also found
significant over the SAP period based on both the second and third performance
classification criteria. The significance of risk during the era of deregulation was also
concluded in the study of Pantallone and Platt (1987), whose analysis was based on
the logit technique.
In essence, managerial efficiency ranked prominent among the factors and
over the criteria, in addition to capital adequacy and risk. The ratio of operating
expenses to operating income (0E0I) was the most prominent among managerial
efficiency ratios used. This finding agrees with the conclusions of Meyer and Pifer
(1970), Sinkey (1975) and Pettway and Sinkey (1980). Meyer and Pifer's study was
based on U.S. commercial banks and multiple regression analysis. Sinkey focused on
110 samples each of problem and control (non-problem) U.S. commercial banks. He
applied both univariate and multivariate discriminant analysis to the period between
1969 and 1972. Both techniques of analysis found the ratio of operating expenses to
operating income (and indeed, managerial efficiency) as a significant performance
determinant. Pettway and Sinkey's (1980) two-variable MDA classification model
applied to 33 failed U.S. banks and 33 control banks also exhibited the significance
of the ratio of operating expenses to operating income. Stuhr and van Wicklen
(1974) found as the most important of three managerial efficiency variables, the ratio
of net operating income to assets. Pantallone and Platt is a notable study which does
not acknowledge the significance of managerial efficiency as a determinant of
commercial bank performance. It is important to note that the study did not include
among its managerial efficiency ratios, 0E0I, a ratio which is very widely accepted
and used for assessing managerial efficiency. Their ratios were relatively unpopular.
We have used a more comprehensive set of ratios (37) incorporating a number of
popular ratios from the literature in addition to our own inclusions, some of which
are aimed at capturing the peculiarities of developing economies. Additionally, a
more comprehensive set of tools have been used to establish the significance of these
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variables. Extensive reclassification aimed at assessing the adequacy of the models
and by implication, the individual ratios and combinations of the same have been
conducted.
Capital adequacy is supported by Sinkey (1975) and Hunter and Srinivasan
(1990). Of particular note is a similar conclusion made by Pantallone and Platt (1987)
in a post deregulation study. The specific capital ratio commonly identified is the
capital-asset ratio.
5. The discriminant analysis also indicated that managerial efficiency, bank size
and asset quality were the most prominent combination of factors that distinguished
predominantly public banks from predominantly private banks. Specifically, the
univariate analyses indicated that the public banks which had lower quality of assets
also were less efficient.
During the SAP period, the analysis selected liquidity and risk factors as best
characteristics that distinguished banks with different head-office locations.
Specifically also, banks with head-office outside Lagos were less liquid and had higher
proportion of risk assets than banks with their head-office in Lagos. Perhaps as a
result of the greater opportunities available in the capital city, banks carried above
normal risks.
Profitability, bank size, managerial efficiency and risk were major characteristic
factors that distinguished banks with technical partners from those without. Those
with technical partners were observed to be significantly more profitable than those
without. Our conclusions in this regard can hardly be compared with those of other
studies. They are peculiar to the Nigerian banking system as an example of a
developing country banking system.
6. The logit analysis generally selected fewer number of variables at the same
significant entry level than the discriminant analysis. Based on the first classification
criterion the logit analysis selected both the technical partnership and managerial
efficiency factors as being the most significant for distinguishing between bank
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performance. While the technical partnership factor was significant during the pre-
SAP period, managerial efficiency has been significant both in the pre-SAP and SAP
periods. Managerial efficiency remained the significant factor according to both the
second and third classification criteria over the entire study period. While this
conclusion, is in line with the popular conclusion of many similar studies, it differs
from that of a similar study (Pantallone and Platt, 1987) which also adopted logit
analysis. In the study, profitability (net income to total assets), capital adequacy
(capital/assets), loan volume (commercial and industrial loans to total loans) and risk
(loans/assets) were identified as significant factors.
7. Logit analysis revealed that only managerial efficiency distinguished between
predominantly public banks and predominantly private banks. Risk and capital
adequacy were significant factors, going by the results of the logit analysis, for
distinguishing between banks with head-office located in Lagos and those without
over the period 1988 and 1989. Over the SAP period, managerial efficiency made
the difference between banks with technical partners and those without.
8. Both the discriminant and logit analyses results confirm managerial efficiency
as the overriding factor that distinguished vulnerable from resistant banks irrespective
of the performance classification criterion adopted. Going by the first criterion,
capital adequacy was also confirmed significant in 1989. It is noteworthy that at this
time the adequacy of banks' capital had begun to attract significantly the attention
of monetary authorities.
The different types of analyses agree on the significance of managerial
efficiency in distinguishing banks by ownership and existence or non-existence of
technical partnership agreement while risk level made the difference between banks
with Lagos head-office and the other banks.
9. Based on the re-classification results of the logit analysis and both the
resubstitution and crossvalidation results of the discriminant analysis, we observed
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that the discriminant models had in most cases higher classification ability as reflected
by the false positive rates (FPR) associated with the various models. These models
on the average, had over 85% correct classification ability. This implies the
misclassification rates were averagely less than 15%. Sinkey (1975), a notable study
which also attempted reclassification of sample banks using reclassification and
resubstitution (Lachenbruch classification), recorded misclassification rates which
averaged 25% (reclassification) and 32% (resubstitution). Hunter and Srinivasan's
Probit model of newly chartered commercial banks in the U.S. exhibited correct
classification percentages ranging between 72% and 88% over the 8-year period 1981
to 1988. Pantallone and Platt's (1987) logit model of U.S. commercial banks also
exhibited between 73.5% and 83.1% correct classification rates. The model's
predictive capability improved as the period of a bank's failure got closer. Our
model's impressive predictive capability may have been accounted for by the relatively
small sample size. Pantallone and Platt, and Sinkey had 339 and 220 sample
commercial banks while Hunter and Srinivasan had 169 commercial banks.
These models also performed very well when subjected to logit analysis and
classification. On the other hand the logit models performed less creditably when
subjected to discriminant analysis as they exhibited lower FPRs. We are thus inclined
to prefer the discriminant models to the logit models for their observed performance
in the comparison conducted. The models obtained in respect of ownership, head-
office location and technical partnership were less impressive in their reclassification
ability.
10. Comparing the results for the pre-SAP and SAP periods, there is reason to
believe that only managerial efficiency was significant in distinguishing banks by
performance pre-SAP and while it continued during the SAP period, some other
factors also began to be significant and these included the degree of risk, liquidity
and capital adequacy. The univariate analysis tends to confirm that over the SAP
period the level of risk reduced for resistant banks while liquidity improved along
with their capital base position. Pantallone and Platt's study, covering an era of
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deregulation, did not find managerial efficiency to be a significant determinant of
commercial bank performance. They however found capital adequacy (i.e. capital-
assets ratio) significant. Hunter and Srinivasan who did not include managerial
efficiency in their probit analysis, also acknowledged the significance of the capital-
asset ratio in an era of financial liberalisation and deregulation.
11. It is noteworthy that though the insignificance of capital adequacy over the
greater part of the study period may be contrary to expectations of practitioners and
bank supervisors, the development seemed consistent with the state of the banking
industry at this time. This development, more specifically, could be a reflection of
the grossly under-capitalized nature of all operating banks at the time. This issue had
only begun to receive attention in the new banking dispensation. The fact that
Nigerian banks have declared huge profits pre-SAP inspite of the state of the capital
base of the banks may well explain this development.
12. Our appraisal of the National Bank situation revealed that managerial
inefficiency is positively and significantly associated with bank vulnerability and dismal
performance. The issue of ownerhsip, board composition and management as they
relate to managerial inefficiency and consequently dismal bank performance was
brought to light. The conclusion is that wholly government owned banks tend to
experience frequent changes in the composition of their board, which, invariably,
were politically motivated. As a result the aims of the board members are usually at
variance with the profitability objective of the bank, in addition to the fact that the
education and professional background of many board members make them
unqualified for appointment as directors of banks. The political aims of the board,
and the small probability of remaining in key positions in the bank as well as the
apparent divergence in the aims of board and management which are also observed
by the general staff members inadvertently lead to staff indicipline, lack of
commitment, increase in fraudulent practices, the eventual result of which will be
dismal performance or even the collapse of the bank. If such were to be allowed to
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continue for sometime as in the case of National Bank, the bank will eventually
become vulnerable to financial difficulty. This trend is common among government
owned banks, only that the extent varies. This situation needs to be corrected with
urgency. It is hoped that the National Bank case will serve as a good case in point
and an example to banks in similar situation.
9.3	 Some Policy Recommendations
We find it necessary to make a few key recommendations in the light of the
findings and conclusions of this study.
Firstly, the monetary and supervisory authorities, in particular the Central
Bank, should undertake, from time to time, an assessment of both its capacity and
capability to effectively supervise and monitor the adherence of banks to banking
regulations. This recommendation is a fall-out of the expectation of the majority of
the respondent banks that CBN should help to protect banks and prevent them from
failing. To do this effectively, granted that the argument is acceptable, requires that
the CBN be capable. This is more critical in the light of the sudden expansion of the
banking sector in recent times. With an increase in the number of banks of over 300
per cent in the SAP-period as well as an increase in the spate of regulations and
guidelines being issued to banks, the need to monitor operating banks is not only
imperative but also poses a special challenge to the monetary authorities. It also
needs to convince the operating banks of its ability to effectively perform the
watchdog role.
Secondly, further to the above suggestion, it will be necessary for the
supervisory authorities or arms of the monetary authorities to adopt more scientific
methods in their examination function. There are reports of such
regulatory/supervisory institutions in the developed countries which not only
contributed to the research on early warning and bank performance models but have
also adopted them in carrying out their supervisory functions. In line with Pettway
and Sinkey (1980) such models when applied can be used to set on-site examination
priorities for the supervisory authorities. These approaches can help achieve
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efficiency in the allocation of supervisory resources devoted to preserving and
encouraging a sound and competitive banking system. A similar view is shared by
Korobow and Stuhr (1975).
Managerial efficiency is one factor that has been established in this study as
a significant factor for commercial bank performance in Nigeria over both the pre-
SAP and SAP periods. It will therefore not be out of place to maintain that this
factor is likely to remain a major determinant of bank performance in the near
future. This is also in line with the key role that both the management as well as the
board of directors have to play in ensuring sound bank performance. The chances
of the positive effects that the overall bank management will have on bank
performance will remain low for as long as the composition of the board and the
management of banks is not overseen to some extent by the CBN. The CBN should
put in place a process or framework that will ensure that the integrity and capability
of banks' boards are unquestionable. It should also educate the banks on the
relationship between the management and the board as well as their respective roles
in the overall management of a bank. A situation in which there is almost always an
impasse between the two groups of management that has to be settled in court
threatens the industry a great deal.
We should mention also that the restrictions relating to the composition of
banks' board be applied also to the wholly government owned banks. The dismal
performance exhibited by this class of banks is largely traceable to the composition
and frequency of changes of their boards. Being in most cases large banks, their
collapse will have significant disruptive effects on the industry as well as the economy
as a whole. It should then be suggested that perhaps it would be better if government
divests itself considerably from the banking industry. This suggestion is further
butressed by the fact that almost all banks which are non-performing are either
wholly or predominantly-owned by federal or state governments. In line with the
general policy of economic deregulation, a reduction of the presence of government
in banking operations is very desirable as it could bring about improved efficiency in
the sector. This suggestion is without prejudice to the fact that government may have
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developmental objectives. Such has the adverse effect of constraining bank
performance at least in the short-run. Experience in Nigeria has, however, shown that
the objectives of government involvement are not quite developmental, even if they
had been intended ab initio. The rate at which federal and state governments had
changed hands which has invariably led to similar frequent changes in the boards and
management of these goverment owned banks as well as the factors which have
motivated these changes seem to indicate that such develomental objectives would
have become of secondary importance in preference for other non-developmental and
perhaps other political and personal objectives. On the other hand, even if there were
well articulated developmental objectives for government's presence in banking, the
rate at which the board composition changes, thus bringing about instability, would
most definitely impair the attainment of these objectives.
9.4	 Limitations of Study and Sueeestions for Further Research
Though a considerable amount of analysis has been conducted in this study,
no claim can be made that it has been exhaustive or even absolutely conclusive in its
results. One major limitation relates to the sample upon which the analysis has been
based. Out of the thirty three (33) commercial banks which existed as at end-1985,
our effective sample consisted twenty-two (22) commercial banks. Indeed, the
population is rather small and could have introduced bias into our analysis or at least
restricted the universality of conclusions of analysis based on them. In effect further
research would need to be conducted with almost all existing Nigerian commercial
banks consisting the sample. They are now about 125 in number, with about 65 being
commercial. Such analysis could also further assess the conclusions of this study post
deregulation. To make for a meaningful analyses, one needs to mention that there
is urgent need to improve on the data situation in the sector as well as on the ease
of accessibility. Comprehensive and consistent database needs to be maintained for
all operating banks, in particular, to aid improved monitoring and supervision, which
are becoming more important and vital with the significant growth and expansion of
the Nigerian banking industry.
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Further to this, to further reduce the limited applicability of our findings, as
a result of the relatively small sample size, as noted earlier the data can be pooled
over time to enhance the database and ultimately the efficiency of the results. The
results of such analyses can then be compared with our period-based results for any
possible semblance while observing the changes over the periods, which, in this case
seem to have been pronounced.
About 125 banks now operate in the industry and this represents a much more
acceptable size for the results of statistical analysis to improve in accuracy and
import. It will be necessary to conduct further analyses based on these banks which
obviously are not all performing or even resistant, inspite of the fact that the majority
are new.
The extent of analysis and the focus of this thesis does not provide adequate
room nor does it take on the responsibility of finding which of the identified models
is best for classifying Nigerian commerical banks into vulnerable and resistant
categories. In fact, the performance classification criteria make it fairly difficult to
decide on an adequate model. The criteria are thus far subjective and a meaningful
model which could be adopted by the monetary authorities can only be identified
objectively if and when an agreement has been reached on which criteria is
acceptable to the authorities above all others. In actual fact, further research could
be conducted based on a different set of criteria than those which have been adopted
in this study. We have employed the return on assets as the basis for classifying
banks into different classes. Other studies could assume different or modified
definitions, depending on the relevance for the chosen economy. Such studies as
would identify a model which could be applied in practice are necessary, in particular,
to help bank examiners and supervisors develop a queue of banks requiring
examination as was suggested in Pettway and Sinkey (1980).
In this study, we have concentrated on both financial and other factors, with
greater emphasis on financial ratios to the neglect of market factors such as stock
prices. Pettway and Sinkey (1980), and more recently Simmons and Cross (1991),
have shown that market information, in addition to financial ratios, are good
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indicators of the health status of banks. Given the nature and state of the capital
market in Nigeria, such a study will be of immense importance, even moreso when
the Nigerian capital merket is itself being deregulated.
Also, it has not been possible to consider the effect of bank competition on
bank performance in this study. With the unfolding developments going on now in
the banking industry such needs to be determined. Indeed, such a study can generate
more conclusive results as to whether the influx of new banks and the consequent
increase in competition would lead to bank failure or better still, affect the
performance of banks.
Our study has also excluded merchant banks. However, this class of banks
have grown in number, in size as well as in scope of activity, that they should also
begin to attract our attention. With 54 of the these banks out of a total of 125 banks,
we would benefit a great deal from a study of their performance characteristics and
how they differ from those observed for commercial banks, especially now that the
latter are being allowed into certain activity areas (such as leasing and performance
of issuing house functions), which hitherto were the exclusive preserve of merchant
banks.
Given the fact that the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) is of medium
to long-term nature, one can view the results and conclusions of this study as
preliminary. Consequently a more confirmatory research would be required to be
conducted as the significant effects of the SAP are being experienced as from the
medium term. The trend in performance of banks during the SAP period would
perhaps be much clearer then than it is now.
On the technical side, the study has shown that certain discriminant models
may be more appropriate than corresponding logit models inspite of the fact that
theory makes us believe that these techniques are interchangeable, being similar
techniques for a particular problem. More research is needed along this line to
further bring out the practical differences, advantages and disadvantages associated
with these techniques to aid researchers in selecting the more appropriate technique
for their use.
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Also, a critique of the stepwise, forward, and backward selection procedures
of both the MDA and logit analyses is that they do not take into account the
relationship between variables that have not yet been selected, with the possible
consequence that some important variables could be excluded in the process. This,
being a general limitation, further qualifies our conclusions just as it has for other
studies which have employed similar techniques.
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Dear
I seek your assistance for the completion of the attached questionnaire which I am using to
collect some of the data I need for my research leading to the award of the Ph.D degree of the
City University, London, United Kingdom. The study is entitled "Commercial Bank Peformance
in a Developing Country: A  Case Study of Nigeria".
As you would observe, the information required is pertinent to the title. The major area of
emphasis of the study is the identification and/or isolation of critical peiformance indicators
which can serve as track signals for identifying'problem' banks early enough in order to avoid
bank failures.
The perceptions and views of top bankers like you will help enrich this study. It is in the light
of this that I request your assistance in the completion of the questionnaire. Be assured that any
information supplied will as much as possible, be treated with the strictest confidentiality.
I thank you for your cooperation and hope that the study will be of use to the industry.
With wannest regards.
Sincerely yours,
FEMI A. Z. ADEKANY E
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Bank Capita/ Adequacy, Liquidity and Risk: 
A Study of Nigerian Commercial Banks. 
Questionnaire
A.	 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. Name of Establishment (Bank)
2. Address of Head Office:
3. Year of incorporation 19 -----
4(a) State the year your bank applied for Licence. 19
(b) Y ear bank licence granted 19 	
5. Year of commencement of banking business 19 	
6. Did your bank ever have foreign technical partners?
1. Y es	 2. No.
7. 1! yes, kindly indicate the ownership composition of your bank over
the years (Percent)
188 	 89
- 345 -
8.	 What kind of partnership arrangement existed between your Bank and the
technical partners. (Please indicate by encircling the right choice)
1. Management Structure/Assistance
2. Staff/PersonneVComposition
9.	 Kindly list your technical partners indicating their country of origin.
Name of Partner (s) Country
(i)
(iv)
10.	 Kindly indicate in each year whether management of your bank was predominanti
foreign or domestically controlled.
Use F: If predominantly foreign
D: If predominantly domestic
	 t  80	 81	 82 	 83	 84 t
I	
86	 87
Management Type	
85 
	 I. 	
B.	 BRANCH NETWORK AND EMPLOYMENT
11.	 Does your bank have any other branches apart from the head-office
branch?
1. Yes	 2. No.
.12.	 If yes, kindly give the total number of branches opened over the years
by locational composition.
80 87	 88
80 r 81
1
821
	
_U U5_
Management
Supervisors/
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Middle
Management
-17
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13.	 Kindly give the composition of your branches by location (rural and urban).
1
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19.	 Kindly give the composition of your staff strength by category over the years.
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16.	 In your opinion, which of the following factors are the major determinants of
Bank Performance. (Encircle your choice).
1. Capital Adequacy 7. Revenue Application
2. Asset Quality 8. Ownership
3. Managerial Performance 9. Regulation/Deregulation
(efficiency)
4. Loan Portfolio 10. Number and Distribution of branches
5. Liquidity 11. Violation of Regulatory guidelines
6. Revenue Sources 12. National economic variables.
17.	 Kindly rank the factors in Q. 16 in order of importance of these factors to bank
performance.
I.	 vii.
_
U.	 viii.
iii. ix.
iv. x.
V.	 xi.
vi.
18.	 Which of these factors do you believe are positively associated (correlated)
with bank failure?
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
19.	 Which of these factors do you believe to be negatively (associated) correlated
with bank failure?
i. V.
ii. vi.
iii. vii.
iv. viii.
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21.	 Which of the above factors
in signalling possible bank
(Q.16) would you adjudge the most important
failure?
1. 4.
2. 5.
3. 6.
22. Briefly give reasons for your choice in Q. 21
23. In your own opinion under what conditions/circumstances would you judge
a bank as running the risk of failing?
24. What methods would you adopt as a banker to forestall possible bank
failure?
25. Would you share the opinion that the CBN should help protect and
prevent bank failure?
1.	 Yes	 2.	 No.
26. Kindly state your reason(s) for your answer to Q.25
- 356 -
27.	 Kindly indicate whether the persistent violation of the following
CBN monetary policy guidelines would eventually lead to bank
failure?
1. Cash Ratio Yes / No
2. Liquidity Ratio Yes/ No
3. Capital Adequacy Yes / No
4. Sectoral Credit Allocation
Ratios Yes/No
28.	 Please, list some of CBN's guidelines that you believe are beneficial
to commercial bank performance.
(i)
29.	 Please, list some of CBN's guidelines that you believe are detrimental
to commercial bank performance.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
30. Do you support the view that the recent influx of new banks into the
industry may result in bank failures?
(1) Yes	 (2) No
31. Briefly, give some of your reasons for your answer in Q.30.
357.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION ON SAMPLE BANKS FOR 1985
Bank Code PBN 1)18 COB BC! NIB ACB SBN UBN NAB AFB
1. Total	 Loans 55.83 . 262.29 379.54 71.45 757.09 520.09 1492.98 184.93 512.47
Agric Loans 7.87 . 30.35 . . 170.2 16.46 71.9
Manufacturing
Loans
13.48 . 95 . . . . 203.05 78.19 179.02
Other loans 34.48 . 136.92 . . . . 1119.74 90.28 261.55
2. Total	 Operating
Expenses
8.42 . 38.73 81.98 4.65 101.71 30.18 334.58 11.88 66.3
Interest on Loans 3.2 . 0.05 56.82 6.29 2.46 . 124.76 12.77 43.52
Wages & Salaries 2.07 . 5.6 8.25 1.12 30.42 . 100.66 4.84 .
Other Expenses 6.35 . 33.08 16.91 . 28.45 . 109.16 7.05 .
3. Total Assets 153.95 . 419.11 1586.06 197.55 1265.69 897.74 4370.05 370.22 1803.5
Risk Assets" 108.32 . 287.78 1363.87 131.76 996.07 649.32 3997.07 259.77 856.69
Current Assets 145.87 . 131.33 222.19 65.79 406.08 450 4301.52 215.02 946.83
4. Total	 Deposit 113.67 . 354.3 1285.02 155.38 951.41 816.5 3380.45 350.85 823.02
Time Deposit 20.17 . 75.24 479.27 51.57 163.59 316.21 490.29 125.79 435.14
Current Deposit 74.78 . 96.17 787.29 21.43 363.86 185.16 1324.6 85.89 273.29
Savings Deposit 18.58 173.56 18.5 0.33 413.04 64.33 818.59 25.49 111.2
Other Deposit 0.16 . 9.38 0 82.05 10.91 250.81 746.97 113.76 3.4
5. Total	 Capital 7.5 . 10.96 20 10 12 17.53 54.43 10 27
6. Share-holders
Funds
7.64 . 25.11 72.64 9.95 12.5 39.39 206.88 19.37 111.69
7. Bad Debt Provision 0.08 . 2.2 5.53 0 114.75 81.06 183.21 4.11 59.67
8. Total	 Reserves 0.14 . 14.15 24.84 0 0.5 21.86 143.14 9.37 41.7
9. Total Operating
Income
11.07 . 40.72 135.27 12.13 101.54 111.72 415.74 37.32 146.39
Loan Income 4.65 . 32.86 61.44 5 70.91 70.09 195.67 17.15 43.52
Securities	 Income 3.69 . 3.62 56.27 . 3.64 31.88 162.61 5.82 50.8
Other Income 2.74 . 4.24 17.56 . 26.99 9.79 57.48 14.35 52.07
10 Government
Securities
Holding 7.76 . 46.13 465.41 54.01 20.5 45.36 1908.12 81.37 730.78
11 Other Borrowed
Funds
0 . 0 0 0 50.32 0 0 0 0
12 Cash Holding 4.55 . 14.5 12.35 1.29 35.06 10.48 41.79 6.53 20.23
13 Short-term Assets 13.53 . 131.33 33.13 53.22 218.81 453.58 331.18 187.72 934.58
14 Net Income 2.65 • 21.46 20.18 5.61 -0.17 4.92 290.97 4.26 40.84
15 Dividend 0 . 0.7 5.18 1 0 0 8.17 1 9.12

359.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION ON SAMPLE BANKS FOR 1986
Bank Code RN UTB COB BCI NIB ACB SBN UBN NAB AFB
1. Total	 Loans 86.9 98.93 281.35 413.04 111.23 873.39 659.92 1845.96 248.59 730.63
Agric Loans 12.96 7.69 48.14 . . . . 267.53 19.92 131.97
Manufacturing
Loans
21.86 44.43 129.45 . . . . 401.29 116.72 216.94
Other loans 52.09 46.81 103.76 . . . . 1177.13 111.95 381.72
2. Total Operating
Expenses
13.51 17.63 41.49 81.98 12.06 117.41 36.06 372.98 18.78 75.52
Interest on
Loans
. 4.11 0.04 56.82 9.89 2.53 . 134.59 17.51 62.68
Wages 6
Salaries
2.8 0.2 5.74 8.25 2.02 32.68 • 113.06 6.96 .
Other Expenses 10.71 0.69 35.71 16.91 . 82.21 . 125.34 11.82 .
3. Total Assets 220.59 174.01 446.05 1586.05 648.54 1427.12 1432.14 5298.55 457.01 2109.8
Risk Assets* 191.69 167.5 315.96 1363.87 217.37 1181.43 1008.72 3615.54 398.24 1349.1
Current Assets 211.73 70.86 130.09 222.19 431.19 403.3 412.03 5219.69 208.55 760.64
4. Total	 Deposit 158.22 156.69 375.99 1285.02 389.37 1027.89 1331.91 4000.25 409.05 787.61
Time Deposit 54.98 34.39 103.75 479.23 106.64 229.36 371.52 820.46 133.34 324.61
Current Deposit 67.56 17.09 108 787.29 52.41 329.82 218.89 1135.08 104.83 326.53
Savings Deposit 35.48 2.39 162.82 18.5 0.89 428.39 76.63 1034.56 35.16 136.48
Other Deposit 0 102.82 1.43 0 229.43 40.31 664.15 101015 135.72 0
5. Total	 Capital 7.5 2 10.96 30 10 12 28.92 54.43 10 35
6. Share-holders
Funds
10.17 4.58 27.12 92.11 19.49 12.5 41.54 299.72 23.94 134.44
7. Bad Debt
Provision
0.87 3.22 7.15 5.54 1.86 111.96 113.27 296.74 5.04 71.92
8. Total	 Reserves 2.67 0 16.16 35.84 9.49 0.5 12.62 190.76 13.94 64.43
9. Total Operating
Income
17.27 12.95 43.77 165.26 54.34 117.41 123.06 476.76 37.04 193.22
Loan Income 8.09 9.08 35.22 61.66 . 79.06 75.88 198.21 25.07 62.68
Securities
Income
4.75 0.17 3.63 84.66 • 5.32 34.77 160.96 9.95 59.69
Other Income 14.43 3.71 4.93 18.95 33.03 14.41 117.58 2.02 70.85
10 Government
Securities
Holding 5.93 0.28 41.13 716.71 102 20.5 20 1404.08 16.45 331.18
11 Other Borrowed
Funds
0 0 0 0 0 50.32 0 0 0 0
12 Cash Holding 7.49 2.39 14.5 15.65 2.64 57.1 7.46 46.39 11.21 21.59
13 Short-term
Assets
21.41 70.86 131.33 114.98 217.26 173.75 104.18 1636.61 192.03 744.33
14 Net Income 2.53 -4.67 21.46 26.83 30.28 0 0 342.18 5.57 62.31
15 Dividend 0 0 0.7 4.77 15 0 0 8.71 1 11.88
360.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION ON SAMPLE BANKS FOR 1986
Bank Code NBN PAB NNB HNB SGB UBA ABN GBN OBN WBN
1. Total	 Loans 563.14 241.07 287.34 98.65 558.13 1707.02 232.27 5.13 91.38 123.64
Agric Loans 99.37 . 58.62 7.42 56.37 222.28 . 1.54 . .
Manufacturing
Loans
191.83 . 100.57 31.39 • 556.94 . 3.12 . .
Other loans 271.95 . 128.15 59.83 . 927.81 . 0.47 .
2. Total Operating
Expenses
84.87 33.76 36.45 23.35 84.91 311.42 28.4 1.47 13.84 21.74
Interest on
Loans
1.19 . 17.23 14.82 57.01 182.89 . 0.41 11.66 10.89
Wages &
Salaries
28.69 . 19.22 6.61 12.67 79.48 . 0.36 • 6.86
Other Expenses 54.98 . 1.91 15.24 49.03 . 0.71 . 3.99
3. Total Assets 886.11 279.97 444.29 453.914 1136.63 4617.64 830 14.16 436.2
5
247.46
Risk Assets 776.87 262.48 263.73 272.77 1024.99 4057.74 420 5.13 138.3
5
154.18
Current Assets 48.92 265.73 433.24 352.81 1125.86 559.9 390 14.16 . 93.28
4. Total	 Deposit 721.37 200.98 367.82 228.35 694.65 3932.79 308.07 15.41 199.3
5
209.37
Time Deposit 163.8 75.65 124.58 114.18 509.36 1511.62 144.16 5.05 . 86.19
Current Deposit 313.55 70.08 134.55 40.33 134.56 1236.92 113.68 9.78 . 57.86
Savings Deposit 224.01 55.25 101.87 0.98 34.22 467.33 50.63 0.57 . 65.32
Other Deposit 0 0 6.82 0 16.5 716.92 0 0 0 0
5. Total	 Capital 21.67 11.31 11.75 8 28.9 75 10 3.22 7.5 6
6. Share-holders'
Funds
21.67 42.19 14.46 8.658 41.54 238.84 26.67 2.72 13.9 8.52
7. Bad Debt
Provision
81.72 94.09 3.6 0.71 113.27 281.18 7.02 0.07 2.1 .
8. Total	 Reserves 11.67 0.56 2.71 2.66 12.62 163.84 11.43 0 6.2 3.72
9. Total Operating
Income
88.02 10.22 40.22 29.11 123.06 441.98 72.57 1.35 34.4 24.3
Loan Income 60.64 6.93 36.22 26.61 75.89 153.94 52.17 0.53 16.9 13.37
Securities
Income
10.29 . . • 34.77 234.94 . 11.7 .
Other Income 17.48 3.3 3.99 1.49 14.41 53.09 2.04 0.82 5.8 .
10. Government
Securities
Holding 19.26 0 23.08 96.09 10.42 2194.14 86.72 0 42.8 10
11. Other Borrowed
Funds
10 0 0 0 0 0 410.21 0 197.5 0
12. Cash Holding 20.49 8.75 19.71 4.23 7.46 31.35 0 0.15 24.3 0
13. Short-term
Assets
88.46 265.73 19.94 273.23 104.17 528.55 47.48 10.9 273.6 93.28
14. Net Income 0 23.53 3.77 3.4 4.67 81.9 1.5 -0.12 6.8 -1.56
15. Dividend 0 0 0 1.5 0 9.7 0 0 2 0
361.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION ON SAMPLE BANKS FOR 1987
Bank Code PBS UTB COB BC! NIB ACB SBN UBN NAB AFB
1. Total	 Loans 111.367 91.97 312.7 457.86 110.17 982.28 738.71 1872.22 266.32 952.55
Agric Loans 22.01 15.25 50.47 . . . . 262.11 41.94 162.01
Manufacturing
Loans
27.12 37.1 146.75 . . . . 567.67 95.58 375.89
Other loans 62.24 39.61 115.48 .
.
. . 1048.44 128.8 414.56
2. Total Operating
Expenses
22.55 20.3 45.81 141.6 25.51 157.33 53.09 527.76 28.94 87.94
Interest on
Loans
. 11.58 0.15 96.74 38.1 1.25 . 238.12 29.18 103.58
Wages &
Salaries
4.35 0.31 6.02 14 . 39.03 • 143.65 9.12 .
Other Expenses 18.2 0.5 39.64 30.87 . 117.05 . 145.99 19.82 .
3. Total Assets 309.96 250.57 491.9 2420.19 1007.06 1608.03 1649.03 5747.58 602.09 2635.59
Risk Assets* 240.25 246.39 367.64 2304.34 451.02 1307.2 1086.9 3179.32 494.98 1380.11
Current Assets 301.46 155.92 124.26 115.85 556.04 452.64 400 5640.2 339.79 1254.63
4. Total	 Deposit 185.75 224.01 393.56 1546.37 698.32 1183.75 1522.98 4073.69 536.28 1477.7
Time Deposit 53.42 66.7 105.84 692.09 196.35 346.03 625.65 790.91 231.2 773.22
-
Current Deposit 63.26 29.68 77.83 854.27 116.56 369.43 233 1242.04 131.45 370.93
Savings Deposit 50.68 3.68 192.08 0 2.35 466.57 107.43 1074.58 48.15 182.99
Other Deposit 16.39 123.95 17.82 0 383.07 1.73 556.9 966.16 125.48 150.53
5. Total	 Capital 2.5 2 10.97 20 20 120.02 28.92 63.5 15 37
6. Share-holders
Funds
18.15 3 28.37 118.19 42.82 12.5 41.97 348.59 28.5 170.84
7. Bad Debt
Provision
1.97 6.39 -17.53 5.16 10.78 116.21 155.36 415.16 7.99 95.55
8. Total	 Reserves 5.65 0 17.41 50.81 22.82 0.5 11.32 223.24 13.5 85.84
9. Total Operating
Income
28.05 22.91 47.84 211.44 153.6 157.33 156.26 611.28 15.4 288
Loan Income 13.92 15.63 32.57 94.6 60.75 112.11 117.21 282.02 _	 42.89 103.58
Securities
Income
5.51 0.28 1.57 97.02 • 9.71 22.47 100.88 1.65 70.21
Other Income 8.62 7.01 13.7 19.82 . 35
'
51 16.58 228.4 13.88 114.21
10
•
	
--
Government
Securities
-
Holding 11.57 0.28 13.13 1022.25 237 0
.
0 1181.36 15.39 610.77
11
•
Other Borrowed
Funds
0 0 0 0 0 48.28
.
0 0 0
-
0
12 Cash Holding 6.64 1.27 17.16 10.98
.
3.14 66.46
.-
9.37 34.93 12.1 27.43
13
.
Short-term
Assets
29.46 155.92 124.26 104.87 289.26
-	
-
223.66 263.5 2084.29 305.27
-
1254.63
14 Net Income 3.48 2.61 21.18 36.66 89.26 0 0.435 373.15 6.56 87.94
15 Dividend 0 0 0 6.54 0
_
0 0 10.16 2 15.25
362.
FINCIAL INFORMATION ON SAMPLE BANKS FOR 1987.
Bank Code NBN PAB NNB HNB SGB UBA ABN GBN OBN WBN
1. Total	 Loans 656.39 253.67 353.75 98.74 553.64 2240.83 266.59 13.78 131.39 140.39
Agric Loans . . 63.68 68.47 83.05 325.85 . 7.82 . .
Manufacturing Loans . . 134.42 13.77 . 825.41 . 3.35 . .
Other loans
_., . 155.65 54.64 . 1089.57 . 2.61 .
2. Total Operating
Expenses
105.07 44.36 53.33 29.91 110.22 392.84 37.04 3.37 73.84 27.43
Interest on Loans 3.4 2.88 26.27 18.92 76.14 236.92 . 0.91 11.66 14.49
Wages & Salaries 31.15 . 27.06 9.02 14.98 91.93 0.7 . 7.81
Other Expenses 70.69 . 1.96 19.13 63.98 . 1.75 . 5.13
3. Total Assets 1041.52 406.26 553.46 643.19 1358.01 5656.71 940 1.71 436.25 365.54
Risk Assets* 839.16 183.88 353.14 279.85 1021.11 3791.5 562 13.78 138.35 324.24
Current Assets 53.49 392.3 531.72 467.35 1345.14 1865.21 412 1.71 . 141.3
4. Total	 Deposit 841.46 280.105 474.64 297.92 868.65 4766.73 477.41 4091 199.35 254.3
Time Deposit 255.51 113.77 155.55 696.59 574.56 1706.68 261.25 11.89 . 85.98
Current Deposit 325.27 103.58 151.25 86.91 218.65 1204.889 138.13 27.95 . 81.32
Savings Deposit 260.68 62.8 127.13 14.41 37.95 555.89 77.64 1.07 . 87
Other Deposit o 0 40.11 o 37.5 1299.26 o 0 0 0
5. Total	 Capital 21.76 3.18 11.77 10 28.92 75 15 5.44 9 15
6. Share-holders
Funds
21.76 3.18 14.46 13.54 41.97 266.18 32.7 5.44 17 29.69
7. Bad Debt Provision 99.01 101.02 3.85 0.41 155.36 394.12 7.2 0.29 3.7 .
8. Total	 Reserves 11.76 0.57 2.71 7.54 11.32 191.18 12.41 o 8 24.89
9. Total Operating
Income
108.49 50.46 57.36 44.27 156.26 569.17 92.9 4.19 46 32.51
Loan Income 70.84 29.21 55.02 39.16 117.21 194.41 61.79 2.52 32.3 16.42
Securities	 Income 7.85 8.89 . 22.47 234.79 . o 3 .
Other Income 37.65 12.36 2.34 2.73 16.58 139.97 31.11 1.67 10.7 .
10
.
Government
Securities
Holding 19.56 39.5 8.69 55.88 26.4 1243.14 157 o 29.7 19.2
11
.
Other Borrowed
Funds
5 41.35 o o o 0 380.33 0 179.5 o
12 Cash Holding 22.58 12.35 19.91 4.67 9.37 63.08 o 0.55 34.8 0
13 Short-term Assets 1797.9 394.57 46.57 358.68 263.5 1802.13 58.22 62.31 297.9 191.97
14 Net Income 0.94 3.87 4.04 7.89 0.44 105.89 2.25 0.82 8.8 5.08
15 Dividend 0 0 0 3 0 16.34 0 0 3 0
363.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION ON SAMPLE BANKS FOR 1988
Bank Code PBN UTB COB BCI NIB ACB SBN UBN NAB AFB
1. Total	 Loans 142.23 104.72 371.62 476.76 130.66 1124.66 804.35 2228.88 331.45 1051.51
Agric Loans 26.23 19.6 65.18 . . . . 329.87 55.09 196.91
Manufacturing
Loans
39.68 27.29 135.72 . . . . 793.48 124.77 432.34
Other loans 76.32 57.82 170.72 . . . . 1105.52 151.59 422.26
2. Total Operating
Expenses
42.93 29.02 73.11 201.4 119.24 211.11 77.82 661.4 36.75 149.67
Interest on Loans . 16.32 0.11 139.55 73.89 2.4 . 262.14 42.4 198.14
Wages & Salaries 6.35 2.12 6.37 17.37 10.02 45.57 . 172.74 13.29 .
Other Expenses 36.58 10.58 66.64 44.48 25.33 163.13 . 226.51 23.44 .
3. Total	 Assets 5509.76 287.89 705.04 2578.86 1368.6
4
2149.41 2082.41 6335.77 662.56 2213.5
Risk Assets" 394.72 243.54 468.26 1951.89 759.94 1747.1 1155.03 4274.68 549.63 1753.94
Current Assets 497.71 179.01 236.78 626.98 608.7 828.89 621 6204.92 359.19 959.56
4. Total	 Deposit 352.66 238.84 549.71 1901.83 753.21 1595.5 1913.15 4876.54 631.55 1661.31
Time Deposit 99.11 76.78 141.99 881.88 284.69 504.78 747.7 993.5 225.18 714.12
Current Deposit 141.89 57.86 95.59 1019.95 187.48 440.9 475.68 1399.13 171.61 526.41
Savings Deposit 83.5 6.06 252.01 . 4.23 608.71 165.36 1380.19 77.61 288.08
Other Deposit 27.56 98.14 60.11 0.39 0 41.11 524.39 1103.12 157.16 132.71
5. Total	 Capital 25 8.7 16.97 22 20 12 28.92 63.5 15 50
6. Share-holders
Funds
32.65 17.55 31.94 147.26 85.08 12.5 44 412.76 31 210.46
7. Bad Debt
Provision
16.29 11.14 5.73 9.27 -5.22 112.93 197.75 621.05 8.33 130.99
8. Total	 Reserves 7.68 1.61 14.97 71.08 65.08 0.5 11.95 327.03 16 125.45
9. Total Operating
Income
49.04 36.41 76.39 293.71 203.62 211.11 179.85 773.73 87.39 395.66
Loan Income 24.45 19.76 47.59 96.92 75.8 145.66 139.72 370.76 67.7 192.14
Securities Income 16.36 1.46 2.01 162.86 . 0.09 19.74 173.68 1.83 99.69
Other Income 8.23 15.19 26.79 33.93 . 65.39 20.39 229.3 17.83 103.83
10
.
Government
Securities
Holding 6.44 1.03 16.13 1329.39 599.45 0 0 1377.75 7.65 672.67
11
.
Other Borrowed
Funds
0 0 0 0 0 48.28 0 0 0 0
12 Cash Holding 6.82 2.78 8.63 23.01 9.396 50.3 11.36 42.15 8.94 29.56
13 Short-term Assets 108.23 179.01 236.78 144.19 215.88 500.68 113.11 2018.94 301.44 959.56
14 Net Income 3.67 5.18 29.8 44.94 77.25 0 2.03 511.59 4.5 90.89
15 Dividend 0 0 0 12.54 34.99 0 0 12.7 2 15.25
364.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION ON SAMPLE BANKS FOR 1988
Bank Code NBN PAB NNB HNB SGB UBA ABN GBN OBN WBN
1. Total	 Loans 841.22 294.32 490.79 162.16 766.57 2635.46 334.9 20.55 137.43 67.4
Agric Loans 146.14 . 83.44 25.21 . 416.14 . 11.66 . .
Manufacturing
Loans
294.39 . 181.59 39.05 . 902.73 . 4.99 . .
Other loans 400.69 . 225.77 99.5 . 1316.59 . 3.89 .
2. Total Operating
Expenses
144.06 56.53 89.46 47.88 132.69 485.75 45.3 12.63 25.96 49.54
Interest on Loans 3.61 5.27 47.83 31.55 90.07 271.39 . 5.23 23.99 41.44
Wages & Salaries 34.39 . 17.09 13.06 18.93 122.23 . 1.06 . 8.1
Other Expenses 106.06 . 24.54 3 . 27 23.69 92.13 . 6.34 .
3. Total Assets 1471.5 481.64 808.72 999.06
,	 ,
1285.42 7061.1 1072 53.74 550.8 638.41
Risk Assets* 1136.79 128.94 548.39 613.52 1160.95 4781.51 578 20.55 219.4 274.58
Current Assets 136.88 467.54 786.26 732.51 1272.67 2279.59 600 53.74 380.4 363.83
4. Total	 Deposit 1185.34 377.02 711.45 427.46 868.53 5872.88 753.94 102.58 324.25 453.9
Time Deposit 412.48 137.95 257.54 281.69 219.22 2645.2 375.05 54.82 178.34 155
Current Deposit 452.28 162.12 202.49 135.29 593.7 1461.83 241.86 45.68 32.43 143.8
Savings Deposit 320.59 76.95 182.29 10.49 52.61 724.79 137.03 2.09 113.48 155.1
Other Deposit 0 0 69.13 0 13 1041.06 0 0 0 0
5. Total	 Capital 21.76 11.37 11.75 10 28.92 75 20 7.57 10.5 20
6. Share-holders
Funds
21.76 62.88 29.82 25.08 44 328.47 41.46 7.57 20.6 49.43
7. Bad Debt
Provision
118.56 187.82 7.97 0.49 197.75 526.74 9.55 0.35 3.7 27
8. Total	 Reserves 11.76 0.56 18.08 19.07 11.95 253.47 16.11 0.53 11.1 35.57
9. Total Operating
Income
148.69 68.85 99.69 75.91 179.85 641.02 143.69 16.33 67.5 50.88
Loan	 Income 99.58 39.89 85.86 67.17 139.72 301.18 93.21 9.86 20.4 40.07
Securities	 Income 12.06 13.14 10.93 . 19.74 230.28 . . 29 .
Other Income 49.13 15.98 2.89 8.74 20.39 109.55 50.49 6.47 18.1 .
10 Government
Securities
Holding 17.3 0 8.44 36.97 0 1835.07 61 6 68.9 0
11 Other Borrowed
Funds
16.5 41.35 0 0 0 0 49.38 0 122.6 0
12 Cash Holding 52.49 15.98 20.74 5.65 11.36 44.73 0 2.56 39.5 0
13 Short-term Assets 467.68 465.66 132.89 342.92 113.11 2234.87 77.74 109.52 291.9 428.27
14 Net Income -205.49 66.07 51.86 14.54 2.03 83.99 3 3.69 13.8 25.91
15 Dividend 0 0 0 3 0 38 0 0 5 0
365.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION ON SAMPLE BANKS FOR 1989.
Bank Code PBN UTB COB [ICI NIB AC8 SBN LIFIN NAB AFB
1. Total	 Loans 152.69 118.89 312.14 388.17 139.51 962.7 899.07 2380.23 317.62 1157.57
Agric Loans 23.63 24.79 68.67 . . . . 333.23 44.31 234.77
Manufacturing
Loans
41.9 47.34 104.26 . . . . 952.09 127.27 463.52
Other loans 87.16 46.76 139.22 . . . . 1094.9 146.14 459.28
2. Total
Operating
Expenses
72.76 64.85 94.68 209.39 64.21 619.02 123.35 907.01 54.5 201.79
Interest on
Loans
. 40.38 6.28 104.84 47.16 2.49 . 379.6 45.96 263.73
Wages &
Salaries
10.04 7.38 8.53 27.84 16.37 55.66 . 244.51 17.14 .
Other Expenses 62.73 17.09 79.88 76.71 . 560.87 . 282.89 37.37 .
3. Total Assets 810.29 570.66 729.83 1757.99 810.08 1855.4 2049.8 7986.08 548.44 2505.36
Risk Assets* 29.57 559.05 517.01 1179.46 339.8 1463.63 1228.38 3813.88 402.15 1722.17
Current Assets 790.3 434.19 410.82 578.52 470.28 745.63 1015 7807.24 242.46 783.19
4. Total	 Deposit 533.13 489.41 702.84 1053.53 367.55 1549.12 1876.34 5782.83 551.52 1656.46
Time Deposit 76.56 56.71 143.58 339.17 17.55 287.73 626.87 1150.98 141.33 442.78
Current
Deposit
135.53 57.8 148.61 714.36 213.81 176.28 460.74 1788.7 146.25 595.26
Savings
Deposit
140.96 15.06 355.45 0 7.84 708.86 246.33 1774.73 108.06 412.17
Other Deposit 180.09 359.84 55.19 0.2 0 76.26 542.4 1068.43 155.89 206.25
5. Total	 Capital 25 20 20.39 179.61 20 23.99 28.92 63.1 20 58.34
6. Share-holders
Funds
37.05 25.9 -39.61 179.61 112.65 -273.62 47.46 533.91 32.91 276.65
7. Bad Debt
Provision
10.93 15.11 86.7 1.32 10.34 465.16 73.74 868.29 9 155.29
8. Total	 Reserves 12.05 5.9 -60.01 84.39 96.65 0.5 12.82 443.74 12.91 176.65
9. Total
Operating
Income
84.21 77.89 106.38 289.21 206.95 317.7 214.91 1059.42 105.35 481.4
Loan Income 21.05 33.86 68.99 97.68 80.05 171.88 160.95 475.44 69.79 263.73
Securities
Income
36.6 0.063 1.75 138.2 . 0.069 10.99 176.29 1.01 66.79
Other Income 26.57 43.97 35.65 53.33 . 145.75 42.97 407.69 34.54 150.88
10
.
Government
Securities
Holding 5.55 0.53 21.13 638.5 174.15 0 0 995.29 5.96 236.89
11
.
Other Borrowed
Funds
.
. . . 48.28 0 0 0 0
12 Cash Holding 10.65 9.9 16.1 23.74 6.45 46.43 10.16 49.19 9.29 57.11
13
.
Short-term
Assets
540.08 434.18 410.82 47.5 251.1 305.99 64.89 4122.93 209.64 783.19
14 Net Income 7.53 8.92 54.4 51.4 12.57 -298.12 3.46 679.82 2.91 122.57
15 Dividend 0 4 0 17.04 45 0 0 15.88 1 18.25

